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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the reproduction and transformation of Swiss national 
identity in the period from the late eighteenth century to the beginning of World War II. 
To this end, the major part of the thesis focuses on four relatively short time frames, all of 
which were characterised by heightened concern with questions of national identity: a) the 
period 1760-1798, which witnessed the rise of an early, elite-centred Swiss national 
movement, b) the civil war of 1847 and the subsequent founding of the modem Swiss 
nation-state in 1848, c) the late nineteenth century (1880-1900), when Swiss nationalism 
entered its mass phase, and d) the 1930s (1933-1939), when authoritarian volkish 
nationalism from Germany challenged Switzerland’s poly-ethnic conception of 
nationhood.
Two questions guide my analysis in the substantive part. First, to what extent can 
nationhood be invented or fabricated? And second, how are ‘civic’ and ‘organic’ 
conceptions of nationhood related to each other in this process of national reconstruction, 
and what causes shifts in the balance between the two?
A final part (part III) addresses these question by way of comparison. The first 
comparative chapter contrasts Switzerland with Germany, arguing that there was more 
scope for inventing nationhood in the German than in the Swiss case during the last third 
of the nineteenth century. I attribute this difference to the fact that in Switzerland a 
popular ethno-symbolic memory posed cultural constraints on the activities of national 
ideologues, unlike in Germany, where pre-modem national myths and symbols never 
developed a constraining capacity.
The second comparative chapter examines the role of landscape symbolism in the 
construction of national identity in Switzerland, the United States and Canada during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. I attribute the prominence of geographical 
determinism in the national discourse of these three societies to the divergence between 
the nationalist ideal of ethno-cultural homogeneity and their polyethnic composition.
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Introduction
When I first conveyed my interest in the topic of Swiss national identity to a friend 
whose own research bore some relation to mine, he understood my enthusiasm for the 
topic but did not share my conceptual concerns. I told him that I felt like Fernand 
Braudel who wrote, in the introduction of his The Identity o f France: ‘The word 
“identity” appealed to me, but has not ceased to torment me over the years.’1 At the 
root of my concern was this: while in everyday usage the word ‘identity’, and 
especially ‘national identity’, tended to be typically associated with continuity, with 
sameness over time, my own experience told me that what was most interesting about 
the phenomenon of ‘national identity’ was its process-like character.
In this connection, a number of questions sprang to mind. What provokes public 
struggles over the definition of nationhood? Why do changes in definitions of national 
identities occur? What are the driving forces behind such transformations: politics, 
culture, or international developments? What changes if definitions of nationhood 
change, and what remains constant, and why? What is the relationship between 
nationalism and national identity? Is the way in which national identities are publicly 
defined determined by nationalist doctrine? To what degree do antecedent cultural 
structures (comprising specific values and communal narratives) shape the 
reconstruction of national identities over time? These, I told my friend, were some of 
the questions I would like to address in my research. How, I asked him, was it possible 
to get to grips analytically with such an elusive social phenomenon? In an attempt to 
alleviate my concerns, my friend replied in a straightforward manner: ‘National identity 
is what’s there. What undergoes change is nationalism*.
My friend’s answer did not help me out of my conceptual quandary. As 
subsequent discussions with people whose opinion I greatly respect have made me 
aware, however, his was the majority view with regard to the issue of ‘national 
identity’. Even among social scientists, those who treat national identity as a stable and 
continuous phenomenon rather than a process are in the majority; not that the 
colleagues and teachers I consulted were not interested in social and cultural
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transformations. In fact, most of them were historical sociologists whose research 
centred, in one way or another, on the question of social change. What their reactions to 
my thorny questions seemed to indicate, however, was that I was dealing with a socio­
cultural phenomenon that lent itself more to detailed description than to sophisticated 
explanation. A glance at the two grand theories of nationalism, those of Ernest Gellner 
and Benedict Anderson, was not encouraging either. Both treat national identities as 
structurally determined: as a function of modem industrialisation (Gellner), or as 
tantamount to that new cognitive style -  nationalism -  brought upon us by the 
combined effect of religious decline and the rise of print capitalism (Anderson).
But can we take national identities for granted in this way? Is it really possible 
to regard them as givens, as the natural companions of the modem nation-state? I do 
not deny that structural conditions and state institutions partly explain why the nation 
persists as a cognitive and emotive category. What I increasingly felt, however, was 
that the reproduction of nationhood depends to a considerable degree on the active 
contribution of social actors. While there are numerous studies that describe and 
classify the features that constitute national identity in a particular empirical case, few 
of these works examine the mechanisms that determine how national identities are 
formed and change over time.2
These issues formed the point of departure to my present research. This 
dissertation examines the formation and transformation of Swiss nationhood in the 
period from the late eighteenth century to the beginning of World War II. My case 
study is Switzerland and my concern with the reconstruction of national identity in the 
face of a changing social context provides the guiding thread of my thesis. Specifically, 
this thesis addresses three questions:
• when does the nation become a subject of public debate, and what are the 
driving forces behind the reconstruction of nationhood?
• to what extent can nationhood be invented or constructed during periods 
of heightened concern about national identity?
• how are ‘civic’ and ‘organic’ conceptions of nationhood related to each other in 
this process of national reconstruction, and how do shifts in the balance between 
them occur?
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Switzerland, it seems to me, is a particularly interesting case for an examination of 
these questions. First, because Swiss nationalism does not fit easily with either of 
Europe’s ideal-type models of nation formation -  France, where nationalism radiated 
outwards from a powerful centre, and Germany, where princely particularism for 
centuries impeded a similar development. Consequently, neither a ‘top-down’ nor a 
‘bottom-up’ approach, if applied in isolation, is likely to produce good results in the 
Swiss case. Hence, Swiss nationhood was formed, as it were, from both ‘below’ and 
‘above’, as opposed to the English and French case, where nation-building occurred 
through cultural pervasion and bureaucratic incorporation by a powerful aristocratic 
elite.3 From the fifteenth century onwards, an ethno-symbolic memory, comprising a 
repertoire of myths, symbols, and narratives evolved in tandem with a set of 
Confederate institutions. This pre-existing memory simultaneously furnished and posed 
constraints on the ideological projects of the late-eighteenth century patriots and the 
nation-building elites that followed their example in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. This specific constellation renders Switzerland an ideal case for an 
examination of how modem nationhood is forged and reconstructed at the interface of 
popular historical memory and elite-driven projects of national invention.
The second factor that makes Switzerland an intriguing case for the sort of 
analysis to be conducted here concerns the polyethnic composition of the Swiss nation­
state. When modem nationalism began to spread across Europe from the turn of the 
eighteenth century (and particularly with the rise of ethno-linguistic nationalism from 
around the 1870s), Switzerland’s national elite faced a particularly challenging task. 
Unlike their counterparts in linguistically homogenous countries such as Germany, 
France or England, Swiss would-be nation-builders could not refer to shared ethnicity 
(in the sense of shared ethnic descent or linguistic affiliation) to bolster their claims.
Yet the national ideology they constructed out of this quandary was not purely 
‘political’ or ‘civic’. (Although the concept of civic exceptionalism, as will become 
evident in the substantive chapters of this thesis, has been part and parcel of the 
country’s national self-definition ever since the rise of an early Swiss nationalism in the 
late eighteenth century.) Rather, they responded to this challenge by constructing a
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Swiss national identity that combined civic and organic elements. More specifically, 
they claimed that the Swiss nation was both a voluntary and a natural community -  an 
exemplar of a Willensnation yet also a true Wesensgemeinschaft. Hence, rather than the 
absence of popular nationalism (as some commentators have claimed), it is the fact that 
Swiss claims to nationhood have had to be realised in a polyethnic environment that 
renders Switzerland distinct from most other cases.
These ideas are reinforced in the two chapters of the final part (part III) by way 
of systematic comparison. Contrasting Switzerland and Germany, the penultimate 
chapter highlights the impact of collective memory on modem nation formation. Using 
Canada and the United States as comparative examples, the final chapter examines the 
significance of geographical determinism for the construction of nationhood in 
polyethnic societies.
Method and plan
The basic method used in this study is what Ragin described as the ‘qualitative 
comparative method’.4 In concrete terms, I shall apply both a diachronic and a 
synchronic comparative strategy. The major part of the dissertation (part II) contains a 
diachronic comparison of different historical periods relevant to the reconstruction of 
Swiss nationhood between the late eighteenth century and the Second World War 
(chapters 3 to 6). Here the objective is to explore national identity as a process and 
account for its reproduction and transformation over time. The concluding part (part 
III) compares the Swiss case with Canada and Germany respectively. This cross- 
cultural comparison will allow me to discuss the general relevance of my arguments 
and findings and to develop new theoretical distinctions and historical types.
My analysis of Swiss national identity draws upon both primary and secondary 
documents. The former include newspapers, pamphlets, official reports and debates, 
sermons, speeches, histories, poems and folk songs, magazines and periodicals, records 
of ceremonies and national festivals, and minutes of national movements. Hence, for
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each of the periods considered, I examined a variety of sources that would reflect 
different social and political orientations and conceptions of nationhood. The major 
criterion for the selection of the sources was whether they could contribute to an 
explanation of national identity as a public phenomenon.
Let me emphasise at this point what this study is not. To begin with, it is not a 
general history of Switzerland, although historical events and developments play a vital 
part in the overall argument.5 Nor is it a representative account of Swiss national 
identity. I have severe doubts whether such an aim could be accomplished at all. 
Switzerland may be a small country, but the great diversity of its political culture 
precludes a reasonable answer to the question ‘what does Swiss national identity 
consist of?’6 In addition, the demand for a comprehensive picture of Swiss national 
identity is in itself predicated on the static notion of national identity that I have 
criticised in this chapter: national identity conceived in terms of a content or relatively 
stable state of mind, rather than as a process of reconstruction.
Nor do I pretend to have given equal weight to all the linguistic groups that 
constitute the Swiss population. The bulk of sources that I have considered for this 
study pertain to the German-speaking majority. (Nevertheless, attitudes of French- 
speaking Swiss will resurface prominently throughout the text, while the Italian­
speaking public has received less attention.) As much as I regret this, it poses no 
problem for my analysis because, with very few exceptions, Switzerland’s polyethnic 
structure was a cognitive norm that structured the thoughts of those who participated in 
the public discourse of national identity irrespective of their linguistic affiliation. This 
dissertation focuses on how different social actors redefined nationhood at particular 
historical junctures, and why they embraced some definitions rather than others; it does 
not aim to describe how nationhood was conceived in each and every comer of Swiss 
society. Accordingly, the analytical focus is on politics and culture, and how they 
interact in the reconstruction of national identity, while economic variables are given 
less systematic attention.
The period under consideration spans the time from the rise of Swiss 
nationalism in the late eighteenth century to when it reached its greatest intensity in the
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late 1930s. The decades after the Second World War have not been included in the 
systematic analysis because of my belief that during the post-war era Swiss nationhood 
underwent a sea change. Faced with economic globalisation and European integration, 
various sections of society have begun to express dissatisfaction with what is 
increasingly perceived as the country’s conservatism and its aloofness from what is 
happening in the rest of the world. Particularly since the 1970s, therefore, traditional 
features of Swiss national identity -  particularly its marked historicism and 
geographical determinism -  have come under fire. A further thesis would be required to 
investigate the causes of this transformation.7
The dissertation is in three parts and eight chapters. In the first chapter of Part I 
(chapter 1), the thesis is situated within the theoretical literature on nationalism and the 
argument, outlined in the introduction, is further elaborated. Chapter 2 traces the 
emergence, between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, of an ethno-symbolic 
memory composed of a repertoire of symbols, myths, and values.
Part II, comprising four chronological chapters (chapters 3 to 6), focuses on the 
reconstruction of Swiss nationhood in the period from the late eighteenth century to the 
beginning of the Second World War. Chapter 3 shows how the ethno-symbolic memory 
that had emerged by the eighteenth century shaped the discourse of the Helvetic 
patriots between the 1760s and the turn of the century, and how they subsequently 
fused its (‘civic’ and ‘organic’) components into a cohesive national narrative that 
would supply the basic building blocks for future national discourse. Chapters 4 to 6 
concentrate on three relatively short time frames, all of which were characterised by 
heightened concern with questions of national identity: a) the revolutionary 
transformations of 1798 and 1848, respectively, which were accompanied by fierce 
struggles over the definition of Swiss nationhood; b) the late nineteenth century (1880- 
1900), when a conjuncture of domestic and geopolitical developments led to a massive 
increase in nation-centred activity; and c) the 1930s (1933-1939), when authoritarian 
volkish nationalism from Germany challenged Switzerland’s polyethnic conception of 
nationhood.
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Part III addresses two problems by way of comparison. Chapter 7 looks at 
nation-formation in Switzerland and Germany in the nineteenth century to determine 
the impact of collective memory and historical events on the construction of nationhood 
in each case. I show that each of the two societies followed a distinct road to nation- 
formation: German nationhood can be understood as a product of nineteenth-century 
events, while Swiss nationhood was decisively shaped by antecedent symbolic 
structures. Chapter 8 examines the construction of national identity in Switzerland and 
Canada during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, highlighting how 
ideological entrepreneurs used landscape symbolism to foster an organic definition of 
nationhood. I attribute this to the divergence between the nationalist ideal of cultural 
homogeneity and the polyethnic composition of the two national-states in question. The 
conclusion summarises the results and considers, in the form of a suggestive postscript, 
the development of Swiss nationhood in the post-war period.
Notes
1 Braudel (1989: 23).
2 For recent historical studies that support this view, see Linda Colley’s (1992) study on the formation of 
British identity between 1707 and 1837, and Michael Kammen’s (1991) near encyclopaedic book on die 
United States.
3 On lateral and demotic ethnies, see Smith (1986: ch. 6).
4 Ragin (1987: x).
5 The best such work in the English language is Steinberg (1996). For a highly informative recent 
account of modem Swiss history, see also the chapters in Eine kleine Geschichte der Schweiz (Hettling 
et. al. 1998).
6 As Jonathan Steinberg (1996: 1) has put it in what is still the best general history of Switzerland in the 
English language: ‘The sheer variety of Swiss life ... makes it hard to write a coherent account of the 
place’.
7 There are remarkably few accounts of post-war Swiss identity. For an analysis of the anti-immigration 
movement of the 1960s and 1970s, see Romano (1999). The contributions in Imhof et. al. (1999) address 
various topics relevant to this issue. See also Zimmer (forthcoming).
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PARTI: 
THEORY AND HISTORY
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CHAPTER ONE
The Reconstruction of Swiss National Identity: 
A Framework for Analysis
The nation can have its BEING only at the price 
o f being forever in search o f itself
Fernand Braudel1
Although national identity has become fashionable as a term in both public and 
scholarly debate, little effort has gone into its development as an analytical concept. 
While identity theories have sprung up thick and fast, there is no theory of national 
identity. On the other hand, most existing theories of nationalism tend either to pay 
scant attention to the question of national identity, or else take it for granted as a social 
phenomenon. National identities, so a prevalent view has it, are the cultural by-products 
of modem nationalism. In a recent essay, anthropologist Richard Handler has even 
recommended that the term should be abandoned altogether because of its origins in 
nationalist discourse.3 Instead, I propose to develop national identity as an analytical 
tool that can help us to get a better grasp of the dynamics of modem nationhood.
Given my dissatisfaction with how existing theories of nationalism address the 
question of national identity, the main purpose of this chapter is to introduce and 
develop a framework and method that represents an alternative to existing approaches. I 
shall argue that national identity ought to be conceived of as a process that is shaped by 
both political and cultural factors, with special attention devoted to the interaction of 
domestic and international contexts. As far as the Swiss case is concerned, I consider 
the interaction of three sets of conditions to be of particular importance: competition 
between domestic political actors, inter-nationalist competition engendered by the 
search for international recognition as a nation-state (which is further reinforced by 
particular historical events), and symbolic resources.
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Furthermore, I shall call into question the usefulness of classifying nation-states 
by their adherence to a ‘civic’ or ‘ethnic’ conception of nationhood. Instead, I shall 
demonstrate that both civic and organic understandings of what constitutes nations 
furnish definitions of national identity to vaiying degrees, and that the balance may 
shift in one or the other direction depending on time and circumstance. This will lead to 
a revision of the classical model in favour of an approach that distinguishes between 
two boundary mechanisms (‘civic’ and ‘organic’) and four symbolic resources 
(political values/institutions; history; culture; geography). Yet before I develop my 
analytical framework along these lines, I shall present, in the form of a typological 
outline, some of the most prominent scholarly attempts at coming to terms with the 
idiosyncrasies of Swiss nationhood.
Explaining Swiss exceptionalism: variations on a theme
If Switzerland has repeatedly attracted the curiosity (but rarely the systematic attention) 
of nationalism scholars, this is indeed because its very existence flies in the face of 
nationalism’s core doctrine: namely, that nations are communities of shared culture, 
preferably in the form of a common language. Nationalism scholars, sometimes 
because they followed this doctrine, and more often because there was little empirical 
evidence that suggested otherwise, tended to agree that ethnic homogeneity -  although 
there are only very few ethnically ‘pure’ nation-states in the world, monolingual 
societies have usually claimed that they are ethnically homogenous -  was a significant 
factor for the long-term survival of modem nation-states. Thus Switzerland, according 
to this logic, constitutes an anomaly. The Swiss should never have become a ‘nation’ in 
the first place, bound together by an overarching ‘national identity’. If they did 
somehow manage to acquire one, then it should have dissolved long ago. But it hasn’t. 
Why? (Switzerland’s linguistic composition between 1888 and 1980 is reflected in Tab. 
1- 1.)
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Tab. 1-1: Swiss resident population according to linguistic affiliation (native tongue) 
in o/oo
German French Italian Rhaeto-
Romansch
Other
1888 714 218 53 13 2
1910 691 211 81 11 6
1920 709 213 61 11 6
1930 719 204 60 11 6
1941 726 207 52 11 4
1980 650 184 98 8 60
Source: a) Statistisches Jahrbuch, 1945, Tab. S. 41; b) Weibel (1986: 222).
Perhaps the most convincing attempt at solving this puzzle derives from those political 
scientists who have focused on a combination of systemic (consociationalism) and 
structural (cross-cutting cleavages) factors. Building on Lijphart’s theory of 
consociationalism, for example, McGarry and O’Leary discuss ‘cantonisation’ as a 
conflict-regulating device that has produced good results in Switzerland in particular: 
‘Under cantonisation the relevant multiethnic state is subjected to a micro-partition in 
which political power is devolved to (conceivably very small) political units, each of 
which enjoys mini-sovereignty.’4 The theory of cross-cutting cleavages, on the other 
hand, rather than focusing on the role of deliberately created political mechanisms, pays 
attention to the pattern of cultural division within a society. Its central premise is that 
where several cultural features (particularly religion and language) coincide the 
potential for conflict is enhanced. Hence, unlike, for instance, in Belgium, religious and 
linguistic boundaries in Switzerland are not coterminous. This, along with the small 
size of the country, facilitated the emergence of cross-cutting loyalties between Swiss 
elites of different linguistic and religious affiliation. This is indeed the mechanism that 
operated in all the major conflicts which immediately preceded the founding of the 
Swiss nation-state in 1848 (most notably, this applies to the Helvetic Revolution of 
1798, and the civil war of 1847).5 The combined effect of consociationalism and the 
cross-cutting of cultural cleavages, in tandem with the constitutional recognition of
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three (now four) languages, has helped to reduce the potential for ethnic conflict in 
Switzerland to the present day.
Another group of scholars has attributed the success of the Swiss model to 
effective social communication and collective learning. Karl W. Deutsch, the founder 
of this school of thought, has argued that the emergence of the Swiss nation-state can 
be best understood as a unique process of political integration in which several cultural 
groups participated over a period of several centuries. This process had produced a 
stock of common institutions, especially communalism, a popular army, and political 
neutrality. These gradually came to form the basis of an overarching Swiss national 
identity. What enhanced Switzerland’s capacity for political integration was its leading 
role in the modernisation process. By the turn of the nineteenth century, Deutsch 
argues, Switzerland had overtaken most other European countries in three crucial areas: 
the popular education of its citizens, economic innovation, and social communication 
(embodied in the high density of its newspapers).6
Unlike Deutsch, whose theory operates with an abstract concept of social 
communication, Benedict Anderson stresses the role of shared language for the rise of 
nationalism. Consequently, the Swiss example poses a considerable challenge to the 
validity of his argument that modem nations are essentially communities of shared 
language. In marked contrast to Deutsch, Anderson maintains that Switzerland’s 
relative economic and cultural backwardness made it a late-comer to nationalism, and 
that this enabled its survival as a nation in spite of its polyethnic composition. 
According to Anderson, then, Switzerland, with no nationalism worthy of the name 
before 1900, is ‘part of the “last wave’” , ‘not much older than Burmese or Indonesian 
nationalism’. This, for Anderson, explains why Switzerland could do without a single 
shared language. As he explains: ‘In other words, [Swiss nationalism] arose in that 
period of world history in which the nation was becoming an international norm and in 
which it was possible to ‘model’ nationness in a much more complex way than 
hitherto.’7
I find both accounts unconvincing. Deutsch’s explanation, it seems to me, tends 
to equate political with national integration: why should large-scale communication in
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itself produce an overarching national identity within a polyethnic polity? Anderson’s 
central argument, on the other hand, that modem nationalism came late to Switzerland 
(while it certainly serves the purpose of corroborating the core argument that nations 
are essentially language communities) does arguably not correspond with the historical 
facts: republican nationalism gathered momentum from the 1830s onwards, realising its 
aspirations in 1848 with the founding of the Swiss nation-state. If anything, the success 
of the republican movement in the first half of the nineteenth century helped to 
withstand the centrifugal forces that resulted from European ethnic nationalism. Thus I 
would argue precisely the opposite of Anderson: if no popular Swiss nationalism had 
emerged until the late nineteenth century -  the period, that is, in which ethno-linguistic 
nationalism was on the rise all over Europe -  the probability of Switzerland 
disintegrating would have been enhanced rather than reduced. If any historical period 
gave cause for concern to those European polities which, for structural reasons, were 
bound to construct nationhood along more complex (that is, non-linguistic) lines, it was 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.8
Finally, a fourth group of scholars, taking a more idealistic stance, has seen in 
the specific nature of Swiss nationalism the major reason why Switzerland managed to 
survive as a polyethnic nation-state. Swiss nationalism, they have maintained, has been 
political rather than ethnic in content and orientation. Hans Kohn has been the 
paradigmatic proponent of this view. In his essay, Nationalism and Liberty: the Swiss 
example (first published in 1955 in German), he treats Switzerland as an example of the 
‘Western’, liberal variety of nationalism. According to Kohn, then, Swiss national 
identity is similar in nature to that of England in its emphasis on liberal-democratic 
institutions rather than ethno-cultural features such as language or putative ethnic 
descent. Kohn emphasises that the Swiss constitution, as it came into being in 1848, 
constitutes a synthesis of American and French role models. Hence what Kohn and 
those who take a similar view are saying is that Switzerland is a voluntary nation, a 
Willensnation, and that this peculiar ideology, this particular brand of nationalism, 
explains both its formation and survival as a polyethnic nation-state.9 Although I do not 
deny the significance of the civic component for Swiss nationhood, I do not agree with
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Kohn’s observation. Ever since its inception in the late eighteenth century, two 
conceptions of nationhood furnished the formation and subsequent reconstruction of 
Swiss national identity: one ‘civic’, the other ‘organic’. For the reproduction of Swiss 
nationhood over time, both were of equal significance. I shall discuss the relevance of 
the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism to my own analysis further below.
Moving beyond Swiss exceptionalism: outline o f the argument
The conclusion that I draw from the foregoing assessment is this: if there ever was a 
puzzle to be solved about Switzerland’s existence, it has been solved decades ago. The 
theories of consociationalism and of cross-cutting cleavages have provided the most 
convincing answers to the question of why Switzerland succeeded as a multiethnic 
nation-state. McGarry and O’Leary, writing in the early 1990s, have merely fine-timed 
an argument that has been formulated previously by scholars such as Andre Siegfried 
and Arendt Lijphart. Karl W. Deutsch’s model accounts for political rather than national 
(and thus inevitably also ethno-cultural) integration, while Benedict Anderson’s view 
of Switzerland as a later-comer to nationalism does not stand up when confronted with 
historical evidence (see chapters 2 and 3 in particular).
Anderson’s account in particular suggests that more research needs to go into 
the genesis of Swiss nationalism, and in the way in which national identity was defined 
at different stages of Swiss history. Hence, rather than continuing the narrative of Swiss 
exceptionalism, this thesis takes a fresh look at Swiss nationhood, placing it in the 
context of recent theoretical developments in nationalism research. More specifically, it 
intends to contribute to two theoretical debates. The first concerns the relationship 
between ‘collective memory’ and ‘elite invention’ in the reproduction of national 
identity: between antecedent cultural patterns and elite-induced political activity. The 
second is the issue of civic and ethnic forms of nationhood and their impact on 
nationalism and nation formation. The outcome of this endeavour, I hope, will be 
mutual enrichment: first, a more differentiated understanding of how national identity is
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reconstructed at the interface of culture and politics; and, second, a new, theoretically 
informed account of Swiss national identity.10
On the substantive level, the focus of the thesis is on the formation and 
transformation of Swiss nationhood in the period from the late eighteenth century to the 
beginning of Second World War. The objective is to identify the driving forces behind 
the reconstruction of nationhood, and to examine the impact of a changing social 
context on the definition of national identity. While the major case study is 
Switzerland, with four relatively short time frames receiving particular attention, the 
two thematic chapters of the final part use Germany (chatper 7) and the United States 
and Canada (chapter 8) as comparative examples to explore specific questions.
Collective memory versus patriotic invention
When, how, and to what extent do cultural traditions influence social actors? These 
questions have received two distinct answers. For some scholars, ‘culture* -  whether in 
the form of shared codes, received values, or inherited ways of life -  is considered the 
major determinant of human affairs and the glue of any social order. In sharp contrast 
to this view, a second paradigm conceives of culture as a symbolic ‘toolkit’ from which 
social actors select particular elements depending on time and circumstance. For the 
proponents of the first viewpoint, then, ‘culture’ constitutes a structure that determines 
social actors, while those adhering to the second position tend to regard it as a 
superstructure, as the respective outcome, that is, of profound social transformations 
and/or a function of political power struggles. This basic analytical division has its 
concordance in the scholarly literature on nationalism and national identity, particularly 
when it comes to the question of the impact of the ‘national past’ on contemporary 
nation formation. To juxtapose the two positions that mark the endpoints on an 
analytical continuum, radical ‘perennialists’ maintain that the past determines the 
national present, while for instrumentalist and constructionist ‘modernists’ political
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interests, shaped by present circumstances, determine the course of nation formation 
and the construction of national identities.11
It is undoubtedly the second orientation (that which treats cultural traditions as 
epiphenomena of more fundamental social processes and/or functions of political 
power struggles) which has been more influential in the field at large. It is at the heart, 
for instance, of Hobsbawm’s concept of the ‘invention of tradition’. While conceding 
that popular national symbolism ‘enters into the making of nations’, Hobsbawm 
emphasises the pivotal role of nationalist elites not only in mobilising social and 
political resources, but also in determining the way in which nationhood is publicly 
defined.12 Through the selection of specific national symbols and traditions, Hobsbawm 
argues, particularly state elites and their associated personnel try to influence the 
definition of nationhood.
The picture Hobsbawm is painting of nationalist activity, epitomised in his 
concept of ‘invented traditions’, is based on three inter-related, although logically 
distinct, assumptions. These are: instrumentalism, creationism, and diffusionism. The 
instrumentalism assumption refers to the question of why ‘the nation’ becomes a topic 
of public debate at particular points in time. According to Hobsbawm, this is because 
the politics of national identity serves state-elites and other political power holders as a 
means of legitimating their interests. In other words, references to the ‘national past’ 
serve as strategic handmaidens of contemporary needs. The creationism assumption 
relates to the question of what shapes the constructions of national ideologues. It entails 
the view that traditions are malleable, and that, therefore, elites face relatively few 
cultural constraints as they go about the business of defining national identity. The 
diffusionism assumption refers to the question of how particular conceptions of national 
identity disseminate among the wider public. Here Hobsbawm argues that particular 
definitions of nationhood diffuse, relatively unhindered, from their elite-producers 
downwards to the populace at large.
Thus for Hobsbawm, national symbols are little more than political devices 
invented for political reasons. Specifically, the concept of the nation serves to shore up 
the authority of certain power elites keen to secure legitimacy for themselves in the face
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of rapid social and economic change with its uprooting effects on large sections of the 
public. Although Hobsbawm concedes that the ‘most successful examples of 
manipulation are those which exploit practices which clearly meet a fe lt... need among 
particular bodies of people’,13 this does not lead him to move beyond his elite-centred 
political functionalism. As he accounts for the salience of ‘invented traditions’ in 
modem societies:
[Invented traditions] ... are highly relevant to that comparatively recent 
historical innovation, the ‘nation’, with its associated phenomena: nationalism, 
the nation-state, national symbols, histories and the rest. All these rest on 
exercises in social engineering which are often deliberate and always 
innovative, if only because historical novelty implies innovation.14
According to Hobsbawm, therefore, it was particularly from the late nineteenth century 
onwards that the enthusiasm for invented traditions became a conspicuous feature of 
European nationalism. Embodied in public rituals and national ceremonies, these 
inventions are to Hobsbawm a project in symbolic politics initiated by particular 
power-holders. As he comments on the proliferation of national mass ritual in Europe 
between 1870 and 1914: ‘After the 1870s, therefore, and almost certainly in connection 
with the emergence of mass politics, mlers and middle-class observers rediscovered the 
importance of “irrational” elements in the maintenance of the social fabric and the 
social order.’15
It is plainly evident that the impetus behind Hobsbawm’s significant 
contribution was an effort to debunk many of the essentialisms that nationalists have 
promoted over decades and centuries: e.g., that nations are natural and immemorial 
communities rooted in a continuous past, and they reflect the ‘inner self of their 
constituent communities. Following Hobsbawm’s lead, many scholars have begun to 
stress the political nature of nationalism and the invented character of national 
identity.16 This is no doubt an important undertaking, given the extent to which the 
nationalist rhetoric and mythology has acquired the status of a taken-for-granted reality 
almost everywhere in the world. No less problematic than taking nationalism at face
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value, however, is the opposite tendency of confusing the analysis of how people 
construct nationhood with an exercise in the revelation of false consciousness.
If Hobsbawm has stressed the political and invented nature of nationhood, 
Anthony D. Smith has directed his attention to the cultural dimension of modem 
nationalism and its embeddedness in the historical longue duree. In a systematic 
critique of the modernist standpoint embraced by Gellner, Anderson and Hobsbawm, 
Smith has developed what he designates an ethno-symbolic approach to nation 
formation. In a series of contributions, he has argued that nationalism (and modem 
national identities) has stronger roots in pre-modem ethnicity than the modernists are 
ready to admit. In particular, he has emphasised the role of ethnies and ethno-histories 
in the formation of nationalism and modem national identities. The former he defines 
as ‘named human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, 
having an association with a specific territory, and a sense of solidarity’.17 Smith 
distinguishes sharply between ethnies, which have their origins in the pre-modem 
period, and nations, which he defines as modem political communities. What 
distinguishes nations from ethnies is that they are based on a ‘mass, public culture, a 
common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members’.18
For Smith, the significance of pre-modem ethnic groups lies in their being the 
bearers and producers of myth-symbol complexes or ethno-histories, composed of 
particular symbols, myths, and historical memories. Through institutions such as the 
Christian church, kingdoms with their lateral ethnies, communal treaties, cults and 
customs, these myth-symbol complexes are preserved and transmitted over centuries. In 
the form of ethno-histories, they have often provided the cultural resources from which 
national ideologues have constructed and reconstructed national identities from the 
eighteenth century onwards. While Smith does not accept the primordialist view that 
ethno-histories rigidly determine the definition of modem national identities, he 
nonetheless maintains that they delimit the scope for the kind of elite-driven national 
invention which for Hobsbawm is the hallmark of nationalism. As he puts it:
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Nationalists have a vital role to play in the construction of nations, not as 
culinary artists or social engineers, but as political archeologists rediscovering 
and reinterpreting the communal past in order to regenerate the community.
Their task is indeed selective -  they forget as well as remember the past -  but to 
succeed in their task they must meet certain criteria. Their interpretations must 
be consonant not only with the ideological demands of nationalism, but also 
with the scientific evidence, popular resonance and patterning of particular 
ethno-histories.19
National identity as politics and culture
The foregoing review has concentrated on the works of Hobsbawm and Smith because 
they have developed the kind of ‘middle-range’ theory that is pertinent to the type of 
study to be conducted in this thesis, and because they provide insights into how 
nationhood is reconstructed over time by social actors. This cannot be said of the two 
‘grand theories’ of nationalism, those of Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson, which 
largely focus on how ‘the nation’ and nationalism came about rather than on how
onnationhood is reproduced as a symbolic order. So far, however, remarkably little 
substantive and theoretical effort has gone into studying nationhood as a phenomenon 
that is ultimately determined at the intersection of culture and politics rather than by 
either one factor.21 In my own approach, I therefore try to combine Hobsbawm’s view 
of nationalism as political activity with Smith’s emphasis on the cultural, ethno- 
symbolic dimension of nationhood. The result is a fusion of two assumptions: that 
social actors play a crucial role in the recurrent reconstruction and reformulation of 
nationhood over time; and that cultural antecedents -  if they form part of a collective 
memory -  delimit the scope for inventing national identities by shaping the definitions. 
(I accept the view they share with Anderson and Gellner, namely that nations and 
nationalism are modem phenomena, directly related to the process of increased 
functional differentiation unleashed in the wake of the social and economic revolutions 
of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. As such, they are quite distinct
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from the related phenomena of ethnic groups and ethnicity, which have been known 
since antiquity.) What matters here is not so much ‘historical truth* but ‘popular 
resonance*. As Calhoun has put it: ‘Ethnicity or cultural traditions are bases for 
nationalism when they effectively constitute historical memory, when they inculcate it 
as habitus ... not when (or because) the historical origins of the claims are accurate.’22
Such efforts to reconstruct nationhood are both path-dependent and contingent. 
They are contingent in that they present symbolic ‘responses’ to specific conditions and 
events, which can be both domestic and international in nature. Yet at the same time, 
such projects of national reconstruction are path-dependent. That is to say, their mostly 
intellectual protagonists are bound to draw, to some degree at least, upon existing 
cultural resources (consisting of certain cultural idioms, symbols, values, and myths) 
that are deeply entrenched in a given society. The impact of such cultural resources on 
the process of national reconstruction is conditioning rather than determining. By 
furnishing the cognitive and expressive frameworks for those involved in the project of 
national reconstruction, these resources reduce the likelihood of pure invention.23 To 
state my argument by mixing metaphors from Hobsbawm and Marx: people do invent 
traditions, but not in circumstances of their own choosing.24
‘Strategic’ thinking may play its part when political elites use familiar symbols 
to buttress their projects. As Kertzer puts it: ‘Every culture has its own store of 
powerful symbols, and it is generally in the interest of new political forces to claim 
those symbols as their own.’ Yet regardless of whether strategic conduct is involved, 
and irrespective of whether actors are aware of their impact, symbolic antecedents 
shape the reconstruction of nationhood at any particular point in time. Archer thus 
attributes culture’s conditioning influence on social actors above all to the temporal 
embeddedness of all social processes: ‘Because of the pre-existence of those structures 
which shape the situations in which we find ourselves, they impinge upon us without 
our compliance, consent or complicity.’26 The idea can be figuratively presented by 
referring to Archer’s morphogenetic cycle (see Fig. 1-1).
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Fig. 1-1: The reconstruction of nationhood in morphogenetic terms
T1 CULTURAL CONDITIONING
T2 SOCIO-CULTURAL INTERACTION T3
T4 CULTURAL ELABORATION
The core concepts: ethno-symbolic memory, nationalism, national identity
Three concepts are central to this examination. The first is ethno-symbolic memory. 
Composed of a repertoire of myths, symbols, narratives and values, such an ethno- 
symbolic memory crystallised within the Swiss Confederation between the fifteenth 
and seventeenth centuries (chapter 2). As will become evident in subsequent chapters, 
this ethno symbolic memory supplied the cultural resources upon which social actors 
drew as they re-defined Swiss nationhood at particular historical junctures.271 will 
argue that ethno-symbolic memory can influence elite constructions of nationhood in 
either one of two ways: (a) as a constitutive factor, and (b) as a constraining factor. In 
its constitutive mode, collective memory forms a more or less self-evident part of social 
actors cultural frameworks. In its constraining mode, on the other hand, collective 
memory becomes relevant to elites’ concerns because of its apparent salience among 
the wider public.28 The extent to which collective memory can put constraints on 
ideological entrepreneurs varies from case to case. This is the theme of the comparison 
between Switzerland and Germany in chapter 7.
The term national identity, by contrast, is meant to refer to the process whereby 
nationhood is reproduced at the interface of culture and politics. Hence, as employed
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here, both national identity and ethno-symbolic memory are distinct in meaning from 
the terms nationalism or nationalist ideology. These latter terms are reserved for the 
nation-centred ‘idea systems used by identifiable political actors’ or actor groups.30
The conceptual distinction between ethno-symbolic memory and 
nationalism/nationalist ideology has the purpose of analytically separating ‘culture’ 
(which pertains to the paradigmatic level) from socio-political action (which relates to 
the syntagmatic level). The idea behind this analytical distinction is similar to what 
Skocpol had in mind when she distinguished between ‘ideology’ and ‘cultural idioms’. 
As she explains: ‘Cultural idioms have a longer-term, more anonymous, and less 
partisan existence than ideologies. When political actors construct ideological 
arguments for particular action-related purposes, they invariably use or take account of 
available cultural idioms, and those idioms may structure their arguments in partially 
unintended ways.’31 (The three concepts are summarised in Tab. 1-2).
Consequently, the conception of national identity proposed here differs from 
most other definitions in two important respects. First, ‘national identity’ is defined as a 
process of reconstruction rather than in terms of certain properties, attitudes and 
perceptions.32 Second, ‘national identity’ is equated neither with continuity of meaning 
nor with any kind of societal consensus. While the persistent empirical relevance of 
certain cultural resources -  indigenous folk traditions, myths, symbols, narratives and 
beliefs -  may indicate certain continuities of focus and even of interpretation, as an 
analytical a priori, the association of identity with continuity is problematic. The same 
goes for the equation of national identity with a consensus of interpretation. Much of 
the power and appeal of national symbols, myths and rituals lies precisely in the fact 
they enable the members of a community to build political solidarity in the absence of a
'X'Xconsensus. As defined here, therefore, national identity represents the respective 
outcome of a contentious process in which different individuals and groups participate 
and which is shaped by ethno-symbolic memory and nationalist activity.34
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Tab. 1-2: Concepts and analytical levels: ethno-symbolic memory, national ideology, 
national identity
Concept Meaning Analytical Level
Ethno-Symbolic Memory Myths, Symbols, Narratives 
and Values (constitutive and 
potentially constraining)
Paradigmatic Level: 
Cultural Svstem
Nationalism / Nationalist 
Ideology
Political actors that construct 
ideologies for particular 
purposes
Syntagmatic Level: 
Social Action
National Identity The process whereby 
nationhood is reconstructed
Interaction of the Paradigmatic 
and the Syntagmatic: 
Socio-Cultural Interaction and 
Cultural Elaboration
Identity politics: when nations become topics
Not only does national identity represent a process rather than a fixed state of mind, 
but, contrary to what the classical nationalist doctrine may profess, ‘the nation’ is also 
but one potential object of loyalty and collective identification; and as such, it has to 
compete with other potential foci of allegiance in the public realm. These include 
gender, region, religion, class, political affiliation, occupation or lifestyle. Many of 
these categories are immediately relevant to peoples’ everyday lives, and for much of 
the time, they may play a more salient role than the nation.35 This does not mean that 
nationhood is either ‘there’ or ‘absent’: identities are not, in Gillis’ words, ‘something 
that can be lost as well as found’.36 What it suggests, however, is that modem nations 
go through ‘settled’ and ‘unsettled* periods. During settled periods the values, symbols 
and myths that make up the nation as a socio-cultural category are more or less taken 
for granted so that they form, as it were, a cultural tradition or common sense. During
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unsettled historical phases, on the other hand, national identity is called into question. It 
is during such periods that we witness the formation of competitive public struggles 
over the definition of nationhood.37 The chapters of part II focus on how national 
identity was reconstructed during such periods.
What causes such struggles to emerge in the first place? We have already 
noticed that in the theories of Gellner or Anderson, this question does not really arise. 
The same is true of the state-centred accounts, especially those of Anthony Giddens, 
Michael Mann, and Charles Tilly.38 Their underlying logic is straightforwardly 
diffusionist: state-elites (besides streamlining their bureaucratic regimes and 
consolidating their territorial authority) produce and propagate national ideologies; 
nationhood becomes of public concern when these elites intensify the production of 
such ideologies for particular reasons. A more instrumentalist version of this argument 
underpins Hobsbawm’s empirical observation concerning the proliferation of national 
ritual in late-nineteenth-century Europe.39
Approaches that conceive of nationalism largely in terms of an intra-national 
dynamic harmonise nicely with instrumentalist notions of nation-formation as elite- 
induced ideological projects designed to legitimate state authority. There can be little 
doubt that power elites have a vested interest in shoring up their authority through 
staging national mass celebrations; and Hobsbawm’s observation that the proliferation 
of public national ritual in Europe coincided with the expansion of democratic rights is 
therefore a perceptive one. The ‘nation’, which constitutes a symbolic order, lends 
meaning and legitimacy to the political order that is commonly referred to as the ‘state’, 
which is rooted in a set of legal, political and economic institutions.
Nevertheless, a top-down approach to nation-formation, with its inherent bias in 
favour of domestic factors, leads to a highly reductionist picture. Not only do appeals to 
nationhood only make logical sense in an international context, but to a far greater 
extent than any other ideological movement, nationalism established itself as an 
international force from the outset. The classical nationalist claims -  that the world is 
divided into nations, that the nation is the source of all political and social power, that 
nations and their members possess a distinct character and identity, and that loyalty to
35
the nation overrides all other allegiances40 -  came to provide an international norm 
from the early nineteenth century onwards.
Once nationalism had established itself as the dominant political force in 
nineteenth-century Europe, then, it was bound to stir up competition among different 
conceptions of nationality and to serve as a major catalyst of national self-assertion. 
Whether or not a claim to nationhood received international recognition depended in 
large measure on the ability of the claimant to show that their nation was authentic and 
distinct. Hence, the European-wide discourse of national identity reveals that 
declarations of cultural difference and demands to be recognised as a nation among 
nations were but two sides of the same coin. In other words, the driving force behind 
this new and increasingly conspicuous kind of ‘identity politics’ was inter-nationalist 
competition between existing and emerging nation-states rather than domestic 
struggles 41 In Europe, the impact of inter-nationalist competition on the reconstruction 
of nationhood became marked in the second half of the nineteenth century.
To be sure, the domestic dimension was important too. The state and its 
officials, furnished by intellectuals and the professional intelligentsia, tended to be the 
first to respond to the challenge of inter-nationalist competition. Locked in the 
relentless dynamics of inter-nationalist competition, these strata employed a variety of 
means and resources to forge national identity and thus to secure international 
recognition. The most frequently employed strategies included official speeches on the 
state of the nation, the staging of public festivals and commemorations, the passing of 
new legislation to promote national art and exhibitions, and the provision of extra funds 
to promote the scholarly study of the national past. But if the nation became a topic of 
public debate during such periods, this was by no means merely the result of state- 
induced nationalism. Intermediate social groups -  especially private associations and 
political parties -  played a major part in this overall endeavour. If the nation recurrently 
became a public topic, then it was often due to the combined weight of intra- and inter­
nationalist competition. The interaction of inter-nationalist and domestic ideological 
competition and how it fuelled and shaped the reconstruction of Swiss nationhood will 
be examined in chapters 5 and 6.
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Civic and organic nationhood
I have now developed a general framework for the examination of national identity. 
What is needed in addition is a set of analytical tools adequate to deal with the 
following question: how was national identity defined, and what prompted changes in 
definitions of nationhood? The second theoretical discussion pertinent to this thesis 
therefore concerns the role of ‘civic* and ‘organic’ conceptions of nationhood. As my 
examination in the substantive chapters will show, both civic and organic elements 
entered into the fabric of Swiss national identity. The question can thus be reformulated 
as follows: how were ‘civic’ and ‘organic’ conceptions of nationhood related to each 
other in national discourse during different phases of Swiss history, and how did shifts 
in the balance between the two occur?
The intellectual origins of this distinction hark back to the turn of the twentieth 
century. The eminent German historian of the first half of the twentieth century, 
Friedrich Meinecke, in his seminal Weltbiirgertum und Nationalstaat (first published in 
German in 1907), a study of the intellectual genesis of the German national state, may 
be regarded as the first scholar to have applied this conception to an empirical case.
A*}Meinecke distinguished between a Kultumation and a Staatsnation. Writing at the 
end of World War II, Hans Kohn, in his equally influential The Idea o f Nationalism 
separated a ‘Western’, political type of nationalism from an ‘Eastern’, organic variety.43 
The ‘civic’-versus-‘ethnic’ bipolarity has retained its important analytical role in more 
recent studies of nationalism. Among the authors to have used it systematically and 
thus contributed to its further refinement over the last decade, the works of Anthony D. 
Smith, Rogers Brubaker, Liah Greenfeld, and Michael Ignatieff spring to mind.44
To be sure, each of these authors has different terminological preferences: 
Renan, while he has not coined his own shorthand terms, distinguishes between a 
voluntary and a determinist type of nationality. Meinecke, as indicated, uses the terms 
‘Kultumation’ and ‘Staatsnation’ to separate a state-centred from a culture-centred 
conception of nationhood. Kohn employs the concepts of an ‘Western’ and an ‘Eastern’ 
type of nationhood, while Brubaker contrasts a ‘state-centred and assimilationist’ with
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an ‘ethno-cultural and differentialist’ conception of nationality. Finally, Smith, 
Greenfeld and IgnatiefFuse the terms ‘civic* and ‘ethnic’ to separate different types of 
nationalism. Greenfeld has proposed to further subdivide civic nationalism into an 
‘individualistic-libertarian’ and a ‘collectivistic-authoritarian’ variety. Up to a point, 
these different terms stand for a slightly different conceptual emphasis. It cannot be my 
task here to trace these differences in every detail.
Whatever the terminological and substantive differences separating these 
authors, three dichotomies tend to inform their conceptualisation of the civic-ethnic 
distinction.
Political voluntarism versus ethnic organicism. The first dichotomy separates 
two orientations that could be termed ‘political voluntarism’ and ‘ethnic organicism’ 
respectively. While the civic or political conception of nationhood is voluntarism, 
putting human will above naturalistic criteria, its ethnic counterpart conceives of the 
nation as determined by historical or ethno-cultural traditions. These traditions, so the 
assumption runs, have a life of their own and influence human actors irrespective of 
their being aware of it. This notion is present in all works discussed above that make 
use of the concept, sometimes under the heading of ‘cosmopolitianism versus 
particularism*, but it is perhaps captured most evocatively by Ernest Renan: ‘Man is the 
slave neither of his race, his language, nor his religion; neither of the courses of the 
rivers, nor the mountain ranges. One great aggregate of men, of sound spirit and warm 
heart, creates a moral conscience that is called a nation.’45
State-centredness versus culture-centredness. The second dichotomy is between 
a state-centred and a culture-centred conception of nationhood. The civic nation, so the 
argument goes, is primarily a political reality. Here the nation is seen as rooted in the 
institutional framework that constitutes the modem state. It is the state and its 
institutions, in other words, that ultimately constitute the nation. The legitimacy of 
ethnic nationhood, by contrast, rests on the claim to a shared culture in the broadest 
sense of the word, embodied in a common language, religion, shared historical 
experiences, or genealogical descent. The civic conception of nationhood, we are told, 
is likely to emerge where the state developed prior to or coincided with the emergence
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of nationalism, as was the case in England, France, the Netherlands and the United 
States. An ethnic conception of nationhood, by contrast, is more likely to be found 
where the realisation of a unitary state was protracted and contentious, as was the case 
in Germany and many countries in Eastern Europe. In Kohn’s words: ‘Nationalism in 
the West was based upon a nationality which was the product of social and political 
factors; nationalism in Germany did not find its justification in a rational societal 
conception, it found it in the ‘natural’ fact of a community, held together... by 
traditional ties of kinship and status.’46
Modernism versus pre-modernism. The third and final dichotomy refers to the 
temporal dimension and distinguishes a modernist conception from one that emphasizes 
the role of the pre-modem past in the evolution of nations. From this viewpoint, civic 
nationhood is not only voluntaristic but also essentially modernist. Civic nationalists 
searching for national founding moments illustrates this. While they too show a keen 
interest in determining national origins, they tend to go back no further than the late 
eighteenth century. They show a marked preference for revolutionary turning points -  
1776,1789,1798, or 1848 -  when the ‘sovereign people’ became an autonomous actor 
and when politics became a public affair. This is different in the case of the proponents 
of the ethnic conception of nationhood, who conceive of the nation as an organism that 
develops slowly and more or less continually in the course of history’s evolution. This 
temporal break marks the shift from an organic to a voluntarist or, to use Meinecke’s 
words, from a ‘vegetative and dormant’ period of national life to a period when the 
people ‘express themselves in great united actions and manifestations of will’.47
I believe that the civic-ethnic dualism has proved useful in two cases: as a broad 
scheme of classification; and in institutional analyses of nation-building of the kind that 
Roger Brubaker has pursued in his comparison between France and Germany. In other 
words, if the focus is, as in Brubaker’s study, on how particular understandings of 
nationhood -  civic-political in the case of France, ethno-cultural in the case of Germany 
-  shaped citizenship legislation, the model works well. Hence Brubaker is able to show 
that the French citizenship law of 1889 was informed by a civic understanding of
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nationhood, while the German Reichs- und Staatsangehdrigkeitsgesetz of 1913 was 
based on an ethnic conception of the nation.48
Civic and organic boundary mechanisms
However, a more nuanced framework is needed if we are to examine how national 
identities are publicly re-defined and re-constructed at particular historical junctures. 
As an alternative to the classical model, I propose to distinguish between two levels 
which are not kept separate in either of the classical formulations of the civic-ethnic 
distinction. We need to distinguish, on the one hand, between the mechanisms which 
social actors use as they reconstruct the boundaries of national identity at a particular 
point in time; and, on the other hand, the symbolic resources upon which they draw 
when they reconstruct these boundaries. On this basis, I differentiate between two 
boundary mechanisms.49 The first of these two boundary mechanisms rests on a civic 
conception of nationhood and can therefore be described as the civic boundary 
mechanism. The second is predicated on an organic conception of nationhood and we 
can therefore call it the organic boundary mechanism. (Civic and organic conceptions 
of nationhood are described in Table 1.3).
Tab. 1-3: Civic and organic conceptions of nationhood
Conception Logic Focus
CIVIC voluntaristic
• community of law
• state-institutions
• modernity
• political culture
ORGANIC deterministic
• community of native 
culture
• pre-modernity
• ethnic descent
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At the same time, I distinguish between four symbolic resources. These cultural 
resources provide the symbolic raw material which social actors use as they reconstruct 
and redefine national identity. Here I distinguish between four symbolic resources'. 
political values/institutions; culture; history; and geography. When they define national 
identity in public, social actors ‘nationalise’ these resources. Yet depending on which 
boundary mechanism is employed -  civic or organic -  a different picture of national 
identity emerges. Hence rather than focusing on national identity in terms of its 
symbolic content (territory, a civic culture, legal institutions, historical myths and 
memories), we should start by asking how the boundary of nationhood is constructed at 
particular points in time. What are the mechanisms used to create and legitimate this 
boundary? Is nationhood created by invoking the will of the citizen, the knowledge of 
certain cultural codes and ways of life, or by relating the nation to particular historical 
experiences, myths of ethnic descent or certain geographical factors?
In practice, there is considerable likelihood that those who adhere to a civic 
conception of nationhood will reveal the following priority in the selection of symbolic 
recources: political institutions (1st priority), culture and history (2nd priority), nature 
(3rd priority, rather unlikely). The proponents of the organic conception of nationhood 
will emphasise geography (embodied in concepts such as ‘nature’, ‘homeland’, or 
‘landscape’) first, then history and culture, and only in the third instance will they draw 
on political institutions. But the crucial thing about these two distinct conceptions of 
nationhood is not what resources they refer to, but how they conceive of these 
resources: the civic conception of nationhood processes the available resources in 
voluntaristic terms -  as a product of human action; the organic conception of 
nationhood, by contrast, processes the resources in deterministic terms -  as 
embodiments of the communal organism. (These operations are summarised in Figure 
1-2.)
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Fig. 1-2: The construction of nationhood: boundary mechanisms and resources
BOUNDARY MECHANISM RESOURCE
Social Actors
Organic
Political Values/ 
Institutions
Culture
History
Geography
Each of these conceptions in itself would have been insufficient for the formation and 
subsequent reproduction of polyethnic Switzerland. It was their fusion that was 
paramount, resulting in a nationalism that proved both internally integrative and 
capable of securing Switzerland’s recognition internationally. The civic conception of 
nationhood was decisive in that it helped to transcend ethno-linguistic pluralism while 
at the same time decreasing the potential for ethnic conflict. In the Swiss context, the 
construction of ‘national unity’ could only derive from a voluntary commitment to a set 
of political values and collective loyalty to the state and its institutions.
Yet, the organic conception was equally significant, particularly for two 
reasons. First, all social institutions need ‘some stabilizing principle to stop their 
“premature demise’” . The organic conception of nationhood, resting on a mechanism 
that Mary Douglas has called the ‘naturalization of social classifications’, provides 
national identities with such a stabilising principle. As Douglas has put it in a crucial 
passage: ‘There needs to be an analogy by which the formal structure of a crucial set of 
social relations is found in the physical world, or in the supernatural world, or in
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eternity, anywhere, so long as it is not seen as a socially contrived arrangement.’50 
‘Nations’ and ‘national identities’ are no exception in this regard. In fact, they are 
prime examples of naturalised cultural institutions. Where the civic subscription to a set 
of abstract political values and institutions would leave ‘the nation’ underdetermined, 
references to its organic rootedness serve to establish a link with the invariant in a 
world of recurrent change.
The second reason for the significance of the ‘organic’ conception has to do 
with the international ideological context in which the constructors of Swiss national 
identity had to operate. This context was defined by classical nationalism’s central 
doctrine: that nations are organic communities and that this organic character is 
expressed in a single shared culture (preferably language). The Swiss, unable to fulfil 
the criterion of ethno-cultural homogeneity (and fostering a myth of civic 
exceptionalism), did their best to demonstrate to the outside world that they too were 
members of a ‘natural’ nation. Asserting that Switzerland had continuously emerged 
out of a pre-modem past, and that the country’s natural environment (especially the 
Alps) had fostered an authentic national character, they tried to do justice to the organic 
ideal of classical nationalism.
Looking ahead
The chapters to come present a comparative historical analysis of the formation and 
transformation of Swiss nationhood, executed within the frame of reference developed 
in this chapter. Chapter 2 traces the emergence and subsequent dissemination of an 
ethno-symbolic memory in the Swiss Confederation between the late medieval period 
and the close of the seventeenth century. Part II focuses on the reconstruction of Swiss 
nationhood during four periods between the late eighteenth century and the beginning 
of the Second World War. Finally, the two thematic chapters of Part in  discuss the core 
issues of this dissertation -  the role of ethno-symbolic memory in modem nation 
formation, and the respective impact of ‘civic’ and ‘organic’ notions of community on
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the construction of nationhood in a polyethnic setting -  by placing Swiss developments 
in a comparative context.
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CHAPTER TWO
The Formation of an Ethno-Symbolic Memory 
(15th -  18th Century)
The belief in common ethnicity often delimits 'social circleswhich in turn are not 
always identical with endogamous connubial groups, for greatly varying numbers o f  
persons may be encompassed by both. Their similarity rests on the belief in a specific 
‘honour’ o f  their members, not shared by the outsiders...
Max Weber1
Swiss nationhood did not evolve naturally out of a pre-modem Swiss ethnicity, nor can 
it be described in terms of an ancient psychological attachment to a putative Swiss 
‘homeland’. The first explanation would be unduly deterministic, while the latter would 
be reductionist in the extreme. Nevertheless, as subsequent chapters will reveal, cultural 
antecedents are too important to be ignored altogether. In the next chapter (chapter 3), I 
shall argue that these patterns supplied the symbolic ‘raw material’ from which the late- 
eighteenth century patriots constructed Swiss nationhood. Hence, if our aim is to 
account for the formation and reconstruction of Swiss national identity in the period 
from 1760 to 1939, these cultural patterns deserve more than cursory attention.
This chapter will supply the evidence necessary to sustain my argument. To this 
end, it provides a systematic analysis of the formation of the ethno-symbolic memory 
of the Old Swiss Confederation. Such a memory emerged between the late-medieval 
and early modem periods as a number of towns and rural communities developed into 
the alliance that came to be referred to as the Swiss Confederation. The term ethno- 
symbolic memory, as I use it here, refers to the repertoire of myths, symbols and 
narratives that describe the genesis and subsequent evolution of a community, and that 
locate it in time and space. An ethno-symbolic memory, thus understood, is both 
indicative of, and supplies a group with, a shared sense of purpose, mutual loyalty, and 
self-identity. Whilst a sense of collective loyalty developed among the members of the 
Swiss Confederation in the course of the fourteenth century, it took at least another
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decade until this collective loyalty found expression in an increasingly rich ethno- 
symbolic memory. In the centuries that followed, the myths, symbols and narratives 
that constituted this memory became salient among the wider populace.
The formation of this repertoire of symbols, myths and narratives within the 
emerging Swiss Confederation sprang from two mutually inter-linked processes. The 
first was the development of the Confederate alliance and its central institutions: the 
various treaties of alliance, the concordats, the Confederate Diet. These institutions 
functioned as an incubator for the emerging Confederate self-identity. The second 
process with an effect on the production of Confederate group identity concerns the 
power politics in the area: the antagonism between the nascent Swiss Confederation 
and the Habsburg dynasty and other feudal lords. This conflict literally produced the 
Confederate mythomoteur, the central political myths and the symbolic boundary that 
constituted the Swiss Confederation as a distinctive community with a separate sense of 
identity. The first two sections of this chapter are devoted to an examination of these 
two processes. The third and concluding section assesses the popular salience of the 
core myths and legends and argues that they had become a political factor in the course 
of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
The institutional framework: towards an alliance of rural communities and towns
The opening o f the Gotthard Pass and the expansion o f Habsburg rule in central 
Switzerland
If its military successes of the fourteenth and fifteenth century allowed the Swiss 
Confederation to survive as a distinctive political entity in a Europe dominated by 
feudal powers, its unique geographical location enabled it to come into being in the first 
place. For one thing, central Switzerland, the region that emerged as the core of the 
nascent Confederate alliance, had been on the periphery of the Holy Roman Empire
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until the thirteenth century. It was only from the twelfth century onwards that the 
colonisation movement began to affect the mountainous areas north of the Gotthard. 
The process of feudal penetration occurred after a similar delay. Unlike the villages and 
towns of the plains, which had come under feudal jurisdiction during the High Middle 
Ages, the valleys north of the Gotthard had remained largely unaffected until the mid­
thirteenth century. The first mention of the three valley communes, which in 1291 were 
to conclude the first Confederate alliance, dates from the first half of the thirteenth 
century: Uri was mentioned in 1231; Schwyz in 1240; and Unterwalden was named for 
the first time in 1291, when it joined the original alliance.
When the Alpine valleys of central Switzerland did eventually attract the 
interest of the feudal powers, geography again played a vital part. The opening of the 
Gotthard pass at the turn of the twelfth century led to a profound change in the political 
dynamics of that region. Not only did the Gotthard provide the shortest route over the 
Alps, the proximity of waterways both on its northern and southern slopes allowed for 
the speedy traffic of goods and people along Europe’s north-south axis.2 After the 
decline of a number of small dynasties that had helped to colonise the area around the 
Gotthard, the Habsburgs emerged as the dominant feudal authority in central and north­
eastern Switzerland. Anderson identifies the construction of a ‘magnified Germanic 
State’ in the South of the Empire.3
A number of territorial acquisitions indicate this new drive towards expansion 
and unification of their domains: in 1285 Rudolf of Habsburg took over the imperial 
protectorate (Reichsvogtei) in the canton of Uri, and in 1291 the same ruler purchased 
the rights over the town of Lucemee. These were early indications of what became a 
systematic effort on the part of the Habsburgs to intensify their territorial ambitions in 
central Switzerland. It is hardly an accident that their efforts to increase their influence 
in central Switzerland coincided with the opening of the Gotthard route. Of all the 
regions which they controlled within Swiss territory in the thirteenth century, the area 
around the Gotthard was the most lucrative because of the high customs revenue from 
the north-south traffic.4 At the same time, the Gotthard traffic provided a vital source of 
income for the inhabitants of the adjacent valleys. Here revenues from transportation
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services and profits from the rapidly developing cattle and meat trade between the 
valleys and northern Italy were of particular importance. It was their geographical 
position on the Gotthard route which largely explains why the inhabitants of those 
Alpine regions were often not poor.5
The rise o f the communes
The fact that Habsburg-Austria did not enter a political vacuum as it began to intensify 
its authority in central Switzerland in the latter half of the thirteenth century proved 
significant for what was to come. When the Habsburgs became the dominant political 
player in the area, the valleys of Uri, Schwyz and Unterwalden in particular had already 
established themselves as communes with a relatively high degree of political 
organisation and autonomy from the Holy Roman Empire.6 The most important of 
these three Alpine communities, Uri, had in 1231 become reichsfrei -  which meant that 
it was subject to no lord save the Emperor. The neighbouring community, Schwyz, 
obtained a similar charter of freedom in 1240, but unlike that of Uri the legality of this 
did not go unchallenged.7
The process whereby rural or town communes developed a form of political 
organisation to make them more autonomous from feudal lords has been referred to as
Q
‘communalism’. According to Brady, ‘communes’ were ‘sworn associations of adult 
males formed to get, guard, and exercise rights of self-administration and government’. 
However, they only became ‘politically significant when they federated to exercise 
higher judicial and military functions’.9 Such communes sprang up all over Europe 
during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. They first appeared in the more urbanised 
areas of northern and central Italy, southern Germany, and the Netherlands. Rural 
communes emerged somewhat later, particularly along the coast of the North Sea and 
the Alpine regions.
Overall, was more likely to develop in mountainous regions, where a harsh 
geography and relentless climate forced the peasants to co-operate to secure a supply of 
water throughout the year and for measures to be taken against rockfall. Many of the
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Alpine communes that organised themselves as associations of adjacent valleys were in 
fact formed out of a sense of self-preservation. Historical evidence also suggests that 
the communes that developed in Alpine areas had a better chance of long-term survival. 
For one thing, their location at the periphery of a large empire or lordship allowed them 
to develop considerable strength before they had to compete with ambitious territorial 
rulers. For another, Alpine topography favoured their chance of military success even 
against the far superior armies of the nobility. These favourable geographical 
conditions were absent in the plains. With the exception of the communal movement of 
northern Italy, towns in the plains, even if they formed encompassing alliances, fared 
far less successfully in the competition with feudal powers. An example of this 
occurred in he towns of southern Germany when they formed a communal alliance in 
the fourteenth century, and eventually lost out against the nobility.10
In Switzerland, where conditions were more favourable, a communal federation 
began to take shape from the late thirteenth century onwards, which was increasingly in 
opposition to the territorial policy of Habsburg-Austria. When the Habsburg rulers tried 
to bring the Alpine communities around the Gotthard under their immediate 
jurisdiction, the Swiss comunes opposed such a change and demanded instead that their 
ancient liberties -  their Reichsfreiheit -  be respected.11 Thus a classical conflict 
emerged between feudal and communal principles and ambitions. The peasants, who 
resided in the valleys around the Gotthard pass, had developed their own political and 
economic interests well before the Habsburgs had become the dominant dynasty within 
the Holy Roman Empire in the course of the thirteenth century. When the Habsburgs 
began to pursue a more rigid approach in the closing decades of the thirteenth century, 
tensions rose. Keen to reinforce their territorial lordship in central Switzerland, the 
House of Habsburg began to establish a network of control by sending their own 
officials into the area. Given the determination of the valleys to maintain the status quo 
or even to expand their territorial authority, a protracted conflict was the inevitable 
consequence. As Peyer puts it: ‘The fight for independence from external powers,... 
the effort not to be stamped out by the territorial authorities of the time, is characteristic
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of the history of the Swiss Confederation from the thirteenth to the end of the fifteenth 
century.’12
The formation o f the Swiss Confederation
This antagonism provided the impetus behind the evolution of the Swiss Confederation 
between the thirteenth and early sixteenth centuries. The first alliance was concluded in 
1291 between the valleys of Uri, Schwyz and Unterwalden. This original alliance was 
confirmed in 1315, only three weeks after the Habsburgs had been defeated in a first 
decisive battle at Morgarten. Five other communities joined the Confederate alliance 
over the following decades to form an alliance of eight cantons: Lucerne (1332), Zurich 
(1351), Glarus (1352), Zug (1352), and Bern (1353). These eight member cantons -  
four of them rural valleys (Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, and Glarus), and four of them 
towns (Lucerne, Zurich, Zug, and Bern) -  made up the core of the Swiss Confederation 
of the late fourteenth century. According to Perry Anderson, it is this coalescence of 
Alpine valleys and towns ‘within the complex inventory of European feudalism’ that 
rendered the Swiss Confederation a unique political phenomenon.13
From 1393 onwards, the member cantons regularly confirmed their mutual 
allegiances by oath -  the term Eidgenossenschaft, Switzerland’s official name to this 
day, literally means Oath Confederation.14 By the early sixteenth century, five other 
cantons had followed to form the Confederation of thirteen cantons: Freiburg and 
Solothum in 1481, Basel and Schaffhausen in 1501, and Appenzell in 1513. A number 
of so-called zugewandte Orte were quasi-protectorates of the Confederation. These 
included, among others, the abbey and town of St. Gallen, Mulhausen, Neuenburg, and 
Geneva. A marked hierarchy separated the full from the affiliated members of the 
Confederation, the so-called Zugewandte Orte, which was reflected in the contracts that 
the Confederates concluded with the latter. However, in some cases Zugewandte Orte 
managed to become full members. This applied to the five cantons that joined the 
Confederation between 1481 and 1515 -  Freiburg (1481), Solothum (1481), Basle 
(1501), Schaffhausen (1501), and Appenzell (1513). Yet the old cantons, the so-called
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Alten Orte, made sure that the five new ones remained in the position of junior partners. 
For example, they did not participate in the administration of the subject territories, and 
their freedom to conclude other agreements was firmly circumscribed. For a discussion 
between full and affiliated members of the Confederation.15 Finally, a third circle 
consisted of the so-called gemeine Herrschaften, territorial acquisitions from the wars 
of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. These common custodies were jointly 
administered, thereby forcing the cantons to co-operate and reaffirm their political 
alliance at a time of deep religious schism.16
Nevertheless, the conflict with Habsburg-Austria was not the only reason why 
the Swiss Confederation came into existence as a separate political community. 
Domestic factors were important as well. Hence, in the original as well as in subsequent 
alliances, the cantons pledged mutual aid against violence from inside and outside their 
pact, as well as common actions against feud, extortion, and robbery. In other words, 
political functions that normally fell under the jurisdiction of a princely houses or other 
local lord, had been taken up by an alliance of peasant and town communes. In addition 
to political motives, economic considerations also played their part. Marchal speaks of 
an ‘economic interdependency’ that had evolved between the Alpine valleys and the 
towns of the plains during the course of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.17 The 
towns depended on supplies of cattle and dairy products from central Switzerland; the 
Alpine regions, in turn, had an interest in securing grain and salt supplies from the 
plains; and both the towns and the Alpine valleys benefited from the north-south trade 
via the Gotthard route. Although these economic issues were not mentioned in the 
various treaties of alliance, it is safe to assume that they provided an important 
incentive to consolidate the coalition between the valleys north of the Gotthard and 
towns such as Lucerne, Zurich or Bern.
Nevertheless, an anti-Habsburg tendency is clearly discernible in all these 
alliances. The original Treaty of 1291, for example, entails the provision that ‘we will 
accept or receive no judge in the aforesaid valleys [Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden] 
who shall have obtained this office for any price, or for money in any way whatever, or
1ftone who shall not be a native or a resident with us’. It is quite evident that this
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paragraph was directed against Austrian attempts to intensify authority through the 
purchase of rights which were then looked after by their local officials. The Treaty of 
1315 confirmed and expanded upon the original alliance. Concluded three weeks after 
the defeat of a Habsburg-led army at Morgarten in 1315, this new treaty further 
strengthened the anti-Habsburg dimension of the Confederate alliance. In it, the three 
valleys agreed that none of them would acknowledge another authority without the 
consent of the other two, and that they would not hold separate negotiations, or 
conclude special agreements, with external powers. Given the strong anti-Habsburg 
element in the Treaty of 1315, Marchal has described its purpose as that of 
‘coordinating a common policy towards external forces’.19
The expansion of the original alliance over the subsequent decades and 
centuries confirms this picture. The town of Lucerne had come under Habsburg control 
in the thirteenth century, and its citizens were forced to participate in the economic 
blockade against the valley cantons. When in the 1320s Austrian officials began to 
restrict the political and economic rights of the citizenry of Lucerne, its patrician elite 
began to revolt and in 1332, Lucerne concluded a treaty of alliance with the three valley 
cantons.20 The anti-Habsburg tendency was to play a vital role in subsequent treaties 
between the three valleys and Zurich (1351), Glarus (1352), Zug (1352), and Bern 
(1353).
In the period from 1353 to 1415, new institutions were set up that led to a 
deepening of the alliance of eight cantons. Two such institutions merit our attention. 
The first is the so-called Tagsatzung or Confederate Diet. As an institution that 
emerged out of the political practice of the Confederation, it manifested an increasing 
need for a common decision-making body. Every canton sent two representatives to the 
Tagsatzung. Between 1353 and 1400,48 conferences were held, but the number 
increased to 126 between 1401 and 1420. In 1410 alone, five conferences took place, 
and in 1460 the number was a high as 18. Decisions required either unanimity 
(especially for matters that concerned the Confederation as a whole) or majority vote, 
depending on the issue in question. The questions that were debated in the Diet
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included the preparation of warfare, mediation in case of internal and external conflicts, 
the regulation of mercenary services, as well as economic matters.21
Plate 2-1: The representatives of the Confederate cantons assembled at the Diet 
in Baden, 16th century.
The second new institution, the Confederate concordats, was a creation of the second 
half of the fourteenth century. These concordats presented agreements between all the 
member cantons, while the previous treaties (with the exception of the 1291 Treaty 
between the Forest cantons) contained special provisions for particular cantons. The 
Pfaffenbrief of 1370 and the Sempacherbrief of 1393 exemplify the more inclusive 
nature of the concordats. The Pfaffenbrief contained the provisions that everybody who 
lived on Confederate territory, even if they were in Austrian services, had to swear 
allegiance to his town or land; that bishops who were not members of the 
Confederation were prohibited from appealing to foreign courts; and that all cantons 
were bound to guarantee the safety of the traffic from the Gotthard to Zurich. These 
agreements represented a significant step towards the territorialisation of Confederate 
jurisdiction and penal authority.22 The Pfaffenbrief also manifests a fairly developed 
common consciousness among the members of the Confederation. The expression ‘our
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Confederation’ was used for the first time in reference to the Confederate territory of 
the eight cantons. Similar expressions were employed in various concordats, especially 
in the Sempacherbrief (1390) and the Stanser Verkommnis (1481).23
Ironically, many of the bills that had the effect of promoting communal 
solidarity had the character of peace treaties aimed at preventing the escalation of 
conflict between Confederates. In the wake of the battle of Sempach (1386), domestic 
feuds and expansionist wars were a constant threat. These problems were accompanied 
by rising tensions between the rural cantons and the towns. The Sempacherbrief of 
1390 had the purpose of preventing private warfare both between cantons and between 
a canton and a foreign power. Other provisions concerned the regulation of Confederate 
warfare, including the treatment of deserters and the partition of booty among the 
cantons. The conflicting interests and economic inequality between rural cantons and 
towns were again strikingly revealed after the wars against Burgundy. The threat of a 
civil war could be diffused through the Stanser Verkommnis of 1481, which prohibited 
the members of the Confederation to wage war against each other and regulated the 
distribution of war booty.24
Wars and Confederate myth-making
If the Swiss Confederation acquired permanence because it was able to develop a set of 
common institutions, it was also forged by warfare. To begin with, warfare had an 
existential significance for the nascent Confederate alliance. Without success in 
warfare, the Confederation’s institutional framework -  the various treaties of alliance, 
the common concordats, the Confederate Diet -  would either not have come into 
existence or remained short-lived. Besides, war was decisive in forging the myths and 
legends that infused the member cantons with a common consciousness and sense of 
mutual loyalty. Te Brake writes on the relationship between warfare and communal 
identity in the early modem period:
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Of course, most of these largely defensive unions did not survive in the long 
run, but when they did, the Dutch and Swiss cases suggest, the historical 
experience of often ‘heroic* collective efforts became deeply embedded in the 
political culture of the resulting confederations.25
Most significantly, however, wars produced a number of diacritical markers and thus 
served to fortify a symbolic boundary that structured Confederate consciousness in a 
permanent way. As Smith has argued concerning the role of warfare in forging 
‘adversarial identities’: ‘Through the creation of chronic adversaries, usually endowed 
with negative stereotypes, warfare sets the pattern of relationships with significant 
collective outsiders ... War may not create the original cultural differences, but it 
sharpens and politicizes them’.26 Wars also set in train a myth-making process that 
became manifest in the fifteenth century. In fact, it is no exaggeration to maintain that 
the battles that the Confederates fought over the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries 
produced many of the myths, legends and symbols that constituted their ethno-symbolic 
memory. These myths, legends, and symbols came to form part of a dramatic 
narrative about the historical origins and subsequent evolution of the Swiss 
Confederation. At the same time, they embellished the symbolic boundaries between 
the Confederates and those groups and political entities that were increasingly 
perceived as ‘outsiders’.28
The most important of these military encounters include:
1315: Battle of Morgarten (against Habsburg-Austria)
1386: Battle of Sempach (against Habsburg-Austria)
1474-77: Burgundian Wars (against Duke Charles the Bold)
1499-1500: Swabian Wars (against the Habsburg-led Swabian League)
In each of these wars, armies of the nobility, often led by a powerful feudal dynast, 
suffered defeat at the hands of the Confederate infantry. In the battle of Morgaten in 
1315, for example, prince Leopold of Austria fought with a contingent of 2,000-3,000
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knights against little more than 1,000 peasant soldiers from the three forest cantons 
(Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden). The outcome of the battle was unexpected: the 
peasant infantry of the three valleys routed the Austrian seigneurial cavalry. Some 
seventy years later, as the tensions between Habsburg-Austria and the Swiss 
Confederation reached a new climax, a second battle broke out between the same 
opponents. In the Battle of Sempach in 1386, the Habsburg-led army, despite again 
having a superior number of soldiers at its disposal, lost and Leopold III of Austria died 
on the battlefield. This second defeat initiated the decline of the House of Habsburg as 
a political player on Swiss territory. Serfdom was consequently abolished in Uri, 
Schwyz and Unterwalden within a decade.29 In the Burgundian Wars (1474-77), the 
Confederate armies eventually gained the upper hand over Duke Charles the Bold, then 
the most significant opponent of the French King. The Swabian League -  a coalition of 
nobles and cities founded in 1488 as a bulwark against the Swiss Confederation’s
■JA
expansionist military behaviour in southern Germany -  met the same fate in 1499.
Feudalism versus communalism: the emergence o f an ethno-symbolic boundary
Thanks to its military success, the Swiss Confederation managed to thwart the 
territorial ambitions of Habsburg-Austria, Burgundy, or the princes of Savoy. What was 
even more significant in the eyes of the nobility, however, was the fact that the Swiss 
Confederation represented a principle of social and political organisation which 
contradicted and challenged the feudal order. Losing against a more successful 
competitor was part of the military and political reality to which every dynasty or small 
lordship that harboured territorial ambitions was used to. So long as those competitors 
were of noble birth, military defeat did not necessarily amount to a catastrophe. What 
made the Confederation a particularly dangerous opponent, however, was that its 
mission was, at least in part, an anti-feudal one. This is well in accordance with Smith’s 
point that although ‘wars have occurred between every kind of group from the family to 
the empire, it is those that have been waged between different kinds of political 
authority ... that have had the greatest impact upon ethnic formation and persistence’.
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The fact that the defeat of a feudal power at the hands of a peasant infantry was to 
remain the exception in late-medieval and early-modern Europe made it all the more 
suitable as a catalyst for the development of a Confederate self-identity.31
Fearing a demonstration effect among their own subjects, nobles of different 
status and power began to set up coalitions against the Swiss Confederation. In 1407, 
the bishops of Augsburg and Constance, the duke of Teck, seven counts, and eighty-six 
nobles founded the Society of Saint George’s Shield, a forerunner of the Swabian 
League which was to be set up a few decades later in 1488. Its self-declared aim was to 
assure that ‘we will all, individually and severally, secure aid and advice in the best and 
most expeditious way against the peasants of Appenzell and all of those allied to 
them’.32 Brady argues that it was mainly fear of ‘the growing strength of the idea of 
turning Swiss among the common [South German] folk’ that made cities like 
Nuremberg, Augsburg, or Ulm join forces with Habsburg-Austria in the South German 
League.33
The protracted conflict between the Swiss Confederation and its feudal 
opponents served to forge an ethno symbolic boundary that came to structure 
Confederate self-identity for centuries to come. Its outward manifestation took the form 
of mutual verbal abuse between Confederates and nobles. The literature containing 
such assaults and counter-assaults rapidly proliferated throughout the fifteenth century, 
reaching its apex during the Burgundian and Swabian wars.34 Blickle maintains that the
nobles’ reaction illustrates the incompatibility of feudal and communal 
principles, and the documented behaviour of the Habsburgs and their noble 
clientele toward the Swiss strengthens this impression of antagonism. Ever 
since the Swiss defeat of the Habsburgs near Morgarten in 1315, the Austrian 
and Swabian nobles had developed a fear of the Swiss that can only be called 
pathological. In the Habsburg and neighbouring regions during the later Middle 
Ages and beyond, the nobles feared the rise of a ‘new Switzerland’. The image 
served to demonize any alternative principle to feudalism.
These fears were anything but groundless. According to Brady, the ‘idea that 
Confederate power fed on the destruction of lords and lordship was fact, not fantasy’.36 
The influence of Swiss communalism manifested itself most forcefully in south and
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south-western Germany as well as in the Alsace, as the history of peasant protest 
clearly shows: ‘Each of the nearly sixty rural uprisings in this great region between 
1336 and 1515, plus every alliance of rural with urban communes, formed a link in the 
tremendous running social war that began with the Swiss victory at Morgarten in 1315 
and ended with the Revolution of 1525.’37
During the German Peasant War of 1525, moreover, a peasant pamphlet had it 
that the entire Swiss Confederation was the product of a revolutionary upheaval, an 
alliance that had grown
out of the blatant tyranny of the nobles and other lords, who drove and forced 
the Common Man unceasingly and without scruple, against all justice, with their 
unchristian, tyrannical violence, motivated by their own arrogance, mischievous 
power, and plans.38
The successive victories of the Confederate armies against their noble opponents, the 
German peasants concluded, had “doubtless happened from the power and decree of 
God. How else could the Confederation, which daily grows in strength, have arisen 
from only three simple peasants?”39
King Maximilian’s 'Manifesto against the Swiss Confederacy’ (1499) confirms 
that it was a dread of a possible mirror effect rather than territorial ambitions that drove 
the German cities and nobles into a war against the Swiss cantons. The Swabian War 
was ‘a preventive social war against the spread of masterlesness into Tyrol, Vorarlberg, 
Swabia, and the Upper Rhine’.40 In his tirade against the Confederates, King 
Maximilian alluded repeatedly to the daunting prospect of Swiss communalism gaining 
ground in southern Germany:
How much damage [the Confederates] have caused to the German nation, the 
Holy Roman Empire and the whole of Christianity may be obvious to all those 
of us who know that their deceptive words and actions ... brought many of our 
subjects on their side. Those members of the Empire that decided to emulate the 
Swiss peasants and to support their vicious cause have now begun to act in an 
unlawful and rude manner against their neighbours and against the Empire as a 
whole.41
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The above quotation also contains the central accusation directed against the 
Confederates: namely, that they had violated the feudal order in which the nobility held 
the top position and the peasantry the bottom in the hierarchical pyramid.42 Numerous 
accounts of the nobility as well as the songs of the German Landsknechte depict the 
Swiss Confederation as a community that had shamefully perverted this God-given 
order. The Landsknechte were the foot soldiers that constituted the German infantry. 
Recruited mainly from indigent members of the lower nobility, they emerged as the 
main rivals of the Swiss peasant soldier on the market for mercenaries from the 
sixteenth century onwards. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Swiss 
mercenaries and German Landsknechte were serving under French, Spanish, Austrian 
as well as Dutch commanders. 43
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Plate 2-2: Swiss Cow and Habsburg Lion. Illustration 
for an anonymous song against the Swiss Confederates, 
16th century.
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Hence the competition between Confederates and German Landsknechte on the market 
for mercenaries partly explains why, in many statements of the time, the Confederates 
are disdainfully referred to as ‘peasants’ and ‘villains’ notable for their rude and 
primitive behaviour. The mayor of Bern, Niklaus von Diesbach, in a speech he 
addressed to Frederic ID in September 1473, categorically repudiated all these charges. 
In fact, he defended the political behaviour of the Swiss Confederation over the 
preceding centuries, putting the blame squarely on the Habsburg officials in central 
Switzerland. These officials, he claimed, had not only introduced new, exorbitant taxes 
to subjugate the population, but they had also maltreated the women of the valleys. 
Faced with such a situation, Diesbach concludes, the Confederates had had no choice 
but to resist.44
Tab. 2-1: The formation of an ethno-symbolic boundary
Basic Dualism: Communalism vs. Feudalism
Diacritical Features: Peasantry/
Townspeople
vs. Nobility
Subjective 
Value Orientations: Equality vs. Hierarchy
Simplicity vs. Sophistication
Independence vs. Authority/
Control
The Confederate Mythomoteur
The most serious allegation of all, however, held that the Swiss Confederation was an 
anti-Christian community. This allegation was implied in the accusation that the 
Confederates had violated the feudal order (which was seen God-given), and it 
appeared explicitly in numerous other communications and speeches. In his Manifesto
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against the Swiss Confederates, for instance, King Maximilian I described the 
Confederates as ‘cruel Turks’ who were a danger to the Christian faith.45 Following 
along these lines, the humanist scholar, Jakob Wimpfeling, maintained that the 
Confederation’s wars against the nobles had not only been unjust but also damaging to 
Christianity. In a medieval society, the charge of anti-Christian behaviour must have 
carried great weight, which in part explains the Confederates furious reaction. The 
fierce controversy that ensued over these issues gave birth to the Confederate 
mythomoteur or myth-symbol complex 46 It comprised three myths 47
The myth o f ethnic election. If God had not agreed with their cause, several 
Confederate propagandists proclaimed, he would not have led them to victory against 
the nobility in successive battles. In other words, the battle victories were perceived as 
a sign of the covenant between God and the Confederates. As a folk song by Matthias 
Zoller of the late fifteenth century put it: ‘You were guided, like the people of Israel, 
through the sea without much suffering.’48 Various sources from the fourteenth century 
onwards report that the Confederates had adopted particular customs of worshipping to 
underline their covenant with God. Most notably, they were described as praying with 
their arms crossed (Beten mit zertanen Armen) in order to symbolise Christ’s suffering 
for a sinful humanity.49 This provoked disapproval among the clergy. The Dominican 
Johannes Winckel, for example, used all his erudition to prove that the Confederates’ 
custom of praying was but a vain attempt to conceal their actual sinfulness. 
Condemning their practice as ‘reprehensible, evil, and superstitious’, Winckel argued 
that the ‘utterly boorish Swiss, who formed an alliance against justice and common 
religious doctrine,... are in danger of eternal damnation’. ‘Equally doomed’, he 
argued, was their belief of being God’s chosen people: ‘Not he who recommends 
himself is elected, but he whom God recommends’.50
Myths o f foundation and liberation. We encounter the myths of foundation and 
liberation in the humanist chronicles of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, as well as 
in a number of folk songs that can be dated to the early fifteenth century. In fact, much 
evidence suggests that the humanist chroniclers drew inspiration from an oral tradition 
that had emerged shortly after the historical events which were then found expression,
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in dramatised form, in the three myths outlined above.51 The legitimation of the Swiss 
Confederation as a distinctive political unit provided, once again, the motivation behind 
the chronicles. As Hans-Conrad Peyer has argued, it is this particular motivation that 
gives ‘all the Swiss chronicles ... the character of a plea’. Their purpose ‘was to fend 
off Austrian demands’ and ‘to reject the allegation that the Confederates were merely a 
bunch of rebels who had fought against their rightful authorities’.52
The myths of liberation and foundation were first recorded in the White Book of 
Samen by the Obwalden chronicler, Hans Schriber, in 1471. The myth of foundation 
found expression in the legend about the Oath of the Riitli, while the myth of liberation 
was personified in the figure of Wilhelm Tell. According to the myth of foundation, the 
Habsburg Yoke provided the impetus behind the conclusion of a secret alliance 
between the leaders of Uri, Schwyz and Unterwalden. The legend has it that this 
alliance was concluded secretly on the Riitli meadow above Lake Uri in August of 
1307. The notion that the Confederates had liberated themselves from an external 
enemy, already present in the foundation myth, was then personalised in the legend of 
Wilhelm Tell. According to the latter, Tell assassinated the Habsburg bailiff, Gessler, to 
liberate his people from a relentlessly oppressive regime.53
However, the White Book, though influential, was far surpassed in salience by 
Aegidius Tschudi’s Chronicon Helveticum. Tschudi’s chronicle, written in the third 
decade of the sixteenth century, came to be seen as the key text of the Confederation’s 
past by successive generations of scholars and the political elite alike.54 A member of 
the ruling elite of his native Glarus, Tschudi worked in a manner that was typical of the 
chroniclers of his time. Although making use of legal documents in his work, he fell 
back on his imagination to fill in remaining gaps and to add a poetic flavour to the 
overall narrative by personalising the historical reconstruction based upon the available 
records. This applies, most notably, to the myths of liberation and foundation: i.e. 
Wilhelm Tell and the Oath of the Riitli.
Although the documentary evidence available could substantiate neither the 
events nor all of the protagonists that constitute the myths, Tschudi did not hesitate to 
present them as factual evidence. It was thus that, by filling these historical gaps,
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Tschudi created three legends, complete with dates and places, that henceforth came to 
form the cornerstones of the Confederation’s communal mythology: the Oath between 
the leading representatives of the three valley-communities (allegedly sworn on 8 
November 1307, on the Riitli-meadow above Lake Uri); the assassination of the 
Habsburg bailiff Gessler by Wilhelm Tell (on 19 November 1307, in Kiisnacht in the 
canton of Schwyz); and the destruction of a number of castles, the centres of Habsburg 
authority in central Switzerland, by the self-liberating Confederates (1 January 1308).55
Tab. 2-2: The Confederate Mythomoteur
Historical Background Manifestation/Representation
Myth of Ethnic a) Battle Victories Custom of Prayer, Chronicles,
Election
b) Status Violation
Pamphlets, Songs
Myth of Foundation Charter of 1291:
Alliance of the three valleys 
(Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden)
Oath of the Ruth
Myth of Liberation Battles against the Habsburgs Legend of Wilhelm Tell
The diffusion and political relevance of the Confederate mythomoteur
The diffusion o f the myths
The appeal of the mythical repertoire that I have just described was not confined to a 
limited number of scholars and educated officials. In fact, several scholars have 
convincingly argued that by the fifteenth century the Confederate myth-symbol 
complex had come to form a constitutive part of a ‘public discourse’ in which several 
social groups participated.56 We have already indicated that the myths that acquired 
popular salience in the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries did not depend
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for their effectiveness upon their being true. But why, we have to ask, did they retain 
their appeal over the following centuries?
To begin with, as dramatic narratives that had emerged out of actual historical 
events and processes, they possessed a plausibility structure. What made them myths 
and thus half truths rather than mere fictions was that they could be associated with 
collective actions and events that actually took place: battles in particular, as well as the 
conclusion of alliances and the taking of oaths to confirm their content. Steinberg thus 
concludes (rightly in my view) that the ‘story of William Tell is not false, even if there 
never was a man of that name and he never shot an apple off his son’s head. Its truth is 
the truth of a communal tradition by which the Swiss defined and made precise their 
public values.’57 In other words, the fact that the liberation narrative appears plausible 
against the historical background is what explains its salience, not the actual existence 
of a person named Wilhelm Tell (for which we have no evidence).
This and their capacity to create foci of communal allegiance and sympathy 
apparently greatly assisted their dissemination through chronicles, historic folk songs, 
folk plays, pamphlets, sites and monuments, which emerged in great number during the 
course of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Through such means of symbolic 
communication, the Confederate myth-symbol complex became more firmly rooted in
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the life-worlds of a wider segment of the population. From the sixteenth century 
onwards the core myths with its heroic figures and narratives -  Wilhelm Tell, the Oath 
of the Riitli, the maltreatment of the local population at the hands of the Habsburg 
officials -  were represented through a variety of different means, including: coins, 
wooden statues, cups, as well as statues in churches and town halls.59
Historical texts, songs, and public rituals helped to reproduce the myths and 
legends and to maintain the memory of the historical events that they dramatised. One 
form of public remembering were the so-called Schlachtjahreszeiten, the 
commemorations of the late-medieval battles that took place annually. At these 
commemorations, religious services were held in honour of the fallen soldiers, and 
special attention was paid to the war heroes whose legends were narrated and thereby 
made known to a wider public.60 Another, and no less important, way to sustain a lively
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memory of the battles, myths and legends was through folk songs which emerged in 
large numbers since the latter half of the fifteenth century. The so-called Tellenspiele -  
festival productions devoted to the legend of William Tell which had been staged 
regularly since the beginning of the sixteenth century -  also served to popularise and 
reproduce the myths. Such festival productions assumed a significant role during the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the religious divide posed a serious threat to 
the Swiss Confederation. In these plays, the founding era was portrayed as the golden 
age of Confederate history, and the religious divisions were described as a departure 
from the virtues of the forefathers.61
The political salience o f the myths
What was even more important for the long-term survival of the Confederate myth- 
symbol complex or mythomoteur was the political significance it acquired almost from 
the outset. In part, this was but a natural consequence of its spread during the late- 
medieval and early-modern periods. However, the diffixsion of the myths from the late- 
medieval era onwards would not have sufficed to render them politically significant. 
What was decisive in this regard was the distinct social and political reality of 
communalism. Blickle argues that as a principle of social and political organisation, 
communalism, unlike feudalism, favoured the emergence of a ‘public sphere’ in the 
Swiss Confederation. Such a public sphere, he maintains, took shape in the late 
fifteenth century. He also maintains that this public sphere, once it had come into 
existence, forced the Confederate elites to legitimate their actions before a wider 
public: ‘The policies within a certain territory thereby become dependant on a 
“public”.’ In this context, the historical past, expressed and personified in the myths, 
acquired an important function in securing political legitimacy.62
A side-glance at the Scottish case can help to illustrate the specificity of 
communal identity formation in the Swiss Confederation. In Scotland, too, recurrent 
medieval warfare (i.e. the war of independence against England that began in the late 
thirteenth century) served as a catalyst for the formation of a sense of communal
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identity. Under the stress of constant attacks from England, the Scottish government 
produced, in the words of Susan Reynolds, ‘the most eloquent statement of regnal 
solidarity to come out of the middle ages’.63 In a letter to the pope known as the 
Declaration of Arbroath, thirty-nine Scottish barons justified their claim to regnal 
independence from England by pointing out the common descent of the Scottish kings, 
and that the Scots had from earliest times been unconquered and independent. Despite 
the fact that these claims fly in the face of many of the relevant facts, the Declaration 
reflects the Scottish leadership’s belief ‘in the historic regnal unity [of Scotland] and 
their right to independence’.64 Yet, essentially, the myth of ethnic origin and 
independence that found expression in the Declaration of Arbroath reflects the self- 
identity of a regnal community dominated by kings and nobles. This tiny elite provided 
the driving force behind the creation of the communal myths that the Declaration of 
Arbroath contains. It was not geared to a public (its sole addressee was the pope), and 
the indications are that it possessed limited popular resonance among ‘ordinary’ Scots 
at the time (even if this was to change from the eighteenth centuries onwards).65
This was different under conditions of Confederate communalism. Given the 
strong anti-establishment tendency of the core myths, authority partly depended on the 
ability of the political elites to prove that their actions did not violate the example set by 
the supposedly virtuous ancestors whose memory was preserved in the foundation and 
liberation myths. Indeed, the degree to which the Confederate elite of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries tried to legitimate their claim to authority by references to the 
mythical narratives is conspicuous. A case in point is the religious conflict that resulted 
from the Reformation. The Catholic cantons made much of the fact that they had 
remained faithful to the faith of the ancestors, while the Protestant members of the 
Confederation had departed from the moral and religious parameters set by the 
founding fathers. Protestant representatives countered such allegations by criticising the 
Catholic cantons of central Switzerland for their heavy involvement in trading with 
mercenary soldiers. This and not the reformation of the Christian faith, they argued, 
signalled a departure from the legacy of the heroic forebears.66
69
The Swiss Peasant War of 1653 underscores both the popular resonance of the 
foundation and liberation myths in early-modern Switzerland and their capacity to 
inspire collective action against the ruling authorities. Hence, when the rebellious 
peasant alliances denounced the authorities of Lucerne as tyrannical, they explicitly 
referred to the anti-Habsburg foundation myths to legitimate their actions. For the same 
reasons their forefathers had defeated the oppressive Austrian nobility and expelled 
their bailiffs, they claimed, they now raised their weapons against the territorial 
authorities. Andreas Suter has shown that the Confederate myth-symbol complex that 
had emerged in the fourteenth and fifteenth century was decisive in inciting the 
rebelling peasants to take military action in 1653. In particular, the myth of liberation 
personified in the figure of Wilhelm Tell possessed a mobilising capacity because it 
formed ‘part of a cultural tradition which involved both elite- and popular culture’ and
iV7also cut across religious boundaries as well. Only days after the peasant revolt had 
been crushed in a short and bloody encounter, three peasant leaders took revenge by 
assassinating a high representative of the Lucerne authorities. The three men who 
executed the assassination were all disguised as Wilhelm Tell. The next day, they went 
to mass in the village of Schtipfheim, apparently displaying the murder weapon to the 
gathered crowd. Thus they expressed their conviction that their actions had been in 
accordance with God’s will, and the impromptu reactions of the local population 
suggest that their deed was understood as they had mtended: as tyrannicide.
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Plate 2-3: The topography around Lake Lucerne with the three Confederates o f the 
founding myth in the top left-hand comer. Woodcut, 16th century.
Conclusion
This chapter has traced the formation of the ethno-symbolic memory within the Swiss 
Confederation between the late-medieval and early-modern periods. It was composed 
of three communal myths: a myth of foundation (embodied in the myth of the Riitli); a 
myth of liberation (expressed in the legend about Wilhelm Tell); and a myth of ethnic 
election, serving as an explanation for the Confederate victories over the Habsburg 
armies and as a justification for their resistance to the feudal status order. This ethno- 
symbolic memory provided the outward manifestation of an increasingly salient 
Confederate self-identity. In a crucial sense, this self-identity was predicated on the 
dualism between communalism and feudalism, which served as the Confederate 
mythomoteur.
By the turn of the eighteenth century, this dualism, dramatised and typified in 
the three core myths, had become a political factor: an ethno-symbolic memory which
71
would play a significant role in both the legitimation of power and the mobilisation of 
social protest. Would this pattern of legitimating one’s actions and one’s authority 
through references to the core myths continue into the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, the era of modem nationalism? The chapters of part II seek to determine the 
impact of this ethno-symbolic memory on the construction and re-construction of Swiss 
nationhood in the modem era, and how new events and processes led to 
reinterpretations of its constitutive parts.
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PARTH:
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SWISS 
NATIONHOOD
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CHAPTER THREE
Nationalising the Ethno-symbolic Memory:
The Synthesis of the Helvetic Patriots (1760-1798)
The revered founders o f our republic were brave fighters rather than experienced statesmen or 
thoughtful legislators. They fought as only true and unique heroes can fight for the liberation o f 
their Fatherland; but they neglected to give to their state, created from the mere iron o f their 
weapons, a proper nature capable o f incorporating all its different parts into a single coherent 
body. ...It has been left to our times to penetrate more deeply into the core o f the state and -  
like a medical doctor whose knowledge o f the illness is the cause o f the patient's recovery -  to 
select and apply the appropriate remedy. Ought we not to believe that this happy time has now 
arrived, like the beautiful sunrise which testifies to the arrival o f a new day? Has not 
predestination placed flames on our horizon, which are to enlighten us?
Address delivered at the 1763 meeting of the Helvetic Society1
How to transform Switzerland from a relatively loose confederation of cantons and 
subject territories into a modem nation-state? This was the question that preoccupied 
the minds and fuelled the emotions of the Helvetic patriots during the late eighteenth 
century. While the question received a variety of answers, two narratives structured the 
discourse of Swiss patriotism in the late eighteenth century. The first could be termed 
the future-oriented narrative of social and political improvement. The numerous 
references to the future are testimony to the patriots’ hope that a better, more rational, 
more virtuous, and less divided society -  most of them used the term ‘common 
Fatherland’ to denote the society of their dreams -  was on the horizon. The second 
narrative that permeates patriotic discourse could be described as the narrative of 
historical origins. The invocation of a glorious past, the veneration of virtuous 
ancestors, was rarely absent whenever the patriots discussed how to transform a 
lamentable present into a promising future. In concrete terms, they referred to the 
myths, symbols, and narratives that by the eighteenth century had come to constitute 
the ethno-symbolic memory of the Swiss Confederation (see chapter 2).
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Essentially, therefore, the patriots’ project can be regarded as an ongoing 
attempt at fusing these two narratives -  the one forward-looking, the other retrospective 
-  into a single definition of Swiss nationhood. Theoretically, civic universalism and 
ethno-symbolic particularism are imcompatible. In practice, however, the relationship 
between the two narratives was one of ambiguity and tension rather than direct 
contradiction, and the patriots’ persistent endeavour at solving this tension served as the 
catalyst for early Swiss nationalism. In the course of this process, the pre-modem 
myths, symbols, and narratives were reinterpreted in the light of the civic values of the 
Enlightenment that inspired the patriots. Though concentrated in the Protestant, 
German-speaking areas of the Swiss Confederation, the patriotic network that expanded 
rapidly in the closing decades of the eighteenth century cut across linguistic and 
religious boundaries.3
This chapter analyses this process of identity formation as it unfolded between 
1760 and 1798. It comprises three sections. The first examines the rise of Swiss 
patriotism from the 1760s in terms of its ideological programme and organisational 
structure, while the second puts forward an explanation as to how and why this rise 
took place. The third section examines the patriotic discourse about Swiss nationhood 
as a process of boundary construction.
The rise of Swiss patriotism: ideology and organisation
The genesis of Swiss patriotism in the late 1750s and early 1760s overlapped and built 
upon the historicist revolution that became first noticeable shortly after the turn of the 
seventeenth century. The latter was based on the belief that individual and social 
phenomena can best be interpreted as the ‘product of sequences of events which unfold 
the identity and laws of growth of those phenomena’. For the adherents of the 
historicist worldview, moreover, the communal past was a source of inspiration and 
moral authority.4 Hence the more salient this worldview became among the educated
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public, the more bound were the patriots to legitimate their political aspirations and 
programmes in the language of historicism.
As early as the 1720s, the minister, Johann Jakob Breitinger and, even more 
prominently, the literary critique and historian, Johann Jakob Bodmer, developed an 
interest in the Confederation’s past. More than three decades before Rousseau was 
embarking on a similar enterprise, these two intellectuals of the Enlightenment had 
pioneered the historicist reaction against the rationality and universalist orientation of 
the French Enlightenment. Campbell Orr, for example, argues that Bodmer and 
Breitinger, together with other Swiss intellectuals of their generation, ‘pioneered the 
way from classicism to Romanticism, while stopping short of the fully developed 
Romantic creed associated with Germany ...\5
Yet, while engaging with its fundamental premises, their criticism was not 
confined to the French philosophes but included the chroniclers of Swiss medieval 
history. The civic humanists, who in the sixteenth century had begun to chronicle the 
pivotal events of Swiss history, became a preferred object of their scorn. Bodmer in 
particular launched a fierce attack on the method and style embraced by the historians 
of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, arguing that they were ‘among the most 
simple-minded of their profession’. He complained that their uninspired narratives had 
amounted to nothing more than ‘the faithful collection and registration of past events’.6 
Such scholars, whom Bodmer described as mere ‘copyists’, were contrasted with more 
imaginative historians, who tried to determine the character of a people by studying 
their history. Thus for Bodmer, the history of the Confederation represented ‘a source 
of the most beautiful expeditions’, and he declared that ‘whoever is going to write it 
will be embarking on an eulogy to an entire people’. As he sketches out his programme 
for national renewal:
We therefore expect specific messages about the most alien customs and 
fashions there are in the Swiss country; especially those which are peculiar to 
a town, or to Switzerland as a whole, such as: the distinct ways of upbringing, 
of caressing young women, of having a wedding, of treating one’s wife ... Yet 
although those moral novelties are to be given preference that set Switzerland 
apart from other countries, this does not mean that we should exclude ...
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examples o f ... generous contempt, of despicable admiration for wealth or 
lasciviousness, honour, and life; neither should we leave aside natural 
speeches on the weaknesses and strength of men, of the joy and misery of 
human life.7
No doubt greatly influenced by the pioneering work of Bodmer and Breitinger in 
Zurich, and of Albrecht von Haller in Bern, others were to follow their example. The 
year 1758 is particularly significant in that it saw the publication of three pamphlets in 
which a mostly cautious critique of the political order of the ancien regime was 
couched in an openly patriotic language. The three authors were Isaak Iselin, Franz Urs 
Balthasar and Johann Georg Zimmermann. The titles of their works were 
Philosophische Traume eines Menschenfreundes (‘Philosophical Dreams of a 
Philanthropist’); Patriotische Traume eines Eidgenossen von einem Mittel, die veraltete 
Eidgenossenschaft wieder zu verjiingen (‘Patriotic Dreams of a Confederate about 
Possible Means of rejuvenating the Old Confederation’); and Nationalstolz (‘National 
Pride’). Works entailing a patriotic critique of the status quo appeared also in the 
French language throughout the eighteenth century, notably by Abraham Ruchat, in 
Lausanne, Louis Bourguet, in Neuchatel and, if much later, by the minister Philippe- 
Sirice Bridel, in Basle. Moveover, around 1755, a network of private correspondence 
connecting Helvetic patriots from Zurich, Lucerne, Bern and Basle was set up by young 
disciples of Bodmer and Haller.8
In the course of the 1760s, therefore, ethnic historicism spread outwards from 
the drawing rooms of closely-knit learned circles to become the cognitive model of a 
rapidly growing number of patriotic circles. It was thus the early nationalist movement 
was bom in Switzerland (see Figure 3.1.).
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Fig. 3-1: Number of patriotic associations, 1761-1797
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Source: Im H of and de Capitani (1983: 66).
It is not difficult to ascertain the social backgrounds of the leading lights of this 
movement. They were all members of an educated elite, and, almost without exception, 
they were critical of the existing order. Their agenda included such demands as the 
introduction of a single constitution for the whole Confederation, majority rule for the 
decision-making in the Confederate Diet, equality for the subject territories. All these 
measures should serve the advancement of the patriotic spirit among the public at
The Radical Movemement
The national discourse of the period between 1760 and 1798 gave rise to two distinct 
concepts of national identity. A radical strand of patriotism was developed in Zurich by 
a circle that had formed around the charismatic intellectual and scholar Johann Jakob 
Bodmer in Zurich.10 The activities of this movement were dominated by young or 
prospective scholars, ministers and artists. The overwhelming majority of those who 
joined the circle were former or actual students of the Carolinum in Zurich, where
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Bodmer was lecturing in patriotic history between 1731 and 1775. The Carolinum was 
an academy for the education of ministers. Faced with a major crisis in proto-industrial 
production during the 1760s, a large part of Zurich’s economic elite sent their male 
offspring to the Carolinum instead of encouraging them to join the familial enterprise. 
This led to a sharp increase in student numbers.11
Once there, the young students, most of whom came from backgrounds where 
Enlightenment ideas were eagerly consumed, found themselves in a highly 
conservative institution where strong discipline and orthodox practices of education 
were the rule. Students were prohibited to use languages other than Latin in their 
private conversations in the corridors. However, they had the opportunity to listen to a 
teacher like Bodmer, who taught a secular subject matter and was an ambidextrous 
ideological entrepreneur. In his lectures, he acquainted his students with the doctrine of 
natural law and with Rousseau’s philosophical works and expressed criticism of the
17status quo. Thanks to his radical views and his enthusiasm as a teacher, Bodmer came 
to be greatly admired by the students.13 Many of his young adherents followed his 
doctrines without much reservation. As one of his disciples described the purpose of the 
radical movement:
The main purpose of this society is to examine the principles and doctrines of a 
truly philosophical policy in order to get a better grasp on the advantages, 
mistakes and improvements of the different ways of government. To this end, 
we shall pay much attention to the history of the Fatherland and try to draw 
practical lessons from it.14
Democratic republicanism and the doctrine of natural law constituted the ideological 
basis of radical patriotism. Bodmer, for instance, argued that the ‘superfluous affluence 
of the aristocrats is very damaging to a free state, because inequality in material goods 
produces various pernicious passions in the hearts of the citizens, thus abolishing the 
natural equality which originally existed among men.’15 In his play, ‘Gesslers Tod, 
oder das erlegte Raubthier' (‘Gessler’s death, or, the hunted-down predator’, printed in 
1775), he justified the assassination of the Habsburg official at the hands of William 
Tell with the argument that the former, by breaking traditional legal agreements and
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oppressing the local population, had acted like a criminal. In his own words: ‘One is 
entitled to use any means to end the life of a beast. I cannot prosecute somebody 
according to the rules of law who has repealed all lawful procedure.’16
Some of his young followers went even further in their radicalism than their 
teacher by portraying the Confederation’s history in terms of a succession of 
revolutionary acts and upheavals. This applies, for example, to the young Rudolf 
Kramer. In 1768, he published a history of what he called the ‘revolutions in the 
Confederate states from the seventeenth century to the present’. The book provided an 
explicit justification of the Swiss peasant war of 1653 and of ensuing rural uprisings 
and protests, arguing that there was ‘ample evidence that the revolutions which 
occurred from time to time in the Helvetic states’ were the result of the lack of 
republican equality.17
Despite its initial success, however, the demise of the radical youth movement 
began in the 1770s. It was hastened by the censorship, repression and public stigmati­
sation of Zurich’s patrician authorities, and by the latter’s success in domesticating 
some of its most radical proponents and turning many of them into reformers. 
Eventually, this led to a split of the radical movement, with some members going 
underground and organising themselves in secret societies with limited capacity to 
influence public opinion. But many of the movement’s most gifted thinkers and 
agitators, like Johann-Caspar Lavater, Johann Heinrich Fiissli or Heinrich Pestalozzi 
joined the patriotic reformers in the Helvetic Society and embarked on successful 
political careers.18 One former radical and Bodmer’s successor as professor of patriotic 
history at the Carolinum who came to embrace a reform strategy was Johann Heinrich 
Fuessli (1745-1832). In 1778, he gave the following advice to his students:
Young men! Conceal before the eyes of the plebeians the holy enthusiasm of 
virtue. If you have insights, enlighten your fellow citizens by means of your 
manners ... and your scholarly work ...But do not storm your way, and do not 
talk inconsiderately. Do not throw arrows against vice unless you are 
convinced that you can destroy it, for otherwise you will only earn the scorn of 
the mocker.19
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Reform Patriotism
The reform-oriented patriots gathered in the Helvetic Society, who embodied the 
prevailing strand of Swiss national identity on the eve of the Helvetic Revolution. The 
distinctiveness of the conception of Swiss nationhood it advanced rests upon three 
broad features:
1. The nation as a balanced synthesis of ethno-historical and 
civic elements.
2. Nation-formation as an attempt to simultaneously supersede 
and guarantee loyalties and attachments below the national 
level (regional/cantonal).
3. Nation-formation as a gradual process, not as a radical or 
revolutionary act.
The Helvetic Society was founded in 1761 and ceased to exist following the outbreak 
of the Helvetic Revolution in 1798. It formed the first patriotic association to be set up 
with the deliberate aim of attracting members from all parts of the country. The plan to 
set up such a society emerged from a discussion between the politicians Isaak Iselin 
(Basle) and Kaspar Hirzel (Zurich), and the poet Salomon Gessner (Zurich). At the 
time of the foundation of the Helvetic Society, Iselin and Hirzel had already been 
prominent figures for some time in the patriotic movements in their respective home 
towns.20
Measured against contemporary standards, the Helvetic Society pursued an 
open membership policy. Its initiators rejected plans -  formulated, for instance, by the 
radical patriots Johann Jakob Bodmer and Heinrich Zellweger -  to develop the new 
association into a kind of scholarly club, or an academy for the education of future 
statesmen. While the Helvetic Society’s founders greatly respected Bodmer for his 
achievements in the field of patriotic history -  he was made a member in absentia at the 
society’s first meeting in 1762 -  his radical inclinations were perceived as potentially
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harmful to the patriotic cause. Instead of opting for visionary exclusiveness, the 
protagonists of the new society (at least from the 1770s onwards) chose a realist course 
that took account of actual socio-political conditions. It was thus in accordance with 
this basic orientation when the protocol of the 1763 meeting, politely but firmly, 
rejected the radicals’ plan to turn the Helvetic Society into an elitist academy devoted 
to the improvement of Swiss politics:
Even though it is conceded that the propositions of Mr. Bodmer and Mr.
Zellweger are very advantageous and well considered in their general 
intentions, and as much as we would wish their being realised, it is nonetheless 
necessary to postpone these propositions until the arrival of more pleasant 
times.21
Instead, the leaders of the Helvetic Society tried to combine patriotic and social 
activities. This involved meeting influential people from other parts of the Swiss 
Confederation, and entering into political discussions with them. As for discussion 
topics, matters of a practical nature were considered as vital as having scholarly debates 
about the latest works of the philosophes or the written contributions of other active 
members of the society. For example, on October 17,1763 Johann Caspar Hirzel, by 
then a leading figure within the Society, wrote to Isaak Iselin with regard to the request 
put forward by Bodmer and his associates:
If we choose to become a learned society, we will inevitably frighten off those 
who would like to visit us as long as we simply met as faithful Confederates. I 
admire every scholar, but I would welcome with the same enthusiasm a 
sensible, honest man from Uri or the Melchthal as a teacher of the sciences.
The new statutes of 1766 officially sanctioned this open approach. Among the purposes 
of the annual meetings the formation of ‘close friendships’ between ‘Confederates from 
all cantons and parts of our common Fatherland* was named and the hope was 
expressed that ‘these more than private friendships would provide the seed from which 
numerous and multiplying contacts would gradually spread all over the nation’.23 The
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atmosphere at the annual meetings, which used to last four days and to which the wives 
of the members had access, was often quite lively. In the afternoon, the members, 
mostly in small groups of two or three people, would go for walks in the surrounding 
countryside. Social events would be followed by patriotic ceremonies. After dinner 
with wine and music, around midnight, three youths would step on the podium in front 
of the gathered members to create a symbolic renewal of the Oath of the Rtitli, followed 
by a sip from the liberty cup of the heroic blood of their forefathers. The ceremony 
would be brought to a close with a collection for the poor of the town where the 
meeting took place.24 All this was in sharp contrast to the puritan spirit that reigned 
during the gatherings of the radical Bodmer circle in Zurich, where the consumption of 
tea, coffee, and tabacco, let alone alcohol, was prohibited during the meetings.
At least initially, however, the growth and appeal of the Helvetic Society was 
impeded by censorship and other forms of oppression brought about by the ruling 
authorities. Despite its non-subversive political agenda, from the very outset various 
cantons, among them Bern and Solothum, reacted with suspicion to the new society. 
Consequently, the membership in the late 1760s stagnated at between 60 and 80, only 
sharply increasing from the middle of the 1770s onwards. At the same time, the social 
composition of its membership changed dramatically, with an increasing number of 
cantonal magistrates joining the Society’s ranks. The Protestant and German-speaking 
element dominated within the Society, outnumbering Catholic and French-speaking 
members by a ratio of almost ten to one. However, the fact that all the cultural 
segments of Swiss society were represented meant that the Helvetic Society could 
effectively be regarded as a microcosm of early Swiss nationalism.26
Those who could make it to the annual gatherings of the Helvetic Society, 
spending four days socialising and debating with other members on the state of the 
Confederation, took home from these meetings a memorable patriotic experience. Most 
importantly, for those in a position to share this experience, the Swiss nation had ceased 
to be a purely ‘imagined community’, an ‘invisible ... beauty which can only be 
envisaged with the eyes of reason’.27 In the eyes of its members, the Helvetic Society 
was the literal embodiment of this nation. Its inclusiveness and nation-wide appeal
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made it unique according to late eighteenth-century European standards.28 As opposed 
to the radical Bodmer-circle in Zurich, the bulk of its members were not free-floating 
intellectuals but belonged to the country’s political and economic elite; besides, it must 
be bom in mind that the great majority of those taking part in its activities were at the 
same time members in similar societies in their respective home regions. This way a 
considerable network of patriotic activity all over the country emerged and was 
sustained for several decades, making an important contribution to the education of two 
generations of Swiss patriots.
But how did this patriotic network affect the great majority of Swiss who did 
not belong to any such circle and for whom the nation largely remained an ‘invisible 
beauty’? There was, to be sure, no shortage of proposals on how to spread the national 
message to wider sections of the population. These proposals included requests to 
intensify social interaction between the various social groups and regions that 
composed the Confederation; they furthermore entailed a plan to set up a national 
academy for the education of future statesmen which -  unlike ‘foreign academies’ -  
would fully appreciate the complex structure of the Swiss Confederation as embodied 
in the ‘differences between the various Confederate states’;30 they finally contained the 
wish for a national assembly, where the ‘general Fatherland’ could be perceived ‘as a 
concrete entity’, and which, by enabling the Swiss ‘to overlook the whole’, would 
provide the inspiration necessary to ‘concentrate all [their] efforts on improving [their] 
common Fatherland’. However, few of these projects were actually realised during 
the eighteenth century.32
Nevertheless, perhaps the most important plan to foster national consciousness 
was about to be realised. Apparently at the request of the 1765 or 1766 meeting of the 
Helvetic Society, Johann Caspar Lavater (himself an active member) began to compose 
a considerable number of folk songs on various historical topics. In these songs, the 
foundation period, epitomised in the medieval myths and battles, took pride of place. In 
1767 a first collection of Lavater’s songs was published, and others were soon to 
follow. At the Helvetic Society’s 1768 meeting, Fiissli had only the highest praise for 
Lavater’s work. At a time of crisis and corruption, Fiissli argued, there could not have
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been a better ‘antidote’ to the challenge at hand than ‘national songs’. Within a very 
short period, so he claimed, Lavater’s songs had had a considerable resonance in many 
parts of the Swiss Confederation, ‘driving out rhyming jokes and popular obscenities’, 
as he put it in a typically moralistic phrase. Turning towards Lavater, who was 
apparently among the audience, he proclaimed: ‘Finally, these songs have penetrated 
regions where people rarely ever read a book; and it is in such regions that these songs, 
some foreign words apart, are best understood.’ Fiissli therefore concluded his speech 
by requesting Lavater to continue with his compositions, recommending that he pay 
particular attention to two broad themes: the joy of the peasant in Switzerland as 
opposed to his counterpart in monarchical states; and the Swabian Wars, which, he 
claimed, was the only ‘epoch of our history’ which had not yet found expression in the 
existing collection of Lavater’s historic folk songs.33
The rise of Swiss patriotism: an explanation
Why did the nation become such a prominent topic after 1760? Neither a monocausal 
explanation nor an assessment of different variables in isolation can do justice to the 
complexities of the process considered. In what follows, then, I seek to explain the rise 
of the Swiss nation as a cognitive and emotive category resulting from an intersection 
of four sets of conditions. Each condition, taken on its own, cannot explain the rise of 
patriotism, but their interaction makes it a likely outcome. These include
1. the sociopolitical conflicts that proliferated in the course of the eighteenth 
century combined with a parallel lack of cooperation on the Confederate level;
2. the emergence of new cognitive models grounded on rationality and 
universalism during the seventeenth century and their spread during the 
eighteenth;
3. the contradictions embodied in the type of regime commonly referred to as 
Enlightened Absolutism;
4. the existence of a well-entrenched ethno-symbolic memory comprising a 
repertoire of symbols, myths, and narratives.
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Let me deal with each of these issues in turn.
A less than united Confederation: social conflicts and political divisions
In sharp contrast to the conflicts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, most of the 
conflicts of the eighteenth century were of a social and political, and not primarily of a 
religious nature.34 Two developments led to a sharp increase in the number of conflicts 
in eighteenth-century Switzerland. One concerns the quasi-absolutist policies pursued 
by a number of Swiss towns, particularly Zurich and Bern. By increasing the tax 
pressure on agricultural production, these policies resulted in a widening of the socio­
economic gap between town and countryside. In concrete terms, this meant that the 
peasants of the rural areas had to bear the burden of heavy taxation, while the city 
dwellers were largely exempt from such duties. With regard to political rights, too, the 
rural population was clearly kept at a disadvantage compared to the citizens of an 
average town. The 18,000 strong population of Zurich’s countryside, for example, 
possessed virtually no influence on political decision-making, while it carried a heavy 
tax burden. Hardly surprisingly, this situation favoured the development of tensions and 
a latent potential for conflicts.
Another line of conflict, which cut right across town populations, resulted from 
the practice of patrician rule. In Bern, Freiburg, Solothum, Lucerne and Zurich 
particularly, the concentration of power in the hands of a few families and cliques, who 
were reproducing themselves by co-optation, became a prime cause of grievance. 
Moreover, in the eighteenth century the populations of the larger towns were divided 
into citizens and those who lacked full citizenship rights. In around 1770, the 
proportion of citizens in Geneva making up the total population was 27 per cent, in 
Bern 30 per cent, in Basle 50 per cent, and in Zurich 60 per cent.37 Conflicts were most 
likely to occur where political and social inequality coincided with economic hardship. 
Guild-uprisings are recorded for various towns, notably for Basle in 1691, for Zurich in 
1713 and 1777, and for Freiburg in 1781 and 1782.38 The epicentres of conflict, 
however, were Geneva and Zurich. In Geneva, the first wave of protests and uprisings
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reached its peak in 1782, and the existing authorities could only hold on to their power 
as a result of French interference. In Zurich, too, where the making of all important 
decisions lay in the hands of a small group of patricians, a steady increase in conflicts 
was witnessed between 1760 and 1780. However, by applying a combined strategy of 
repression and reform, the ruling elite managed to keep revolutionary transformation at 
bay.39
The particularist tendencies within the Old Confederation, i.e. the inability of its 
parts to co-operate with one another in important matters of internal and external 
security, presents another feature of the Confederation of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. The protracted history of the plan to centralise the Confederation’s 
military defence exemplifies this problem. From the seventeenth century onwards, 
successive attempts were made to set up a standing army under a central command 
based on the model of the Low Countries. None of these did come to fruition, however. 
Efforts to arrive at tighter military integration, promoted most vigorously by Zurich and 
Bern in particular, met up against two main obstacles. For one thing, the project faced 
opposition from the Catholic communities of central Switzerland who feared -  not 
without justification -  that closer military integration would further strengthen the 
already existing hegemony of the Protestant towns. For another, the plan was likely to 
have provoked broad popular resistance because it would have necessitated a 
substantial increase in the burden of taxation on the countryside.40
Another area which reveals the Old Confederation’s political disunity concerns 
the regulation of mercenary service. In the absence of a common policy towards such a 
regulation, each Confederate could freely and independently enter into contracts with 
foreign powers to provide mercenaries, depending on their own particular wishes and 
preferences. This lack of co-ordination between the (mostly Catholic) rural cantons that 
supplied mercenaries to foreign armies sometimes had dire consequences. In the 
Spanish Succession War (1701-1714), for instance, 23,000 Swiss soldiers fought on the 
French side and 20,000 fought in the army of the Alliance. In the battle of Malplaquet 
in 1709, these Swiss regiments met and almost wiped each other out, much to the 
outrage of Switzerland’s emerging patriotic elite 41 The fact that up until the eighteenth
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century Protestant and Catholic cantons held their separate diets is a further indication 
of the low degree of cohesion and mutual loyalty within the Confederation. Witnessing 
the apparent extent of internal discord at close range, a German scholar travelling 
across Switzerland, while speaking fondly of the commercial spirit and skills he found 
among the Protestant elite of the towns, concluded in 1795 that ‘the much praised unity 
between the cantons of the Confederation seems to have suffered greatly in recent
„ ,  ? 42years .
Rationality and Enlightenment universalism -  the emergence o f new cognitive models
The Confederation’s internal divisions and the still prevalent particularist orientations 
among large sections of its population, alone would not have been sufficient to enable 
the emergence of nationalism as a new ideology and movement. Neither a lack of 
internal unity and loyalty, nor internal conflict and grievance, let alone inequality, per 
se can be expected to inspire patriotic passion. A combination of fatalism and regional 
upheavals would have been likelier outcomes, had there not occurred a cultural 
transformation that profoundly affected the perception of social and political affairs. I 
am referring to the spread, during the course of the eighteenth century, of a new 
cognitive model based on rationality and universalism that affected the educated elites 
in particular. Measured against this model, the ancien regime left a lot to be desired.
‘The new philosophy calls all in doubt.’ So wrote the English poet John Donne 
as early as 1612.43 The spread of scientific rationality, hitherto confined to the new 
natural philosophies, proved to have an impact on the existing social and political order 
that no perceptive observer could neglect, and Switzerland was no exception in this 
respect. To be sure, the culture of science took root later and spread less quickly in 
Switzerland than, for instance, in England, where it became ‘part of public life during 
the 1640-1660 period.’44 Nonetheless, natural scientists like Albrecht von Haller in 
Bern, or the mathematicians Jakob and Johann Bemouilly in Basle, soon gained a 
European-wide reputation in their respective fields. Inspired by these scholars and their 
prestige, an ever larger number of educated Swiss started to consume scientific and
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other scholarly literature. The increased consumption rate of such works was fuelled by 
the rapid expansion of ‘print capitalism’ in the wake of the Reformation. Along with 
this revolution in the production and dissemination of printed material went a cultural 
transformation of no less significance. I am referring to the publication of pamphlets, 
learned journals and books, and what have you, in the ‘national’ vernaculars (German, 
French, English, Italian) rather than in Latin.45
Taking up the themes of scientific rationality and universal laws, and applying 
them to human society in general, the Enlightenment movement brought about a 
fundamental change in the ways in which individuals and groups perceived the world 
they inhabited. To a far greater extent than their colleagues in the natural sciences, most 
Enlightenment thinkers were intent on spreading their ideas to the wider reading public. 
The Swiss participated in the Enlightenment project as both recipients and producers of 
new ideas. Paris and some of the northern German states, notably Prussia, provided the 
Enlightenment with its leading centres, but the contributions of Zurich, Basle and 
Geneva remained anything but marginal.46 Some, like the Bernese natural scientist 
Albrecht von Haller, the philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau from Geneva, or the 
literary critic and historian Johann Jakob Bodmer from Zurich, were in the vanguard of 
the Enlightenment movement and their influence on the Swiss educated public was 
considerable.47
The contradictions o f Enlightened Absolutism
It remains difficult for contemporaries to grasp societal contradictions, which 
potentially engender social transformations, as long as the discrepancy between the 
value system underlying an existing order and new cognitive models remains in the 
abstract. What renders such contradictions concrete and visible, however, is if they 
become entrenched in a social formation or authority structure. The contradictions that 
were characteristic of the old regime in its later stages -  between achievement and 
ascription, Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, as it were -  were not only embodied, but 
actually institutionalised in the system of Enlightened Absolutism. As a socio-political
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authority structure, the latter represents an attempt to infuse a given order based upon 
rank and hierarchy with enlightened ideals of progress and rationality.48
In one regard, Enlightened Absolutism, by providing a bulwark against regional 
particularism, aristocratic privilege and exclusive forms of representation, prepared the 
ground for the emergence of constitutional governments based upon quasi-modem 
notions of equality and justice. At the same time, however, a hierarchy, legitimated by 
differences of birth and rank, along with the feudal revenue from agricultural 
production, was to remain at the core of absolutist authority even in its late phase. 
Hence, while engendering a reform movement and preparing the ground for the 
emergence of a ‘public sphere’ which furthered the exchange of rival ideas, 
considerable efforts were made at the same time to preserve ascribed status.
Voltaire and Diderot, to name but two prominent examples, supported the 
theory and practice of Enlightened Absolutism because they believed in the possibility 
of reforming the absolutist system by infusing it with Enlightenment rationality (but not 
equality!). Rousseau, on the other hand, regarded such a reform plan as inherently 
contradictory and ultimately doomed, arguing that Enlightenment-values were 
incommensurate with absolutist rule.49 As can be seen in hindsight, the frequent 
unintended consequence of attempts to reform states along such lines was that it cast an 
even sharper light on the Janus-faced nature of late absolutist regimes. In other words, 
as a perceptive analyst has put it succinctly, the project of Enlightened Absolutism 
‘attempts at securing and extending authority while at the same time creating important 
conditions for its own supersession’.50
Of course, at no point during the eighteenth century, let alone earlier, did the 
Swiss Confederation as a whole possess the two fundamental features of late absolutist 
states such as Prussia or France: territorial integration and administrative centralism. 
There was no king to successfully impose on his territory what were the recognised 
essentials of every self-respecting absolutist state: a standing army, a permanent 
bureaucracy, national taxation, a codified law, and the beginnings of a unified market.51 
Nevertheless, several Swiss towns, notably the Protestant centres Zurich and Bern went 
some way down the absolutist path. While such aspirations did not bear fruit at the
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Confederate level, these would-be absolutist states were not wholly unsuccessful within 
their own spheres of influence in centralising authority, homogenising legal and 
economic matters and tightening the fiscal grip on their subjects. The political elite of 
these two towns, whether of aristocratic or bourgeois origin, saw as their ideal not 
republican simplicity but the lifestyle of the international enlightened aristocracy. As in 
other European cities, these aspirations and claims to political power were symbolically 
expressed by distinct ways of dressing and ritual behaviour. At the same time, 
however, this very elite made use of cognitive models that had evolved with the 
Enlightenment in an attempt to reform the existing order so as to make it more efficient 
and less vulnerable. Against this background, Zurich and Bern, along with Basle, were 
to emerge as the epicentres of the nationalist movement that took off in the 1760s, 
furnishing it with many of its protagonists. It was in these towns that what has been 
described as the Janus-faced nature of Enlightened Absolutism was visible to the 
critical public, many of whom were themselves involved, in some way or another, in 
the politics of the bureaucratic state.
Yet the patrician families that dominated politics showed a general reluctance to 
accommodate newcomers from the bourgeoisie, and those who eventually gained 
access to political office had often reached a considerable age. It is hardly a 
coincidence, then, that particularly young educated town dwellers, who were either 
unwilling to wait or found themselves shut out from power completely, supplied the 
radical movement with its main recruitment basis. Even for successful reformers who 
had never flirted with radical ideas, the contradictions of the old regime provided a 
major impetus behind their decision to join the patriotic movement. They could not fail 
to recognise that ‘free and unconventional opinions were regarded with suspicion, if not 
even prohibited or prosecuted*. Nor could they simply ignore that ‘the state of the 
Swiss Confederation as a whole looked increasingly hopeless’.53 These evident 
contradictions provided fertile soil for an ideological programme and movement which, 
while critical of old regime institutions, still largely operated within its parameters.
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Ethno-Symbolic Antecedents
There can be little doubt that the conjuncture of certain socio-political and cultural 
factors produced societal contradictions that enhanced the potential for social and 
cultural change. Yet these conditions formed a necessary but by no means sufficient 
condition for the arrival of a nation-centred discourse. The fact that the patriots were 
strongly influenced by universalistic principles can plausibly explain why they 
launched their criticisms against the existing order in the name of the ‘public*, 
‘citizenry’ or ‘common Fatherland’ rather than in the name of a sectional political 
group. What it does not explain, however, is why their patriotism adopted so 
profoundly historicist overtones.
Collecting and interpreting the nation’s past and making the broader public 
acquainted with its assumed moral lessons became a paramount task. Some members of 
the Helvetic Society demanded that the collection of all historical sources be arranged, 
so that they became available for scholarly examination. As one member expressed this 
request at the 1766 meeting:
Let us now, like busy bees, collect the material and use it to construct a building 
which is to stand out due to its proper structure, its virtue, and not least its 
usefulness. Let us take the trouble to discover the truth about the deeds of our 
fathers, and let us spread the insights that we have gained from such an 
endeavour.54
As in the case of the radicals, the foremost concern was with the normative content of 
the historical past. The question of whether the portrayals were true in an objective 
sense came second. It did not matter that historical legends, particularly those about 
William Tell, did not stand up to scientific test. As Bodmer himself freely admitted:
It is not necessary that these small legends can be considered true history.
They can nonetheless have the desired impact on peoples’ minds, as by 
instilling repugnance to tyrants, and in teaching an esteem for the value of 
liberty and the rights of the people.55
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What mattered considerably, however, was that the myths could lend moral authority 
and thus legitimacy to the patriotic project. The view that a community could only be 
preserved ‘by the means it was founded’56 was shared among the different factions of 
Swiss patriotism, and its moral force was generated and constantly sustained by two 
interrelated myths: a myth of the heroic age, and a double myth of communal decline
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and regeneration. The myth of heroic age located the peak of Confederate history in 
the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.
What is significant in this regard is that the liberation and founding myths, as 
well as the core events to which they referred, were merely alluded to but never spelled 
out in detail. The lack of substantive exploration indicates the self-evident status of the 
foundation and liberation myths. The medieval legends and events, so it appears, were 
assumed to be known, as was their moral value for the community. The fact that the 
Swiss Confederation (like the Greeks or Romans, but unlike the Germans or French) 
disposed of a republican heritage that could serve as a legitimate role model for the 
present was a source of much pride. Hirzel expressed a common view when he referred 
to the founding of the Confederation in the fourteenth century as the ‘establishment of a 
Republic for the sake of civil liberties’. In fact, he continued, this event formed ‘one of 
the most important occurrences to have honoured humankind’. 58 Simplicity, self- 
restraint, heroic bravery, and love of liberty constituted the catalogue of virtues 
associated with a long republican past and the basis of the patriots’ civic nationalism.
The gradualist strategy of reform patriotism is evident in numerous statements. 
In sharp contrast to other ‘nations that... did not know the love of the Fatherland’, one 
patriot declared, the Confederates were not ‘drunk with their love of liberty’ but 
‘faithfully... recognised their duties against their authorities’ when they founded their 
allegiance.59 What is characteristic of this approach, however, is that it directs its 
criticism against rigid conservatives and radicals alike. The radicals were accused of 
portraying the founding of the Swiss Confederation as the work of ‘rebellious peasants 
who got rid of their lawful authorities’. The defenders of the old regime, on the other 
hand, were criticised because they regarded the teaching of the national past as a 
subversive activity. To reform-minded patriots, this suspicion was wholly unfounded,
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given ‘that the first alliance presented the most impressive example of modesty and 
respect for the legitimate authorities’. 60
‘There is no doubt that the history of our ancestors holds the best lessons for us. 
... But are we, the heirs of this liberty which is in its turn the fruit of so much heroic 
bravery and sacrifice, are we still truly free?’ Through stubbornly reiterating the 
question of whether the Confederation of the present could stand the test of its heroic 
past, the patriots created a myth of communal decline and regeneration. Naturally, they 
had little doubt that the Confederates had departed from the path of their forebears and 
that this was indeed at the very root of the current crisis. The catalogue of identified 
vices included ‘desires that are a consequence of our extravagant ways of life’ as well 
as ‘damaging practices in order to rise to lucrative office’. Once the cause of the decline 
was so clearly established and unanimously recognised, however, the appropriate 
remedy seemed equally obvious. Emulating the virtues of the glorious ancestors was 
considered an essential part of that remedy.61
What seems clear is that by referring to historical title deeds, symbols and 
myths the patriots aimed to legitimate their demands for social and political reform as 
well as to enhance their status within their own community. But why were these 
myths, symbols and historical narratives so readily at hand? The answer is because they 
formed part of an ethno-symbolic memory that had emerged in the sixteenth century 
and was subsequently elaborated and popularised (see chapter 2). By the eighteenth 
century, it had come to form an accepted part of the worldview of the educated and also 
possessed a considerable degree of popular resonance. Hence, by introducing the 
Confederate ethno-symbolic memory as a second cultural variable in addition to 
Enlightenment universalism, we are able to explain why the quest for civic reform took 
the form of a ethno-historicist nationalism (see Figure 3.2.).63
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Fig. 3-2: The rise of Swiss early nationalism: a model
So cio -Po litica l  L ev el  Cu lt u r a l  L e v el
Inequality Enlightenment
universalism
(social; political; regional)
Higher 
Level Fusion
Enlightened Absolutism Ethno-Symbolic
(contradiction-ridden) Memory
▼
Critical Civic Discourse
▼
Patriotic Synthesis
o f ‘civic* and ‘ethno-symbolic’ 
components
What kind of patriotism? Defining the lineaments of Swiss nationhood
It is now time to take a closer look at the construction of Swiss nationhood in the late 
eighteenth century. This will lead us to identify the different mechanisms and at times 
conflicting conceptions the patriots embraced as they endeavoured to define the 
boundaries of Swiss national identity.
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Embracing humanity: patriotism as civic universalism
As argued in the introduction to this chapter, this fusion of ethno-historical idioms and 
modem civic values is always precarious, often contested, and therefore one of the 
major causes of the dynamic nature of modem national identities. In the debates of the 
Helvetic Society the tension between the civic and ethno-historical dimension of the 
nation was clearly noticeable as well. While the moral value of the foundation and 
liberation legends was considered self-evident, some patriots asked themselves whether 
it was right and proper to restrict their patriotic feelings to the national level when 
Enlightenment universalism preached the love of humankind.64
This predicament of ‘nation versus humanity* was most eloquently expressed in 
a presidential address by Isaak Iselin in 1764. In his ‘Speech about the love of the 
Fatherland’, Iselin drew a distinction between two forms of patriotism. One he called 
the ‘ordinary love of the Fatherland*. Its nature was emotional if not irrational, its 
content concrete rather than abstract, and its scope defined by the narrow confinements 
of the present rather than possibilities of what the future might hold. According to 
Iselin, this version of patriotism was indifferent towards the wider mental and political 
environment and showed an exaggerated appreciation for one’s ‘own* customs and 
manners. For all these reasons, ‘ordinary patriotism’65 took an ‘overwhelmingly 
exclusive’ direction. Such an ‘ordinary patriotism’, Iselin concluded, ‘considers only 
one’s own land and fellow citizens, and often only the inhabitants of a single province 
or town, or even of a single clan, tribe or association, as worthy of respect and love’.66
Iselin was quick to point out, however, that even though ‘ordinary patriotism’ 
alone is deficient as a basis for true virtue due to its lack of ‘reason’, it nonetheless 
provided a bond of solidarity necessary for modem nations to evolve. Where it was 
absent, ‘neither the more noble patriotism nor true virtue, nor genuine grandeur among 
human beings could ever have developed’, and ‘the strange historical events that obtain 
eternal significance would not have occurred’.67 One therefore had to acknowledge, 
Iselin continued his exploration, the achievements of those who ‘in less enlightened 
times’ fostered this kind of patriotism and thus ‘paved the way for the welfare and bliss
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of their peoples’. Hence from Iselin’s point of view, ‘ordinary patriotism’, forms a 
necessary but transitional stage in mankind’s forward march towards ‘noble 
patriotism’, culminating in a ‘love of humanity’ that would supersede national 
limitations. As if to compensate for the fact that human imperfection made it unlikely 
that his generation could witness the arrival of this ideal state of affairs, Iselin 
concluded by developing a modem myth of election for the Swiss. Being composed of 
different ethno-linguistic groups, Iselin argued, Switzerland was the world’s living 
proof that civic universalism was more than a dream: ‘Fortunate circumstances allow 
you -  circumstances which perhaps no other people could pride itself on -  to conceive
Aftof yourself as true citizens of the world, as true citizens of all nations.’
Plate 3-1: A lexander Trippel, Herkules oder Allegorie auf 
die Eidgenossenschaft (1775). M useum  zum  A llerheiligen.
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The challenge o f particularism: patriotism as civic nationalism
From the 1770s onwards, however, we witness a shift in perspective. While prior to 
that date the neo-classical historicism of the Enlightenment (with its cosmopolitan 
tendencies) existed alongside a more decidedly ethno-historicist conception of the 
national past, the latter now became predominant. The following statement from 1775 
signals this shift:
I do not reprimand those whose aim it is to make our youth acquainted with 
the peculiar deeds of Caesar or Scipio ... Yet what is far more beautiful and 
worthy of praise is to tell the Confederates about the history and the lives of 
their forefathers, the origin of the Swiss Confederation, the heroic and noble 
deeds of those who founded our alliance 69
The ‘humanity versus nation’ debate now gave way to a discussion about the relation 
between two types of loyalties: those below the national level (communal, regional, 
cantonal), and that to the nation. The problem that needed to be addressed, as several 
members now argued in their speeches, was that the Swiss possessed a ‘dual 
Fatherland’. One was rather ‘general’ and consisted ‘of all that which, as a result of 
prudence, developed into a larger entity which as a whole is distinct from other 
peoples’. The second, more particularist Fatherland plays an equally important role as a 
focal point of collective loyalty, because it is to the latter that people owe their ‘lives, 
education, security’, as well as ‘such precious goods as parents, children, the first
7 0objects of our tenderness’. Demands to embrace the ‘general Fatherland’ -  ‘the nation 
as a whole’ -  are frequently justified by references to the heroic deeds of the Old 
Confederates. The following statement provides a typical example of this 
nationalisation of Confederate ethno-symbolism, by which a pre-existing repertoire of 
myths and symbols was re-interpreted in the light of the value catalogue of the 
republican patriotism of the eighteenth-century: ‘Love your own Fatherland; but love 
even more the wider, more extended Fatherland: it was for the latter that our forebears 
went to war and thus sacrificed their blood and fortune.’71
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The major reason, it seems, why the Helvetic patriots suddenly felt it necessary 
to tackle the problem of the ‘dual Fatherland* has to do with the development of its 
membership.72 As already indicated, during the 1770s the Society witnessed a 
considerable influx of people with real-world experience. These people were well 
aware of the prevalence of strong regional attachments in their respective home 
cantons. They also knew that this situation was rooted in the religious divide that had 
resulted from the religious wars between the sixteenth and early eighteenth centuries. 
This history of conflicts and divisions impeded closer cultural and political integration 
at the Confederate level while reinforcing already existing loyalties at the regional and 
local level. In the face of the predicament at hand, universalist calls to embrace 
‘humanity’ were considered far-fetched, if not downright irresponsible, and the 
cosmopolitan idealism which frequently resurfaced in the debates came under 
increasing attack. Instead of an ‘all or nothing’ attitude, which was condemned, the 
leaders of the Helvetic Society began to urge the younger patriots to ‘settle for that 
solution which is most likely to be commensurate with time and circumstance, and with 
the genius of their fellow countrymen’.73
The challenge o f cosmopolitanism: patriotism and the search for  ‘national character’
As cosmopolitanism increasingly became a bad word for many reform patriots, more 
energy was poured into turning people’s particularist loyalties outwards so that they 
would include the ‘greater Fatherland’. This was paralleled by efforts to define more 
firmly the symbolic boundaries of Swiss nationhood. In the 1760s, for example, Johann 
Georg Zimmermann came up with an explicit formula of nation formation by 
exclusion. In his pamphlet, Nationalstolz, he argued that national pride rested on two 
fundamental conditions. The first comprised a group’s effort to live up to the ‘glory of 
the forebears’. The second was the possession of ‘particular prejudices’, for it was 
‘mainly these prejudices’, he claimed, that ‘make for the particular pride of a nation, 
and ... give it its specific character’.74 The basis from which national prejudice would 
flourish best, Zimmermann concluded towards the end of his text, were the areas where
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a people felt themselves to be distinct from their neighbours. Such distinctiveness 
Zimmermann saw in the Confederation’s republican tradition, and in the widespread 
contempt among its population for despotism. It was these republican traditions that 
Zimmermann regarded as being the genuine grounds for the creation of a secularised 
version of Swiss national election. In view of this glorious republican heritage, he asked 
rhetorically, was it not only natural that the Swiss ‘felt a certain elevation in their 
hearts’, that they considered themselves privileged to be able to ‘enjoy a particularly 
fortunate destiny’ and, even, as creatures ‘of a higher order’ when they compared their 
own fate with that of their aristocratic neighbours?75
Quite frequently, moreover, the delineation of Swiss nationhood went in tandem 
with a rejection of the cosmopolitan attitudes still widespread among the educated 
strata, particularly the educated youth. ‘What do we gain ... if we know how numerous 
the French armies are, how many duchies that there are in Germany, how far away 
Moscow is, ... in one word, how the whole world around us looks like?* one Helvetic 
patriot asked in 1765. ‘As long as we do not know more about our own strength and 
power’, he continued, ‘we will remain aliens in our own Fatherland, ignorant of its 
history and the evolution of our state*. The change of the Helvetic Society’s statutes 
around 1782 was a clear manifestation that the civic nationalists (whose rhetoric was 
decidedly historicist) had now won the upper hand over those who still openly 
sympathised with cosmopolitan views. Before that time, both citizens of the Swiss 
Confederation (i.e. those bom in a Swiss canton) and ‘foreigners’ could become active 
members. Apparently during the 1782 meeting, however, it was decided that henceforth 
only the former could be active members, while the status of foreigners (Froemde) was 
restricted to that of honorary members without the right to vote. In fact, the concept of 
the ‘foreigner’, which had been largely irrelevant, it seems, to the concerns of the 
Society’s founding members, became salient in the patriotic discourse from the 1780s 
onwards.77
Interestingly enough, almost everything rejected as ‘non-Swiss’ was associated 
with cosmopolitanism. The view that ‘those who feel at home everywhere are really at
*70
home nowhere’ was now expressed with increasing frequency. But cosmopolitanism
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was not discussed in the abstract. Rather, as the debates of the Helvetic Society 
developed, it acquired a concrete face insofar as values and orientations held to be 
cosmopolitan and thus undermining ‘Swissness’ were identified with the supra-national 
culture of the European nobility. Consequently, the two neighbouring states in which 
the monarchical principle held sway -  France and, to a lesser degree, Germany -  
henceforth provided the level of comparison against which a Swiss ‘national character’ 
was defined. There was no guarantee, as one patriot told his fellow Helvetians, that the 
young Swiss elite could ‘protect their hearts from being affected by those virtually 
imperceptible effects of fine obscenities, softness and splendour’ that characterised 
French and German aristocratic culture. Such foreign manners and customs, he 
continued, went ‘directly against the sense of decency which distinguished the 
republican citizen in general and the free Helvetian in particular’.79 What could the 
nation gain, so another member of the Society asked by caricaturing the lifestyle of the 
court, if the Swiss youth spent their days ‘dancing in the anterooms of kings’ in the 
morning and having ‘lunch every afternoon with a dragoon-captain and three 
comedians’.80 The enthusiasm, furthermore, with which foreign works of philosophy 
and literature were received within Switzerland became a cause of concern and even 
suspicion. As one member summed up the argument:
As things stand in our Confederation, you will not come across many homes 
where you cannot find, along with the most recent products of Gallic 
slipperiness, the sort of German novels and plays which tend to leave you in 
the dark whether the hero or heroine is to be taken as a model to be emulated 
or, quite to the contrary, as an abhorrent example.81
Given that they lent themselves ideally to define Swiss national identity based on an 
opposition between the republican and monarchical principles, the choice of France and 
Germany as negative examples is hardly surprising. Moreover, every Swiss patriot was 
well acquainted with French and German culture. The majority of the Swiss political 
elite had spent a year of their education in France, to learn French and become 
acquainted with French civilisation and some of the leading thinkers of the time. Apart 
from France, Germany, too, especially the universities of Berlin and Gottingen, were an
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attractive destination for the young Swiss elite. It is against this background that the 
older generation of patriots expressed concern about ‘the impertinence of our widely
Q
travelled youth’, and notably about the fact ‘that almost all youth of a certain age, but 
in particular those designated to serve the state, are travelling,... without guidance, to 
foreign countries’.83 Several speakers therefore requested that this travel be reduced. 
One of the main motivations for the young Swiss travelling to Paris, becoming 
proficient in the French language, no longer warranted travelling abroad since this task, 
several members of the Society maintained, could as well be achieved at home, by 
spending some time in those parts of the Swiss Confederation where French was the 
native language.84 The danger of being constantly exposed to foreign customs, values 
and manners was, as one commentator claimed, nothing less than a ‘decline of the 
traditional energy inherent in our national character’. ‘No people under the sun, and 
certainly not the Swiss’, another argued, ‘can exchange their fundamental internal
or
characteristics for foreign ones without being punished for it’.
Plate 3-2: Johann Heinrich Fiissli, Die drei 
Eidgenossen beim Schwur auf dem Riitli (1780), 
Kunsthaus Zurich.
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In search o f national authenticity: fostering the nature-nation link
Nature complemented history as a symbolic resource in the definition of Swiss national 
identity. Both mechanisms -  the construction of continuity with Switzerland’s alleged 
ethno-historical past (historicism) on the one hand and the creation of a sense of 
naturalness {naturalisation) on the other -  were employed by the patriots to render 
Swiss nationhood authentic. Furthermore, nature was used to add an organic dimension 
to Switzerland’s predominantly political (i.e. civic-republican) conception of 
nationhood.86
In Switzerland, nature’s national significance was embodied in the Alps. The 
breakthrough towards the nationalisation of Alpine nature came only in the course of 
the eighteenth century, when the mountains ‘had ceased to be monstrosities and had 
become an integral part of varied and diversified Nature*,87 and when, towards the end 
of the century, a cult-like enthusiasm was focused on the Swiss Alps in particular. 
Various Enlightenment scientists and poets, foreign and Swiss alike, contributed to this 
development. The English scientist Thomas Robinson, in his Natural History, 
described the Alps as an ‘integral and necessary part of nature's harmony’.88 The Swiss 
Johann Jakob Scheuchzer (1672-1733), after two decades of travelling the Alps, 
published in the 1720s a topographical description of the Alpine landscape entitled, 
Itinera Alpina.
From the middle of the eighteenth century onwards, moreover, the classical 
view, which had conceived of nature primarily in utilitarian and anthropocentric terms, 
gave way, slowly but surely, to a more romanticized conception in which nature was
O Q
conceived as an organic force, even as a source of almost religious importance. In an 
age of enlightened criticism of aristocratic politics and opulence, a large section of the 
educated public, many of them influenced by Rousseau’s La Nouvelle Heloise (first 
published in 1761), began to see in the Swiss Alps and their inhabitants an expression 
of simplicity, purity, honesty, and liberty, the republican virtues par excellence.
The Alps increasingly became an important aspect of Swiss patriotism in the
onclosing decades of the eighteenth century. The patriots of the Helvetic Society 
presented the them as the true seat of Swiss virtues. One of its founding fathers, Franz
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Urs Balthasar, expressed the significance of this connection in 1763 by saying that the 
character of the Swiss nation found its complete expression in its untamed Alpine 
landscape. The Alps were frequently portrayed as the scene where the Swiss 
Confederation had been founded at the turn of the thirteenth century, making them the 
genuine source of national authenticity. This argumentative pattern was ideally suited 
to justify the general fight against cosmopolitanism, manifested in the youth’s alleged 
inclination to excessive foreign travel. For how could ‘a mountain people’ like the 
Swiss, so one speaker asked his audience, once removed from the ‘rough climate’ of 
the Alps and ‘exposed to a tender way of life and milde air’, sustain their national 
character. Like a plant exposed to the wrong climate, he continued, they would ‘soon 
fade away and become extinct.’91
Conclusion
The latter half of the eighteenth century witnessed the rise of an early nationalist 
movement and ideology in Switzerland. Building on ideological precedents, the 
movement gained momentum from the 1760s onwards, when patriotic circles began to 
spring up all over the country. Two distinct concepts of national identity emanated from 
the national discourse of the period between 1760 and 1798. A radical strand of 
patriotism was developed in Zurich by a circle that had formed around the scholar and 
ideological entrepreneur Johann Jakob Bodmer in Zurich. Adhering to the doctrine of 
natural law, the protagonists of this movement and their apostles favoured a radical 
transformation of the institutions of the old regime. However, it was the Helvetic 
Society (founded in 1761) that emerged as the epicentre of Switzerland’s rapidly 
expanding early nationalist movement. Preferring a gradualist approach to a 
revolutionary one, the members of the Helvetic Society fused ethno-historicist and civic 
elements into a single concept of Swiss nationhood.
The rise of Swiss early nationalism was prompted by an intersection of socio­
political and cultural factors. Perceived through the prism of Enlightenment
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universalism, the status quo -  embodied in the proliferation of conflicts in the late 
eighteenth century, along with a historical legacy of political divisions -  appeared 
gloomy and a profound change of existing institutions seemed inevitable. The concept 
and social reality of Enlightened Absolutism was crucial in that it rendered the 
contradictions of the old regime concrete and visible. Zurich, Bern and Basle, where the 
authorities had gone some way down the late absolutist path, were to emerge as the 
focal points of the nationalist movement. The coincidence of these conditions provided 
fertile ground for the emergence of an ideological movement that questioned the status 
quo. However, it was a second cultural factor -  the ethno-symbolic memory that was 
constitutive of the patriots’ mental frameworks -  that explains why it was nationalism 
that supplied the emerging reform movement with its language and ideology.
The prevailing nationalist programme of the late eighteenth century was based 
on a fusion of two narratives, the one forward-looking, the other retrospective and 
historicist -  what we have termed the ethno-historicist and the civic-universalist 
conceptions of nationhood. Some of the founding members of the Helvetic Society 
tried to shift the balance in the latter direction by arguing that the noblest form of 
patriotism consisted in a cosmopolitan love of humanity. These efforts were not to 
succeed, though, and from the 1780s onwards the balance between the two conceptions 
was restored and cosmopolitanism became a bad word. In fact, the decision to restrict 
active membership in the Society to citizens of Swiss cantons, along with other efforts 
to fortify the boundaries of Swiss nationhood more firmly by fostering a linkage 
between landscape symbolism and Swiss ‘national character’, suggests that the ethno- 
historicist conception had gained the upper hand in the closing decades of the century.
While the patriots were unable to transform the institutions of the old regime 
(this did not occur until the Helvetic Revolution of 1798), the following chapters will 
demonstrate their ideological project was nonetheless significant in that it set the 
parameters for the reconstruction of Swiss nationhood in the nineteenth century.
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CHAPTER FOUR
The Struggle for Unity (1798-1848): Swiss Nationhood 
Goes Public
Confederates! Whatever may divide us 
We all recognise one God 
To whom we remain faithful:
Fatherland! Be our God 
That unites us all.
Radical pamphlet, 18331
If the Swiss patriots of the eighteenth century had failed to realise their major plan -  to 
unite the cantons and associated territories into a single nation-state -  they had 
nonetheless succeeded in nationalising the Old Confederation’s ethno-symbolic 
memory, based as it was on the liberation and founding myths of the late medieval 
period. In doing so, they had established the cultural parameters within which public 
debates about Swiss nationhood would henceforth take place.
Their significant contribution to the definition of national identity 
notwithstanding, the language of national patriotism did not yet capture the popular 
imagination. Up until the turn of the eighteenth century at least, the number of people 
who attended the meetings of patriotic societies amounted to one or two thousand at 
best. If we added to this inner circle those sections of the educated strata that 
sympathised with the aim of establishing a modem Swiss nation-state, the number 
would hardly extend beyond ten thousand people. Given that this group included many 
adroit propagators of the national doctrine, this was not an insignificant number of 
supporters, but it was certainly not enough to represent a national public. This 
shortcoming was clearly recognised by several adherents of republican nationalism at 
the turn of the eighteenth century. In 1798, for example, in one of the first meetings of 
the newly established Helvetic parliament, a member of the house bitterly lamented the
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lack of a common national ‘spirit’ that would serve to distinguish the Swiss ‘from other 
nations’.2
The task of forging and popularising such a ‘spirit’ was to fall to the two 
generations that followed the patriots who lived in the latter half of the eighteenth 
century. During the half-century spanning the time between the two revolutions of 1798 
and 1848, republican nationalism spread outwards from the drawing rooms of the 
patriotic societies to reach ever-broader sections of the Swiss public. This development, 
praised and supported by liberal and radical-democratic groups, provoked considerable 
concern among those who opposed the republican movement and its secular religion -  
nationalism.
Nevertheless, the unfolding conflict that culminated in the short civil war of 
1847 enhanced rather than weakened nationalism as a movement for constitutional 
reform. It spread in a tidal wave, first affecting the cantons and then pushing for a 
liberal nation-state, a project that was brought to fruition with the Constitution of 1848. 
The prominent legal scholar and politician, Johann Caspar Bluntschli, for instance, 
acknowledged with some astonishment the decisive role of popular nationalism in 
bringing about the modem Swiss nation-state of 1848. Looking back on the turbulent 
events of the past decade, he argued in 1850 that the ‘feeling of Swiss nationality’ had 
been stronger than one would have expected, while the appeal of ‘cantonal 
particularity’ had been overestimated by the opponents of the liberal nation-state.3
It was thus between 1798 and 1848 that the Swiss Confederation attained the 
features that, according to Smith, distinguish modem nations from ‘ethnies’: a clearly 
delimited territory, a public culture, economic unity and legal rights and duties for all 
the members of the designated national community.4
How had this transformation come about? What provided its major impetus? 
What were the social carriers of republican nationalism, and what its major institutional 
forms? In what ways, finally, did the definition of Swiss nationhood change as 
republican nationalism began to reach the public at large? These are the questions 
which will be addressed in this chapter. The first section provides an outline of the 
constitutional conflicts that punctuate the period between 1798 and 1848. The second
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section traces the emergence of a national public sphere. A concluding section shows 
how the anti-republican opposition was nationalised, and shows how the republican 
movement and its opponents contributed two rival definitions of Swiss nationhood to 
national discourse.
The dual Revolution: political and constitutional developments
Modem Switzerland is the product of a movement for constitutional reform, which 
culminated in the revolutions of 1798 and 1848. Republican nationalism, the engine of 
this transformation into modem statehood, therefore owes much to the socio-political 
dynamism that these constitutional struggles unleashed.
The Revolution of 1798, which led to the centralised nation-state of the Helvetic 
Republic, signalled the beginning of an irresistible drive towards a republican order. 
From its very inception, the Helvetic Republic was severely contested, and it eventually 
disintegrated in 1803 after only five years of existence. Although the old order was 
partially re-established, the same old patterns could not be resumed. As early as the 
1830s the republican project regained momentum, causing constitutional changes in 
many cantons and increasing the pressure for national unification under the banner of a 
federal constitution. In the 1840s, the conflict threatened to escalate in a situation that 
constantly bordered on civil war. A fully-fledged civil war finally broke out in 
November 1847 between liberal and radical cantons on the one side, and the mostly 
Catholic Conservative cantons of the Sonderbund allegiance on the other. The defeat of 
the conservative coalition paved the way for the Swiss nation-state of 1848. It is to 
these developments, and their implications for the development of national identity, 
that I shall now turn.
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The Helvetic Republic (1798-1803)
In March 1798 the Swiss Confederation (along with the Low Countries, Milan, and the 
Kingdom of Naples) became one of the satellite ‘sister republics’ established by France 
between 1795 and 1799 to consolidate her contested rule on the Continent.5 Within the 
space of a few months, the Helvetic Republic had taken the place of a political system 
that had existed for more than three centuries. The transformation was accompanied by 
a remarkable shift in the balance of political power, with former radicals forming the 
core of the Helvetic leadership. But the reality of the Helvetic Republic brought in its 
wake another novelty: 300 years after the Burgundian wars Switzerland was again the 
scene of a European war.6 What Stuart Woolf has identified as revolutionary France’s 
prime motives behind the establishment of ‘sister republics’ holds true for Switzerland 
as well. They
served at one and the same time ideological, political and military purposes: to 
hold faith to the ideals of the Revolution by creating states in the image of 
republican France; to requite the expectations of the native patriots, the most 
loyal supporters of the French; and to strengthen French defences through a
*7
semi-circle of cushion states.
The contrast between the new republican order and its predecessor could have hardly 
been greater. Almost overnight, the Swiss Confederation had changed from a 
confederation of states (Staatenbund) into a highly centralised national state (with a 
representational system of popular sovereignty) after the French role model. The 
cantons -  some of them newly formed entities -  were restricted to mere bureaucratic 
units without any autonomous legislative power. The traditional inequalities that 
marked the relations between cantons and subject territories on the one hand, and towns 
and countryside on the other, were abolished.8 Consequent upon these developments, 
formerly subordinate territories (the so-called Untertanengebiete) such as the Vaud, 
Aargau, or Thurgau were elevated to the status of full cantons. Cantonal boundaries 
were abolished, as was feudal taxation. To enable a better control of those elements 
most hostile to the new order, the valley-cantons of Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden and Zug 
were grouped together into a single canton Waldstatte.9
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The main power and authority now rested with a central governing body, the 
Helvetic Directory, which put its proposals before a parliament, which in turn 
represented the Swiss people. A central bureaucracy with various ministries was 
established, a Bureau fur Nationalkultur (‘Ministry for National Culture’) was set up, 
and a state-sponsored information policy was launched. Popular education, formerly in 
the hands of the church, was particularly high up on the agenda of the Helvetic 
authorities. ‘The Helvetic Republic’, proclaimed the Directory in October, 1798, ‘must 
strive to permeate the remotest valleys with the message of the Enlightenment’.10 
Official rhetoric was followed by practical action: the duration for primary education 
was extended; the quality of education was improved; the number of children attending 
school rose considerably; and, perhaps most important of all, the collective belief in the 
value of popular education was greatly enhanced.11 However, the fact that the new 
education policy potentially diminished the influence of traditional (particularly 
religious) institutions also created a potential for a recurrent conflict between the 
nationalising state and the (Catholic) church.
The Helvetic Constitution guaranteed several new rights, notably the freedom of 
conscience and religious faith, freedom of free speech and expression. In addition, the 
protection of private property rights and of free trade were introduced. The complete 
reformation of the criminal law in accordance with the values of the Enlightenment 
found its most marked expression in the abolition of torture.12 In terms of its political 
implications, the constitution stressed popular sovereignty as well as territorial and 
administrative unity, emulating the French notion of une nation une et indivisible. The 
juxtaposition of old and new orders was thus the central theme of the first article of the 
Helvetic Constitution:
The unity of the Fatherland and the general interest will henceforth take the 
place of the weak bond that used to connect the large and small localities ... in a 
rather haphazard fashion. Where hitherto we only felt the weakness of the single 
parts, we will now feel the concentrated strength that results from their 
unification.13
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The lack of a mass support undoubtedly hastened its demise, but the Helvetic Republic
could not have come about without popular support for an abolition of the old order.14
Notably in the rural areas of Zurich and Basle, where the revolutionary potential had
been greatest both prior to and immediately after 1789, as well as in some of the subject
territories, such as the Vaud or the Aargau, the prevalent reaction was enthusiastic.15
The same is true of parts of the Thurgau, the Ticino, as well as St. Gallen. The new
order was also embraced by the rural elites of the early-industrialised areas in Zurich
and Basle and, at least initially, by the peasant populations of these cantons as well. The
prevailing response on the part of the traditional (reform-oriented) elite was one of
critical reserve.16 A third group, finally, spearheaded by the Catholic cantons of central
1 ^Switzerland, was outrightly hostile to the new order.
From its very inception, therefore, the Helvetic Republic was as much a focal 
point of social and political conflict as it was an embodiment of constitutional progress. 
One line of conflict divided federalists from centralists within the Helvetic elite, 
another separated the supporters of the regime from its sworn enemies. The four coups 
d’etat that took place between 1800 and 1802 testify to the instability of the regime and 
to the weakness of its constitution. When the European wars ended in 1801 Switzerland 
lost much of its strategic significance for France. On the initiative of Napoleon, who 
was concerned about the internal instability of the Helvetic Republic, a federalist 
constitution was accepted in May 1802. When in the summer of 1802 he withdrew his 
troops from Switzerland, a number of popular uprisings were the immediate 
consequence, and the Helvetic Republic disintegrated within the space of a few 
months.18
To subsequent generations, the historical memory of the Helvetic Republic 
remained ambivalent. Because it was so strongly linked with foreign rule, it was 
unsuitable as a basis from which to create a popular nationalism. In Switzerland as 
elsewhere, the French policies of occupation and the creation of new forms of 
government ‘destroyed the sympathy enjoyed earlier by the French revolutionaries, 
even among the patriots*. For French occupation went hand in hand with ‘pillaging, 
billeting, requisitions and war contributions followed’.19 This may explain why, as a
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focal point for collective identification, the Helvetic legacy was of limited significance. 
It did not provide, for instance, an ideological focal point for the national movement 
that had gained such momentum from the 1830s onwards.
The home-made revolution: 1830 -1848
The period between 1803 and 1830 brought a conservative restoration of considerable 
proportion: the Act of Mediation of 19 February 1803 effectively restored political 
sovereignty to the old cantons under a loose, federal constitution; the freedom of 
residence was abolished; the constitutional unity established under the Helvetic regime 
gave way to great diversity in terms of guaranteed rights and regulations; and the 
traditional gap between town and countryside in terms of political and economic rights 
were to some degree reinstated. Nevertheless, some important achievements of the 
Helvetic era, such as the abolition of subject territories, remained in place. In fact, the 
Mediationsverfassung, the constitution proposed by Napoleon, elevated many of the 
previously subject or allied territories to full cantonal equality, and St Gallen,
Graubiinden, Aargau, Thurgau, Ticino and the Vaud ‘took their places as full members
00of a federal union of nineteen cantons’. (Geneva and the republic of Valais were
annexed to France in 1803, but they returned to the Swiss Confederation in 1815.)
Overall, therefore, the institutional conditions, as they presented themselves at
the beginning of the nineteenth century, were favourable for the republican nationalist
movement that gained currency in the 1830s, further buttressing the trend towards
0 1constitutional reform and political and territorial integration. Under the influence of 
the July Revolution in Paris, liberal constitutional reforms were carried out in many 
cantons during the so-called regeneration era which lasted from 1830 to 1848. By 1831, 
the eleven Swiss cantons with the largest populations had introduced republican 
constitutions. Encouraged by these successes at the cantonal level, the republican 
movement developed into a national movement that pressed for similar reforms on the 
federal plane. The first calls to introduce a federal constitution were made at the Diet of 
1831.22 In a meeting of the Academie des Sciences morales et politiques held in January
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1848 in Paris, Alexis de Tocqueville thus concluded that ‘Switzerland has been in a 
state of revolution for fifteen years’.23
Republican nationalism was composed of two major sub-groups, the Liberals 
and the Radicals. While the former emphasised individual liberty and representative 
democracy, the latter placed much weight on equality and direct democratic 
participation rights. Liberalism was largely confined to the traditional elites of the 
established cantons. It had its strongholds in the towns of the planes, where classical 
liberal constitutions with representative systems of government were established. In 
1830/31 transformations of this kind took place in Zurich, Lucerne, Schaffhausen, 
Freiburg, and the Ticino. The power of the members of parliament was considerable, 
while the possibility for the voters to change the constitution was limited. In addition, 
inequalities between town and countryside persisted in Zurich and Lucerne in 
particular.24
The Radicals, who attracted the strongest popular support, formed the driving 
force behind demands for a federal constitution and national unification. Members of a 
new, self-confident middle class, mainly from the small towns and the industrialised 
parts of the countryside constituted the bulk of its leadership. In terms of professional 
occupation, tradesmen, craftsmen, merchants, publishers, industrialists and 
manufacturers provided the strongest contingents. Radicalism had its strongholds in 
eastern Switzerland, as well as the Aargau, the Vaud, in the rural areas around Basle, 
and in the Jura.25
In those cantons in which the Radicals dominated, parliament was elected 
directly, and the constitution could be altered at the discretion of the sovereign.26 The 
standardisation of civic law, the development of new tax regimes that would replace the 
feudal system of taxation, as well as a secularisation of the education system were 
among the most important changes introduced in the radical cantons. In 1832, the 
Schweizerischer Republikaner, the radicals’ flagship newspaper, defined the raison 
d’etre of the Radical movement as lying in two major objectives: the ‘rational reform of 
the outdated order*, and ‘national unification’.27 Both the secularisation of education 
and national unification were fiercely opposed by the Catholic Conservative cantons.
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What transformed the existing tensions into the short civil war of November 
1847 was a succession of events that started in 1841. A momentous incident took place 
in the canton of Aargau after local monks had been accused of inciting the Catholic 
peasantry against the Radical government.28 In January 1841, the Radical-dominated 
parliament responded by deciding (by a vote of 115 to 19) to dissolve Aargau’s 
monasteries. By virtue of this decision, the authorities were entitled to take over the 
monasteries and use them for schools and welfare institutions. The monks were given 
forty-eight hours to settle their affairs and leave. However, this decision was in open 
violation of the Federal Treaty of 1815, and the Confederate Diet consequently 
annulled the Aargau’s decision at a meeting in April 1841.29
With the Radicals remaining adamant in their opposition to the religious activity 
of the monasteries, however, the conflict was bound to continue. On August 31,1843, 
as more cantons turned liberal, the Diet decided to accept the abolition of four 
monasteries (while four covenants were allowed to stay open). The Catholic cantons 
regarded this decision as a grave challenge to their religious autonomy and as a sign 
that the Diet had been turned into a pro-liberal institution. The Great Council of 
Lucerne, which was firmly in the hands of Catholic Conservatives, responded swiftly 
by inviting the Jesuits to take up residence in the canton. In an attempt to counter the 
spread of secularisation, Jesuits were soon appointed to the town’s theological faculty 
and there was to be a Jesuit-staffed church again as well. From the point of view of the 
Radicals and Liberals, the measures taken by the Lucerne authorities were a 
provocation of the first order. When in December 1844 a group of Radicals tried to 
overthrow Lucerne’s government by use of force, this initiated a new phase of open 
civil war. A second attempt in March 1845, in which a militia army o f4,000 men 
participated, met the same fate.30
The conflict between Liberal and Radical circles on the one hand, and the 
Catholic-Conservatives on the other, had now turned into open hatred. For the Radicals 
at least, the Jesuits represented the incarnation of the dark forces of reactionary evil. It 
was in this poisoned political climate that the Zurich poet Gottfried Keller, an active 
supporter of republican nationalism, wrote the following tirade against the Jesuits:31
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Hurrah, I  hear the Hunting Call!
Look what’s arriving, big and small,
And jumps and hops and somersaults 
And, without let-up, shrieks and shouts:
Th e  Jesu its  a r e  c o m in g !
Look how they ride in on a sow 
On little snakes, a dragon now.
God are those peppy fellows gay,
All embryos stir in dismay:
Th e  Je su its  a r e  C o m in g !
Or to quote from an anonymous Zurich high school student’s poem of 1844:32
You, Jesuits, false man o f God 
How come no bullet’s struck you yet?
You, who’s destroying Switzerland
You, villain Jailing liberty
You now must go, you beast from hell...
But the conflict did not stop with the Radical attempts to overthrow the government of 
Lucerne. On December 11,1845, seven Catholic cantons (Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, 
Zug, Lucerne, Valais, and Fribourg) formed the Sonderbund, an alliance designed to 
contain the Radical movement. The spiritual leader of the alliance, which represented 
roughly one-fifth of the population of Switzerland, was Constantin Siegwart Muller.
His most ambitious aims, to conclude alliances with conservative powers in an attempt 
to annex major areas of the Liberal cantons, did not enjoy the support of the majority of 
the Sonderbund’s members. When in June 1846, the existence of the alliance became 
public knowledge, the majority of Liberal cantons demanded its immediate dissolution. 
In a speech held at the Diet of 1847, Ulrich Ochsenbein sent a warning to those foreign 
powers (and indirectly to the members of the Sonderbund) that harboured plans to 
interfere in Switzerland’s internal affairs. Alluding to the late-medieval battles and the 
liberation myths, he declared that ‘... the world ought to be aware that Switzerland ...
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will know how to sacrifice its every strength ... to safeguard the independence won for 
it by its forefathers in many a fierce battle’.33
On July 20,1847, the Confederate Diet (in which the liberal and radical cantons 
were in the majority) increased the pressure by passing a resolution ordering the 
dissolution of the Sonderbund. Voting for the resolution were Aargau, Bern, Geneva, 
Glarus, Graubiinden, St. Gallen, Schaffhausen, Solothum, Thurgau, Ticino, Vaud, 
Zurich, and the two half-cantons, Appenzell-Ausserrhoden and Basle-Land. Voting 
against it were the Sonderbund’s seven, plus Neuchatel and the half-canton of 
Appenzell-Innerrhoden.34 Furthermore, in September of 1847, the Diet, by the same 
majority, voted to expel the Jesuits from Switzerland. On separate assemblies, the 
Sonderbund cantons declared the Diet’s decision unlawful. After several attempts at 
finding a peaceful solution to the conflict had failed, both sides began to mobilise their 
troops (95,000 men took up arms on the side of the federal army, and half as many on 
the side of the Catholic alliance). The war that came to be called the Sonderbund War 
broke out on November 4 and lasted until November 29 when the last member of the 
Sonderbund, the Valais, capitulated. Even for a war as brief as this one, the casualties 
were very low in view of the killing potential of mid-nineteenth century warfare: 74 
soldiers had fallen on the side of the Diet, and 24 on the side of the Sonderbund, with 
around 500 wounded.35
The victory of the federal troops over the alliance of the Catholic cantons 
brought the breakthrough in the struggle for a modem Swiss nation-state. The task of 
drafting a new constitution was assigned to a special commission made up of 
representatives of all cantons except Appenzell Inerrhoden and Neuchatel. The 
commission convened for the first time on February 17,1848. The majority of those 
who participated were politicians rather than constitutional theoreticians. The draft that 
resulted from these consultations embodied a compromise of the centralist ideas of the 
Radicals and the ultra-federalism of the Conservatives. At the heart of the new 
constitution was a bicameral legislature, consciously modelled after the American 
example. The National Council (Nationalrat), elected in a nation-wide popular vote, 
would represent the Swiss people, while the Council of States (Standerat) would
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express the interests and concerns of the cantons. Following the precedent of the U.S. 
Senate, each canton, irrespective of its size, would send two delegates to the Council of 
States, and each half-canton one delegate. Besides a new system of political 
representation, the major innovation concerned the introduction of civil and economic 
rights. Trade obstacles were removed; the freedom of residence was extended to all 
Swiss citizens (except Jews who remained excluded from this right until the 
constitutional revisions of 1866 and 1874, respectively); common tariffs, weights and 
measures were set; and a federal post office was established. In September 1848, the 
voters accepted the new constitution by an overwhelming majority (almost seven to 
one).36
Conflicts, communication, and the nationalisation of the public sphere
After the previous outline of core events and processes that characterise the period 
between 1798 and 1848, this section will focus on their impact on Swiss nation 
formation. I shall argue that the constitutional conflicts that punctuate this fifty-year 
time span provided the major impetus behind the institutionalisation of a national 
public sphere. As this process unfolded, an increasing number of people were drawn 
into nation-oriented activities either as part of an ever-increasing audience or as active 
participants. Although short-lived and contested, the Helvetic State set the ball rolling 
by creating a number of institutions designed primarily to promote national 
consciousness. After two decades of conservative restoration, the 1830s and 1840s 
witnessed the rise of a popular republican nationalism. In the absence of a central state, 
this national revival received its major impulse from within civil society. The driving 
force behind this new nationalism was the movement for constitutional reform, 
embodied especially in the new national mass societies and festivals.
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The Republic’s attempt at nationalising the masses
With the Helvetic Revolution, the modem Swiss nation-state had ceased to be the 
dream of a few hundred patriots and had become a tangible reality that began to leave 
its imprint on the lives of wider society. Most significantly, the Helvetic State made 
nationalism its official ideology. While state-induced nationalism did not manage to 
turn Switzerland into a society of consensus and stability, it nonetheless changed the 
nature of social conflict. Under the ancien regime, the cantons had served as loci of 
social conflict. Under the Helvetic regime, by contrast, emerging antagonisms were 
increasingly played out at the federal level. This was an inevitable consequence of the 
concentration of power at the centre, which came about at the expense of the cantons 
and communities. Most significantly, moreover, the Helvetic Republic created the 
conditions for an expansion of public communication. In particular, the freedom of the 
press, guaranteed by the Helvetic Constitution, led to a proliferation of newspapers. 
This allowed both supporters and opponents of the new state to increase their efforts to 
influence public opinion. This transformation was clearly recognised by 
contemporaries. Thus in June 1798, a newspaper reported that
a large part of our people that hitherto merely read the Bible and the calendar 
has begun to develop a great enthusiasm for newspapers and other papers that 
report about the story of the day complete with interpretations. Thus inquiring 
into political rights and injustices, until now the concern of a few educated 
individuals, has suddenly captured the imagination of the masses.
Yet the major actor in this symbolic struggle over Swiss nationhood was the Helvetic 
government, which placed great emphasis on nation building. As a member of the 
Helvetic Directory put it: ‘The [national consciousness] is like a big engine. It must set 
the [state] machinery in motion and keep it going if the latter is not to deny its 
service.’38 Strategic motives seem to have played as important a role in the 
considerations of the Helvetic elites as an actual enthisiasm for the traditional symbols 
and myths. A conversation between two of the protagonists of the Helvetic ruling class, 
Heinrich Zschokke and Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, suggests that didactic
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considerations had a crucial impact on the strategy adopted by the authorities. As 
Zschocke, the leading propagandist of the Helvetic Republic, wrote to the latter in 
1798:
Ordinary people are like children. Whoever wants to raise them up must first 
bend down to them. If I were intending to write for the ordinary people, I would 
envision a sensible boy of about eight or ten years of age who I wanted to get to 
understand my ideas.
In terms of symbolic content, while often referring to the heroic past of the late- 
medieval period, the new regime at the same time tried to infuse the traditional ethno- 
historical repertoire with new elements. This is true in particular of national symbols, 
ceremonies and festivals, where the Helvetic elites tried to imitate French role models. 
In an attempt to forge a constitutional patriotism, Swiss citizens were supposed to take 
an annual oath on the new constitution.40 Foremost among the newly introduced 
national symbols was the national flag, the Helvetic Tricolour. The colours red, yellow 
and green were chosen because these were considered to be the colours of Wilhelm 
Tell.41 Furthermore, Helvetic legislation stipulated that all citizens (like those of the 
grande nation) had to wear a cockade in the Helvetic colours, a portable national flag 
as it were. This new law stirred up conflict, especially in Catholic central Switzerland. 
In Nidwalden, for example, people were attaching pictures of the Virgin Mary to their 
hats and clothes in protest against this new regulation.42 Hence, in spite of having a 
centralised state bureaucracy and a reasonably efficient system of mass communication 
at their disposal, the Helvetic Patriots’ overall success in popularising new national 
symbols remained quite modest.
There is another example that illustrates the potentially constraining capacity of 
a well-entrenched vernacular memory during the Helvetic era, namely, the inauguration 
of republican mass rituals. Established as an attempt to overcome particular loyalties 
and identities, such rituals included an annual oath on the constitution, and the 
commemoration of 12 April, the Day of the Helvetic Republic. Here too, strong popular 
resistance caused the Helvetic government to abandon its attempt to replace existing
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symbolic forms and contents with French models in favour of a symbolic syncretism 
where emphasis was placed on the (civic) reinterpretation of traditional forms. At the 
root of this change, once more, lay the experience that the ‘invented traditions’ lacked 
the desired popular appeal or were seen as outright offensive.43
An official report on the organisation of national festivals by the Minister for 
Arts and Sciences, Philipp Albrecht Stapfer (1766-1840), provides us with another 
example. Acutely aware that for all their splendour the French revolutionary festivals 
had not become popular, Stapfer recommended that the Helvetic Republic draw its 
inspiration from traditional vernacular festivals. Among these, he singled out 
commemorations of medieval battles and the ceremonies held in honour of heroic and 
virtuous personalities (such as Arnold von Winkelried or Niklaus von der Flue).44 In 
another attempt to win over the Catholic cantons for the Helvetic state, Johann Heinrich 
Pestalozzi alluded to the traditional mythical repertoire, arguing that the new 
constitution represented an attempt to ‘restore old Swiss liberties and solidarity’.45
Plate 4-1: Four Francs Coin of the Helvetic Republic, displaying 
Wilhelm Tell carrying the Helvetic Tricolour.
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The invention of the liberty tree corroborates the assumption that successful national 
symbols are often based on a fusion of traditional and novel elements. Like the 
Tricolour, the liberty tree gained in symbolic significance during the French Revolution 
and it frequently appeared in popular protests against the old authorities in Switzerland 
and other countries in its immediate aftermath. According to one estimate, in 1797, 
within less than a fortnight, supporters of the Helvetic Revolution planted around 7,000 
liberty trees all over the country.46 It is noteworthy, however, that even the most radical 
supporters of France, while taking up the symbol in its general form, altered its specific 
content. Instead of putting the French bonnet rouge on their liberty trees, they used 
green hats, since they regarded green as the colour of Wilhelm Tell. In other words, the 
liberty tree was nationalised by adding a symbol that was considered authentically 
Swiss. This practice was sanctioned, if not promoted, by the Helvetic authorities.47
As always, the fiercest opposition against new national customs came from the 
Catholic valley communities. In 1798, troops from Schwyz, Unterwalden, Zug and 
Glarus marches to Lucerne in protest of the towns’ elites sympathetic attitude to the 
Helvetic order. The protesters marched under the banner ‘Jesus, Joseph, Saint Martin -  
this is the true, legitimate liberty tree, for god and fatherland’. After a short religious 
service in which there was mention of Tell and the ‘bloodthursty Frankish Gessler’, the 
trooops started to fell and subsequently bum all the liberty trees they came across. 48
The conflict over Swiss nationhood escalates
It was during the regeneration period of the 1830s that Swiss republican nationalism 
reached its full potential. After the conservative restoration that followed the Helvetic 
Republic’s demise, the 1830s and 1840s brought with them an unprecedented 
politicisation of public life. The change in political culture was considerable. During 
the Old Regime and then again during the period of conservative restoration that lasted 
from 1815 to 1830, politics had been a clandestine affair dominated by small circles of 
powerful magistrates. Modem politics, by contrast, while still largely dominated by an 
educated elite, had nonetheless become a public affair in which a considerable
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proportion of ‘the people’ participated. Democracy and popular sovereignty, the two 
central credos of republican nationalism, made the art of persuasion a vital ingredient of 
success. To win over the masses, political entrepreneurs needed to justify their cause. In 
1833, a Zurich contemporary gave a vivid description of the debates that accompanied 
the era of constitutional reform of the early 1830s:
The liberals among the town people began to fraternise with rural folk. They 
engaged in mutual discussions about both utilitarian and aesthetic matters.
Their meetings took place in welfare societies ... and at the popular folk song 
festivals at which choirs of two- or three hundred voices sang songs about 
Liberty and the Fatherland.... The Swiss people seemed to have rediscovered 
how a public life would awaken and revive all social virtues and strengths, 
particularly the beautiful virtue that manifests itself in the recognition of the 
individual and of personal achievement.49
Many adherents of the old order admitted to being drawn almost against their will into 
the political controversies over secularisation and constitutional reform that the 
Radicals had engendered. ‘The main reason why I cannot escape from politics’, the 
Conservative, Jeremias Gotthelf maintained, ‘is because today politics is everywhere’. 
‘In fact’, he continued, ‘what characterises radicalism is that politics permeates the 
lives of every estate, ravaging the holy sphere of the family and decomposing Christian 
faith.’50 The turning of private individuals and family members into citizens who 
participated in the political controversies of the day was indeed what the radical 
ideologues were after. The poet Gottfried Keller, for instance, while he praised the 
virtue of political participation, had only contempt for what he saw as the self-centred 
concerns and interests of individuals who kept standing aloof from modem politics. On 
May 2,1848, he declared: ‘The silent majority must be ... morally destroyed .... No, 
there must not be any private person left.’51
What also contributed much to the nationalisation of the public was the marked 
proliferation of newspapers during the regeneration period. During the course of the 
1830s, Switzerland became the country with the highest density of newspapers in the 
world.52 The general politicisation of public life, along with the liberalisation of public 
opinion, had enabled this trend. Most of the newly established newspapers were liberal
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or radical in orientation, and the cantons of Zurich, Aargau, St. Gallen and the Vaud 
were the centres of this new founding wave. Liberal-conservative and conservative 
newspapers, albeit less numerous, were quick to respond to the challenge.53 Not only 
did the number of newspapers increase sharply in the wake of the July Revolution in 
Paris, but they also became more ‘national* in outlook. As a contemporary observed in 
1830 concerning the changes taking place in newspaper reporting:
Even before the events of July [1830] patriotic concerns had occupied a lot of 
space in the papers;... As the movement gained momentum over the last few 
months, freedom of the printed press was introduced in most areas where 
hitherto it had been unknown. Papers that used to be insignificant became 
lively and colourful. With few exceptions, our newspapers have undergone 
profound changes.54
Numerous popular associations and a burgeoning festival culture contributed their part 
to the nationalisation of the public sphere. Well before the founding of the federal state 
in 1848, various national societies emerged that pursued an overtly national ideological 
agenda. The most important of which were the Swiss Shooting Association (founded in 
1824), the Swiss Gymnastic Society (founded in 1832), and the Swiss Folk Song 
Association (founded in 1842). These societies emerged as the bastions of the 
republican nationalism of the regeneration period. Not only did these national 
associations provide an organisational roof for the hundreds of cantonal societies and 
their activities, but they also served to concentrate the minds of their members on the 
national cause. The Swiss Folk Song Association, for instance, stated as its purpose the 
‘promotion and embellishment of the folk song movement, the awakening of higher 
feelings for God, Liberty and Fatherland, and the bringing together of the friends of the 
arts and of the Fatherland’.55 Their annual festivals amounted to huge national 
celebrations, attended by hundreds of active participants and thousands of visitors.56
The national shooting festivals in particular were mass gatherings devoted to the 
worshipping of Swiss nationhood. Taking place each year in the summer and lasting for 
one week, these festivals were the bastions of republican nationalism (which is why 
they were largely avoided by Switzerland’s Catholic population).57 The shooting
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festivals also came to symbolise the will to defend the country against internal and 
external enemies. Referring to the protagonist of the liberation mythology, this 
argument found expression in a radical newspaper report in 1841: ‘The archer Tell 
created the Swiss Confederation, and the Shooting Association is the Tell of our day.
r o  _
Switzerland’s salvation therefore must come from its activities.’ The Jesuits became 
the scapegoats of the radical shooters who formed the bulk of the festival attendants. 
They were described as ‘snakes in the heart of Switzerland’, and they were held 
responsible for the lack of national unity, while the leaders of the Sonderbund were 
described as ‘degenerated sons’ and as ‘degenerated Swiss’. The rhetoric against the 
Jesuits was particularly strong at the 1847 festival. An official speech expressed it thus:
At the shooting festival in Glarus the Swiss people have renewed their oath of 
allegiance. They have made a mutual oath that they shall rather die than hand 
over their marvellous banner to the Jesuits, apostates and foreign reactionaries.59
Plate 4-2: Shooting Festival in Zurich, 1834. 
Schweizerische Landesbibliothek, Bern.
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Once the constitutional reforms were accomplished, the re-education of the public 
continued in the form of a ‘cultural policy in the spirit of the Enlightenment’.60 In the 
school curricula of the regenerated cantons, which had made schooling compulsory, the 
nation became a central category. Particularly in the cantons with a radical majority, the 
influence of the church on popular education declined dramatically. An examination of 
curricula in Bern and Geneva concluded that, between 1930 and 1848, biblical 
instruction increasingly gave way to national history. In Geneva, a secularised national 
history, presented as a catalogue of moral lessons that centred on the late-medieval 
liberation and foundation myths, became the standard, at least in protestant primary and 
secondary schools. In Bern, Heinrich Zschokke’s popular Swiss history (Des 
Schweizerlands Geschichte fur das Schweizervolk, first published in 1822) -  a text in 
which late-medieval battles and myths take a central role -  was the text most frequently 
used in secondary schools.61
International pressure
The pressure exerted on Switzerland by foreign conservative powers both during the 
Helvetic Republic and then again between 1830 and 1848 contributed its part to an 
intensification of national discourse and a strengthening of national consciousness 
among the broad masses. This pressure exerted its influence mostly in an indirect 
fashion: because of the Swiss Confederation’s role as a save haven for foreign 
revolutionaries who had fled from persecution. The fact that political refugees could 
benefit from a relatively liberal climate in Switzerland provided a principal cause of 
foreign interference. Prince Mettemich, the Austrian Chancellor, thus complained 
bitterly in 1845 about the republican virus spreading form Switzerland:
Switzerland stands alone today in Europe as a republic and serves troublemakers 
of every sort as a free haven. Instead of improving its situation by appropriate 
means, the Confederation staggers from evils into upheavals and represents for 
itself and for its neighbours an inexhaustible spring of unrest and disturbance.62
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Making efficient use of the freedom of the press guaranteed in the liberal and radical 
cantons, foreign political dissidents polemicised against the conservative authorities of 
their native countries. The foreign conservative powers that were the subject of such 
criticism, especially Austria and Prussia, frequently responded by pressurising 
Switzerland to tighten its liberal laws. In the summer of 1836, for example, such 
pressure caused the Swiss Diet to limit the right for asylum. Swiss republican 
nationalists, who regarded German and Austrian Liberals as their brothers in arms, 
reacted with popular protest to such measures, with some demonstrations attracting up 
to 10,000 participants.63
The fact that the Diet did not take seriously the demands that were formulated at 
these demonstrations was water on the mill of the nationalist movement. By 1836/37 
there existed as many as fourteen societies that pursued an explicitly national agenda. 
Messmer argues that the fact that the cantonal governments repeatedly had to give way 
to foreign pressure and expel political refugees accused of preparing uprisings against 
their governments was widely perceived as a blatant violation of Switzerland’s right to 
self-determination, thus ‘strengthening radical nationalism’.64 The conservative 
Sonderbund alliance, moreover, had direct contacts with foreign conservative powers. 
Austria and France in particular supported this anti-republican movement both 
financially and by supplying it with weapons. All this added to the outrage on the part 
of the Radicals and Liberals, for whom the members of the Sonderbund were 
‘foreigners’ who conspired against the ‘Swiss Fatherland’.65
As the previous examination has shown, popular Swiss nationalism began to 
form between 1798 and 1848. Its potential was first revealed before and during the 
Helvetic Revolution, reaching its full strength during the regeneration period (1830- 
1848). Liberal and radical-democratic groups came to provide the major impetus 
behind the formation of this republican nationalism. During the regeneration era in 
particular, these groups gained the support of majority of the Protestant public. The 
engine of republican nationalism consisted of a number of civil society institutions, 
with newly emerging popular societies like the Swiss Shooting Associations and the 
Swiss Folk Song Association playing a major part. These societies and the national
135
rituals they organised attracted a mass audience. The regenerated cantons with then- 
liberal constitutions and secularised education systems added an institutional 
component to these symbolic activities that was crucial for its success.
Thus, essentially, the republican nationalism of the period between 1798 and 
1848 was a movement for constitutional reform. Drawing its central ideological lessons 
from the Enlightenment and its revolutionary manifestations in France, its battle cries 
were ‘liberty’, ‘progress’, and ‘fatherland’, with the radical sections of the movement 
placing much emphasis on ‘equality’. After the movement had successfully realised its 
objectives in many cantons in the course of the 1830s, the ‘Swiss nation’ was the next 
logical target on the agenda of the national movement. (The development of Swiss 
republican nationalism is depicted in Tab. 4-1.)
Tab. 4-1: The rise of republican nationalism (1798-1848): focus of identification, 
nature of ideology, institutional form
Epoch Focus of 
Identification
Nature of Ideology Driving Force / 
Institutional Form
Pre-1798 Canton / 
Swiss Nation
Civil Rights (Equality 
and Liberty)
&
Ethno-Symbolism 
(Liberation Myths)
Elite Societies
1798-1803 
(Helvetic Republic)
Swiss Nation / 
Canton
Civil Rights (Equality 
and Liberty)
&
Ethno-Symbolism 
(Liberation Myths)
Helvetic State
1803-1830 
(Mediation & 
Restoration)
Canton / 
Swiss Nation
Civil Rights (Equality 
and Liberty)
&
Ethno-Symbolism 
(Liberation Myths)
Elite Societies, 
Popular Societies, 
Mass Festivals
1830-1848
(Regeneration)
Swiss Nation / 
Canton
Civil Rights (Equality 
and Liberty)
&
Ethno-Symbolism 
(Liberation Myths)
Elite Societies, 
Popular Societies, 
Mass Festivals, 
Liberal and Radical 
Cantons
136
Competing definitions of nationhood
The insignificance o f shared language
From its very outset, however, republican nationalism, with its secularising and 
centralising thrust, provoked strong popular resistance. What separated the republican 
nationalist movement and its Catholic Conservative opponents was their adherence to 
two rival and ultimately irreconcilable conceptions of communal organisations. 
Language, by contrast, frequently considered the principal agent of national divisions, 
did not present a divisive factor. That language was no stumbling stone to national 
solidarity becomes less surprising upon closer inspection of the republican movement. 
Daniel Frei’s argument on Helvetic nationalism holds true for the entire first half of the 
nineteenth century as well:
At the turn of the eighteenth century, the linguistic question did not yet have the 
powerful force able to determine the course of history. ... Ordinary people were 
hardly aware of it, and to the educated parts of the population the use of the 
language of the cosmopolitans, French, was nothing but natural.66
It was therefore with astonishment rather than outrage that the members of the Helvetic 
Senate discovered in 1798 that the presence of Italian-speaking representatives posed a 
problem of communication that required an agreeable solution. (That the members of 
the Helvetic parliament were able to communicate in French, the language of the 
Enlightenment, was taken for granted.) After a short and pragmatic debate, the Senate 
decided to employ an Italian translator. In a concluding speech, one member 
maintained that the reality of multilingualism had to be accepted ‘until the Helvetians 
one day, as through a miracle, adopt a common language’.67
Of even greater importance was that the dynamics of the constitutional struggle 
favoured the emergence of alliances that cut across linguistic and religious boundaries. 
Hence, during both the Helvetic Revolution and the constitutional revolutions that 
punctuated the 1830s and 1840s, German-, French- and Italian-speaking cantons were
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fighting for the same values and interests, resulting in a community of belief that 
transcended linguistic differences. For example, in the Sonderbund war of 1847 troops 
from the Vaud and the Ticino fought alongside their counterparts from Zurich and 
Bern.68
Republican nationalism versus Catholic communalism
If language did not prove to be a divisive factor in the formation of the modem Swiss 
nation-state, religion and geography did. The resistance against republican nationalism 
was particularly strong in Alpine, Catholic areas. Gaining strength and militancy in 
proportion to the success which republican nationalists enjoyed in the Protestant 
cantons, this conservative movement strongly opposed efforts at modem nation-state 
building. Essentially, therefore, the conflict between, on the one hand, the Radicals and 
Liberals and, on the other, the Catholic Conservative opposition that later organised 
itself in the Sonderbund alliance represents a classical struggle between a modem 
republican nationalism and an anti-national movement. The motives of the latter can be 
described as ‘traditional’: its major task was not progress in the sense of the 
Enlightenment, but to defend the autonomy of a Gemeinschaft-based. social order that 
had its central organising institutions in the village, the valley, and the Church. The 
popular democratic assemblies, the so-called Landsgemeinden, was the incarnation of 
this traditional social order.69
Catholicism played a cmcial part in the conservative resistance to the modem 
nation-state because it structured peoples’ lives in an encompassing sense. It supplied 
these communities with a principle of social organisation and ontological wholeness 
that was in sharp contrast with the ideals that informed Protestant republican 
nationalism. The strong secularising thrust and the drive towards central regulation, the 
hallmarks of this civic nationalism, posed a considerable threat to this traditional way 
of life. The ‘popular anti-centralism’ to which this conservative movement adhered was 
tantamount to ‘the rejection of the modem state’.70
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A glance at their notions of ‘liberty* can serve to bring into even sharper relief 
the different conceptions of community that informed republican nationalists and their 
conservative opponents respectively. To republican nationalists, liberty meant 
emancipation from traditional customs and dependencies in the name of nature and 
progress; it also meant that certain rights (such as freedom of speech, of association and 
of the printed press) and institutions (including popular sovereignty, the separation of 
the legislative, executive, and judiciary spheres) would become enshrined in a 
constitution; and, above all, it meant political unification and (a certain degree of) 
cultural standardisation. It this modem conception of liberty that informed the rhetoric 
and deeds of radical leaders like Ulrich Ochsenbein. The fact that the republican 
nationalists frequently employed an historicist rhetoric to legitimate their claims does 
not alter this. ‘It is my ambition*, Ochsenbein proclaimed after the failure of his failed 
expedition against Lucerne of 1844, ‘to have contributed more than anyone else toward 
unifying and strengthening our Fatherland, and make it appear as one to the outside
71world. That is what I want to achieve, or die.’ These were basic credos that united 
republican nationalists, although Liberals tended to emphasise individual rather than 
collective rights, and Radicals pushed for equality.
For the (Catholic) anti-national movement, by contrast, liberty meant freedom 
from external interference wherever it may come from. For the adherents of this 
conservative conception of liberty, then, freedom was tantamount to the preservation of 
communal autonomy, and thus to the protection of a way of life shaped by a set of 
distinctive political and cultural institutions. This notion of liberty, therefore, was 
collective rather than individual. Forming a peculiar mixture of cantonal particularism 
and Catholic universalism, moreover, it ran counter to the ideals held dear by the 
champions of the modem nationalising state.72 It was to this understanding of liberty 
that Johann ab-Yberg, the Landamann of Catholic Schwyz was alluding to in October 
1847 when he addressed a 9,000 strong crowd at a popular assembly. As he put it in 
what was an unmistakable incitement to war: ‘All right then, war, and why? Because 
you wish to be free as your fathers were,... because you will not allow Catholic
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institutions -  which must be sacred to all true Catholics -  to be robbed and pillaged,... 
because you want justice.’73
The nationalisation o f the anti-national movement
Although fuelled by rival conceptions of community, the conflict between republican 
nationalists and their opponents constituted in its very essence a controversy over 
modem nationhood. By participating in this controversy, the Catholic Conservative 
anti-nationalists unintentionally contributed to anchoring nationhood as a social 
category in the popular imagination. Two factors in particular were conducive to the 
nationalisation of the anti-national opposition.
The first concerns what could be termed a shared ethno-symbolic focus. Both 
Liberals and Radicals, who were united in their aim to create a Swiss nation-state, and 
the Catholic Conservatives who strongly resisted their project referred to the late- 
medieval liberation and foundation myths to warrant their political agendas. The 
historicist narrative of liberation therefore provided a common normative and cognitive 
focus even as the conflict had escalated and turned into a civil war in the winter of 
1847. Both sides attempted to bolster their rival claims by referring to exemple virtutis 
from the allegedly heroic past of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The founding of 
the Old Confederation, the battles at Morgarten (1315) and Sempach (1386) against the 
Habsburgs, and particularly the legend about Wilhelm Tell were stock items in the 
rhetoric of Radicals and Conservatives alike. In a pamphlet dating from the 1840s, the 
Catholic cantons, Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden and Lucerne were accused of having 
become ‘peijurers to the Oath of the Rutli’. In a poem dating from around the same 
time, Tell fights with the liberals and radicals against the reactionary forces that set up 
the Sonderbund alliance.74
The second (and principal) factor favouring the nationalisation of the anti­
republican opposition derived from the successful institutionalisation of the modem 
nation-state since the turn of the eighteenth century. In this respect, the Helvetic 
Republic, though short-lived, determined the tracks along which the future journey was
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to follow. It set the stage, as it were, for future debates about Swiss nationhood. For at 
least in part, the Helvetic state had succeeded in creating a new political and 
geographical space. The concept of Swiss nationhood as an ‘organic unity of state, 
people and territory* had for the first time found expression in the Helvetic Constitution 
and the social practice of the Helvetic State.75 The impact of these transformations on 
the republican nationalist movement of the 1830s and 1840s were marked. While 
initially concentrating its efforts on constitutional reforms at the cantonal level, this 
movement drew inspiration from an institutional and cognitive framework created 
during the Helvetic Republic.76 Even the anti-republican movement, whilst continuing 
to oppose the nationalisation of the state through the promotion of a Gemeinschaft- 
based rhetoric of political and cultural autonomy, was bound to operate within this very 
framework, thereby helping to reinforce it.77
Two rival definitions o f nationhood
While a common ethno-symbolic focus ‘united’ supporters and opponents of the liberal 
nation-state, they also served to elaborate two distinct conceptions of nationhood. The 
adherents of republican nationalism tended to embrace a civic definition of national 
identity, as opposed to their Conservative opponents, who defined the nation in organic 
terms. Liberal and Radical nationalists depicted Switzerland as a voluntary nation, a 
Willensnation capable of uniting different cultural groups within a shared framework of 
values, norms, and institutions. This essentially civic definition of Swiss nationhood 
found paradigmatic expression in a play, written during the 1830s by a supporter of 
republican nationalism:78
T r e u h e r z : It is true that the Swiss are a mixed nation, 
composed o f Germans, Frenchmen, Italians; but despite 
differences in terms o f language, customs and religion these 
different parts constitute one nation. For they possess a 
specific character, a nationality, which they share and by 
virtue o f which they distinguish themselves from other 
European peoples.
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St a d t r a t : And this character, this nationality, what does it 
consist in?
TREUHERZ: Their love o f liberty and their profound hatred o f  
servitude. The love o f liberty, and a constant worry to be 
deprived o f it -  this caused our forebears to unite into one 
single nation, and the same concerns must unite us today.
Meanwhile the anti-national movement contributed an organic understanding of 
nationhood to the fabric of Swiss national identity. What happened was this: the 
Catholic Conservative opponents of republican nationalism projected their own 
(Gemeinschaft-based) conception of community onto the national level. Thus from the 
viewpoint of the champions of the anti-national cause the Swiss nation was determined 
by the same ‘laws’ as their much-praised ideal-type communities: the family, the 
village, and the canton. Consequently, in the organic conception favoured by the 
Catholic Conservative opposition, the Swiss nation appeared as a pre-political 
community based on natural similarities and shared ancestry. As the Catholic 
Conservative politician, Philipp Anton Segesser expressed this organic understanding 
of Swiss nationality in 1847: ‘A people is like a family, while adoption is something 
that remains a matter of civil law’.79 A Catholic newspaper report of 1846 provides an 
even more instructive description of Swiss nationhood as a community of shared 
ancestry:80
The question remains: who constitutes the Fatherland, the Nation? The 
divided authorities, the party that breeds revolution and public outrage, or 
those immediate descendants of the heroic forefathers who constitute the 
pillars of our Fatherland’s history and liberty?
These rival definitions of Swiss national identity manifested themselves in two distinct 
periodisations of the national past. Typically, the opponents perceived the late medieval 
period as the unsurpassable peak of Swiss history. From such a viewpoint, the welfare 
of the Confederation consequently depended on whether its members returned to the 
moral guideposts set by the forebears. Instead of linear time and a belief in evolutionary 
progress -  the basic credos of republican nationalism -  this organic view of community
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was rooted in a cyclical conception of temporality. The Helvetic state was described as 
a derivation from the ‘right path* set out by the heroic forefathers, which were 
perceived in genealogical terms. Liberals and Radicals, because they had diverged from 
the right path by importing foreign ideas and institutions, were therefore portrayed as 
archenemies of the Swiss people. The core myths -  William Tell and the Oath of the 
Rtitli -  were not interpreted in terms of a breakthrough to the kind of liberty expressed 
in the natural-law doctrine. Instead, the emphasis was placed on national independence, 
with the prevention of foreign interference held to be the first duty of true patriotism.81 
What is more, the forebears were attributed the status of role models of liberty and 
simplicity because they are considered genealogical ancestors, resulting in a 
‘genealogical myth of descent’.
Republican nationalists, on the other hand, understood the national past in terms 
of a tripartite model of communal evolution. Its first stage being the heroic age of the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries when the Swiss nation had been founded and liberty 
had been achieved in a succession of battles against external enemies. This glorious era 
had been followed by a period of steady decline. Spanning the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, the demise was epitomised by internal disunity, servitude and 
egoism. It had eventually given way to a new age of light, which had culminated in the 
Helvetic Revolution of 1798. But, according to the republican narrative, the Helvetic 
Republic had exceeded even the medieval heroic age in its achievements by adding to 
the precious virtues of unity and liberty a civic state based on the principles of 
rationality and progress. Yet as with the Conservative periodisation of the national past, 
republican nationalists historicised the present. In contrast to the former group, 
however, they interpreted the liberation myths in ideological rather than genealogical 
terms: as symbols of a revolutionary struggle against Austrian oppression and thus as 
early forerunners of the republican revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries.83 In this narrative, then, the late medieval heroes appeared as champions of 
the civic virtues and values that lay at the heart of the modem nation-state, while the 
element of genealogical ancestry remained conspicuously in the background.
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This ideological interpretation of the foundation and liberation myths was much 
more in keeping with the multicultural construction of Swiss nationhood that emerged 
as a constant feature of republican nationalist discourse. The way in which the French- 
speaking participants in the National Shooting Festival of 1847 held in Glarus 
illustrates this well. The various speeches reveal a semantic consensus in that the 
delegates of Geneva or Lausanne were described as ‘nos freres par les sentiments ’, and 
the evidence suggests that this terminology was consensual. As a delegate from 
Lausanne put it: ‘While in terms of our flesh and blood we are not the descendants of 
the Old Confederates, in terms of our spirit we clearly are.’84 (The rival definitions of 
nationhood are discussed in Tab. 4-2.)
Nature
The natural environment in general and the Alps in particular retained much of the 
significance they had already possessed in the discourse of the Helvetic patriots (see 
chapter 3). However, references to Alpine nature were conspicuously more frequent in 
statements by republican nationalists, who, unlike many of their sworn enemies, tended 
to live in the towns rather than in mountainous surroundings. By contrast, those who 
opposed the modem nation-state were less inclined to use nature as an ideological 
means of forging national unity and authenticity, which was precisely the function it 
fulfilled in the discourse of republican nationalism. In a number of statements, the Alps 
were presented as protective, purifying and character-building. As one member of the 
Helvetic parliament described the alleged blessings of an Alpine environment for a 
community: ‘All Alpine peoples were traditionally better mannered and more virtuous 
than the residents of the plains,... and even though they may possess less money, the
O f
often dispose over more inner substance and a stronger character than those.’
Overall, however, between 1798 and 1848 the salience of the Alpine theme in 
public discourse did not match that of the historicist and republican ones. As we shall 
see in subsequent chapters (chapters 5, 6, and particularly chapter 8), this was to change
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from the 1870s onwards, when ethno-linguistic nationalism rose to prominence in 
Europe.
Tab. 4-2: rival definitions of Swiss nationhood (1798-1848)
Type of Movement Conception of 
Community
Conception of 
Time
Type of 
Historicism
Republican 
Nationalism 
(Radicals & 
Liberals)
Nation-oriented
Voluntaristic: 
‘Will to Liberty’
Gesellschaft-Based
Linear
Discontinuous
Ideological: 
Ideological Myth of 
Descent
Naturalising 
Alps as Seat of 
National Virtue
Catholic-
Conservatives
(Sonderbund)
Localitv-Centred
Organic:
‘A Nation is Like a 
Family’
Gemeinschaft-Based
Circular
Continuous
Genealogical: 
Genealogical Myth of 
Descent
Conclusion
The socio-political conflicts that punctuated the period from 1798 to 1848 had three 
major effects on Swiss nation formation. First, they engendered a communications 
revolution, thereby forging a public sphere that potentially involved all geographical 
areas and social segments of nineteenth-century Switzerland. The rise of the republican 
nationalist movement that gathered such momentum between 1830 and 1848 would 
have been inconceivable without this parallel development.
Second, within this now considerably expanded Swiss public sphere ‘the nation’ 
became the central focus of attention. Encouraged by the constitutional reforms it had 
achieved in the cantons, republican nationalism developed into a powerful movement
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aiming to create a modem nation-state. The defeat of the Catholic Sonderbund in the 
short and relatively bloodless civil war of 1847 paved the way for the Constitution of 
1848 and thus for the fulfilment of the central aspiration of republican nationalists.
Third, in the course of this process the anti-national opposition (those who 
support the Sonderbund alliance) was nationalised: in defending what it regarded as its 
political and cultural autonomy, the Catholic leaders were bound to participate in the 
controversy over Swiss nationhood, thereby contributing to rooting ‘the nation* as a 
cognitive and emotive category among their own rank and file. In ideological terms, the 
Catholic opposition began to apply its own ideal of community -  that of the organic 
Gemeinschaft, inspired by the local community, the region, and the canton -  to the 
national plane.
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CHAPTER FIVE
‘We have become a People’:
Evolving into a Modern Mass Nation (1870-1900)
In 1861, the Swiss poet Gottfried Keller lamented that the state of national 
consciousness still left a great deal to be desired. As a measure to improve this sorry 
state and make the nation a focus of popular concern instead, he demanded that ‘great 
and genuine national festivals’ be organised in which ‘hundreds of thousands of people 
should take part’. He recommended that these festivals should take the form of ‘great 
historic commemorations which represent the sum of moral experiences or the common 
hopes of a people, not excluding moments of tragic self-reflection.’1
Keller’s patriotic hopes turned out to be less far-fetched than it may have 
seemed to many of his contemporaries for whom the divisive experience of the civil 
war between Protestant-Radical and Catholic-Conservative cantons in 1847 was still in 
living memory. In fact, it was merely his death in early 1891 that prevented him from 
seeing his dream come true. During the first two days of August of the same year, only 
months after Keller’s death, Switzerland celebrated the 600-year long existence as a 
nation. The central commemorative festivities, which attracted more than 20,000 
people, took place in central Switzerland, particularly in Schwyz and Uri, the two 
cantons most strongly associated with the country’s national origin.
The national festival of 1891 signalled a new national era; one in which a more 
efficient usage of national ritual had favoured the emergence and spread of a more 
inclusive identity in Switzerland. In fact, the 600th anniversary celebrations of 1891 
marked the culmination in a wave of nation-oriented activities that had been gathering 
momentum since the 1880s, transforming Switzerland into a modem mass nation.2 
Becoming a mass nation, however, was not the same as achieving a popular consensus 
on the meaning of Swiss nationhood -  competing conceptions of national identity 
persisted. What it did mean, however, was that the nation was becoming a popular 
reference point, increasingly cutting across cultural and class-based boundaries.3
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This chapter comprises four sections. To help gain a familiarity with the symbolic 
repertoire that dominated the national discourse of the time, the first section provides a 
‘thick description* of key aspects of the national festival of 1891. The second section 
addresses the question of why Switzerland became a mass nation in the last third of the 
nineteenth century. This transformation is attributed to a complex interaction 
geopolitical and domestic factors which, mutually reinforcing each other, prompted the 
national revival of the 1880s and 1890s. In marked contrast to the state-elite centred 
model embraced by Hobsbawm and others, I explain this revival as the product of 
nation-oriented activities in which both the nationalising state and civil society play a 
significant part. The third part examines how Swiss national identity was re-defined in 
the context of internationalist competition.
Two days of worshipping the nation: the national festival of 1891
The official festivities started on Friday evening, August 1, when the organising 
committee welcomed the honorary guests and the various delegations from all parts of 
the country, and ended on the evening of August 2.4 The Friday evening was filled up 
with singing and music performances. On Saturday morning, August 2, at five o’clock, 
the participants were woken up by cannon fire, and at six o’clock the music corps 
signalled the reveille with the national anthem. After church and sermon the 
representatives of the Federal government and of the Uhrkantone (the alleged founders 
of the Confederation, the cantons Uri, Schwyz and Unterwalden) gave their speeches. 
Emil Welti, the President of the Swiss Confederation, addressed the crowd gathered in 
Schwyz, singling out the two issues that were to dominate the thematic agenda of the 
national festival -  the national past and its great relevance to the country’s present and 
future on the one hand, and Switzerland’s place as a nation in a world of nation-states 
on the other:
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Confederates! Nobody may dare interprete the thoughts and feelings the 
Swiss people are attaching to this day ... We are looking back with great 
humility over six centuries of history to the beginnings of our 
Confederation. We are seeking advice from our forefathers to find relief 
from the confusions of these days, and to be enlightened about what the 
future might hold. On 1st August 1291 the men of the three valleys, Uri,
Schwyz and Unterwalden gathered ... What began as a promise of mutual 
protection of their homeland subsequently came to serve as the seed from 
which the tree of the Confederation could grow and, by virtue of its 600- 
year long persistence, take its rightful place among the other nations.5
In the course of the afternoon an historic play -  the Festspiel fur die Eidgendssische 
Bundesfeier -  was staged in which 960 mostly lay-actors of Schwyz and the 
surrounding villages, as well as 400 singers and 120 musicians took part. In the 
preliminary stages of the festival, some 30,000 copies of the play were sold. The exact 
size of the audience of the play is unknown. What we do know, however, is that the 
number of seats available was 11,054. However, according to a report in the Neue 
Zurcher Zeitung (August 1,1891), there were about as many stands, amounting to a 
total audience of about 20,000.
The stage had been built following classical role-models, displaying a porta 
triumphalis as well as a number of Venetian flagpoles. The play lasted for a good three 
hours and ended with the merging of actors and audience into a huge carnival 
procession. After the play some 7,000 people participated in a banquet which awaited 
them in the festival hall. At 7 o’clock in the evening the church bells of Schwyz (and all 
over the country) rang for 15 minutes. At nightfall bonfires were lit on the surrounding 
valleys and mountains, and musical performances on the town place of Schwyz 
signalled the end of the first day of the festival.
The morning of the second day resembled that of the first. After the religious 
service the historic play was staged for the second time. In the afternoon the official 
guests, along with thousands of visitors, travelled to the nearby Rutli meadow in the 
canton of Uri, where 600 singers sang the festival cantata based upon the text of 
Schiller’s Wilhelm Tell. Speeches by representatives of the three founding cantons were
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followed by a boat journey on Lake Lucerne. As the ship approached the village of 
Brunnen in the canton of Schwyz it was already dark, with both the shore and the 
mountain ranges shone brightly in the light of the bonfires.6
The centrepiece of the national festival in Schwyz was the historical play that 
was staged both on Saturday afternoon and on Sunday morning.7 During the play the 
audience was presented with a tour d ’horizon of Confederate history leading up to the 
present and alluding to possible scenarios for future development. In a short prologue, 
the settlement of the area around Lake Lucerne around 200 AD was brought to the 
audience’s attention. The four scenes that followed, and which formed the thematic 
core of the play were concerned with the period from the late thirteenth to the late 
fifteenth centuries, paying particular attention to the Confederation’s founding in 1291, 
the subsequent battles against the Habsburg armies, and the reconciliation in 1481 
between the estranged Confederates. The concluding epilogue judged the state of 
contemporary Switzerland against the background of the past, pointed to the changes 
that had occurred in the modem era, and ended with a view into the future. It is worth 
noting, however, that the plot was not confined to the portrayal of significant historical 
events. Historical myths, particularly Wilhelm Tell (‘Tell’s Schuss in Altdorf) and 
Arnold Winkelried (‘Arnold Winkelried bei Sempach’) were represented in the play. 
These well-established national myths were portrayed in the form of tableaux vivants, 
with actors using their gestures to portray them. The respective meaning of the scenes 
was acoustically underlined in that particular songs were sung by a choir. Such 
tableaux found frequent usage in popular plays throughout the nineteenth century, and 
formed an important medium for the communication of themes of the national
Q
mythology towards a wider audience.
The play’s lengthy epilogue was finally devoted to the living, at least for the 
most part, and the play concluded with the singing of the song ‘To the Fatherland’
(.Dem Vaterland), which at the time was something like the country’s national anthem. 
The fact the audience was made a part of the overall plot at the closing stages of the 
play not only gave the endeavour a strong republican overtone, but it also contributed a
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great deal to rendering the play a highly emotional experience for many among the 
audience.
The protagonists of this epilogue were: ‘Helvetia,’ ‘The 22 Cantons of 
Switzerland,’ ‘Switzerland’s youth,’ and ‘The Mountains’. The whole plot of this last 
section was centred around the symbolic figure of Helvetia, the symbol of the modem 
Swiss nation-state as it came into being in 1848. Within the play the figure of Helvetia 
was depicted as the mother of all Swiss, both past and present. Helvetia, a female 
figure, represented the ultimate symbol of national unity and reconciliation. She had the 
task of securing the peace between different religious groups, and making sure they left 
their conflictive past behind them. She also had the new task of safeguarding mutual 
tolerance and understanding within a country that comprised different linguistic 
groups.9 Thus shortly before the play ended and the gathered crowd started to sing the 
national anthem, Helvetia reminded the audience to consider the country’s cultural 
diversity as a strength rather than a weakness:
You my sons, like the beautiful country,
You too form a diverse whole;
In language and thought, in thought and feeling 
You are shaped by mountain peaks and valleys alike.
I love diversity,
And love you all, my sons, the same.
Take this country as a model:
Everybody respect his brother 
And honour his peculiarity.10
Evolving into a mass nation: an explanation
The localist character o f national activity until 1850
The national festival of 1891 marks the peak in a wave of nation-oriented activity that 
began to manifest itself in the early 1880s. In the first half of the nineteenth century
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deep-rooted religious and political divisions often prevented attempts at buttressing 
national identity from developing its full potential. To grasp the nature and scale of this 
transformation towards a modem mass nation, a brief glance at the genesis of national 
ritual is therefore necessary.
The divisions between Protestant and Catholic cantons were reflected, for 
example, in the so-called Schlachtjahreszeiten, the commemorations of the medieval 
battles, a tradition dating back to the fifteenth century.11 In the nineteenth century these 
events, which were organised at the cantonal or communal level and had originally 
been designed as religious processions for the commemoration of the dead, adopted a 
more overtly national outlook. Yet, despite the fact that these commemorations were 
devoted to historic themes of a principally national significance, it was often a local 
rather than truly national sense of patriotism that was expressed on these 
commemorations. When Schwyz paid tribute to the fallen of Morgarten in 1815, for 
example, the fact that no representatives of other cantons had been invited underlined 
the localist character of the event.12
Another important upholder of national activity, the patriotic associations, was
largely composed of supporters of the liberal state and thus reflected the religious and
political divisions that culminated in the civil war of 1847. This partisan bias was
perhaps most clearly noticeable in the Swiss Rifle Shooting Association, which had
been founded in 1824 after rifle shooting had been declared a national sport in the
11military legislation of 1817. Within a short period of time this federal organisation 
disposed over a dense network of associations spread all over the country. From its 
foundation, the Swiss Rifle Shooting Association organised annual shooting matches in 
different parts of the country. These shooting matches served as a political platform for 
the liberal and radical supporters of constitutional reform, a programme which, though 
opposed by most Catholic cantons, was eventually realised in 1874. It took until 1861 
for the first national shooting match to take place in mostly Catholic central 
Switzerland, with the enthusiasm among the local population remaining rather 
modest.14
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In the face of the deep-seated political and religious antagonism following in the 
wake of the civil war of 1847, the liberal state was restricted to a marginal role in the 
way of national activity. Given that the founding of the national state of 1848 was 
preceded by major societal conflict, the political elite who supported the new socio­
political order was conspicuously hesitant in bolstering national activity prior to the 
1880s. This was partly because the political constitution of 1848 had restricted the 
state’s authority by transferring considerable autonomy to the respective cantons; but it 
was also due to fears among the new ruling groups that every activity on the part of the 
federal state, whether in the sphere of politics or culture, could potentially threaten the 
liberal state. In the face of the humiliation felt by many Catholics in the wake of the 
war of 1847, and the climate of tension and antagonism that resulted from this, such 
fears were by no means unfounded. In 1870 Philipp Anton von Segesser, an intellectual 
protagonist of the Catholic alliance which had been defeated in 1847, described the 
feelings prevalent among Catholics:
Even though a return to the legal situation of before 1847 was 
inconceivable, there nonetheless remained strong feelings of distrust and 
antagonism, especially when the process of centralisation became obvious 
in the newly emerging institutions. This resistance was still very strong 
among the people we represented. Those people perceived the federal 
political bodies as conquerors and oppressors ... The building of the 
Confederation of 1848 was not yet safe from being rocked by a severe 
blow.15
The boost o f national ritual in the last third o f the nineteenth century
National festivals played an essential role in broadening the nation’s appeal and in 
shaping a cognitive framework that would channel what henceforth could and could not 
be said and thought about the meaning of Swiss national identity. Looking back on the 
post-1848 development from the vantage point of the turn of the century, one observer 
singled out the contribution of national festivals to the creation and spread of a common 
Swiss identity:
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Our national festivals are ... comparable to popular assemblies. They help us to 
wrap a brotherly bond around the boundary posts not only of the cantons, but 
also of the different tribes ... The festivals are the cults which we consecrate to 
our Fatherland ... If, in fact, we have become a people since the foundation of 
our new Confederation [in 1848] -  and we have indeed -  then we owe this to a 
large extent to the national festivals.16
Zurich’s festival, in celebration of its 500-year long membership of the Confederation, 
in 1851 can be seen as a first sign on the way towards more integrative national 
festivals and commemorations. According to the intentions of its organising committee, 
the festival was to be a truly national festival. While representatives of all Catholic 
cantons had also been invited, with the exception of Lucerne the cantons of the former 
Catholic Sonderbund did not partake in the event.17
Plate 5-1: First Wilhelm Tell Monument (1852), Lugano, 
Riva Giocondo Albertolli (and thus important precursor 
of the Tell Monument in Altorf of 1895).
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But it was only from the 1880s onwards that most of the various patriotic activities and 
festivals held across the country finally lost their formerly localist outlook to become 
truly national events. This holds true of the various kinds of public festivals (harvest 
festivals in the French-speaking part, historical processions and plays as well as 
commemorations of battles in German-speaking Switzerland) acquired an increasingly
1 ftnational focus and began to attract larger crowds. It also applies to the commemo­
rations of the Agreement of Stans in 1881, to the battles of Sempach in 1886 and Nafels 
in 1888, as well as to the celebrations in honour of the 400-year anniversary of Brother 
Claus in 1887, and to the 700-year birthday of the city of Bern. Providing the prelude to 
the commemoration of the Charter of 1291 in Schwyz, these festivals managed to 
attract a considerable degree of public attention. Commenting on the commemorations 
of the battle of Sempach in 1886, the Italian-speaking Swiss newspaper ‘La Liberta’ 
reported that this event had ‘far exceeded the boldest expectations’ and that the ‘20,000 
spectators were moved to tears’.19
The boost in national activity went hand in hand with the introduction of forms 
of national representation that were new although they had historical precursors of 
some kind. The most important of these new forms were historical plays of the sort 
carried out in Schwyz in 1891. The era of the historical plays came into full swing 
during the 1880s with the commemorations in Stans (1881), Sempach (1886), Nafels 
(1888) and reached their peak in the national festival in Schwyz (1891) and the 
celebrations in honour of Bern’s 700th birthday (1891). As the above analysis of the 
great historical play in Schwyz has shown, these plays were monumental displays of 
commemorated national history, usually involving several hundred lay-actors and 
attracting often more than 10,000 people.20
Thanks to this general upsurge in national activity from the 1880s and to the 
invention of the historic plays which proved to be a highly appealing form of national 
ritual, some of its neighbours started to take notice of the Swiss public’s enthusiasm for 
national festivals. The Illustrierte Zeitung of Leipzig, for instance, in an article which 
appeared in the last decade of the nineteenth century, called Switzerland ‘the El Dorado 
of the national festival’:
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It is well recognised in Germany that there is barely another country that 
understands how to celebrate with such taste and enthusiasm, as does this 
small people, both the annual meetings and contests of its large associations 
(singers, gymnasts, riflemen) and the commemoration days of its liberty 
which often relate to events stretching far back in its history.
And even in France -  arguably the leading country in the field of national ritual 
throughout the nineteenth century -  there was praise for the Swiss history plays. As the 
Paris-newspaper Le Temps, wrote in 1889: ‘La Suisse est le pays par excellence des 
grandes fetes populaires.’21
Plate 5-2: Ferdinand Hodler, Turnerbankett (1877/1878), Oil on Canvas, Kunsthaus Zurich.
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Plate 5-3: Das moderne GriXtli (1887/1888), Oil on Canvas, Geneve, Musee d ’art et 
d ’histoire.
Switzerland may have changed, but, so Hodler’s painting seems to suggest, it remained 
faithful to its founding principles. The painting depicts men from different cultural and 
social backgrounds greeting each other at a National Rifle Shooting Festival. The three 
men in the left comer symbolise the Oath between the three Confederates.
Explaining popular nationalism
What forces caused Switzerland to become a modem mass nation? There are two 
influential explanations for the increase in national ritual in the last third of the 
nineteenth century.22 The first one has been put forward by Eric Hobsbawm in an 
article which concludes the influential collection of essays he co-edited with Terence 
Ranger, The Invention o f Tradition. In this essay, Hobsbawm links the European-wide 
boom in the production of national monuments and other representations of the nation 
to ‘profound and rapid social transformations of the period’ and the problems this 
posed to ruling classes in terms of political legitimacy.23 Georg Kreis, in his account of
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the process that led to the national festival of 1891 in Switzerland, followed this line of 
explanation.24 Others -  most prominently, Karl Deutsch and Ernest Gellner -  have 
argued that the evolution of mass nations can best be explained as a result of the 
functional requirements of modem, industrialised societies which fostered the 
development of dense networks of communication and efficient means of transport.25
Functional explanations, whether of the socio-psychological (meaning-centred), 
political (elite-centred), or structuralist (economy-centred) kind, possess an intuitive 
(and thus alluring) plausibility. Who would doubt that accelerated social change is 
likely to foster the need for the symbolic restructuring of social relations via public 
ceremony and ritual display, or that state elites have an interest in fabricating social 
cohesion by promoting nationalist doctrines? In the Swiss case, the expansion of 
democratic rights over the last third of the century in many respects challenged 
ambitions to reinforce state centralisation. And who can seriously deny that modem 
(‘capitalist’ or ‘industrialising’) societies’ need for denser communications and more 
efficient means of transport, as well as tourism, have encouraged to a considerable 
degree the emergence of mass nations in many parts of the world? In fact, railroad- 
building took a boost in the latter part of the nineteenth century in Switzerland, with the 
line through the Gotthard being opened in 1882. Besides, communication further 
progressed both in terms of its density and in terms of intensity thanks to an increase in 
the number of newspapers, private associations, and the institutionalisation of the 
popular referendum at the federal level.
The main weakness of these different functionalist approaches lies in their 
inability to explain why it was the nation that became such a prominent topic during 
those decades. Why were the festivals, celebrations and commemorations distinctly 
national in their outlook? Why, in other words, was it the nation that came to fulfil 
these psychological, economic, and political functions? To address these questions, my 
analysis places particular emphasis on the interplay of political, geopolitical and 
cultural factors. I shall thus proceed by identifying the domestic, political and 
geopolitical developments that unleashed these dynamics in the first place, in terms of
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1. a change in the relations between state and civil society embodied in the 
constitutional revision of 1874, which resulted in the state’s taking an 
increasingly active part in the production and promotion of national ritual.
2. an increase in inter-nationalist competitionx noticeable from the 1870s (see Tab. 
5-1).
Tab. 5-1: Increase in nation-oriented activity (1880-1900): a model of multiple 
causation
Level of Causation Broad Starting 
Condition
Particular Manifestation Outcome
Domestic Political 
Culture
Change in relations between 
state and civil society
a) Expansion of State’s 
infrastructural power 
(state centralisation)
b) Expansion of direct- 
democratic rights 
(legislative referendum) Reinforcement of efforts 
to symbolically express
Geopolitics
Increasing Inter-Nationalist 
Competition
a) European-wide growth in 
the promotion of national 
ritual
b) Rise of ethno-linguistic 
nationalism/irredentism 
(Italy and Germany)
the social cohesion and 
collective identity of the 
Swiss nation-state
Domestic political dynamics: the nationalising state and the cross-fertilisation 
of nation-oriented activity
The emergence o f the nationalising State
Confronted with domestic and external challenges (the implications of the latter will be 
discussed in more detail in the next section), state elites, who could rely on the 
intellectual supply of a considerable number of scholars and artists, began to take a 
more active role on the national stage -  by taking a more active part in the public 
discourse about Swiss nationhood, by initiating and co-ordinating public efforts aimed
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at celebrating the nation, by passing new legislation to promote national art and 
national antiquities, and through the provision of funding for scholarly and artistic 
activities which had the nation as its central focus.
From the 1880s onwards, such efforts began to bear fruit. To begin with, the 
state was now conspicuously keen on marking its presence on the various kinds of 
festivals and commemorations all over the country. At most of these events, 
representatives of federal government gave speeches in which they frequently stressed 
the importance of reinforcing the bond of loyalty between the single cantons and the 
Swiss Confederation as a whole. During the commemoration of the Battle of Nafels in 
1888, for example, in front of a mostly Catholic audience, Federal Councillor Hammer 
claimed that ‘never before in its history was our Fatherland so united’.26 It is highly 
indicative of this new and more inclusive sense of national identity that on the National 
Rifle-Shooting Day in 1891 in Lucerne, a Catholic Federal Councillor dared to urge the 
Catholic portion of his audience to bring sacrifices in the name of the new federal state. 
As the first Catholic-Conservative member of the Swiss government, Federal 
Councillor Zemp articulated with great confidence the nationalising state’s objectives:
The Swiss Federal State, which has developed marvellously since 1848 and 
1874, seeks to realise great and novel purposes of life. This necessitates us to 
make sacrifices, even if this means giving up certain long-held particularisms.
For only by making these sacrifices can we sharpen and nourish the national 
consciousness.27
The numerous and highly popular National Exhibitions present another field where the 
state became increasingly active. In the 1880s, these Exhibitions, which had 
traditionally adhered to a rather narrow economic focus, were for the first time given 
more overtly national themes. This organisers of the 1883 Exhibition in Zurich, for 
example, used the railway project through the Gotthard Pass as an example of the 
achievement of a nation that by virtue of its technical skills and economic potential had 
become a respected player in the world market.28
The Federal Council also began to commission a series of monumental 
scholarly works on the history of the Swiss Confederation from some of the foremost
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historians of that time.29 None of these works may ever have reached the instant 
popularity enjoyed by their precursors, particularly the Swiss histories of Johannes von 
Muller and Heinrich Zschokke;30 yet the government’s financial support made sure 
that these books began to make an impact on future debates about the Confederation’s 
past that went beyond the seminar rooms of the country’s universities.31
Cultural legislation is another area where the state’s efforts to promote national 
identity became increasingly visible. The year 1887 witnessed the passing of legislation 
which authorised the Federal government to support ‘public monumental works of art 
of historical or national character’. To this end, a permanent Federal Art Commission 
was set up and endowed with an annual budget of 50,000 Swiss Francs. Commenting 
on the new legislation, the driving force behind the government’s project of fostering 
national consciousness, Federal Councillor Schenk expressed his belief that art could 
help in bringing about a ‘a powerful boost in patriotism’. This task could be achieved, 
he argued, if historians focused on ‘those events and personalities that are of great 
importance to the nation’s history’.32 Moreover, in 1883 Salomon Vogelin, a member 
of parliament, clergyman and professor of art history, proposed to build a national 
museum in order to ‘express the national idea in all possible directions’. His proposal 
was not to be ignored: after a lengthy competition between various towns a protracted 
period of construction, the Landesmuseum opened in Zurich in 1898.33 Soon after it 
had opened its gates to the general public, people from all over the country, and classes 
of school children, visited the new museum in their droves (see Tab. 5-2)
165
Tab. 5-2: annual number of visitors to the National Museum (1898-1907)
1898 171,896
1899 142,077
1900 120,578
1901 94,713
1902 101,584
1903 105,136
1904 94,484
1905 98,501
1906 103,614
1907 104,790
Source: Schweizeriscbes Landesmuseum in Zurich. Jahresberichte 1898-1907.34
A change in state-civil-society-relations: more democracy and centralisation
What made the state become a nationalising state in the first place? A shift in the 
relations between the state and civil society provides the first part of my explanation. 
This shift was precipitated on two parallel developments:
1. the expansion of democratic rights from a primarily representative- 
democratic to a predominantly direct-democratic system since the 
1860s;
2. the state’s increased capability to expand its infrastructural power vis 
a vis the cantons in the wake of the constitutional revision of 1874.
The representative democratic system that had been established with the constitution of 
1848 came under increasing attack in the second half of the nineteenth century. Soon 
after 1848, various cantons -  including Basle-Country, Aargau, Lucerne, Bern,
Geneva, Zurich and Thurgau -  underwent constitutional reforms that set them ahead
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of, and sometimes in a position of tension with, the federal political system. In 
practice, the democratic movement that had gained momentum in those years 
demanded the introduction of the legislative referendum, that is, the possibility to 
challenge parliamentary legislation by way of popular referenda. The more opposition 
grew against what was increasingly conceived as an oligarchic rule, the stronger 
became the call for the introduction of direct democratic rights.
After having enjoyed successes in many cantons, the democratic movement 
started to make inroads on the federal plane from the 1870s. To accommodate the 
movement’s demands that were popular across linguistic and religious boundaries, a 
constitutional change was the only viable option. For although the constitution of 1848 
made certain constitutional changes dependent on the agreement of the popular 
sovereign, its laws favoured a representative system. Two constitutional revisions were 
put before the voters, one in 1874, and the other in 1874. Whereas a first draft for 
revision had narrowly failed in 1872, the second attempt in 1874 went through without 
difficulty: 340,199 voted for and 198,013 against the revision. The new constitution 
provided the Swiss citizenry with an exceptionally powerful instrument to challenge 
legislative decisions whenever they wished to do so.36
But the constitutional revision of 1874 did not merely reinforce political 
participation rights. It also resulted in a strengthening of the federal authority at the 
expense of the cantons. This had several potential and practical consequences. To 
begin with, the constitutional revision had reinforced the state’s capacity to standardise 
civil law and to determine the content of military training. Furthermore, it enabled the 
state to increase its grip on the education system by making public education 
compulsory, free of charge and secular. In the area of professional education, the 
state’s increased scope for regulating standards became noticeable in the 1880s with 
the introduction of a standardised national diploma.37 Finally, a general paragraph in 
the new constitution had widened the state’s capacity to make an impact on the course 
of social and industrial policy.38
Nevertheless, the fact that the constitutional arrangement of 1874 had 
simultaneously increased the scope for political participation and the state’s authority
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posed a serious predicament for liberal political elite: precisely at the time when the 
state had reached a position that allowed it to widen its ‘infrastructural power’, its 
legislative machinery had become more vulnerable as a result of the shift from the 
representative to the direct democratic system. If one follows Mann’s assumption that 
‘the “power” of the modem state principally concerns not “state elite power” over 
society but a tightening state-society relation, caging relations over the national rather 
than the local or transnational terrain, thus politicizing and geopoliticizing far more of 
social life than had earlier states’, then this tension becomes apparent.39
In the Swiss context, this meant that the dominant liberal elite’s capacity to 
determine the relations between the state and civil society (composed of political 
parties, pressure groups and voting citizens), while potentially intact, was bound to 
remain insecure. What added to the state’s general predicament was the fact that this 
distribution of power seriously reduced the feasibility of developing and realising long­
term strategies. A look at the actual legislative development in the immediate 
aftermath of 1874 shows that the voters did not hesitate to use their new democratic 
rights to challenge unpopular legislation. This is true in particular of the period 
between 1875 and 1885, which saw a real wave of referenda resulting in an important 
portion of parliamentary decisions being rejected by the voters.40
Some of these referenda owed their success in large part to unholy political 
alliances between groups which for a long time had been excluded from the liberal- 
radical phalanx of power: the Catholic-Conservatives, who had suffered from the 
Kulturkampf of the 1870s and whose fierce opposition to the centralising and 
secularising implications of the new constitutional arrangement reflected a religio- 
political conflict that went back centuries; and the Social Democrats, whose influence 
was rising as the industrialisation of Swiss society continued to progress. Out of 
different motives, these groups used the institution of direct democracy to hamper the 
legislative machinery driven by a liberal elite whom they perceived as ignorant of their 
own needs.41 Philipp Anton von Segesser (1818-1887), for example, a Lucerne 
patrician and Catholic-Conservative leader, as early as 1866 had discovered 
democratic rights as a means to weaken the nationalising state:
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My firm conviction is that we of the conservative camp must put ourselves 
entirely onto a democratic basis. After the collapse of the old order, nothing else 
can provide us with a future and a justification except pure democracy. Even if 
democracy has its dark side, it is preferable to the quasi-bureaucratic aristocracy 
of the representative system.42
Faced with a political system that posed a constant challenge to its legislative agenda, 
leading politicians responded by intensifying the state’s efforts to foster national 
identity by the various means we have discussed above. For in the perception of most 
of the state’s leading political representatives, popular resistance against enhanced 
state-centralisation expressed a lack of loyalty towards the state and its constitution; 
and at the root of all this, they assumed, lay a lack in people’s sense of national 
identity.
Political power versus symbolic power: the cross-fertilisation o f national activity
Notwithstanding the state’s crucial role, it would be simplistic to regard Switzerland’s 
transformation into a mass nation solely in terms of a by-product of the nationalising 
state. Intermediate activities, deriving from either the cantonal or associational level, 
remained vital in furnishing wide sections of the population with a common stock of 
national symbols and narratives. Of particular significance was the emergence of a 
climate of ideological competition that fuelled public discourse about Swiss national 
identity. It was brought about and sustained by the parallel symbolic activities of 
patriotic associations (particularly the sharpshooting societies), cantons and 
communities, and the state (see Fig. 5-1). As applied here, the concept of ideological 
competition implies two things. First, that none of the major actors involved possessed 
the monopoly over the definition of Swiss nationhood; and second, that the actual 
output in national activity was greater under these conditions than it would have been in 
a non-competitive situation.
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Fig. 5-1: The creation of a climate of ideological competition
Actor-Group_________________________ Type of National Activity
Cantons and Communities • Commemoration of late-medieval battles
• Commemoration of entrance into the 
Swiss Confederation
Private Associations • National sharpshooting festivals
• National festival of the gymnasts
• National folk song festivals
State • Cultural legislation
• Speeches of govemment-representatives
• Education
In a sense, of course, ideological competition between supporters of the liberal state 
and its opponents can be observed throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century; 
but competition increased in the latter part of the nineteenth century as the patriotic 
associations, and particularly the shooting associations, attracted ever larger audiences. 
The Catholic cantons, in turn, used their own festivals and commemorations as 
platforms for their counter activities, singling out their own contribution to the history 
of the Swiss Confederation. At a festival in commemoration of the battle of Morgarten 
in 1863, a speaker proclaimed that without the victory at Morgarten in 1315, the bulk of 
the present Confederation would have remained an Austrian province. He continued his 
speech by alluding to the patriotic activities of the liberal associations in a way that 
clearly revealed a sense of wounded pride:
At a time when from spring to autumn patriotic associations up and down the 
country hold their festivals, with the sharpshooting festivals playing the major 
part, and when from all kinds of directions we are witnessing attempts ... to 
elevate [people’s] sentiment for Fatherland and liberty; at such a time it may 
well be praiseworthy making a pilgrimage to the battlefields where our fathers
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rest in peace, and contemplate the value of both Fatherland and liberty in the 
face of their bloody example. These are popular festivals of a unique kind.43
A decade later, at the height of the Kulturkampf the tone had become even more 
critical. During the commemoration of the Battle of Murten in 1876, a Conservative 
newspaper complained that the Catholics were ‘treated like pariahs’ in many parts of 
the country: ‘But let us not forget: We have to distinguish between the Fatherland and 
those who are accidentally in power. Our love of the Fatherland is founded in the past 
centuries.’44
There are numerous other signs that, once created, these patriotic activities 
developed a dynamism of their own. As one observer described the patriotic 
enthusiasm that apparently reigned over the national shooting festivals in the closing 
decades of the nineteenth century:
The organisers built triumphal arches and stylish halls which can take up to
5,000 persons; several Swiss towns are competing for the right to hold the 
festival, and the successful applicants are seeking to beat their predecessors in 
extravagance.45
The same trend can be observed with regard to national monuments. Towards the turn 
of the nineteenth century in particular, monuments in honour of personalities of alleged 
national significance were built at an accelerating rate. As the liberal politician Carl 
Hilty observed in 1897: ‘Our time has, next to other special passions, also the passion 
for monuments. As soon as an important person has died, a committee of citizens 
inevitably suggests collections for a monument.’46
The prehistory of the national festival of 1891 also manifests how a dynamic 
interaction between various actor groups fuelled the national discourse. Initial plans 
which favoured the Swiss capital, Bern, as the appropriate venue for the festival came 
under heavy criticism. After the project had become public, a newspaper wrote: ‘What 
has Bern to do with the eternal alliance [of 1291] which was concluded some 20 hours 
away in Brunnen between the Urkantone?147 Apparently encouraged by these 
statements, the government of the canton of Schwyz inquired of the Federal Council
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about the possibility of carrying out the planned festival in Schwyz, arguing that 
Switzerland’s foundation ‘could hardly be celebrated in a more dignified way than at 
the place where the Confederation had been won, agreed upon and subsequently 
secured’.48 In June 1890, after both Schwyz and Bern had handed in their bids, the 
Federal Assembly decided by a unanimous vote that the festival on August 1st should 
take place in central Switzerland. Finally, on September 4, a commission composed of 
representatives of the cantons of Schwyz, Uri, Unterwalden, and the Federal Council, 
agreed on Schwyz as the venue for the festival.
This turn of events was significant in that it put the responsibility for the 
organisation of the biggest national event in Swiss history in the hands of the 
authorities of Schwyz. As opposed to the decades preceding the 1880s, when the 
Catholic leadership often combined a localist brand of patriotism with a supra-national 
papism, the state’s new approach worked as an incentive for Catholic communities to 
prove that their national loyalty was no less genuine than that of their Protestant 
counterparts. Half a year before the national festival took place, a Catholic-conservative 
politician urged those of his parliamentary colleagues who were of the same faith to use 
this opportunity to convince the rest of the country that the Catholics, too, venerated the 
Swiss nation:
The festival offers a most welcome opportunity to meet political opponents, and 
to reconcile old differences.... For we must prove to our opponents that we too 
love the Swiss Fatherland in its entirety, despite the fact that we are Catholics 
and thus recognise the Pope.49
The statement makes obvious that the moral pressure to enter the national chorus had 
increased during the closing decades of the nineteenth century. Geo-political 
developments, to which I shall now turn, were partly responsible for this increase.
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Geopolitical dynamics: inter-nationalist competition and the reconstruction of 
Swiss nationhood
There is another, geopolitical, factor which was conducive to Switzerland’s 
transformation into a mass nation over the last decades of the nineteenth century. I am 
referring to what could be termed a climate of internationalist competition. Its 
manifestations were a European-wide upsurge in the production of national ritual and a 
rise of ethno-linguistic nationalism.50 The first variable -  the mass-production of 
national ritual in Europe -  largely determined the scale of the nationalist reaction in 
Switzerland, while the second variable -  ethno-linguistic nationalism -  shaped the ways 
in which Swiss nationhood was defined during those decades.
The European mass-production o f national ritual
As Eric Hobsbawm and some of his collaborators have reminded us in a now famous 
collection of essays, all of western and central Europe witnessed a growth on an 
unprecedented scale in nationalist activity between 1870 and 1914.51 Indeed, a brief 
glance at developments in some of Switzerland’s neighbouring countries proves to be 
instructive.
To begin with, after the founding of the nation-state under Prussian leadership 
in 1871, annually held military parades and commemorations -  in particular the 
Sedantage and the Kaiserparaden -  played an important role in an overall attempt to 
buttress German national identity.52 Besides these, there were the national rituals which 
followed a 50-year or centennial rhythm, such as the commemorative celebrations of 
the Leipziger Volkerschlacht in 1813, the battle in which Napoleon had been defeated 
by an alliance composed of Russia, Austria, Prussia and Sweden. All available 
evidence suggests that these commemorations attracted great public interest when they
C l
took place in 1863 and 1913 respectively. Similar efforts were made in Germany with 
regard to national monuments. For instance, Kaiser Wilhelm I inaugurated a statue 
portraying Arminius the Cheruscan in the Teutoburg Forest in 1875 to commemorate
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the Germanic victory over the Romans in 9 AD; and in the 1890s statues to Wilhelm I 
were erected all over Germany.
In France, too, these state-induced nationalist activities be witnessed. July 14th 
was declared a national holiday in 1880 in commemoration of the day in 1789 on which
80,000 Parisians had taken the Bastille in the eastern part of the city. It should also be 
noted that the intention behind the design of the Eiffel Tower, constructed for the 
Exhibition of 1889, was to frapper le monde. As a monument of outstanding 
proportions, the Eiffel Tower was to convince the rest of the world that France, a nation 
with a great and venerable past, was at the same time a forward-looking country with a 
great future. As in Germany, military symbolism played an outstanding role in French 
national self assertion. The German notion of ein Volk in Waffen corresponded with the 
Third Republic’s une nation en armes, with a big military parade forming the 
centrepiece of the annual 14 July celebrations.54
A similar process can be observed in Britain. It was at the height of this inter­
nationalist competition that London was provided with a single administrative authority 
which subsequently converted the city, in the words of David Cannadine, ‘from the 
squalid, fog-bound city of Dickens into an imperial city’. From the 1870s onwards, 
Disraeli and others were relentless and eventually successful in their efforts to 
transform the image of the monarchy. The latter institution, ‘hitherto inept, private and 
of limited appeal’, began to attract the interest of ‘a broader cross section of the public 
than ever before’.55
The Swiss could not compete with such displays of imperial grandeur, but 
neither could they afford to shut their eyes to the new ideological trend of 
internationalist competition. In its annual report of 1892, for instance, the Commission 
for the Swiss National Museum considered the possibility of launching a series of 
newspaper adverts to urge Swiss owners of antiquities of national significance not to 
sell their possessions at low prices to foreign buyers. Only six years later, these 
concerns seem to have disappeared, the commission came to a fundamentally different 
conclusion as it analysed the market in national antiquities. Reflecting on developments 
of the late 1880s and early 1890s, an executive member of the Swiss National Museum
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identified a pervasive European nationalism as the prime cause of altered trade patterns 
in national antiquities:
It is not least in the great art auctions that a phenomenon has become 
noticeable that has hitherto been confined to the sphere of politics. The trade 
in antiquities has become affected by a national movement insofar as every 
country endeavours to buy their own pieces of art. Whereas in the past the 
English or French used to buy anything they liked in other countries, 
irrespective of the origin of an object, there has been a clear shift in both 
England and France towards local [national] antiquities, even in those cases 
where these are undoubtedly of a lower artistic value than available foreign 
ones. The Englishmen tend to buy the English, the Frenchmen the French, the 
Germans the German, and the Belgians and Dutchman the Dutch old works of 
art. This is not true merely of historical museums but also applies to private 
collectors...56
Nationalism, in other words, had become a recognised international force in late- 
nineteenth century Europe. State legitimacy was largely defined in terms of its 
ideological premises, making the ability to display to the outside world an image of 
vibrant patriotism and genuine nationhood a prerequisite for getting international 
recognition. The Swiss government’s endeavours to put in place a legal framework for 
a state-led cultural nationalism clearly mirrors such concerns. So, too, do the initiatives, 
emanating from private personalities and state-officials alike, which culminated in the 
national festival in Schwyz in 1891. National festivals and commemorations in 
particular provided a welcome opportunity to gain international prestige and 
recognition. The prospect of falling behind in this national competition presented a 
constant concern at least among the political intelligentsia; and among the latter, it was 
quite often the Swiss abroad who, after having gained first-hand experience of the 
countries in which they were then in residence, pointed to the emotive appeal and 
integrative force of such nation-oriented activities. The Swiss Consul in Montevideo in 
particular, had become a great admirer of the national holiday celebrations to which he 
had been exposed for years (both aspiring South American nations and the Colonial 
powers represented in Montevideo conducted such celebrations with great pomp). In
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1892, he sent a letter to the Swiss government, lamenting the fact that Switzerland 
lacked its own national holiday:
Switzerland is the only country in the world that does not possess its own 
national festival, nor any other day of commemoration which, once in a year, 
would help to reunite our hearts and elevate our patriotic sentiments ... The 
Republic of France celebrate the 14th July, the United States of America 
commemorate the 3rd of July, the Italians hold an annual festival in honour of 
the King, the Spaniards observe 2nd May; the Germans, Danish, Swedes, and 
English annually venerate their King; the republics of the South American 
Continent annually commemorate the birthday of their independence. We 
Swiss do not have anything at all.57
The ethno-nationalist challenge
What contributed even more directly to engendering a genuinely nationalist response, 
however, was a widespread perception of an external threat, both actual and 
ideological. In 1888 the constitutional historian, Carl Hilty, articulated a widely held 
view when he argued that ‘the increasingly precarious state of European peace’ had 
inevitably resulted in ‘sharper emphasis being placed upon one’s own [national] 
individuality’.58 In the face of these challenges, demands for national unity were 
multiplying in a climate in which moral and emotional pressure was mounting on those 
who had hitherto remained indifferent to joining in the chorus of national self-assertion. 
‘[Everything begins to lose its alarming face’, so argued Hilty in 1891, ‘if we remain 
united and do not exhaust our resources with pointless internal quarrelling instead of 
keeping focussed on the external danger. For this danger is nearer than we may believe, 
and it considerably heightens every sign of internal weakness on the part of the Swiss 
Confederation.’59 Speaking at the commemoration of the Battle of Nafels in 1888, 
Federal Council, Bernhard Hammer, articulated what by then had become a widespread 
perception in Switzerland:
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Never before in its history was our Fatherland so united, never could our state 
dispose of such an amount of resources, and never was our military defence so 
large and well-ordered as today; yet neither was Switzerland at any time in its 
history surrounded by such a number of war-prone colossi... To stand up to 
these external storms we must preserve our inherited characteristics, and 
cultivate whatever unites and strengthens us; and much of the things that 
divide and weaken us must be removed. It will be our foremost duty to treat all 
our fellow countrymen as brothers.60
While it is surely true that this perception and its consequences became most salient 
after the 1880s, its foundations lay in earlier times. It was a chain of collective 
experiences rather than a single event that had rendered this perception plausible and 
salient throughout much of Swiss society. An event that attracted considerable public 
attention shortly after the Swiss nation-state had been founded was the conflict that 
arose in 1856 with Prussia over the political status of Neuchatel. Possessing strong 
traditional links with the Prussian aristocracy, Neuchatel had become part of the Swiss 
nation-state in 1848. The conflict started when a group of 530 local royalists tried to 
change the small city’s republican regime in an uprising. The coup failed, however, and 
the authorities put the rebels in jail.61 Prussia threatened military intervention, and 
Switzerland responded by mobilising its army, an act that fostered a strong wave of
fS)national feeling that crossed, for a time at least, religious and linguistic borders.
A wave of Italian irredentism provoked a similar response. A first significant 
incident occurred in 1859 when a number of Italian patriots asked the Italian-speaking 
Swiss population to declare their loyalty to Italy: ‘Ticinesi! ... You are tied to us by ... 
sky, land, language, religion, customs, economic interest, historic traditions, tragedy 
and hopes. Hence everything that is most holy to a people ... you do not share with 
Switzerland but with us.’63 In 1862, an Italian general and the Italian foreign minister 
Giacomo Durando, again openly directed irredentist claims towards Switzerland. In an 
immediate response to such claims, the president of the Swiss National Council 
addressed the gathered members of parliament with the following words:
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The theory which led to these claims, if ever realised, would inevitably lead to 
Switzerland’s destruction. If the canton of Ticino is to belong to Italy because 
its population speaks Italian, then the logical conclusion would be that 
Germany could claim Switzerland’s German-speaking, and France its French- 
speaking part. Switzerland would therefore vanish from the map of Europe.
We are dealing here with a matter that is vital to the existence of our 
Fatherland. No member of our people can be in any doubt as to how they 
should react to this question. This challenge will lead Swiss people of all 
regions, of all linguistic and religious affiliations, and of all political 
orientations to one single decision. This decision says: the defence of 
Switzerland at all costs.64
German unification further heightened debates about Swiss nationality. The efforts at 
uniting Germany under Prussian leadership in particular, apparent from the 1860s, 
started to arouse concern when the Prussian-French antagonism began to intensify. 
After press voices in southern Germany had urged the Swiss-German population to 
morally support Germany in its fight against France, Switzerland’s leading liberal 
newspaper, the Neue Ziircher Zeitung, spelled out the official political line:
‘Switzerland does not consist merely of Swiss of German stock; as a matter of fact, its 
raison d ’etre demands that it disregards linguistic affiliation [as a criterion of 
nationality]’.65 What needs to be borne in mind -  and what the Swiss example so 
clearly demonstrates -  is that Bismarck’s kleindeutsche Losung of 1871, while 
admittedly resting on a state-centred rather than an ethnic conception of nationhood, 
was regarded by many Germans as an incomplete nation-state. The Pan-German 
League certainly presented the most radical -  but by no means the only -  current within 
German nationalism prior to 1900 expressing this dissatisfaction with the Bismarckian 
solution on ethno-linguistic grounds.66
The perception of a nationalist threat not only functioned as an accelerator of 
nationalist activity within Switzerland in the latter part of the nineteenth century, but 
also shaped the ways in which Swiss national identity was defined in public discourse. 
Here three narratives are of particular importance: the national past, the national 
mission, and the nature-nation link.
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Locating the nation in time: the prestige of old age
The embedding of a national community in the pre-modem past has been at the heart of 
nationalism ever since its inception in the late eighteenth century. In its neo-classicist 
version this endeavour adopted a more ‘civic’ outlook, with the main emphasis being 
placed upon continuities of value and institutions from the ancients to the 
contemporary. As we have seen in chapter 3, the Swiss patriots of the late eighteenth 
century, were keen to present the late medieval past as the source of national 
authenticity.
The historicist argument, rather than undergoing decline, further gained in 
currency as internationalist competition heightened debates on national identity all over 
Europe in the late nineteenth century. Some characteristics of this historicist project are 
familiar from the early phase of Swiss nationalism: the ideological implementation of 
the past as a broad role-model for the present and future course of action; the pedagogic 
structure of the narrative, starting with the glorious age, followed by a period of decline 
and the subsequent resumption of old virtues in the modem era. The historical play that 
was conducted at the national festival of 1891, discussed at the beginning of this 
chapter, presented us with a most elaborate manifestation of this historicist project.
Each of the play’s scenes sent a clear moral message to the public, drawing on the 
historical narrative and myths to demonstrate the virtues of liberty, independence, 
sacrifice, and unity.
In the face of internationalist competition, however, the new brand of national 
historicism began to place strong emphasis upon the prestige of old age and historical 
continuity as an asset in itself. Preserving that asset, and the lessons it provided, was 
increasingly regarded as a matter of survival rather than of mere choice. As a 
newspaper account put it: ‘The history of all states and of all times teaches us that a 
people who firmly holds on to its past,... and who possesses a deep sense for the 
peculiarity of its development, that such a people will always have a future’.67 As 
nationalism had finally spread outwards from its intellectual interlocutors to affect ever 
wider portions of the public, being able to claim a venerable and continuous past came
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to be seen as one of the chief assets in the ideological struggle for national recognition. 
This seems to be true of polyethnic states like Switzerland in particular, where focusing 
on putative ethnic or actual linguistic homogeneity had to be ruled out as a viable 
option. A long historical trajectory became all the more relevant under these conditions, 
since it could be put to use as a counter-weight against irredentist propaganda coming 
from post-unification Germany and Italy. Reporting on the national festival of 1891, the 
Neue Zurcher Zeitung reminded its readership that in terms of old age, historical 
continuity, and faithfulness to the republican ideal the Swiss nation had few if any 
rivals:
The Confederation has existed for six-hundred years; consequently,
Switzerland may rank among the oldest states in Europe. There may be states 
of far more venerable age, but only few have remained so constant throughout 
their history in their aims and tasks, and few can connect so easily their 
present with their past as Switzerland; members of only a few states possess 
such a lively sense of their past as do the Swiss ... What does today’s German 
Empire have in common with the old Holy Roman Empire! A massive 
bloodstream separates modem France from the Old French Kingdom. Italy, 
furthermore, is a state of most recent origin, and Austria’s tasks and political 
aims have completely changed since it was deprived of the Holy Roman 
Empire and later of its leading role in Germany.
By contrast, Switzerland has continually evolved out of itself, first in 
the struggle against the Habsburgs, and subsequently against the German 
Empire itself. Two centuries after it had been founded, the Swiss 
Confederation achieved full independence. In the three centuries that 
followed, Switzerland almost consumed itself in internal struggles reaching a 
point of stagnation. It is only in this century that the country again became 
fully conscious of its actual task: to build a federal state, based upon 
democratic-republican principles, which encompasses a population which is 
diverse in terms of language, customs and religion, and to grant a considerable 
degree of autonomy to each of these different parts. What is more, this federal 
state has been able to keep up with other states in their efforts to secure peace, 
civility and human progress, and has even taken a leading role in some of 
these activities.68
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The belief in *a unique national mission ’
The belief in fulfilling a special mission in a world of national states is another idea that 
came to great prominence in the last decades of the nineteenth century. There is, of 
course, nothing peculiarly Swiss in this concept. It played an important role in most 
national movements, both in Europe and elsewhere. Nor does the concept only emerge 
with the advent of modem nationalism. In the Swiss case, we encounter it first in the 
late medieval myth of ethnic election, expressed in the belief that the Confederates’ 
battle victories against the superior Habsburg armies were a sign of having been chosen 
by God.69 A secularised version of this myth with strong republican overtones became 
highly popular among the emerging patriotic movement in the late eighteenth century.70
Over the last decades of the nineteenth century, as the doctrine of ethno- 
linguistic nationalism started to reverberate all over Europe, the belief in having a 
special mission gained further currency. The fact of forming a polyethnic nation-state 
now came to accompany the notion of republican exceptionalism, thereby further 
buttressing the concept of national mission. In 1884, the eminent liberal historian, Karl 
Dandliker, warned of the challenge posed by ethnic nationalism when he declared that 
‘the Swiss people did not enjoy the same advantage as their neighbours: being a nation 
in the true and literal sense of the word, that is to say, being an entity uniform in terms 
of linguistic and ethnic composition.’71
Dandliker’s statement is a clear sign that it was feelings of insecurity about 
one’s own conception of nationality rather than outpourings of collective complacency 
that gave rise to the belief in Switzerland’s possessing a peculiar mission in the world. 
In other words, a virtue was made out of necessity. In contrast to the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries, however, when the dualism between democratic 
republicanism and monarchical despotism formed its ideological backbone, the new 
belief in Switzerland’s mission rested on a distinction between ethnic plurality and 
ethnic homogeneity. In this new conception, Switzerland’s ethnic plurality was 
conceived of as a source of pride and as the ultimate expression of the progressive civic
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nation-state of the modem era. This idea was perhaps first expressed by Carl Hilty, who 
in 1875 asserted that
what holds Switzerland together vis a vis its [linguistically more homogeneous] 
neighbours is an ideal, namely the consciousness of being part of a state that in 
many ways represents a more civilised community; of constituting a nationality 
which stands head and shoulder above mere affiliations of blood or language.72
Plate 5-4: Ferdinand Hodler, Wilhelm 7e//(1897).
To secure Switzerland’s national mission ‘to represent the idea of a sharply distinctive 
historical-political nationality’, Hilty argued almost two decades later, a certain degree 
of isolation from the outside world was necessary. As he concluded: ‘Even abroad the 
attitude begins to take root that the Swiss must remain a distinct people with a 
particular ... character.... We must retain this character at any price; we must remain an 
independent, peculiar state which exists in isolation from the outside world. Therein 
consists our first duty.’73
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Through statements like this, the symbolic boundary that constituted Swiss 
nationhood was fortified. Ideologically, the fact that Switzerland was composed of 
different linguistic groups helped to buttress this symbolic boundary rather than weaken 
it, since polyethnicity was sharply distinguished from cosmopolitanism. As the 
president of the city of Bern exhorted in an address to the gathered citizenry in 1891: ‘It 
is not the striving for a boundary-blurring cosmopolitanism that has brought us the 
sympathies of our neighbours; what compels the foreigner’s admiration is the fact that 
all the differences fall silent when the Fatherland is calling.’74
‘We all gaze upon the same mountains naturalising the nation
The symbolic use of alpine landscape was a third aspect that played a considerable role 
in the reconstruction of national identity in the late nineteenth century. Again, what was 
new here was not invoking the alpine landscape as such -  this had been seen since the 
eighteenth century -  but the particular ways in which alpine nature was symbolically 
linked with the nation. Up until the mid-nineteenth century, conceptualisations of the 
relationship between nation and Alpine landscape prevailed. The first was metaphorical 
in nature. That is to say, popular historical myths, memories and supposed national 
virtues were projected into a significant landscape in an attempt to lend more continuity 
and distinctiveness to Swiss national identity. Alpine landscape, in other words, was 
conceived of as reflecting national characteristics. As the writer Gottfried Keller put it 
in 1854: ‘With the thoughtlessness of youth and childish age, I believed that the natural 
beauty of Switzerland was a reflection of historical and political merit and of the 
patriotism of the Swiss people: an equivalent of freedom itself.’75
However, the late nineteenth century witnessed the emergence of yet another 
conceptualisation between nature and national identity. Thus in a context in which 
Swiss nationhood was increasingly experienced as underdetermined vis-a-vis the ideal 
type of ethno-linguistic nationalism, Alpine nature became a stock item in national 
discourse. According to this conceptualisation between nature and nationhood, the Alps 
did more than express national virtues or form an organic link between past and
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present; in this instance the Alps appeared as a unifying principle, even as a force 
capable of creating a national character which superimposed itself on existing linguistic 
and religious differences. This argumentative pattern began to take root in the 1870s 
and continued to resonate until the end of the Second World War, cutting across social 
and linguistic boundaries. The French-speaking intellectual, Ernest Bovet, for example, 
wrote a number of articles in which he rejected the intellectual and moral validity of 
racial theories and ethnic conceptions of nationhood. Not ethnic homogeneity, he 
maintained, but the Alps were responsible for the creation of a Swiss character. In an 
essay entitled, Nationalite (1909), Bovet resumed this theme, linking the alpine 
narrative with the two other cornerstones of Swiss national identity -  its marked 
historicism and its emphasis on liberty and independence:
A mysterious force has kept us together for 600 years and has given to us our 
democratic institutions. A good spirit watches our liberty. A spirit fills our 
souls, directs our actions and creates a hymn on the one ideal our of our 
different languages. It is the spirit that blows from the summits, the genius of 
the Alps and the glaciers.76
The part played by natural symbolism in the construction of Swiss national identity in 
the period from 1870 to 1945 was indeed significant but will not be discussed further at 
this point. However, a more detailed discussion of the phenomenon follows in chapter 
8, which provides a comparative analysis of the significance of landscape symbolism in 
polyethnic nation-states.
Conclusion
Switzerland, like the rest of western and central Europe, witnessed a proliferation of 
nation-oriented activity in the last third of the nineteenth century. Many students of 
nineteenth-century Swiss nationalism have therefore adopted Hobsbawm’s presentist 
position. In keeping with his premises, the Swiss case is seen in these accounts as part 
and parcel of the European-wide late-nineteenth century enthusiasm for ‘invented
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traditions’, embodied in public rituals and national ceremonies; as a project in symbolic 
politics initiated by a few power holders keen to secure legitimacy for themselves in the 
face of rapid social change.77
It is indeed tempting to regard the definition of Swiss nationhood in the late 
nineteenth century in terms of an ‘invention of tradition’: as a national ideology and 
allied ritual practice that was in fact very recent but, once introduced, soon came to be 
seen as a well-established and indeed ancient ‘tradition’. As we have seen, not only 
does the Swiss case loosely fit Hobsbawm’s empirical observation concerning the 
proliferation of national ritual in late-nineteenth century Europe but there is also ample 
evidence to suggest that the preoccupation with national identity was even more intense 
in polyethnic Switzerland than in other European countries. This is particularly true 
from the 1870s onwards, when rising ethno-linguistic nationalism in much of Europe 
posed a serious ideological challenge to the Swiss conception of nationality. Faced with 
the centrifugal pull of ethno-linguistic nationalism, a good portion of Switzerland’s 
political and cultural elite began to embark on efforts at fortifying Swiss national 
identity. While the Swiss nation-state, founded in 1848, surely played an important part 
in this development, the national revival of the 1880s and 1890s cannot be attributed to 
state-induced nationalism alone. (And my suspicion is that this holds true for other 
European cases as well.) Instead, I have identified the catalyst of this national revival in 
a complex interplay of geopolitical (inter-nationalist competition) and domestic factors 
(a climate of ideological competition between the nationalising state and portions of 
civil society).
At the symbolic level, too, an over-emphasis on the present can be misguiding. 
While it surely would be naive to embrace the cultural determinism that tends to inform 
perennialist accounts, it would be equally flawed to explain processes of identity 
construction without systematically taking into account antecedent cultural structures. 
The challenge posed by ethno-linguistic nationalism favoured the view that Swiss 
nationhood was somewhat underdetermined. This perspective gained currency from the 
1870s onwards, prompting a re-definition of Swiss national identity, which is notable in 
three respects. First, the prevailing historical narrative now focused on the prestige
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deriving from a long national pedigree (rather than the virtuous deeds of the founders of 
1291). This narrative, which maintained that Switzerland was an old nation that had 
continuously developed over six centuries, put the stamp on the national festival of 
1891. Second, polyethnic exceptionalism was now added to the older republican 
exceptionalism as a justification for upholding the concept of a national mission and to 
render Switzerland distinctive vis-a-vis its culturally more homogenous neighbours.
Yet pointing out those factors that rendered Swiss nationhood distinctive was merely 
one side of the coin. The other side consisted in proclamations that Switzerland, too, 
was a natural nation, rooted in and determined by the national homeland. Hence, the 
third important feature of the national discourse of the era consisted in a narrative that 
portrayed the Alps as a force that determined (rather than merely reflected) 
Switzerland’s national character. Thus emerged a reconstructed national narrative that 
could serve as a cognitive framework for the next generation.
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CHAPTER SIX
Geistige Landesverteidigung, 1933-1939:
Forging a Swiss Volksgemeinschaft
With the National Exhibition we want to convince other nations that we 
Swiss constitute not merely a community o f interests, but a true Volk 
united by virtue o f its common will and special mission.
Catalogue for the National Exhibition of 19391
Two of the trends that we identified in the last chapter -  the significance of the 
geopolitical, and the related tendency to depict Swiss nationhood as organically rooted 
in history, culture and geography -  considerably intensified in the 1930s. This 
aggravation is relatively clearly discernible from the evidence considered. In the late 
nineteenth century, when significant sections of the Swiss public had felt that Swiss 
nationhood was somewhat underdetermined, they began to search for stabilising 
principles. These they had found in a reinforced historicism and in the natural 
environment. The generation of the 1930s, facing a much more dramatic situation than 
their late-nineteenth century predecessors, concluded that Swiss nationhood was 
seriously underdetermined. This further reinforced the existing disposition to depict 
Swiss identity as externally determined and natural rather than constructed and 
contingent.
In this chapter, I explain the 1930s national revival as a process by which 
nationhood was redefined in the face of the challenge to Swiss nationhood posed by the 
volkish nationalism of the Nazis. This challenge reinforced sentiments of inclusion and 
exclusion, engendering a wave of popular nationalism on an unprecedented scale.
There was no monolithic response to this authoritarian/volkish threat, but the metaphor 
of a chorus of many voices perhaps best describes the nationalism that it provoked.
This chorus was composed of different groups, reacting in different ways to this
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challenge in accordance with their own political orientations and ideological 
preferences.
From about 1935 onwards, however, ‘Swiss culture* took pride of place in 
public discourse about nationhood. What is significant in this regard is that civic 
nationalists contributed the most to the placing of culture at the heart of Swiss national 
identity. While references to the national past and to political institutions and values 
retained their significance throughout the decade, in public manifestations of 
nationalism -  whether state-induced or emanating from civil society -  culture gained 
centre stage. The demotic character of Swiss public culture, a distinct brand of 
Protestantism and enlightened humanism, a unique way of thinking, feeling and 
behaving, and cultural diversity -  these features were identified as authentic 
expressions of Swiss nationhood. They were presented as evidence that Switzerland 
was a natural cultural community rather than a community merely brought together by 
history and shared political institutions. Such a kulturelle Wesensgemeinschaft was 
perceived as more likely to be capable of standing up to Nazi authoritarianism and 
irredentism than a mere Willensnation.
This new cultural nationalism provided the framework within which civic and 
organic understandings of Swiss nationhood could be fused into a highly popular Swiss 
nationalism: in the second part of the 1930s, there occurred a synthesis of 
Willensgemeinschaft and Wesensgemeinschaft. Its overall message -  that the Swiss 
nation was simultaneously man-made and organically determined -  encompassed the 
political spectrum from the Conservative right to the moderate left. The initial impetus 
for this particular brand of nationalism came from civil society rather than the state. It 
emerged in debates about Swiss national identity in newspapers and periodicals, and 
within private associations and political parties. It was only in the late 1930s that the 
state began to take a more active role, lending added weight to the overall project.
This chapter comprises five parts. I wish to open with a vivid illustration of the 
potency of Swiss nationalism in the late 1930s, and the first section therefore provides a 
description of the National Exhibition of 1939.1 then go back in time to explore the 
political and ideological context in which the cultural nationalism of the era developed.
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In the third and fourth sections of the chapter, I examine the different definitions of 
national identity advanced by civic and organic nationalists, respectively. The final 
section provides an account of the fusion of the civic and organic conceptions of 
nationhood that occurred in the later part of the decade.
Swiss nationhood as a communal experience: the National Exhibition of 1939
In the summer of 1939, a visitor to the National Exhibition in Zurich described the 
enthusiasm the event generated among the general public:
This great feeling ... has suddenly captured the Swiss, while hitherto they have 
been content merely to pursue their philistine pleasures. And finally they dare 
... to show it: a feeling of joy and admiration and pride.. ..All of a sudden, the 
Swiss are experiencing the meaning of Heimat. In other words, they are 
experiencing something at home, in their own country, which normally one only 
experiences abroad. And that is the great feeling.
The above observation, however exaggerated it may appear to the present-day 
observer, appears to reflect quite accurately the popular mood during the national 
revival of the late 1930s. The National Exhibition in Zurich transformed the 
nationalism of the era into a popular experience.4 It opened on May 15,1939, and 
closed its doors on October 29 of the same year. During those 174 days, the 
organisers registered 10,506,735 visits, with 130,000 people entering the Exhibition 
gates on the first two days. Even considering the fact that many visitors (especially 
those living in and around Zurich) bought tickets that entitled them to multiple 
entries, there can be little doubt that this was an event of huge proportions. It is 
likely that the total number of visitors far exceeded 1 million. Given that the total 
Swiss population at the time was roughly 4 million, this is a remarkable figure. The 
average number of visitors per day was 60,384, and the highest daily figure was 
163,567.5
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Although the idea of organising a large National Exhibition had first been 
expressed in 1929, it was only in 1935, after the organisers had received financial 
backing from the Federal Council, that serious planning could begin. Private 
associations and other champions of the idea of Kulturwahrung und Kulturwerbung 
(cultural preservation and cultural propaganda) had lobbied for a National 
Exhibition to be held in the latter half of the 1930s.6 In February 1936 an organising 
committee was set up, and within two months it had hired an architect as Managing 
Director of the Exhibition. Over the subsequent weeks and months, 13 advisory 
committees and 12 executive departments were set up, and a permanent staff of 
several hundred ensured that the Exhibition could open on time.
Although it had emerged from the tradition of nineteenth-century 
commercial exhibitions, in terms of its scale and purpose the National Exhibition of 
1939 was distinct from its predecessors.7 Apart from its remarkable proportions 
(more than 4,000 single exhibitors were admitted following a rigorous selection 
process), the major innovation of the Zurich Exhibition was its emphatically 
patriotic message. The organising committee endeavoured to make the Exhibition 
the focal point of a moral rather than commercial discourse. The technological 
dimension of the Exhibition, manifest in the prominent place attributed to 
Switzerland’s manufacturing industries, was not an end it itself, but served the 
purpose of reinforcing a greater patriotic narrative. Hence the organisers portrayed 
these industries as testimonies to Switzerland’s strengths as a nation, and the high- 
quality products that they produced were depicted as manifestations par excellence 
of Swiss national character. In the official Exhibition brochure, the purpose of the 
section Heimat und Volk (‘Homeland and People’) was described as being to 
provide visitors ‘with an idea of the cultural and intellectual wealth of the Swiss 
people’, and to make them aware ‘that this country and its people, its survival and 
future, is worth any sacrifice’.8
The thematic structure of the Exhibition reflected and reinforced this moral 
message. Thus, unlike its precursors, the Zurich Exhibition was not built around a 
core of individual commercial exhibitors with their products. Instead, the organisers
195
attempted to realise an ideal of thematic coherence by dividing the Exhibition site 
into thematic sections. The site along the left shore of Lake Zurich, stretching a 
distance of about one kilometer, was devoted to the theme of technology. The 
pavilions that covered this site housed the pride of Switzerland’s manufacturing 
industries: machinery, watches, and furniture. The exhibition site along the right 
shore of the lake, stretching an equal distance, was dedicated to the theme of 
agriculture. The visitors could cross the lake either by ship or by using a cable 
railway built especially for the occasion.
Thus when contemporary observers compared the Swiss Exhibition with 
foreign examples, they often expressed pride at the innovative conception of the 
former. As a report in the Neue Ziircher Zeitung on the World Exhibition in New 
York, which took place the same year, revealed the chauvinistic tone that 
occasionally accompanied expressions of national pride during this era:
New York presents itself... as an Exhibition in the old style, as a trade fair and 
global department store. Zurich, in contrast, with its communal concept, has 
successfully realised a modem idea.... It is certainly no accident that in 
Switzerland, the home of an exemplary school system, the educational element 
has come to the fore, while New York has placed the main weight on creating 
an impression of enormous, overwhelming size.9
Beyond an imagined community: nationhood as a tangible and sacred experience
All commentators, irrespective of political affiliation, acknowledged that the Exhibition 
was an overwhelming popular success. Most importantly, however, the widespread 
enthusiasm it aroused was not confined to the German-speaking section of the 
population. People from all over the country visited the Exhibition, with an efficient 
rail system and reduced fares apparently serving as an incentive to travel to Zurich. A 
French-speaking contemporary maintained that the ‘National Exhibition marks a novel 
date in the annals of our country: the year in which the French-speaking Swiss went to 
Zurich’.10 In an equally rejoicing tone, a Zurich newspaper praised the Exhibition for
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providing a display of national unity: ‘The fact that the French-speaking Swiss have
welcomed the National Exhibition with such enthusiasm is a source of special
satisfaction for those responsible.’11
Why did people from all parts of the country flock to Zurich to see the
Exhibition with their own eyes, and why was the prevalent response so enthusiastic?
Without doubt, there was widespread awareness that these were difficult and potentially
dangerous times (the Second World War broke out before the Exhibition closed on
October 29). As the ultimate expression of a ‘united Switzerland’, the National
Exhibition was bound to be a source of consolation to many who were fearful of what
was to come. Together with the wider national revival in evidence from the middle of
the decade, this was certainly conducive to making the Exhibition a popular success.
Perhaps a more significant cause of its appeal lay in what I would call its
symbolic density. I am referring here to the capacity of the Exhibition to render Swiss
nationhood -  in all its various dimensions: political, cultural, historical, and
geographical -  a tangible and holistic experience. As a mass ritual for the nation, the
Exhibition succeeded in converting patriotism from an abstract concept to a social
practice in which everybody could participate. ‘What counts at times of turmoil’, a
newspaper editorial asserted shortly after the Exhibition had opened, are not just
‘commendable deeds for country and people, nor the enactment of parliamentary
legislation and government bills’. ‘Such times’, the author concluded, ‘demand that we
1 ?reach out to men and touch their hearts*.
Among the aspects of the Exhibition that were most frequently praised was its 
capacity to represent Swiss nationhood in its totality. As a Social Democrat newspaper 
concluded: ‘Never before has such a comprehensive picture of the Swiss people and
1 'Ieconomy been created’. A Liberal Party publication argued along similar lines, stating 
that the Exhibition ‘teaches us to see our land and our people and displays before our 
very eyes what would be at stake should we be called upon to defend our borders’.14 
And, in a comment on the impact of the Exhibition’s opening ceremony, at which all 
the cantons had been represented by their traditional colours, it was argued that: 
‘Switzerland’s federalist structure has become visible at the opening festival. The state
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came into view. The feeling of love of one’s country became irresistible and could not 
be undermined by critical reasoning.’15
In addition to fortifying their sense of Gemeinschaft, the Exhibition provided 
visitors with a semi-religious experience. This applies particularly to what was know as 
the Hohenweg, a footpath of learning that provided visitors with lessons in national 
history, geography and folk culture. Terminating in the Hall of Honour (Ehrenhalle), 
where pictures of famous Swiss personalities were displayed, this linked past, present 
and future to propagate the belief that Switzerland possessed a distinct national 
mission. ‘The Hohenweg concluded a Catholic newspaper, ‘has become, and will 
remain in our memories, the embodiment of the Swiss idea’.16 Others, the Catholic- 
Conservative Federal Councillor Philip Etter among them, explicitly associated 
attendance at the National Exhibition with a religious experience. So did a French- 
speaking National Councillor who likened the Exhibition to ‘an altar’ and the 
Hohenweg to ‘a cathedral devoted to the Fatherland’.17
The context of Geistige Landesverteidigung
The heightened public concern with national identity that characterises the period 
between 1933 and 1939 did not arise spontaneously but must be understood in terms of 
a particular socio-political context. Whereas the rise of Swiss nationalism in the closing 
decades of the nineteenth century resulted from a complex coincidence of domestic and 
external factors, the major cause of the national revival of the 1930s was first and 
foremost geopolitical. In particular, the rise of National Socialism and its ideological 
companion, volkish nationalism, was the catalyst for a national revival that soon 
captured the public imagination. The popular nationalism that emerged under the 
banner of Geistige Landesverteidigung (‘the spiritual defence of the nation’) was, in 
essence, directed both against the external threat of Nazism, and an internal process of 
right-wing mobilisation sparked by the success of the Nazis.18
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The ascendancy of Nazism and the threat o f ‘homeland nationalism ’
When National Socialism rose to power in 1933, its ideological and political impact on 
Switzerland was twofold. First, its radical ‘homeland nationalism’ directly undermined 
Switzerland’s conception of nationality. Secondly, according to official Nazi doctrine, 
Germany was the national homeland not only of the Austrians, the Sudeten Germans 
and the Germans in Poland, but also of the German-speaking Swiss.19 The fact that the 
National Socialists had to moderate their irredentist propaganda in view of international 
opinion did not prevent such activities from taking place. In addition to its dissemi­
nation via official channels, volkish propaganda emanated from a network of officially 
private and voluntary associations, which in reality were under the control of the Nazi 
state. In 1932, the Landesgruppe Schweiz der NSDAP, which opened its headquarters in 
Davos, served as the bridgehead for Nazi propaganda in Switzerland. After the 
assassination of its leader, Wilhelm Gustloff, in 1936, the Federal Council, faced with 
sustained public criticism over its cautious approach to foreign fascist organisations, 
eventually prohibited this organisation.20
This kind of aggressive Pan-German nationalism had gained momentum in the 
late nineteenth century as a movement that was principally opposed to the small- 
German, state-centred nationalism that had informed the unification of 1871. As 
Wehler argues: ‘Greater-German and Pan-German ideas basically questioned the 1871 
solution to the German question, thus embodying a fundamental challenge to the 
European state system.’21 This perspective was furnished ideologically by Fichte’s 
dictum (which was subsequently reiterated by scores of German nationalists), namely, 
that language represents the natural embodiment of true and authentic nationhood; and 
that ‘it is not because men dwell between certain mountains and rivers that they are a 
people, b u t... men dwell together ... because they were a people already by a law of 
nature which is much higher.’22 This doctrine holds that language is an expression and 
constant reminder of the potency of this Taw of nature’, which works irrespective of a 
people’s awareness of it.
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In the wake of the First World War, and particularly with the rise of National 
Socialism, this credo was racialised. What made the Nazi variety considerably more 
threatening than its nineteenth-century precursor, moreover, was that it formed the 
official doctrine of a powerful and increasingly aggressive state. In this context, volkish 
nationalism was bound to emerge as a geopolitical force on the European Continent. 
Combining a geopolitical drive for Lebensraum with a racist ideology, this particular 
brand of nationalism found its programmatic expression in concepts like Einheit von 
Volk und Rasse, Volkstumspolitik or Deutschtumspflege. The threat that German 
homeland nationalism posed to Switzerland’s polyethnic concept of nationality had 
been clearly recognised ever since the National Socialists had come to power. An 
editorial in the left-liberal Nation, for example, concluded that while the ‘Swiss 
Volksgemeinschaft ’ was ‘rooted in history and political principles’, the Nazi ideal of a 
Volksgemeinschaft was inspired by a ‘naturalistic, volkish, and racist’ worldview.23
Nazi homeland nationalism was more successful in some parts of Europe than 
in others. It exerted much influence in Austria, where a considerable part of the 
population responded favourably to Hitler’s Heim ins Reich. In the Swiss case, 
however, Nazi homeland nationalism did not capture the masses, with an 
overwhelming majority of the German-speaking Swiss openly opposing Germany’s 
demands to join the Reich. To be sure, Nazi doctrines provided inspiration for a few 
fascist movements within Switzerland, as we will see below. Nevertheless, among the 
wider Swiss public Nazi sympathies carried a stigma. The reluctance of Germans 
nationals living in Switzerland to join the National Socialist Party, or to subscribe to a 
German newspaper adhering to the official party line, strongly suggest that there was a 
general anti-Nazi mood among the Swiss public. Of the 120,000 Germans who resided 
in Switzerland in 1937, only 1,364 were members of the NSDAP. Of the German 
newspapers available in Switzerland, the Reichsdeutsche achieved a readership of 
4,000, as did the Deutsche Zeitung in der Schweiz. When in 1938 the editor of the latter 
publication contemplated the reasons for his paper’s lack of appeal to German nationals 
in Switzerland, he mentioned the prevailing anti-German climate as the major cause.
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This climate, he argued, discouraged the bulk of the Germans from reading any 
National Socialist newspapers.24
The movement for National Renewal
Nevertheless, the ascendancy of the Nazis encouraged right-wing mobilisation within 
Switzerland and thereby had an additional destabilising influence on the country’s 
political landscape. The coincidence of Nazi ascendancy with the economic depression 
of 1932 onwards produced a mushrooming of various political protest groups, most of 
which followed a radical right-wing agenda. While drawing extensively on the 
organicist ideological resources that had emerged in elite circles during the 1920s, the 
radical groups attracted considerable support among the lower middle classes.
The political mobilisation of 1933 did not result in a political movement with a 
unified ideological agenda. Two kinds of movements played a significant role. The first 
fit the essential criteria of Eley’s definition of fascist organisations. They displayed an 
‘aggressively plebeian style’, a ‘crude and violent egalitarianism’, and the use of ‘new 
propagandist forms and a general invasion of the cultural sphere’ to realise their aims.26 
This applies in particular to both the Nationale Front and the Neue Front. Founded in 
1930, the two movements fused in April 1933 to become the most popular fascist 
organisation in Switzerland. Possessing strongholds in Zurich, Schaffhausen, Aargau 
and St. Gallen (with branches in Neuchatel, Geneva and Lausane), it had an anti-liberal, 
anti-democratic, anti-socialist and anti-Semitic worldview.27 In French- and Italian­
speaking Switzerland, too, radical right-wing movements made some inroads. All these 
organisations borrowed ideologically from Italian and German fascism. Allied to 
fascist beliefs were millennial hopes of a glorious national future. The leader of the 
Nationale Front provides us with a typical statement in this regard. ‘The belief in 
shallow internationalism’, he declared in 1933, had given way to ‘a reinforced 
emphasis upon one’s own people and a return to the soil’. While hitherto, democrati­
cally elected parliaments had set the political agenda, the new era would see the rise of 
the ‘gifted leader’ and of a ‘new esteem for the irrational’.29
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A number of middle-class protest movements constituted the second significant 
current in the right-wing mobilisation of the early 1930s. Groups such as the Neue 
Schweiz declared as their aim Switzerland’s ‘spiritual and economic renewal’. Like 
other organisations pursuing a similar ideological programme, its following included 
self-employed small traders and manufacturers, shopkeepers and craftsmen, as well as 
the lower ranks of the civil service. The political rhetoric was decidedly anti-inter- 
nationalist and anti-liberal, with attacks on laissez faire capitalism being a leitmotif.
What provided overtly fascist groups and middle-class protest movements with 
some common ideological ground was the belief in the superiority of the corporatist 
order. In Switzerland, corporatist ideology gained in strength when it provided the 
platform for a political initiative aiming at the total revision of the Swiss constitution. 
The initiative demanded that proportional representation be abolished and power 
transferred from Parliament to professional organisations and a tiny group of state 
leaders. While the initiative’s appeal went beyond the fascist right to include the Young 
Liberals and most supporters of Catholic Conservatism, the bulk of the Swiss public 
opposed it.31 This was a severe blow to the corporatist movement. Some of the radical 
protest movements survived this political defeat, but the event nonetheless marked a 
turning point. By the end of 1935, the right-wing movement for national renewal had 
run out of steam, with its most radical exponents finding themselves increasingly 
stigmatised.32
The formation of Geistige Landesverteidigung
The decline of the right-wing movement for national renewal by the mid-1930s was 
due, in large measure, to the parallel rise of a rival ideological movement that turned 
out to be far more inclusive. Using terms such as geistige Landesverteidigung and 
Volksgemeinschaft to express their ambitions, its proponents set out to redraw the
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boundaries of Swiss nationhood in the light of domestic and international 
developments. This popular nationalism reached its peak between 1936 and the 
outbreak of the Second World War. During this period, German volkish nationalism 
created a heightened national awareness among the wider public, and provided the 
major legitimisation for the increasingly popular Swiss nationalism. In this context, the 
argument that the national revival was defensive in character made intuitive sense to 
many. The term geistige Landesverteidigung (‘the spiritual defence of the nation’) in 
particular reflected the widely held conviction that the Swiss were fostering a genuinely 
patriotic response to the nationalistic excesses in evidence in Germany and Italy. ‘We 
are not nationalists’ was the headline of a newspaper report on the National Exhibition 
of 1939, responding to German and Italian Press allegations that the Zurich Exhibition 
was a hotbed of Swiss nationalism directed against the new authoritarian regimes. The 
Exhibition, the report’s author continued, was ‘not nationalistic*, but represented a 
‘national event, an act of self-reflection and inner strengthening’.
While the distinction between a benign patriotism and an aggressive nationalism 
may have seemed plausible at the time, it does not stand up to subsequent analysis. The 
kind of nationalism that rose to prominence in the 1930s was ‘hot’ rather than ‘banal’, 
to use Michael Billig’s terms: active and public rather than passive. Many were well 
aware of living in a climate that was highly charged with patriotic emotion. As Social 
Democrat Ernst Nobs commented in 1938, after Austria had been annexed to the 
German Reich: ‘Under the pressure of recent European developments, the will to 
defend the country by both military and spiritual means has asserted itself with a degree 
of unanimity, vigour and passion that is unprecedented in our history.*34 In a joint 
statement issued immediately after the German invasion of Austria, the political parties 
declared that ‘the entire Swiss people, irrespective of language, religion or political 
affiliation’ were determined to ‘sacrifice their lives in order to defend the integrity of 
their Fatherland’.35
The import of foreign textbooks for Swiss primary and secondary schools 
decreased dramatically in the latter half of the 1930s. Criblez therefore argues that the 
geistige Landesverteidigung went hand in hand with a ‘nationalisation of teaching
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material’, a development that was primarily directed against books from Germany. To a 
greater extent than ever before, Swiss education authorities encouraged Swiss 
academics and other experts to produce learning materials for schools at all levels (for 
the import of foreign teaching materials between 1933 and 1945, see Tab. 6-1).
Tab. 6-1: Import of foreign teaching material for Swiss primary and secondary 
schools
1933 1937 1945
All countries 10,25% 7% 1,46%
Germany 8,91% 6% 0,26%
France 1,01% 0,92% 0,78%
Source: Criblez (1995: 194-5)
The construction of Swiss national identity proceeded along two dimensions. The one 
was a civic, the other an organic conception of nationhood. The following two sections 
of this chapter demonstrate how these two conceptions informed public discourse about 
Swiss nationhood, and how the four symbolic core resources -  political values and 
institutions, history, geography, and culture -  were put to use. The section that follows 
examines the fusion of the civic and organic conceptions in the cultural nationalism of 
the late 1930s.
The civic discourse: reasserting the Swiss Willensnation
The civic conception of nationhood was the dominant current within liberal-minded 
and left-of-centre groups. Locating the essence of Swiss nationhood in a voluntary 
commitment to a set of institutions and values, it portrayed the nation as a man-made 
product.36
204
‘Switzerland’s national essence is based in the mind’
Political values and institutions were the key symbolic resources in the civic discourse 
of nationhood. Civic nationalists pointed to the contrast between Switzerland’s 
democratic political system and that of their autocratic neighbours, thus emphasising 
the constitutive role of liberal values and democratic institutions in the Swiss polity.
The view that Switzerland, to a greater degree than most European nations, depended 
for its very existence on these values pervaded the discourse of civic nationalists. We 
encounter it in the assertion that the survival of the Swiss nation is contingent on the 
will of its citizens to preserve it as a distinct political, historical and cultural 
community. The historian Herman Weilenmann encapsulated this doctrine in 1938:
Switzerland’s national essence is based in the mind, because it lacks both the 
tangibility of physical features and the mythical dream of an Urvater [racial 
forefather]: the will to preserve this state unites this people and secures its 
alliance.37
The Social Democrats, while sharing the liberal belief in the crucial role of the state and 
its democratic institutions, attempted to reconcile patriotism with internationalism. 
Thus, in the view of their leadership, there was no doubt that ‘The love of one’s country 
and internationalism do not contradict each other.. ,’.38 However, the ‘nation’ had a 
strong boost both within the Social Democratic Party and among its rank and file in the 
second half of the 1930s, as becomes apparent from a glance at the Mayday 
celebrations of the 1930s. Until 1936, an internationalist agenda had prevailed at this 
celebration of the socialist Left, which, in terms of its emotive appeal, clearly 
outweighed Switzerland’s national holiday on August 1. This was to change from about 
1936, however, as the wave of national enthusiasm reached its peak, thereby increasing 
the moral pressure to place the ‘nation’ first. The national Mayday celebrations of 1938 
marked a watershed: for the first time in the history of the event, the Social Democrats 
carried the national flag alongside the traditional red flag.39
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Hand-in-hand with this growth of patriotism within the Left in the mid-1930s 
came a rapprochement between the Social Democratic movement (including the trade 
unions) and the ruling coalition of Liberals and Conservatives. In 1935, the Swiss 
Social Democratic Party abolished from their statutes the paragraph calling for the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, and in the same year a majority of their supporters voted 
in favour of a programme designed to strengthen the Swiss military defence. 
Representatives of the Social Democrats and the trade unions were now regularly 
consulted on economic and social legislation. An agreement between the Swiss 
Metalworkers’ and Watchmakers’ Union and the Federation of Metal and Machine 
Industries further improved relations between workers and employers.40
The indications are that in the French-speaking Swiss cantons, too, the civic 
conception tended to prevail even as the geistige Landesverteidigung reached its peak 
around 1938. In that year, the historian David Lasserre wrote that, ‘in contrast to his 
fellow compatriots of the German-speaking cantons, to the Romand Switzerland 
represents a matter of the mind and will rather than a material reality*. Yet it would be 
wrong, Lasserre continued, to conclude from this that the latter was therefore less 
fervent in his patriotic attachment: ‘What it means, however, is that his patriotism is 
perhaps more abstract than that of his German-speaking counterpart.’41 An important 
reason for this apparent discrepancy seems to be that in the French-speaking cantons 
(and to some extent in the Italian-speaking South as well) the Nazi threat was perceived 
less in cultural than in political terms. In December 1938, for instance, the Gazette de 
Lausanne observed: ‘Neither the Romandie nor the Ticino display the extreme 
nervousness which we discover, with some astonishment, in the public statements of 
our fellow Confederates of the German-speaking cantons.. .’42
Civic historicism: the political achievements o f the founders
Historicism was not absent from civic nationalism. References to the ‘national past’ 
supplied the civic discourse of nationhood with didactic narratives that helped to foster 
a moral narrative based on apparently timeless values and virtues. The moral lessons
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supposedly offered by the past, moreover, were a source of pride and inspiration. The 
civic nationalists’ approach to history, as to political values and institutions, was 
markedly different from that of those who argued along organic lines. As a broad rule, 
liberal and left-of-centre groups associated the country’s historical origins primarily 
with the revolutions and reforms of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 1789,
1798, and 1848 were the dates most frequently mentioned in references to 
Switzerland’s putative national origins. ‘Our culture goes back to the bourgeois 
revolutions of the late-eighteenth century’,43 was a typical comment from this 
perspective on the historical dimension of Swiss nationhood.
Although not doubting that 1798 and 1848 were landmark dates in the evolution 
of modem Switzerland, some adherents to the civic conception of nationhood 
nevertheless perceived a longer historical trajectory. The Confederate Alliance of 1291, 
in particular, was regarded as significant. However, unlike Conservatives who 
subscribed to an organic view of Swiss nationhood, civic nationalists put the same 
interpretation on 1291 as on the republican revolutions of the late eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. To a similar degree to these revolutions, they argued, 1291 stood 
for ‘emancipation and unification’. At the symbolic level, this projection of the modem 
process of nation-building back to the middle ages resulted in what Smith has called an 
‘ideological myth of descent’. Its manifestation is a narrative that portrays the supposed 
founders of the nation as moral role models rather than genealogical ancestors.44
The civic manner of accommodating the pre-modem past, therefore, was 
abstract rather than concrete. Attempts to bring the founders to life with the help of 
detailed descriptions of their ‘heroic’ deeds are largely absent from accounts that are 
inspired by the civic viewpoint. Where allusions to medieval figures are made, they are 
usually to the three Confederates; but we seek in vain for mentions of Wilhelm Tell, the 
key myth of liberation. A statement by the French-speaking intellectual William 
Rappard provides us with a typical example of this point of view. Rather than 
associating the historic alliance of 1291 with the founding of the Swiss nation, Rappard 
emphasised the inspiration it provided in the face of the Nazi challenge. The moral
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lesson to be drawn from 1291, Rappard insisted, concerned the need ‘to defend [our] 
individual and collective existence against a foreign oppressive power’.45
The organic discourse: forging the national Wesensgemeinschaft
Seen through the organic prism, the nation -  embodied in culture, political institutions, 
history, and geography -  appears as a social whole that develops in accordance with the 
laws of natural growth. Such an organic view of national identity was prevalent in the 
discourse of right-of-centre groups, which ranged from Catholic Conservatives to 
circles on the radical right. If the concept of the Willensnation was the leitmotif of civic 
nationalism, Wesensgemeinschaft was the term that organic nationalists used to 
describe their ideal of community. Insofar as organic nationalists referred to political 
values and state institutions, it was in their efforts to promote the project of a 
corporatist state. This was the form of socio-political organisation that they considered 
best suited to the task of reinstating within society ‘the feeling of family unity that got 
lost’ 46 But the favourite symbolic resources of organic nationalists were history, 
culture, and geography.
*There are no deliberate new beginnings in history ’ -  The historicist vision o f organic 
nationalism
According to the organic vision, the national past is a force in its own right: a force 
which can only be accepted, not interfered with at will. As was asserted in 1939 in a 
comment confronting visitors of the National Exhibition in Zurich: ‘There are no 
deliberate new beginnings in history ... only a hopelessly confused or deceived 
individual wants to be in charge of his own fate... ’47
A glance at the national discourse of the Catholic Conservatives provides 
insight into the way in which organic nationalism made use of the past. Two features 
are notable. First, the pre-modem past played the key role, with the late medieval past 
and central Switzerland (the putative birthplace of the nation) providing the focus. In
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order to secure the nation’s ‘vitality, health and strength’, the Conservative Federal 
Councillor Philip Etter maintained, the Swiss had ‘first and foremost to detect the 
heartbeat of the Urschweiz’ 48 By contrast, the revolutionary transformations that 
marked the rise of the modem era had a marginal place in the organic narrative. Where 
they entered the picture they were usually discussed in negative terms, as events that 
interrupted the ‘organic evolution of the old democratic forms and ideas’.49
The second feature that distinguished the organic view of the national past from 
its civic rival was the significance of genealogy. Genealogical descent, which was of 
little interest to liberal and left-of-centre groups, was strongly emphasised by the 
historicism embraced by organic nationalists. This found expression in a ‘genealogical 
myth of descent’. Unlike civic nationalists, who depicted the medieval ‘founders’ as 
early representatives of republican ideals, organic nationalists emphasised physical 
descent rather than a moral-ideological connection. The voice of Catholic Conservatism 
provides us with an exemplary statement of this genealogy-centred historicism, 
bringing out with great clarity the contrast with the civic view of a historical 
community:
We talk a great deal about the Fatherland, but many of us have lost the true 
meaning of this word: the land of the forefathers. The Fatherland has become a 
mere subject of patriotic festivals. In our daily lives, a lively patriotism has 
given way to a mere belief in the state. This is effectively an impoverishment of 
our cultural life.... The homesickness, which haunts the Swiss abroad, is not 
rooted in the state, but in the Fatherland, the land of the forefathers.50
‘There is finally a great awakening o f our people ' -  the nation’s cultural essence
Swiss organic nationalists, even when they embraced genealogical descent, did not 
subscribe to notions of ethnic purity. Like those who subscribed to the civic creed, its 
adherents missed no opportunity to emphasise that Switzerland was ethnically and 
culturally distinct from Germany. Complaining about a misconception deemed to be 
‘particularly widespread in France, England, and the United States’, namely that the
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German-speaking Swiss were ethnically Germans, a Catholic newspaper report came to 
this conclusion: ‘We are a mixture of Celts, Romans and Germans..., with the Nordic 
element being the weakest of all.’51
However, this did not prevent the organic nationalists from claiming that 
Switzerland possessed a single cultural core. Culture, to organic nationalists, was an 
essence or potentiality that embodied the nation’s spirit and character. Civic 
nationalists, in contrast, tended to focus on political culture, which was seen as a 
product of the human will. They did not treat culture as a phenomenon in its own right, 
but referred to it in stressing their ideal of the Willensnation. In the organic discourse, 
in sharp contrast, culture and politics were quite separate spheres.
It is revealing to look at the different meanings attributed by organic and civic 
nationalists to the key terms of this era’s national discourse. Whereas in civic usage, the 
terms geistige Landesverteidigung (‘spiritual defence of the nation’) and Schweizergeist 
(‘Swiss spirit’) underscored the voluntary nature of Swiss nationhood, organic 
nationalists perceived them in Herderian terms. Thus Geist, from an organic 
nationalist’s point of view, stood for the trans-historical essence of Swiss nationhood. 
‘The significance of geistige Landesverteidigungas one representative of this 
viewpoint put it, ‘lies in the fact that national self-assertion derives not from the will of 
an authority, but from the spirit of the nation. There is finally a great awakening of our 
people’.52
Geography and Nationhood
Geography is a further symbolic resource that can be drawn upon in depictions of the 
nation as a natural community, which explains its prominent role in organic 
nationalism. An organic nationalist may typically proclaim that aspects of the natural 
environment will have shaped a national community that is unique in terms of its 
culture and character. The geographical theme was especially appealing in the Swiss 
case because it provided scope for promoting a sense of national unity in the absence of 
ethno-cultural homogeneity. In this context, organic nationalists accentuated the
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identity-forming role of the Alps in particular. As one commentator asserted in a 
newspaper read widely by the middle classes:
We understand by Swissness a certain spiritual and physical heritage which has 
characterised the people of the Alps to the Jura through the centuries of our 
history to the present day.... We are the only truly alpine state in Europe.... The 
Alps are our strength, for it is in the alpine human being that we find common 
ground.53
During the National Exhibition of 1939, also, the natural environment was depicted as a 
character-shaping force. In a three-volume publication that appeared in 1940 on the 
Exhibition, Gonzague de Reynold argued that ‘in order to germinate and grow a people 
needs a natural environment’.54 De Reynold was supported by the geographer Charles 
Burky, who maintained that ‘The physical milieu, the natural context, determines a 
people. This is an axiom. Evidently, the Swiss are incapable of escaping this 
imperative.’55
The fusion of Willensnation and Wesensgemeinschaft in the cultural nationalism of 
the late 1930s
The irresistible rise o f Swiss culture
The available evidence leaves little doubt that ‘culture’, from about 1935 onwards, 
gained centre stage as a symbolic resource for the construction of Swiss nationhood.
The temporal aspect is crucial here: whereas references to political institutions and 
values had multiplied immediately after the Nazi take-over of 1933 and remained 
relevant for the rest of the decade, it was during the latter half of the 1930s that 
allusions to Swiss national culture gathered momentum. As a liberal periodical 
observed: ‘Today, Switzerland’s cultural life ... is under threat. As a result of this threat
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to our spiritual independence, emanating from Italian and German nationalism, even 
the most trusting Confederate has had his eyes opened.’56
‘We Swiss form a distinct race *: a digression
A brief digression on the subject of race can help to set in sharper relief the Swiss 
predicament of the 1930s, and the context of the development of a cultural nationalism 
in the latter half of the decade. In 1936, the Thurgauer Zeitung published a special pull- 
out section entitled Die Herkunft des Schweizervolkes (‘The Origins of the Swiss 
People’). The author of the report, Karl Keller-Tamuzzer, began by stating that the 
questions of ‘race’ and of ‘ Volkstum ’ (ethnic origin) had come to occupy the minds of a 
great many people and that, as a result, it was necessary to probe more deeply into ‘the 
essence of the Swiss Volkstum ’. In a subsequent exposition, he distinguished between
e n
five successive waves of settlement on Swiss territory -  Pfahlbauer, Rhaeto- 
Romance, Helveto-Romance, Alemannic, and Burgundian.
Keller-Tamuzzer’s argument continued in a relatively straightforward manner. 
As the Swiss Confederation developed over the centuries and millennia, ‘Swiss blood’ 
resulted from the intermingling of these different groups. As early as 1800 BC, he 
argued, the intermingling of Rhaeto-Romans, Helvetians and Pfahlbauer, had led to a 
‘volkish unity’ within ‘original population’. The stock of this original population 
underwent another mutation when, between the second and seventh centuries AD, 
Alemannic tribes and Burgundians started to settle on Swiss territory. But the 
Pfahlbauer, we learn from Keller-Tamuzzer, had an advantage over those who arrived 
later because they had been living on Swiss territory since 3,000 BC. To begin with, the 
Pfahlbauer were more numerous than the newcomers. More importantly, however, by 
the time the Alemanni and Burgundians arrived, the Pfahlbauer had developed the 
physical resilience necessary for survival in the harsh alpine climate. Consequently, 
their blood was to become the vital ingredient in the evolution of the ‘Swiss race’.
Applying his evolutionary argument to the present, the author concluded that it 
was primarily due to the fact of racial commonality among the Swiss that the German­
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speaking Swiss had so little sympathy for the developments in Germany. Shared 
history, belief in particular moral and political values, or loyalty towards the state and 
its institutions would not in themselves have cultivated a national consciousness 
capable of encompassing different linguistic groups. In Keller-Tamuzzer’s words: 
‘Historical events and developments cannot be the sole basis of a nation’s survival. 
Historical precedents can be overturned if other factors necessitate it. What cannot be 
superseded, however, are ties of blood.’ He therefore concluded: ‘It is high time ... that 
the widely held theory that we are nothing but Alemanni, Frenchmen and Italians give 
way to a consciousness that we Swiss form a distinct race based upon the original 
population of this country, the Pfahlbauer. ’58
Beyond a purely imagined community: in search o f the cultural ‘Wesensgemeinschaft ’
The above example is instructive not because references to ‘race’ or ‘blood’ played an 
important role in attempts at fashioning Swiss national identity during the 1930s. None 
of the chief protagonists of the national discourse, for example, openly argued along 
such lines; besides, by the mid-1930s, those groups that had publicly expressed 
sympathies for volkish notions of national purity carried the stigma of association with 
National Socialism. Other symbolic resources -  particularly culture, but also political 
institutions and values, the national past, and geography -  were far more significant 
than race or ethnic descent in public definitions of Swiss nationhood.
Nevertheless, while the example outlined above does not represent a dominant 
mode of thought, it nonetheless illustrates a tendency which was increasingly apparent 
in the latter half of the 1930s, namely to define Swiss national identity in a more 
essentialist way. This tendency manifested itself in a proliferation of efforts to 
demonstrate that the Swiss nation was a natural community, determined by history, 
culture and geography. That it was, in other words, more than a social construction 
depending for its survival on the daily plebiscite of the population.
The way in which the flagship newspaper of Swiss liberalism responded to 
Keller-Tamuzzer’s analysis is instructive in this regard. Certainly, the liberal Zurich
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newspaper, like the liberal intelligentsia as a whole, did not abandon its traditional 
conception of Switzerland as a voluntary nation -  a Willensnation. Commenting on the 
‘irrational myths’ that functioned as secular religions and proved so effective in 
mobilising the masses in Germany, this newspaper concluded that Switzerland’s 
popular myth was embodied in the principle of the ‘voluntary alliance’. An article on 
the front page of its August 1st edition, entitled 'Der Bund -  unser Mythos' (‘The 
Confederation -  our Myth’), expressed this as follows: ‘Everybody ... is a member of 
this Confederation, and everybody has the obligation to risk his life in defending this 
Confederation.’59
Yet the very same newspaper simultaneously began to fashion a more tangible 
concept of Swiss nationhood. While its editors expressed serious doubts about the 
scholarly validity of Keller-Tamuzzer’s argument, they understood and appreciated his 
motives. In particular, they shared the view that Swiss nationality was in need of a 
conceptualisation that went beyond locating the essence of Swiss nationhood in its 
population’s civic commitment to abstract values and state institutions. This led the 
newspaper to argue that the goal of asserting Swiss nationhood in the face of the ethno- 
nationalist challenge from Nazi Germany justified the adoption of more essentialist 
categories. A key statement illustrating these dynamics of the late 1930s cultural 
nationalism is the following:
Whether we trace our Schweizertum back to an original population or regard it 
as the outcome of historical experiences or shared struggles for liberty, what 
will be decisive for our people is that the centrifugal forces resulting from our 
having been constituted by three different nations are outweighed by the 
converging forces of a Wesensgemeinschaft that is not simply imagined but 
actually exists.50
In other words, the centrifugal pull of integral nationalism -  whether of the German 
volkish or Italian ethno-linguistic variety -  was widely perceived as a threat to Swiss 
‘national culture’, to the belief, that is, that such a culture did indeed exist. This 
perception impacted upon the public discourse on Swiss nationhood in two important 
ways. First, it increased general interest in the cultural dimension of Swiss national
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identity. Second, it enhanced tendencies to portray ‘Swiss culture’ in more essentialist 
ways. The civic notion of a Willensnation, grounded as it was on voluntarism and the 
institutions of the modem state, was increasingly perceived as inadequate in view of the 
challenge at hand.
Yet rather than simply causing a swing of the pendulum in the ‘organic’ 
direction, this cultural shift led to an amalgamation of civic and organic narratives; to a 
fusion of the notions of Willensnation and Wesensgemeinschaft. What is interesting is 
that the groups that were the driving force behind this change were the ones that had 
hitherto shown a clear preference for the civic (voluntary) conception of the nation. It 
was civic nationalists in search of a Wesensgemeinschaft who contributed the most to 
elevation of culture to such a prominent place in the endeavours to strengthen Swiss 
nationhood. In fact, the shift could not have occurred without the ideological 
contributions of liberal groups in particular.
The notion that Switzerland was a cultural Wesensgemeinschaft had its most 
vocal support from a coalition of liberal associations and newspapers, with left-of- 
centre groups, the trade unions and the Social Democrats soon joining their efforts. One 
of the most vigorous calls for a common cultural policy came from the liberal-minded 
The New Helvetic Society. In 1936, the editors of its periodical published a collection 
of articles devoted exclusively to the ‘spiritual and cultural values’ deemed constitutive 
of Swiss nationhood. In 1937 and 1938, the periodical was largely concerned with the 
question of a ‘common cultural policy’. In addition to the New Helvetic Society and a 
number of prominent politicians and intellectual circles, the following organisations 
joined the call for a cultural policy: the Schweizerischer Lehrerverein (Association of 
Swiss Teachers) and the Schweizerischer Schriftstellerverein (Association of Swiss 
Writers); the liberal Neue Zurcher Zeitung; and the left-liberal movement around the 
newspaper Die Nation.61 While Conservatives maintained their organic conception of 
the nation, civic nationalists started to imagine the Swiss nation as a community that 
was based on more than free will and political institutions.
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The ‘Swiss cultural bond ’
The argument that Switzerland possessed a national culture that transcended ethno­
cultural differences figured prominently in the cultural nationalism that took off in 
1936. The champions of this narrative of cultural unity were liberal-minded groups that 
up until 1935 had for the most part promoted a purely voluntary conception of 
nationhood. Their efforts were aimed at educating the public both at home and abroad 
about the existence of ‘a common Swiss way of behaving with regard to thoughts, 
feelings and will’, irrespective of differences in terms of ‘language, mentality, ways of 
life and customs*. Not only did such a ‘Swiss uniqueness’ exist, one leading liberal 
periodical maintained, but, more importantly, this ‘frame of mind is uniquely Swiss’ 
was ‘not purely determined by shared political experience’.64
Quite frequently, the search for Switzerland’s cultural essence led to journeys 
into the past. What was distinctly Swiss, some argued, was the demotic character of its 
culture. The latter had its roots in the peculiarities of the Confederation’s state-building 
process from early modem times; in the fact that, as Werner Ammann put it, ‘the 
people, not the court of the monarch’ had been the ‘upholders of cultural life’.65 Other 
liberal writers pointed to the fact that the great cultural movements -  Christianity, 
Gothicism, and the Renaissance -  had come to Switzerland directly, not via Germany, 
and that this had produced distinctive results. The only great cultural movement that 
had originated in Germany, the Reformation, had been reshaped after arriving in 
Switzerland. Zwingli and Calvin, some argued, were democratic humanists, which 
inevitably had brought them into conflict with Luther, who had not questioned the 
authority of the German princes. This was why, a prominent public intellectual 
concluded, ‘a Zurich Protestant feels much closer to his brothers in faith from 
Neuchatel or Geneva than to a German Lutheran’. He continued:
In other words, there emerged, in the sphere of religious faith as in many other 
domains, a Swiss cultural bond [schweizerische Kulturverbindung] that 
transcends ethnic groups and shapes our way of life -  that is, living culture -  in 
a much more profound way than does language.66
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The Diversity o f Swiss Culture
The supporters of a Swiss cultural policy created a second narrative, within which the 
emphasis was on the country’s cultural diversity. The complex variety of cultural 
idioms and groups was depicted as a virtue rather than a weakness, and as a factor that 
helped to strengthen Switzerland’s symbolic boundaries against the aggressive 
nationalisms of both Germany and Italy. A special emphasis was placed upon the 
importance of linguistic diversity. The Swiss-German dialect was singled out as a 
symbolic marker which highlighted the cultural uniqueness of the Swiss nation. The 
following statement typifies a widely held opinion:
There is no doubt that our dialect is a strong bulwark against spiritual 
infiltration from abroad.... Maintaining our dialect is thus tantamount to 
undertaking a spiritual Grenzschutz (protection of the border). In view of the 
political developments that our southern and northern neighbours are 
currently undergoing, one might add: protection of the Swiss democratic 
state.67
In the wake of this new enthusiasm for Switzerland’s cultural diversity, Rhaeto- 
Romansch, a language spoken by no more than 20,000 souls in the canton of 
Graubiinden, was elevated to a national language. Calls to recognise Rhaeto-Romansch 
as a fourth national language were aired for the first time in 1935 both in public debates 
and in Parliament.68 The initiators of a parliamentary bill that emanated from these 
activities justified their demands by pointing to the national significance of Swiss 
multilingualism in the face of ethnic nationalism: ‘In contrast to those states which 
achieve unity through shared language,... we see in the unification of those languages 
that are rooted in Switzerland’s so il... the guiding principle of our civic order.’69 A 
few years later these demands were met: in 1938, an appropriate constitutional 
amendment passed both chambers without encountering the slightest opposition; and in 
February 1938, the Swiss voters accepted the new law with an overwhelming 
majority.70 Numerous commentators recognised the symbolic significance of this 
political act. One intellectual and supporter of Swiss cultural policy, for example,
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described it as a clear sign that ‘Switzerland is well aware of her peculiarity as a 
nation’.71
An increasing interest in regional diversity also served to buttress the new 
cultural nationalism. Like its linguistic diversity, Switzerland’s complex patchwork of 
regional cultures was portrayed as an aspect of Swiss nationhood that rendered it 
distinct and authentic. The argument was that Switzerland, to a far greater extent than 
other countries, comprised a rich mosaic of regional and local cultures and customs. As 
a liberal intellectual put it:
There are not merely German, French, and Italian Swiss, as today’s 
nationalism would have us believe -  nor are there merely Catholic and 
Protestant Swiss ... What is more, the citizens of every canton, every town and 
every region have been shaped and made distinct by the historic individuality 
of these entities.72
The Government's 1938 White Paper on cultural policy
The 1938 White Paper on cultural policy, the so-called Kulturbotschaft, was the most 
significant official articulation of Swiss nationalism barring the National Exhibition of 
1939. Drafted under the direction of the Catholic Conservative Federal Councillor 
Philip Etter and subsequently passed by Parliament, the report soon came to be seen as 
the Magna Carta of Swiss cultural policy. It stated as its purpose ‘constructive 
reflection upon the cultural bases of the Swiss uniqueness, character and state, as they 
are articulated within our history and national traditions, our spirit and our 
institutions’.73
The White Paper’s general line of argument reproduced the subtle fusion of 
civic and organic understandings of nationhood that had characterised the earlier 
national discourse. Paragraph IV of the report, entitled Sinn und Sendung der Schweiz 
(‘Switzerland’s meaning and mission’), encapsulates this paradoxical synthesis. ‘Every 
state lives by virtue of the cultural forces that gave birth to it, and which, in the course 
of its history, were organically developed*. This explicitly ‘organic’ statement is
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followed, in the next sentence, by the rather ‘civic* supposition that ‘The [Swiss] state 
is founded on a community of common will and spirit, on an idea that supersedes all 
efforts to divide and separate’.74
The complex amalgam of civic and organic elements is also notable in a 
subsequent section of the report, which identifies three principles as being central to 
Switzerland’s special ‘national mission’. The first is her close affiliation with ‘three 
great European cultures’. It is only in Switzerland, it is argued, that the ‘idea of a 
spiritual community of the peoples and cultures of Europe’ has been realised to the full. 
The second principle relates to the cellular character of Swiss society and the 
decentralised structure of its political institutions, embodied in the confederate system 
of cantons and their representation on the Council of States (Standerat). The ‘essence 
of Swiss democracy’, the report asserts, is based upon its ‘organic composition from 
the bottom to the top’. The third and final universal described as constitutive of Swiss 
nationhood is a deeply held ‘reverence for man’s dignity and liberty’. These three 
values, it is argued, have informed a constitutional arrangement which recognises that 
the existing cultural and religious differences are worth preserving.75
According to the report, moreover, geistige Landesverteidigung must have as its 
chief aims the preservation and promotion of these principles. The Swiss Government 
proposed to make available an extra 500,000 Swiss Francs per annum to support these 
efforts.77 In accordance with the general aim of the cultural policy, this sum was to be 
spent, in equal parts, on the preservation of national culture at home -  Kulturwahrung -  
and the promotion of Swiss culture abroad -  Kulturwerbung. Among the domestic 
cultural projects that were to benefit from the new funds, literature, periodicals devoted 
to cultural debates, theatre, film, art exhibitions, and a cultural exchange programme for 
pupils at secondary school level were specifically mentioned. There was also a proposal 
to have important contemporary and historical works of Swiss literature translated into 
all the national languages.78
While most foreigners knew of the ‘beauty of our landscape’ and ‘our economic 
capability’, ‘our country’s culture and cultural achievements are generally less well
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known*. So ran the Government’s justification for its Kulturwerbung, the plan to 
promote Swiss culture abroad.79 This declaration of intention was again followed by an 
enumeration of possible steps to be taken. In addition to a proposition to improve the 
technical capacity of Swiss Radio so that its programmes could be widely received 
abroad, these steps included the promotion of lectures, presentations and exhibitions in 
foreign countries; improving communications with the roughly 400,000 Swiss abroad; 
and the setting up of courses on Swiss history and cultural traditions at overseas Swiss 
schools.
The Government’s White Paper on cultural policy was undoubtedly significant 
in that it strengthened existing demands to bolster Swiss culture both at home and 
abroad. Overall, however, it did not set a new ideological agenda. Rather, the White 
Paper fell within the symbolic and ideological parameters that had been set by the 
national discourse of civil society between 1933 and 1935. This included, above all, the 
contributions of newspapers and periodicals, radio broadcasts and parliamentary 
debates, or the teachers associations who organised conferences on patriotic education. 
It was these agencies of civil society that had set the tone for an increasingly pervasive 
discourse of cultural nationalism. From the mid-1930s onwards, moreover, various 
Swiss universities organised lecture series on topics such as Schweizerisches 
Staatswesen und schweizerische Kulturgeschichte (‘Swiss civic order and Swiss 
cultural history’, Basle 1939), Geistige Aufriistung (‘Spiritual aiming’, Bern 1939). In 
1936, the Federal Technical High School in Zurich organised a series of lectures on 
geistige Landesverteidigung.80
In addition, the cantonal education authorities made various efforts at 
intensifying national education: in Zurich the Education Ministry selected three 
patriotic songs for every age group of pupils and recommended that they be sung at 
regular intervals in both primary and secondary schools. The same canton organised 
prize competitions for its teachers on topics related to civic education and, again, on 
geistige Landesverteidigung. Meanwhile, the education authorities of the canton of 
Aargau introduced Heimat- und Gedenktage. These were days of national 
commemoration, which sometimes took the form of patriotic excursions, and
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sometimes were used for the discussion of national history and geography. On the 
initiative of the Swiss Teachers Association, school halls and corridors across the 
country were decorated with wall paintings portraying themes of Swiss history and 
geography as well as military images.81
It is fair to say, therefore, that the Federal Council’s Kulturbotschaft was 
essentially a (belated) response to calls for a state-led cultural policy that had rapidly 
grown more vocal since the mid-1930s.82 Such calls had multiplied in the wake of the 
Nazi annexation of Austria in March 1938, thereby increasing the pressure on the 
Federal Government to become more active in the sphere of cultural politics.83
Nevertheless, additional weight was lent to the state’s cultural policy by its use 
of national radio to disseminate its message. In the immediate aftermath of Austria’s 
Anschluss, for example, the Director of Switzerland’s national broadcasting company, 
the Schweizerische Rundspruchsgesellschaft, asked broadcasting studios throughout the 
country to pay more attention to core national values. He justified his request by 
claiming that such measures would help to advance the mutual understanding between 
Switzerland’s different linguistic regions. Thus Federal Councillor Philip Etter could 
conclude in 1938 that ‘over the past decade’ the radio had become ‘the most important 
and powerful instrument of cultural propaganda’.
The foreign section of the New Helvetic Society played a particularly important 
role in putting some of these proposals into practice: for example, carrying out a 
number of propagandists activities in various parts of the world in 1938. Its annual 
report of 1938 concludes:
In 1938, Switzerland has launched a forceful assault: in view of the preparation 
for the National Exhibition in 1939, Switzerland has been advertised all over the 
world.... In one way or another, Swiss colonies almost everywhere are contri­
buting to this promotion of our country.85
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The natural and the man-made in harmony: ‘Willensnation' and ‘Wesensgemeinschaft ’ 
at the 1939 Exhibition
The message to the nation that was constantly conveyed by the National Exhibition 
rested on the same combination of voluntarism and cultural determinism that 
characterised the discourse in newspapers and periodicals and the Government’s White 
Paper. The civic theme was articulated in the claim that Switzerland was a voluntary 
nation -  modem, dynamic, and future-oriented. This political discourse was seamlessly 
interwoven, however, into a narrative that portrayed Swiss nationhood as organically 
rooted in history and geography. Indeed, a brief look at the various articulations of 
‘Swissness’ by the Exhibition reveals that the civic conception, with its rhetoric of the 
human deed, was balanced by proclamations in the vocabulary of organic growth. One 
newspaper report gave expression to this perception in a striking manner:
The National Exhibition rests on a unique fusion of the natural and the man- 
made. .. In the midst of the natural world we find the products of human 
creativity ... There is indeed a contrast, but this contrast does not represent a 
loss but, quite to the contrary, brings reassurance.86
The same dualism of civic and organic nationhood was given expression in the 
Hohenweg. Thus the visitors, as they made their way along the one-kilometer patriotic 
foot path, passed the following thematic sections: unserLand (‘our country’); unser 
Volk (‘our people’); soziale Arbeit (‘social work’); lebendiger Bund (‘a vibrant 
confederation*); Wehrwille (‘the willingness to take up arms’); Arbeit und Wirtschaft 
(‘work and economy’); Ehrung (‘honour’); Gelobnis (‘the vow’).87 In this way, the 
national past was made to interact with the nation’s present and future, and the 
‘historic’ and ‘organic’ was juxtaposed with the ‘modem’ and ‘functional’.88 Didactic 
considerations had inspired the drawing of this contrast. The basic message to the 
visitors was this: take pride in present achievements and future capabilities, but be 
aware also of what was achieved in the past, and how this past determines the present 
and the future. Max Huber captured the spirit of the Exhibition’s didacticism:
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[It] ... brings unity to the varied life of the present in terms of temporality, 
continuity, and historical depth; from primeval times to the present day. The 
present... acquires its meaning and is evaluated in the light of what the people 
of this country have achieved to date, and are yet to achieve.89
For Huber, therefore, the Exhibition presented a most skilful synthesis of the two core 
dimensions of the Swiss character: an ‘attachment to nature conceived of as the unity of 
man, earth, plants and animals in the silent rhythm of the seasons’; and a great 
fascination with ‘the overwhelming wealth and agility of humanity’s genius for 
invention’.90 But while liberal intellectuals like Max Huber struck a delicate balance 
between the past and the present, between a civic and an organic understanding of 
Swiss nationhood, others developed a narrative in which an organicist-historicist vision 
was dominant. The official Exhibition brochure, for example, taught visitors that the 
view which held that ‘a people is made up of individuals’ was a delusion. ‘A people’ 
the text continued, ‘is made up of families and kinship groups, and of generations. 
Hence more than ever before we feel that every single individual is connected with the 
past and has obligations to the future by virtue of belonging to such groups.’91
It is evident that the concept of cultural diversity, a key theme of the 1939 
Exhibition, lent itself particularly well to the promotion of the civic-organic synthesis 
that was the hallmark of the Swiss nationalism of the era. The public enthusiasm for 
this diversity was most evident from the staging of the Trachtenfest, the Swiss folk 
costume festival, which took place in August and was widely perceived as the highlight 
of the Exhibition.92 Another strategy designed to promote the concept of cultural 
diversity was the organisation of the so-called Kantonaltage, days devoted to particular 
cantons or regions. During each of these, representatives and folk groups from a given 
canton paraded in the streets of Zurich.
On the one hand, therefore, the public emphasis on Switzerland’s ethnic and 
cultural diversity helped to buttress a civic conception of nationhood. The will of the 
diverse groups to form an alliance, so the argument went, allowed Switzerland to exist 
as a nation. Switzerland, in other words, was a voluntary nation, a Willensnation.
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On the other hand, however, the concept of cultural diversity served to furnish an 
organic view of Swiss nationhood. The country’s ethnic and cultural diversity was 
perceived as more than a symbolic marker -  an element that distinguished Switzerland 
from her neighbours -  though this function was important. Even more importantly, this 
diversity provided evidence that the Swiss nation, while lacking in cultural 
homogeneity, nonetheless had an organic core.
Plate 6-1: The National Exhibition of 1939 -  Nation, Cantons, Communities 
( ‘Gemeinden): the ‘Hall o f Flags’ formed part o f the Hohenweg.
Swiss national identity, according to a frequently expressed opinion, was organically 
rooted in its culturally and ethnically diverse segments: the communities, cantons, and 
regions whose representatives paraded the streets of Zurich during the Exhibition.
These segments had a concrete existence, and were internally homogenous in 
themselves. The logic at work here is obvious: Herder’s preferred expression of organic 
nationhood -  language -  had to be ruled out in the Swiss case. Thus, given that there 
was a profoundly felt need to promote the Swiss nation as an organic rather than simply 
abstract, voluntary community, a symbolic resource other than language had to fulfil 
this function. The elements that constituted Switzerland as a political and cultural entity
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-  the cantons, regions, and communities -  offered to take this role. These elements 
were thereby portrayed as the source of organic Swiss nationhood. This was the central 
message of the National Exhibition, which was widely perceived as the most 
‘impressive manifestation of the Swiss character’.93
Conclusion
Why did ‘culture’ come to represent the key symbolic resource in the Swiss 
nationalism of the late 1930s? One reason is to do with the fact that although history 
and political institutions -  traditionally the core resources in the civic discourse on 
nationhood -  retained significance, they were insufficient bases for nationhood in the 
light of the challenges now being faced. At the same time, however, the search for 
ethnic or racial commonalities was confined to a small segment on the right wing of the 
political spectrum; and by 1935 this segment had acquired the stigma of a fifth column. 
Culture was attractive, moreover, because of its considerable versatility as a symbolic 
resource. That is to say, culture could be portrayed as an achievement, a notion that was 
fully in accordance with the concept of a Willensnation. Alternatively, culture could be 
regarded as a heritage that had evolved over the longue duree, comprising a set of 
symbolic codes, a repertoire of distinct customs, practices and ways of thinking.
The fact that the cultural nationalism of the geistige Landesverteidigung 
simultaneously emphasised Switzerland’s cultural unity and diversity may be a 
contradiction at the level of logic. In practice, however, both perspectives combined to 
reinforce the belief in the existence of a Swiss nation that was not simply imagined but 
actually existed. The most vocal champions of linguistic diversity, for instance, while 
they did not conceive Swiss nationhood in romantic terms, nonetheless subscribed to an 
organic understanding of language. There could be no doubt in their view that each 
living language revealed the ‘spirit’ and ‘soul’ of its speakers.94 The message, of 
course, was that Switzerland was composed of diverse yet organic cultures and that the
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whole, Swiss nationhood, was therefore organic too -  a Wesensgemeinschaft that could 
stand up to the challenge of ethno-linguistic nationalism.
Finally, the amalgamation of the civic and organic narratives in the cultural 
nationalism of the 1930s enabled its proponents to portray the nation as an entity that 
was distinctive and tangible. It was distinctive because it was the product of specific 
cultural and historical processes, which had supplied it with a unique character; and 
because of its apparent internal diversity, embodied in a multitude of languages and 
regional dialects. And it was tangible because the cultural patterns that constituted 
Swiss nationhood were not mere abstractions but -  as many commentators pointed out 
-  manifestations of a ‘living culture*.
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PART III: 
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Memory, Events, and Nation Formation:
Switzerland and Germany Compared
Three questions have guided the analysis in the previous chapters. First, under what 
conditions does ‘the nation’ become a subject of public debate? Second, to what extent 
can nationhood be invented or constructed during periods of heightened concern about 
national identity, and what brings about changes in the definition of national identity? 
And, third, how are ‘civic’ and ‘organic’ conceptions of nationhood related to each 
other in this process of national reconstruction, and how do shifts in the balance 
between them occur?
The first question has been addressed in the foregoing substantive chapters 
(particularly in chapters 5 and 6) and will not concern us here. The answer that has 
been proposed is that national revivals are most likely to occur when inter-nationalist 
competition coincides with domestic political conflict. More specifically, what the 
Swiss example suggests is that when modem nation-states feel threatened from outside 
(whether that threat is actual or ideological, real or imagined is of little importance), 
rallying around ‘the nation’ becomes a moral imperative. Such instances of national 
revival multiplied from the mid-nineteenth century on when nationalism became an 
international force, engendering a process of inter-nationalist competition between 
existing nation-states. Political and cultural elites keen to secure legitimacy for then- 
respective nations were the first to respond to these challenges. In so doing, they 
provoked struggles over the definition of nationhood between rival domestic groups, 
thus unleashing a process that I have called the cross-fertilisation of nation-centred 
activity. In short, public debates over national identity tend to be most intense when a 
perceived external challenge engenders competing views on the ‘nation’ among a given 
population. Such an perspective differs from top-down approaches, which attribute 
changes in the intensity of national discourse to the legitimacy concerns of state elites 
and intellectuals; it also contradicts those accounts which conceive of debates over
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nationhood as spontaneous national revivals, and rooted in psychology rather than 
politics.
This final part of the thesis addresses the second and third questions outlined 
above by way of a comparison. Taking up the second question, this chapter contrasts 
the formation of nationhood in Switzerland and Germany in the nineteenth century. Its 
main concern is the role of ethno-symbolic memory in modem nation formation. My 
argument is that on-going historical events provided the major impetus behind the 
evolution of popular German nationhood, while a well-entrenched ethno-symbolic 
memory shaped the construction of national identity during the same period in 
Switzerland.
The present in the past versus the past in the present: ethno-historical memory 
and modern nation formation
Are nations built or do they grow? Some thirty years ago, Carl J. Friedrich asked this 
question in an influential reader on nation-building edited by Karl W. Deutsch and 
William J. Foltz. His answer was that we must distinguish between, on the one hand, 
the ‘old’ nations of the West (especially France and England), which developed more 
or less continuously out of medieval kingdoms into modem nations, and, on the other, 
the nations that sprang up in the post-colonial world, which were deliberate 
constructions.1 The leading representative of the modernist position among the theorists 
of nationalism, Ernest Gellner, in a public address he made shortly before his death in 
November 1995, asked a similar question: ‘Do nations have navels?’ His answer:
‘Some nations have it and some don’t and m any case it’s inessential.’
Essentially, the discussion outlined above centres on the relevance of pre­
modem ethnicity to modem nation formation, an issues that is still controversially 
debated among nationalism scholars. As indicated in chapter 1, the host of approaches 
to understanding nation formation and national identity can be grouped into two major 
families. The first comprises the ‘perennialist’ perspective. Put simply, its adherents
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maintain that the past determines the present; that national identities form slowly and 
organically; and thus that the scope for the voluntary construction of national identity is 
strictly limited. When explaining this limited scope for invention, perennialists point to 
the determining role of cultural or political antecedents, while the somehow related 
primordialist approach tends to stress the impact of psychological givens.
The second grouping encompasses ‘presentist’ and ‘instrumentalist’ approaches, 
which, overall, have been more prominent in the field. In sharp contrast to the 
primordialists and perennialists, scholars adhering to either of these perspectives 
maintain that the present determines perceptions of the past; that discourses about 
national identity are thus either a function of modem power struggles and/or the 
consequence of a collective search for meaning at times of rapid social change.
Little can be gained, it seems to me, by employing the two approaches as 
analytical a priori, although this strategy is widespread. Obviously, some empirical 
cases are likely to correspond more to the ‘perennialist* scenario, while others (perhaps 
the majority of cases) will approximate the ‘presentist* one. The important question, 
then, is to identify the conditions that favour either of the two scenarios. In an attempt 
to advance the theoretical debate concerning the construction of national identities, this 
chapter adopts a typological and comparative approach. Instead of asking whether 
nationhood is culturally predetermined or constructed by elites, I examine the two 
distinct types of ethno-symbolic memory that by the late eighteenth century had 
developed in the Swiss Confederation and the German Reich, respectively, and the two 
different ways to nation formation paved by these legacies. In the Swiss case, a ‘master 
narrative’ was embodied in a highly structured set of symbols, myths, and political 
values, and cut across social, cultural and political boundaries. German ethno-symbolic 
memory, on the other hand, took the form a ‘symbolic tool-kit’. The symbols, myths 
and values that constituted this tool-kit did not form a highly structured whole, and 
their salience was restricted to a highly educated section of German society.
Two distinct processes of modem nation formation resulted from these 
divergent symbolic frameworks. To illuminate the differences, I shall focus on the 
interaction between current events and ethno-symbolic memory. This will reveal that in
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Switzerland, the political conflicts of 1798-1803 and 1847/48 did not lead to a 
transformation of the prevailing ethno-symbolic memory. Rather, the public re­
definition of Swiss nationhood during the nineteenth century was shaped by this 
memory, since it provided the focus of ideas about what it was to be Swiss.
Germany presents an altogether different picture. Here, a rich but fragmented 
and largely elite-centred ethno-historical memory could not serve as a common frame 
of reference; and, instead, a sequence of events provided the catalyst for the formation 
of modem nationhood. In this regard, the wars of 1806/13 and 1870/71 were 
particularly influential. They had the effect of reinforcing a Franco-German antagonism 
that determined the construction of modem German nationhood throughout the century. 
It was due to the mass mobilising effects of these wars that concepts like Kultumation 
and historic myths like the legends of Arminius the Cheruscan, hitherto of concern to a 
small but vocal elite, began to be diffused among the public at large, thereby serving as 
symbolic fortifications of German nationhood. Finally, in the wake of German 
unification, new myths, glorifying Bismarck as a national hero, and new public rituals, 
especially the annual military parades that were conducted all over the Reich, were 
added to the existing stock.
This chapter has two major sections. The first traces the evolution of an early 
modem ethno-symbolic memory in Switzerland and its impact on modem nation 
formation. This account will combine a summary of issues raised by previous chapters 
with new material on the role of critical historiography on national discourse. The 
second part of the chapter provides a similar but more extensive account of the German 
case. An extended conclusion discusses the interaction between collective memory, 
historical events, and modem nation formation in Switzerland and Germany.
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Memory and nation formation in Switzerland
The formation o f an ethno-symbolic memory 
Common political institutions
The alliance of 1291 between the three forest cantons provided the institutional core for 
the forging, elaboration and subsequently reconstruction of the Confederate memory. 
Although between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries this original pact gradually 
evolved into a coalition of thirteen rural communities and city-states, its basic 
institutional structure remained largely unchanged. From the outset, the Confede­
ration’s institutional framework had three pillars.
The first consisted of a written contract, confirmed on a regular basis by the 
swearing of a communal oath. This oath of allegiance was crucial in that it supplied the 
community with a common ritual that helped to remind the members of the community 
of the purpose of their alliance, as well as of their rights and duties. The ritual did not 
impose uniform attitudes, but helped to reproduce the belief among the members that 
they formed a Gemeinschaft despite having different values and interests.3
A set of rules and agreements for regulating internal peace formed the second 
pillar of the Old Swiss Confederation. The rules were spelled out in the Confederate 
concordats, especially the Pfajfenbrief {1370), the Sempacherbrief (1393), and the 
Stanser Verkommnis (1481). These concerned mutual aid against violence from inside 
and outside, common action against feuds and robbery, the prohibition of foreign 
judges, and a common strategy on relations with external powers. Along with its 
success in warfare, the ability to secure internal peace was a decisive factor in enabling 
the Swiss Confederation to gain de facto autonomy from the Holy Roman Empire at 
least two centuries before autonomy was officially recognised by the Treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648.
The third pillar in the Confederation’s institutional framework was its common 
decision-making body, the Confederate Diet (Tagsatzungl. Although the Diet faced a
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serious challenge during the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it 
survived into the eighteenth century as an important forum for social interaction and 
communication. It seems unlikely that, in the absence of the institutional framework, 
Confederate ethno-symbolic memory would have become as significant a basis of 
Confederate identity as it did from the fifteenth century onwards.
The Confederate wars
If the Confederation’s political and legal institutions provided a framework within 
which common loyalties could develop in a reasonably continuous fashion, successful 
warfare played an equally important part. To begin with, the Confederation’s successes 
on the battle field quite simply secured its survival as a distinctive political and cultural 
community. What is of special interest in the context of this discussion, however, is that 
the collective experiences of the victories over the Habsburgs in 1315 and 1386, the 
Burgundians under Karl the Bold in 1476, and the Swabian League in 1499-1500 
served as a communal mythomoteur for the creation of a Confederate repertoire of 
myths and narratives.
Moreover, these victories provoked fear among feudal lords that Confederate 
defiance could have a demonstration effect on their subjects. As my summary in 
chapter 2 of Thomas Brady’s book on German peasant revolts demonstrates, such 
concerns were anything but unfounded. Peasant populations in the German South in 
particular began to draw inspiration from the Confederate resistance against the 
Habsburg overlords. At the same time, such fears, together with the general resentment 
caused by military defeat, induced Austrian and Swabian nobles to launch a vitriolic 
attack on the Swiss Confederation. The conflict between the upholders of the feudal 
principle and the Confederates, which reached its peak in the closing decades of the 
fifteenth century, helped to foster an ethno-symbolic boundary predicated on the 
opposition between feudalism and communalism. The nobles declared the Confederates 
a disgrace to humanity and accused them of having violated the pre-ordained status 
hierarchy -  the cornerstone of feudalism as a socio-political order. Citing the battle
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victories as their evidence and referring to Old Testament narratives, the Confederates 
responded by claiming that God had chosen them as his favoured people, while 
abandoning the nobility.
This opposition found expression in the myths and communal narratives that we 
first witness in a number of chronicles of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century. 
Here, the myths of the Rutli alliance and of Wilhelm Tell take pride of place. These 
dramatic narratives based on actual historical events and processes -  the wars against 
the Habsburgs had taken place, and the alliance between the three forest cantons had 
been concluded in the late thirteenth century -  were conveyed to a wider audience 
through historic folk songs, folk plays and pamphlets over the course of the fifteenth 
and sixteenth centimes. By the mid-seventeenth century, they had developed into a 
vernacular narrative, as the Swiss peasant war of 1653 underscores.
The myths were subsequently nationalised around the turn of the eighteenth 
century (see chapter 3). Two generations of Helvetic Patriots were the driving force 
behind this transformation. Although concentrated in the Protestant, German-speaking 
areas of the Swiss Confederation, in terms of its ideological appeal the rapidly expanding 
network of Helvetic patriotism cut across linguistic and religious boundaries. In this way, 
an early Swiss nationalism began to spread outwards from the drawing rooms of closely- 
knit circles to a rapidly growing number of patriotic associations, and eventually to wider 
sections of the educated public. Although by the turn of the eighteenth century the myths 
had formed part of a vernacular communal narrative, Schiller's Wilhelm Tell (first 
published in 1804) undoubtedly further advanced their appeal. The play was read and 
performed throughout the nineteenth century and quickly became part of the literary 
canon taught in Swiss primary schools.4
Swiss nation formation: the constraints imposed by ethno-historical memory
Although we can hardly speak of a popular Swiss nationalism before the turn of the 
nineteenth century, the narratives, myths and symbols that constituted the Confederate 
memory had achieved considerable resonance by this time. And it was precisely the
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fact that this memory was popular rather than elite-centred, ‘vernacular’ rather than 
‘official’, that made it a significant factor in modem Swiss nation formation. In 
addition to shaping the public discourse concerning Swiss nationhood from the late 
eighteenth century onwards, it also placed constraints on the public construction of 
national identity in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Claiming the past in the struggle for national unity (1798-1848)
The constraints imposed by the myths have been conspicuous ever since debates on 
Swiss nationhood entered the public realm. This first occurred in 1798, when 
Switzerland became one of France’s so-called ‘sister republics’ (see chapter 4). The 
political conflict that rocked the Helvetic Republic (1798-1803) from the day of its 
inauguration had its counterpart in a struggle over definitions of symbols and myths. 
Each of the two rival factions -  the movement of republican nationalism and its 
opponents -  embraced the myths of foundation and of liberation to bolster the 
legitimacy of its cause. This developed into a fierce controversy in which each side 
accused the other of tyranny and declared itself the true inheritor of ancient liberties.
The supporters of the Helvetic Republic (1798-1803) likened their opponents to 
the Habsburg nobility of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Worse even than the 
Habsburg overlords who had tried to oppress the forefathers’ right to determine their 
own affairs, the enemies of the Helvetic Republic had sought to deny the rights and 
liberties of their own fellow countrymen. Given that Austria spearheaded the 
conservative coalition that opposed the republican movements on the European 
Continent, this particular analogy must have appeared all the more plausible to the 
supporters of the new regime. However, the strategy of alluding to the liberation myths 
to bolster their cause was not confined to the champions of the republican project. 
Drawing on the same mythical repertoire as the supporters of the Helvetic Republic, its 
fiercest opponents portrayed the Helvetic leaders as traitors of the ancestors’ struggle 
against foreign interference. In seeking help from revolutionary France to wipe out the
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traditional order, the opponents of the Republic frequently reiterated, the adherents of 
the republican cause had desecrated the Confederation’s glorious heritage.
Once in power, the Helvetic elites took an active part in the initiation and 
promotion of national festivals and rituals between 1798 and 1803. In attempting to 
propagate national symbols, the new regime sought to fuse traditional myths and 
symbols with new elements and practices that had been elaborated in the context of the 
French Revolution. This syncretistic strategy to some degree reflected the worldview of 
the Helvetic leaders, but it also indicated their limited room for manoeuvre. When the 
Helvetic propagandists diverged too overtly from this approach, conflicts would often 
ensue, underlying the constraints imposed by the mythical repertoire. The various 
attempts to inaugurate republican mass rituals similar to those of revolutionary France 
are a case in point. These were established in an effort to overcome particularist 
loyalties and to forge an identity that would reflect the new concept of une nation une 
et indivisible. Examples of such novel rituals include the annual oath on the 
constitution, and the annual commemoration of April 12, the Day of the Declaration of 
the Helvetic Republic. In both cases, a mixture of popular resistance and apathy caused 
the Helvetic government to abandon its attempt to initiate new customs in favour of a 
syncretism which placed the stress on a (civic) reinterpretation of traditional symbolic 
forms and contents.
The fundamental political conflict between the Protestant Liberal and Catholic 
Conservative cantons that dominated the 1840s confirms the basic patterns we 
encountered in our analysis of the Helvetic Republic (see chapter 4). Even in the 
vitriolic verbal polemics that accompanied the civil war of 1847, the traditional 
historicist narrative, based on the foundation and liberation myths, provided the focus 
for both Radicals and Liberals and Catholics alike. Although the two camps rallied 
behind opposing conceptions of community and interpreted the core myths differently, 
both referred to the same constitutive narratives in seeking to advance their claims. The 
foundation and liberation myths, along with those relating to the late-medieval battles, 
formed the stock items of their respective rhetoric. It is worth noting that the 
controversy over Swiss nationhood that accompanied the hostilities left the basic ethno-
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historical memory as good as unchanged. Together with the institutionalisation of the 
modem nation-state after the turn of the nineteenth century (and particularly after 
1848), this shared ethno-symbolic focus facilitated the piecemeal nationalisation of the 
Catholic Conservative cantons and was conducive to their eventual integration into a 
nation-state they had initially fiercely opposed.
Competing memories of nationhood: liberal historiography and the reconstruction of 
the Swiss past (1870-1900)
Another group bound to face the constraints of ethno-historical memory were the 
professional historians of the late nineteenth century. In 1889, for instance, Wilhelm 
Oechsli, a prominent liberal historian and one of the leading critics of the traditional 
narrative, lamented that the late-medieval myths ‘have become second nature to our 
people and, by and large, are regarded as true history even today’.5 From the 1870s 
onwards, many of Switzerland’s most prominent historians had begun to question the 
founding and liberation myths. The date of 1307, they demanded, had to be replaced 
with 1291.6 The reason for this was that 1307 derived from a repertoire of myths (with 
the legends about Wilhelm Tell and about the Oath of the Rutli forming the core), while 
there existed a document which testified to the conclusion of an alliance in 1291 
between representatives of the three forest cantons. For the liberal historians, who 
followed the new methodological directives introduced by the German historian 
Leopold von Ranke, this was ample reason to get rid of 1307 and declare 1291 the 
nation’s founding date. Thus Oechsli spoke for most of his professional colleagues 
when he stated that the ‘much-loved imaginings do not correspond with the existing 
body of primary sources. What is more, these imaginings are frankly contradicted by 
the available evidence.’7
The historians’ ‘revisionist’ project provides us with two illustrations of how 
the existing ethno-historical memory shaped the construction of Swiss national identity 
in the late nineteenth century. The first concerns their own attitude towards the national 
past, thereby revealing the constitutive role of collective memory. What is most notable
242
in this respect is the fact that they did not abandon the basic temporal and geographical 
parameters traditionally associated with Switzerland’s national origins. On the contrary, 
they explicitly accepted the parameters embodied in the core myths: the dating of the 
nation in the late medieval period and the locating of the nation’s origins in central
o
Switzerland remained unchallenged. The historians’ aim was a more modest one: the 
replacement of a myth-based narrative about Switzerland’s national origins with an 
historical account that met the scientific standards of late-nineteenth century 
historiography.
This fact, though remarkable, has provoked little interest among Swiss 
historians of the post-war era. Why did neither the critical historians nor the leading 
politicians of the late nineteenth century opt for 1798 or 1848 as Switzerland’s 
founding date? After all, the modem Swiss nation-state was a product of the revolutions 
of 1798 and 1848. It had little in common with the Swiss Confederation of the ancien 
regime. Nor had it emerged in organic fashion out of the late-medieval alliances of the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The liberal historians were well aware of this. Why 
is it, then, that none of them gave any serious thought to the possibility of shifting the 
nation’s founding date to the nineteenth century? The evidence suggests that this was 
because historians took the late medieval framework largely for granted. Switzerland 
had been founded at the turn of the thirteenth century, and central Switzerland was the 
geographic heartland of the emerging Swiss nation -  this is what the late-nineteenth 
century historians (and those of the next two generations) had been taught at school; 
and even later, as they became graduate students in Swiss history departments, these 
‘facts’ were hardly questioned.
The same is true of the liberal political elite of the late nineteenth century. 
Statements from any leading Swiss politician of the period championed 1848 as the 
nation’s founding date are hard to find. The same cannot be said of proclamations that 
locate Switzerland’s origins in the late medieval period. A parliamentary report in 
1890, for example, stated that ‘the Eternal Alliance of 1291 was and is the Magna Carta 
not only of our Confederate Law but also of our civic order, national independence and 
liberty.’9 To be sure, the fact that the date of 1848 would have been controversial due to
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its association with the Liberal victory in the civil war of 1847 provides a partial 
explanation for the politicians’ reluctance to promote it as year of the nation’s 
foundation. It is also true, of course, that nationalism attributes much prestige to a long 
historical pedigree. But these factors do not in themselves account for the almost 
complete failure to question the temporal and geographical parameters of the traditional 
national narrative -  a failure which says much about the resilience and resonance of the 
traditional communal memory.
The second example illustrates how a given collective memory shapes the 
construction of national identity by posing constraints on the actors involved. This is 
made evident by the fact that the shift in public opinion that the historians did seek to 
bring about (the shift from viewing 1307 to viewing 1291 as the date of the nation’s 
foundation) was only partially successful. Although in terms of its aims the historians’ 
revisionist project was anything but revolutionary, it provoked a public controversy of 
some proportion. The defence of the myths and legends took different forms. Some 
argued that in forming a kind of poetic super-structure of historical events, the myths 
comprised an important or indeed indispensable part of Swiss national identity. One of 
the earliest and most vocal individuals to have argued along such lines was Zurich poet 
and fierce supporter of the liberal state, Gottfried Keller. In 1861 he argued that the 
possession of foundation legends was an asset to be welcomed rather than a weakness 
to be lamented. These legends, Keller maintained, should be cherished and kept alive 
because they strengthened national cohesion. ‘If there existed no legend about the 
emergence of the Swiss Confederation’, Keller proclaimed at one point in his Gruner 
Heinrich, ‘we would be bound to invent one’. And, Keller’s concerns went even 
further. He feared that the debunking of the core myths would merely be the first step 
of a greater project of rewriting Swiss history, which would eventually lead to the 
complete abandonment of the medieval framework in favour of the nineteenth century. 
It was because of such concerns that, in the 1860s, he exhorted: ‘May the scholars 
continue to fulfil their duty; as long as they do not completely deny what is feasible and 
necessary in order to replace it with what is unfeasible: our having emerged from 
scratch.’10
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Many teachers in primary and secondary schools throughout the country shared 
Keller’s anxieties. When in 1873 a school director openly demanded that, in light of 
recent progress in historical research, the legends be removed from the school curricula 
altogether, it provoked a fierce reaction among sections of the teaching profession. An 
article in the Schweizerische Lehrerzeitung, the official publication of Swiss school 
teachers -  while conceding that legends should be identified as such -  argued that ‘as 
long as Greek, Roman and Germanic mythologies* were taught in secondary schools it 
was ‘irreverent to hold a knife to the throat of our national hero, Wilhelm Tell’.11
Others directed their criticism more openly towards the historical profession 
itself. They argued that instead of highlighting the grounded nature of the myths -  
particularly their close relationship with significant historical events of the thirteenth 
and fourteenth centuries -  historians confined themselves to the dry business of 
distinguishing between fact and fiction. To quote from the report of a Liberal 
newspaper of 1886:
Patriotism need not mourn, even if [science] also strips it of its heroes.
Whether Tell in fact shot the apple off his son’s head, and whether Winkelried 
embraced the enemies’ pikes, or whether these are mere inventions of an epoch 
that was both imaginative and in need of heroic figures: the valley-cantons 
liberated themselves, the knights’ army was defeated at Sempach, and both
17were achieved by heroes.
In a speech delivered at the national festival in Schwyz in 1891, moreover, Adrien 
Lachental of Geneva, the then president of the National Council, adopted an openly 
populist tone when he juxtaposed scholarship and popular perceptions. Contrary to the 
critical historians, he proclaimed, ‘the people at large’ regarded Tell and the Oath of the 
Riitli as symbolic embodiments of republican virtue and true patriotism.13 Lachental 
was seconded by the prominent legal historian Carl Hilty, who noted that the bulk of 
the Swiss population did ‘not like the dry bones of scientifically prepared history’, but 
preferred ‘the powerful narrative of the chroniclers which is still suffused with the air 
of the original deeds’.14
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Overall, however, neither wholehearted rejection nor full endorsement was 
predominant among the many responses to the liberal conception of the national past. 
More often, the struggle between competing conceptions of the national past led to a 
synthesis of the new historical narrative (linked to 1291) with its mythical precursor 
(based on 1307). The trend towards synthesising ‘history* and ‘memory’ -  to use Pierre 
Nora’s terms -  was already in evidence in the build-up to the national festival of 1891. 
Nevertheless, during the 600-year celebrations of 1891, as at the numerous local and 
medium-sized patriotic festivities that punctuated the nineteenth century, the ethno- 
historical memory and the myths and symbols that constituted it were the main focus of 
attention.
To sum up the Swiss scenario: a well-entrenched ethno-symbolic memory 
played a significant part in the construction of national identity in the nineteenth 
century (and beyond) -  either by furnishing, in a self-evident manner, the worldviews 
of those who contributed to national discourse, or by constraining the scope for 
alternative ideological projects. Where ethno-symbolic memory was fragmented and 
lacked in resonance, a different pattern of modem nation formation can be observed. 
This leads me to the German example.
Memory and nation formation in Germany
Explaining German nationalism 
The Sonderweg paradigm
The course of German nationalism has often been portrayed in terms of its departure 
from an ideal western model, resulting in a depiction of the German nation-state as a 
deficient stepchild, as it were, of such countries as France, England, and Holland. 
Within this research paradigm, two issues have received specific attention. The first is 
the question of why, in comparison to some of its neighbours, German statehood was
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such a late arrival.15 Harold James, in a relatively recent contribution, has attributed 
Germany’s belatedness to its lack of two vital ingredients for successful nation- 
building: a set of symbols and myths that were sufficiently distinctive and well-known 
to command the support of the German masses; and a framework of political 
institutions that could serve as a focal point of civic loyalty. Consequently, James 
argues, ‘Germans found it much more difficult [than the members of other nations] to 
work out what the pattern for national life should be’. In addition, the split between the 
Protestant North and the mainly Catholic South, along with the strength of small-state 
particularism, were major impediments to the emergence of an overarching identity 
among the populations of the different German lands.16
A second group of scholars working within the Sonderweg paradigm has placed 
the main emphasis not on the protracted nature of German state-building but on the 
qualitative difference between the German conception of nationhood and that of her 
western neighbours. Put simply, the argument is this: whereas in France and England 
(and other ‘western’ nations) a political conception of nationality emerged as a 
consequence of early and successful state-building, Germany’s political and territorial 
fragmentation was conducive to an ethnic understanding of nationhood. Those adopting 
this viewpoint have tended to stress the part played by cultural elites in standardising 
and popularising an ethno-cultural ideology of German nationhood in the nineteenth 
century. In some accounts, the origins of German national identity are traced back as 
far as Luther and his emphasis on German culture and language, while most have 
attributed a decisive role to German Romanticism.17
No German nationalism before 1871?
Other studies of nineteenth-century Germany have denied altogether that there was a 
popular German nationalism prior to unification. John Breuilly, perhaps the foremost 
representative of this position among English-speaking historians, has argued that ‘a 
unified Germany was created long before nationalism was a strong and active political 
sentiment, certainly before it was a widespread and popular feeling.’18 According to
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Breuilly, a process of territorial and political integration began between 1800 and 1848 
among the various German states (most notably, he argues, in the collaborator states of 
the Rheinbund, which were modernised along Napoleonic lines). Yet it was only during 
the Second Empire, he argues, that a sense of national identity emerged, engendered by 
the formation of a ‘powerful set of imperial institutions’ (including social welfare 
provision, the construction of railways, a navy, and legal codification) and more clearly 
defined state boundaries.19
About two things, it seems to me, there can be little doubt: that nationalism was 
not the major driving force behind the establishment of the German nation-state of 
1871 (although it was not completely marginal as an influence, as Breuilly seems to 
suggest); and that the state in 1871 contributed to the emergence of German national 
identity. Yet to conclude from this that popular German nationalism was the product of 
political unification flies in the face of a considerable amount of evidence, as I shall try 
to demonstrate below. It is one thing to argue that German unification did not result 
from an increasingly powerful sense of German national identity; quite another to 
maintain that there was no such thing as a popular German nationalism between, say, 
1800 and the unification of Germany under Prussian leadership. What makes Breuilly 
come to the latter conclusion is his overtly restrictive definition of national identity, 
which he equates with loyalty to the state and its institutions. On the basis of this 
definition, nationalism is more-or-less inconceivable as long as nationhood does not 
find expression in the political institutions conferred on a people by the modem state 
(above all popular representation and citizenship rights). This becomes plain in 
Breuilly’s interpretation of public reactions to the Napoleonic wars in various countries 
(including Germany). It would be misleading, he maintains, to interpret the hostile 
reactions to the French occupiers as expressions of popular nationalism when they were 
(merely) manifestations of ‘populism stimulated by very traditional institutions and 
sentiments’. A genuinely nationalist response, he argues, was hardly possible ‘without 
the prior internal changes of the kind that had taken place in France’.20
The preponderance of the research agendas discussed above has left little scope 
for assessment of the respective impacts on the formation of German nationhood of
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ethno-symbolic memory and historical events. In the remainder of this chapter, I will 
try to fill this gap.
The Formation o f an Ethno-Symbolic Memory
The Institutional Framework of the Holy Roman Empire
What can be perceived as the contours of an evolving German ethno-symbolic memory 
are largely the product of a particular regnal and feudal organisation and, as such, this 
memory lacks a strong core. Susan Reynolds has observed that when thirteenth-century 
England and France were witnessing a revival of royal authority at the expense of 
lordships and princes, developments in Germany ‘were just then beginning to go in the 
opposite direction’. Thus unlike in the former two cases, in Germany the great duchies 
managed to strengthen their position at the expense of the King.21 The Reichsreform of 
1491 and, subsequently, the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, as the German 
Reich came to be called in 1512, continued and cemented this trend.
The outcome of the Thirty Years War further diminished the prospect of tighter 
territorial and political consolidation. Especially in the western part of the Reich, the 
War had left many territorial questions and disputes unresolved. The Treaty of 
Westphalia of 1648, for example, allocated Alsace a somewhat ambiguous status 
between France and the Empire, thus creating the potential for future conflicts between 
France and Germany.22 Sweden’s intervention, in particular, brought an end to ‘the 
prospect of a Habsburg imperial state in Germany’ and thus of a ‘territorial centre in 
the traditional lands of the Reich \ Instead, Austrian absolutism ‘shifted its whole centre 
of gravity eastwards’, paving the way for the multiethnic Austrian-Hungarian Empire.23
What is more, in strengthening (once again) the princes at the expense of the 
King, the War had produced in Germany the opposite effect to that it had produced in 
France, where the centre had emerged invigorated. Individual territorial rulers -  the 
Reich of 1648 comprised more than three hundred estates, princedoms, and duchies of 
various sizes -  enjoyed the freedom to conclude treaties with each other and with
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foreign powers.24 In the immediate aftermath of the Thirty Years War, numerous 
alliances and coalitions sprang up all over the Reich. Although most of these coalitions 
were short-lived, they nonetheless formed a strong bulwark against attempts at 
territorial consolidation. The vacuum that resulted from the lack of an absolutist regime 
along French or Spanish lines was filled by powerful individual states that pursued a 
successful territorial policy. Prussia and Austria in particular emerged as the driving 
forces behind absolutist rule within their respective spheres of influence. These two 
dynasties became fierce competitors for power and influence within the Reich over the 
course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, hindering the formation of 
overarching political institutions 25
The logistical inability of the Reich’s exercising control over its territories 
undoubtedly posed an obstacle to the emergence of a shared sense of German identity 
of the kind that evolved in early modem France or England. At least at the popular 
level, identification with one’s Land (known as Landespatriotismus) tended to reign 
supreme, whereas loyalty to the German Reich (Reichspatriotismus) remained weak.
As late as 1773, for example, the German poet Wieland used the term ‘nations’ to refer 
to the constituent states of Germany, such as Bavaria, Prussia, and Saxony. In his 
words: ‘The nation is actually not One Nation, but an aggregate of numerous nations’. 
Daniel Jenisch came to the same conclusion in the second volume of his Geist und 
Charakter des 18. Jahrhunderts (published in Berlin between 1799 and 1801): ‘We 
may be Brandenburgers, Austrians, Bavarians, Saxons: but we are not Germans.’ The 
cultural elite’s despair at the preponderance of political and cultural particularism led 
them to favour cosmopolitan ideals. As Schiller and Goethe jointly wrote: ‘Forget, O 
Germans, your hopes of becoming a nation. Educate yourselves instead .. .to be human 
beings’.28
But while the institutional weakness of the Holy Roman Empire inhibited the 
formation of a German identity, it did not prevent German-speaking elites from 
fostering an ethno-symbolic memory aimed at inspiring a sense of German nationhood. 
Such efforts were discernible from the late fifteenth century onwards, with an 
increasing number of Humanist scholars providing the major intellectual impetus.
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These learned men began to perceive as paradoxical the fact that the ‘German nation’ -  
a term cultural elites now began to use with great frequency when referring to the 
populations of the Holy Roman Empire -  was divided between several states.29 In 
Germany as elsewhere, historians, philologists, students of folk culture, printers, poets 
and moral philosophers were in the vanguard of this early modem movement of 
cultural nation-building. In Germany, their efforts produced two important national 
narratives.30 In the first -  the narrative of the Kulturnation -  Germany was portrayed as 
a nation whose essence was located in its cultural properties. In the second -  the 
mythical narrative -  Germans were depicted as the descendants of a victorious tribal 
warlord, Arminius the Cheruscan (see Tab. 7-1).
The narrative of Kulturnation.
Responding to and competing with early national movements in England, France,
Holland and Spain, German civic humanists created the narrative of the German
Kulturnation as the basis of an early modem patriotism. The core elements of this
concept of nationhood were Sprache (language as both a medium of communication
and an expression of the national character) and Bildung (education of both the formal
and moral kind). As early as 1492, the Humanist scholar Konrad Celtis argued that
there was a need to strengthen German unity, power and culture in order to create a
climate in which effective and good government could operate. Thus Celtis demanded
that increased scholarly effort be made in the examination of German geography and in
the German past. In particular, he considered historical knowledge to be cmcial if the
<2 1
general population was to be made of the glorious deeds of their nation.
From the sixteenth century onwards, the language dimension of the narrative of 
Kulturnation was accorded increasing significance. Here, Luther’s contribution was 
significant. His translation of the Bible emerged as the essential textbook of the 
German Protestants. Furthermore, his pamphlet An den christlichen Adel deutscher 
Nation (‘To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation’) sold 4,000 copies within 
eighteen days, leading to the printing of a second edition only one week later.32 In 1578
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a German grammar was published by Johannes Claj,33 which greatly advanced the 
standardisation of the German language. Over the course of the seventeenth century 
there was a proliferation of language societies throughout the Reich, which aimed at 
elevating the German language to a status that would allow it to compete successfully 
with the national languages of France and England. Moreover, the numerous literary 
societies and associations that mushroomed during the reading revolution of the 
eighteenth century often combined historical, linguistic and geographical interests, 
making them the focal points of patriotism.34
Nevertheless, until the middle of the nineteenth century the concept of the 
Kulturnation held little appeal beyond the confines of the German educated elite. 
According to Giesen, as late as the 1770s no more than about fifteen percent of the 
German population were literate, but a mere one percent (roughly 200,000 people) 
actively participated in the reading revolution.
Most importantly, however -  as Norbert Elias was able to show -  Kultur rose to 
prominence as a status-bound concept in Germany over the course of the eighteenth 
century, reflecting the hierarchical structure and social rigidity of German society. 
Hence according to Elias, Bildung became a marker of status for the German educated 
middle classes, distinguishing them from the German nobility who until (at least) the 
end of the eighteenth century acted as the standard bearers of French culture. They 
aspired to the cultural rules and etiquette of France that had reached their maturation 
under French absolutism. Frederick the Great’s distaste for the German language and 
German literature is legendary. But the German educated classes’ admiration for 
French civilisation received a blow when it became increasingly clear that the nobility 
was unwilling to accommodate newcomers from their ranks.37 The Bildungsburgertum 
responded to this humiliation by constructing a social boundary predicated on the 
juxtaposition of German Kultur and French Zivilisation. Yet it soon became plain that 
the concept of Kultur served the bourgeoisie as a dual marker of identity: as well as 
distinguishing them from the nobility, with their love of French civilisation, it marked 
them off from the lower and petit bourgeoisie, who in their view lacked both Kultur and 
Zivilisation.
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Indeed, during the eighteenth century, Germany’s educated classes became 
fervently preoccupied with culture, particularly in the sense of Bildung. This 
preoccupation was epitomised by the establishment of the classical Gymnasium and the 
founding of a number of Humanist universities.39 By the late eighteenth century, the 
educated Germans’ embrace of Kultur and Bildung had not only defined them as a 
distinct social group, but also enabled them to perceive themselves as bearing the 
essence of German nationhood. Nevertheless, and as Breuilly has argued with regard to 
the eighteenth century: ‘The construction of a German national culture, focused on such 
ideas as a national language and national theatre, was highly elitist.’40
The mythical narrative: Arminius the Cheruscan
The second pillar of German national memory before 1800 was built on a myth of 
ethnic origin, contained in the legend of Hermann der Cherusker (Arminius the 
Cheruscan). As with the concept of Kulturnation, German humanists provided the 
major impetus behind the elaboration of this myth. The increased interest in myths of 
national origin, apparent from the turn of the fifteenth century, was by no means a 
German peculiarity but formed part of a European-wide trend 41 The German case 
testified to the competitive nature of European myth-making in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries, which was also under way in Switzerland, France, and Holland, to 
name but a few examples. In his Epitome Germanorum (1505), for example, Jakob 
Wimpfeling ridiculed the claim, made by French scholars that Charlemagne had been 
French. In truth, Wimpfeling maintained, Charlemagne had been a German king ruling 
over French subjects. Wimpfeling even went so far as to say that the explanation of 
why no Frenchman had ever been king of the Holy Roman Empire lay in the 
superiority of the Germans over their French rivals.42 Of the several elements that made 
up the German mythical narrative, the myth of Arminius the Cheruscan had the greatest 
resonance for the German Humanists. By contrast, the two other myths -  the historical 
legend of Barbarossa and the Nibelungenlied -  tend to be overestimated in terms of 
their popular appeal. Although both subsequently acquired significance for the early
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romantics, they were not meaningful for the wider population until after the Wars of 
Liberation.43
Two historical sources furnished the elaboration of the Arminius myth and 
supplied it with the necessary legitimacy despite its nebulous content: Tacitus’ De 
origine et situ Germaniae liber, and the Roman History by Velleius Paterculus. The 
latter work contains a brief description of the course of the battle which in 9 AD ended 
with the victory of the Germanic tribes under Arminius over the Romans led by Varus. 
Velleius portrays Arminius and his troops as virtuous and as shrewd strategists, while 
he depicts the Roman commander Varus as vacillating and weak. Tacitus’ account of 
Arminius, discovered in 1455 in Italy, is concerned with events after the battle and is 
more complex than that of Velleius. His focus is on Arminius and his entourage, whose 
manners and actions he describes as rude and primitive; he also reports on the rebellion 
that ensued against an increasingly power-hungry Arminius.44
Humanist thinkers such as Conrad Celtis, Jakob Wimpfeling, Ulrich von Hutten 
and Heinrich Bebel used these two sources selectively in their various attempts to foster 
a German myth of national origins. What made both sources attractive was that they 
lent themselves well to the elaboration of profound differences between the character of 
the Romans and that of their Germanic adversaries. Further accentuating a tendency 
already present in these sources, the Humanists described the Romans as decadent and 
weak; as frivolous and prone to extravagance. In the eyes of the Humanist myth- 
makers, these character traits rendered them inferior to the physically resilient 
Germanic tribes with their authentic culture. This -  or so it was suggested -  derived 
from their organic rootedness and ethnic purity.45
Over the course of the eighteenth century, the myth of Arminius became 
popular with the early romantics, and so inspired a considerable number of dramatic 
wors. These included compositions by J. E. Schlegel (1743), Justus Moeser (1749), and 
Friedrich Gottlieb Kloppstock (1769,1784, and 1787). Significantly, in all these plays 
Arminius and his followers are presented self-evidently as German. From the late 
eighteenth century, moreover, several German Encyclopedia included references to the 
myth of Arminius the Cheruscan 46
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German nation formation: the pull of historical events
The secondary importance of ethno-symbolism
Yet whatever the salience of the narratives concerning the Kulturnation and the myth of 
Arminius for Germany’s cultural elite, they did not capture the popular imagination 
until well into the nineteenth century (see Tab. 7-1). Nor did they ever develop the kind 
of constraining capacity that I have attributed to the ethno-symbolic memory of the 
Swiss Confederation. Even in the nineteenth century, the first of the two narratives -  
that which emphasised the cultural essence of the German nation -  remained the 
preserve of the educated sections of the German public, for whom it acquired further 
significance as a symbolic weapon against the claims of superiority of French imperial 
nationalism.
The myth of Arminius, on the other hand rapidly gained ground during the Wars 
of Liberation and the war of 1870/71 against France. Containing a communal narrative 
that was vernacular rather than elite-centred like that of the German Kulturnation, the 
Arminius myth was more conducive to promoting popular notions of German 
nationhood. The content of its dramatic narrative -  the manichaen struggle for 
superiority and survival between two powerful adversaries -  made it a paradigmatic 
story for the actual conflicts of the nineteenth century. In other words, the allegedly 
age-old enmity between the Romans and the Germanic tribes, personified in the legend 
of Arminius, served to historicise and naturalise the present-day German-French 
antagonism.47
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Tab. 7-1: The components of ethno-symbolic memory in early nineteenth
century Germany
N a r r a t iv e Sy m b o l ic  R e s o u r c e s Sp h e r e  o f  I n f l u e n c e
• The Kulturnation 
Narrative
Svrache
Bildune
Educated Middle Classes: 
Bildunesbureertum
• The Mythical 
Narratitve
Arminius the Cheruscan 
(Tripartite Myth: Ethnic 
Origin; Foundation; 
Liberation)
Educated Middle Classes: 
Bildunesbiireertum
War and German nationhood I (1806/13): fortifying the national boundary
France, the primary ‘reference society’ (Reinhard Bendix) for most countries on the 
European Continent in the period from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, had 
a particularly profound impact on the formation of nationalism in Germany. The French 
Revolution provides an appropriate starting point for an assessment of this impact. At 
least initially, revolutionary France was much admired by many members of 
Germany’s educated classes. Some of the leading representatives of the German 
intelligentsia, such as Wieland, Tieck, Holderlin, Wackenroder, Kant, Herder, Hegel 
and Fichte (Goethe was notably absent from this group) expressed their support for the 
Revolution and the changes it had brought about; as did lodges and scholarly 
associations. Several members of the German nobility, especially those adhering to the 
principles of enlightened absolutism, were also inspired by France and attempted to 
emulate (however selectively) aspects of French culture and politics.48
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If the execution of Louis XVI repelled many of France’s earlier supporters 
among the German intelligentsia and nobility, the outbreak of war and the experience 
of French occupation provoked anti-French sentiment among the wider German 
population. National propagandists sought to further their cause by tapping into such 
feelings. In August 1808, for example, the Prussian Baron Karl von und zum Stein 
(1757-1831) wrote in a letter to the Prussian King: ‘There is great public outrage 
against an arrogant and predatory enemy here in the Prussian provinces. If wisely 
directed, it will express itself forcefully and will prevail.’49 Blackboum describes the 
impact of the ‘hostilities of 1792-1815’ on the wider German public at large: ‘A whole 
generation grew up in its shadow; it affected everything from levels of consumption to 
religious observance. The war also had an ideological component absent from earlier 
dynastic struggles, and this left its mark on the reshaped German state-system.’50 
Michael Mann discussed the formative influence of the French revolutionary wars on 
European nationalism:
[T]he French fuelled local nationalisms as ‘liberation’ turned into 
imperialism.... By 1799, revolts against the French were widespread.... By 
1808, nearly all patriots were turning against the French; after 1812, even 
active collaborators [i.e. the states in the German south] were deserting a 
losing cause.51
While the popular hostility against French occupation was particularly strong in the 
German north, and especially in Prussia, it also gained momentum in the southern and 
south-western states, notwithstanding their opposition to Prussian, small-German 
nationalism. Even in the collaborator states that formed the so-called Rheinbund, anti- 
French resistance and rhetoric grew in strength from around 1810, as Napoleon’s war 
efforts demanded ever greater sacrifices from the local populations (mainly in the form 
of troop recruitment and increased taxation), and especially after the French armies had 
been defeated by Russia in 1812.52 In 1809, for example, a French envoy reported to 
Paris that the words ‘liberation’ and ‘independence’ could be heard with ever-greater 
frequency in Bavaria. An official report on the public mood in some of the Rhenish 
provinces, dating October 4,1811, came to a similar conclusion. Addressed to the
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French Minister of the Interior in Paris, it announced that ‘the liberation of Germany’ 
was ‘the demand of the moment’ in Halle, Jena, Leipzig, and Tubingen.53
In seeking to understand why French warfare and occupation provoked 
widespread nationalistic reactions, one must remember that the Napoleonic wars 
represented a novel phenomenon: that is, an expansionist mass nationalism. Post­
revolutionary France fought its wars under the imperialist banner of la grande nation, 
and its citizens perceived their nation as having a civilizing mission. In theory, this 
mission consisted of carrying out what official propaganda described as the ‘liberation’ 
of other, less fortunate peoples. In reality, it entailed the imposition by French 
occupiers of their own customs and system of government on the ‘liberated’.54 
Accordingly, this new form of (nationalistic) warfare triggered a new kind of 
(nationalistic) response, which had a popular character. French imperial nationalism 
thus served to nationalise the German masses. More specifically, it helped construct 
what became the backbone of German nationhood in the nineteenth century: a symbolic 
boundary predicated upon the antagonism with France. To quote Michael Mann again: 
‘As in England, contrasting stereotypes of ‘national character’, based on individual 
character, appeared. Germans characterized themselves as open, upright, and God­
fearing, the French as sly, frivolous, and unreliable. The nation and la grande nation 
were no longer one.’ 55
Hence rather than an age-old resentment of the French (as some German 
nationalists claimed), it was the collective experience of war and French occupation 
that established opposition to France as the structuring principle of German 
nationalism. Andreas Rebmann, for example, was a former supporter of France who 
admitted to having changed his mind after Napoleon’s defeat in 1813: ‘I confess that I 
was once a warm supporter of the Rhine frontier, just as now, as a German, I am a 
vehement opponent of the same ... I have never forgotten that I am a German.’56 To be 
sure, the two central elements of German ethno-symbolic memory before 1800 -  the 
notion of the Kulturnation and the myth of Arminius the Cheruscan -  were used to 
historicise and naturalise the symbolic boundary of German nationhood. To recognise 
that a contemporary conflict was historicised, however, is not to deny the fact that it
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was the wars and their repercussions for the German people that elevated these 
elements from elite-centred symbols to popular national narratives. In the context of 
inter-nationalist competition, the notion that language was the most authentic 
expression of an ancient and organic ‘German character’ was politicised, as was the 
myth of Arminius. Both narratives, in turn, served to embellish the emerging symbolic 
boundary with a resonant myth of ethnic origin.57
In the pamphlets and speeches of the nationalist intellectuals, France appeared 
as the arch enemy, and French culture came to epitomise all that was not German. 
Fichte’s ‘Addresses to the German Nation’ are perhaps the clearest testimony to this 
change of attitude from admiration for to bitter resentment of all things French. In 1799 
Fichte had still been arguing that the German cause was lost ‘unless the French achieve 
the most tremendous superiority ... in Germany’. By 1808, when he delivered his 
Addresses in Berlin, he had undergone a profound conversion. Now he was envisaging 
a great awakening of the German spirit, and demanded of his compatriots that they 
participate in a collective search for the ‘national character’, which henceforth had to 
take precedence over the striving for individual happiness.58
The available evidence suggests that Fichte’s change of heart is indicative of a 
wider trend of historicising and naturalising the conflict with France. Historians played 
a key role in depicting France as the ‘eternal enemy’ of the German people. ‘However 
far back we look in our history*, the Berlin historian Friedrich Ruhs wrote, ‘we see that 
the behaviour of the French towards Germany has been consistently hostile’.59 The 
popular writer Ernst Moritz Arndt spearheaded the movement making hatred of the 
French the essence of German nationalism: ‘Let unanimity be your church! Make 
hatred of the French your religion, and let freedom and Fatherland be the saints to 
whom you pray! ’60
Through various modes of communication, anti-French rhetoric radiated 
outwards from a few centres of ideology to a German public that was increasingly 
receptive to nationalist doctrines. Secret societies such as the Tugendbund (League of 
Virtue) or the German League of Friedrich Ludwig Jahn gained influence among the 
youth and among students in particular. In Hesse, Prussia and Braunschweig, patriotic
259
activists drew on local resentment in launching small insurrections against the French 
occupiers. When it became known that Napoleon’s Russian campaign was facing 
defeat, such resentment rapidly evolved into the popular nationalism of the so-called 
Wars of Liberation against Napoleon. Schulze describes the public mood as these wars 
broke out: ‘When King Frederick William III of Prussia issued a call to arms on March 
17, 1813, it triggered a mass enthusiasm similar in some respects to the popular 
uprisings of the French Revolution, fed by a flood of nationalistic, anti-French 
propaganda and verse.’61
Plate 7-1: Adolph Menzel, Victoria! (around 1836), Lithography,
Staatliche Museen zu Berlin -  Preussischer Kulturbesitz.
Painting depicts the German victory in the so-called 
Befreiungskriege against Napoleon’s armies.
The numerous public ceremonies and festivals established in commemoration of the 
Wars of Liberation further contributed to the popularisation of anti-French nationalism, 
with the commemoration of the battle of Leipzig of 1813 emerging as the first national 
festival in German history. In the absence of a central organising body, a campaign by 
Friedrich Ludwig Jahn and Moritz Arndt ensured that the hundreds of regional events 
followed a common pattern during the first commemoration in October 1814.
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Proclamations of Germany’s military strength and manifestations of anti-French 
feeling, expressed in folk songs and speeches, supplied the thematic core of this 
commemorative event. A solemn part, during which bonfires were lit and an oath on 
the German nation was sworn, was followed by banquets, folk dances, concerts, and 
similar activities. Although clearly modelled on French revolutionary festivals, Jahn 
and Arndt spared no effort in seeking to infuse the event with an authentically German 
flavour.62 The introduction of the Liberty Tree is illustrative of this. In order to 
represent German nationhood through the use of this new symbol, ‘German oaks’ 
became the centre of the numerous rituals of liberty that were conducted all over the 
country.63
At least three reasons can be cited for the rapidity with which the anti-French 
framework acquired a taken-for-granted status that cut across social, political and 
cultural boundaries. First, political developments confirmed existing anti-French 
stereotypes. The wars and subsequent occupation of German territory rendered 
plausible the view that France was intent on denying Germany’s right to national self- 
determination. Some parts of Germany were more seriously affected than others: the 
states of the Rhineland, for example, which collaborated which Napoleon, ‘suffered a 
brutal, physically destructive and economically crippling occupation’ that lasted from 
late 1792 until the French defeat of 1813. The occupation of Prussia was briefer but 
equally humiliating for those who experienced it directly.64
Second, the absence of a powerful communal narrative prior to the nineteenth 
century increased the need to establish a relatively clear-cut symbolic boundary 
between Germans and non-Germans. Specifically, the existing communal memory had 
insufficient structural coherence and popular resonance to furnish a positive conception 
of German nationhood. Eric Hobsbawm has come to a similar conclusion. Pointing to 
the ‘multiplicity of [symbolic] reference’ that characterises German national discourse, 
he attributes the primacy of anti-French rhetoric in nineteenth-century German 
nationalism to the lack of a reasonably coherent conception of German self-identity. 
‘Like many another liberated ‘people” , Hobsbawm concludes, ‘’’Germany” was more 
easily defined by what it was against than in any other way.’65
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Third, the wars not only provided an impetus for national mobilisation along 
anti-French lines, but also provided a stronger organisational basis for the national 
project. Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, the founder of the movement of the German gymnasts, 
clearly acknowledged the need for organisation and planning in his statement that ‘the 
random activities of a Volk’ did not ‘make a festival’.66 Thus, the groups and networks 
that organised the national festivals and initiated the erection of monuments became 
integral elements of an increasingly dense network of nation-wide communication. In 
addition to the informal organising committees of festivals and commemorations, then, 
the male choral societies, the sharp-shooting societies, the Burschenschaften, gymnasts
fCland fraternities played important parts m this network.
War and German Nationhood II (1870/71): Reinforcing the National Boundary and 
Creating New National Symbols
In the period from the Wars of Liberation (1813-1815) to national unification (1871), 
German society witnessed a number of developments that, either directly or indirectly, 
strengthened national identity. At the economic level, the German Customs Union 
(Zollverein) was formed under Prussia’s direction in 1834; this facilitated and 
standardised the exchange of goods within a national economic area. The following 
year saw the opening of the first German railway line, which was the first section of a 
network which by 1848 covered more than 3,000 miles. At the political level, the failed 
Revolution of 1848 sparked a (short-lived) wave of nationalism, with the Liberal 
movement at the forefront. In 1859, moreover, the challenge to Austrian supremacy in 
Italy mounted by France (which had entered an alliance with the kingdom of Piedmont- 
Sardiania) provoked nationalistic reactions in Germany, which culminated in 
celebrations of the 100th anniversary of Friedrich Schiller’s birth ‘throughout the 
German-speaking regions’. Another conflict with international repercussions was that 
between Prussia and Denmark over the Duchy of Schleswig in 1863/64, and had a 
similar effect. Finally, Prussia’s victory over Austria was the ultimate blow to the 
Greater-German conception of national unity. After its defeat by Prussia in 1866, the
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leading power of the Austro-Hungarian Empire found herself effectively excluded from 
a Prussia-dominated Germany. Austria’s exclusion also led to a dramatic shift in the 
religious balance within Germany, which was now roughly two-thirds Protestant and 
one-third Catholic.
However, if these events were significant, the developments of 1870/71 -  the 
German-Franco war and the subsequent national unification -  marked a watershed in 
the process of nation formation. Prussia, the largest and most powerful among the 
German states and the driving force behind unification, emerged as the major player in 
the newly founded German nation-state. She accounted for roughly sixty per cent of the 
Second Empire’s territory and population, and supplied by far the largest army of all 
the member states. Three-fifths of the civil servants who constituted the new 
bureaucracy were Prussian. The Prussian King, William I, became the Emperor of 
Germany, and Prussia’s First Minister, Bismarck, became German Chancellor.69
While the war against France (which broke out in July 1870 and ended in 
January 1871) and national unification both had the effect of strengthening Prussia at 
the expense of Austria, they also provided a boost to popular German nationalism. The 
war was particularly important in this regard. Nationalism, as Breuilly is right to argue, 
was not the force that created the German state of 1871. Yet his related assertion that 
‘enthusiasm for a war against a powerful foreign state ... was not the same thing as 
positive national support for the new Prussian-German state’70 somehow misses the 
point. Neither the small-German state nor Prussia emerged as the focus of this popular 
nationalism, although the latter had gained in prestige due to her decisive role in 
bringing about unification. Instead, it was the ‘German nation’ that was the frame of 
reference. Compared to the state, it was abstract enough and had sufficiently emotive 
associations to capture the minds and hearts of Germans from a range of social, 
religious and political backgrounds; and unlike ‘Prussia’, its capacity to mobilise troops 
extended far beyond the northern German states. It is worth noting, for example, that 
the armies of the southern states, many of which had supported France in previous 
confrontations, in 1870/71 ‘fought on the battlefields as enthusiastically as the 
Prussians’.71 Bavaria and Baden had mobilised on July 16,1870, and Wurttemberg
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followed suit the next day. The speed and determination that characterised the process 
of mobilisation owed more to public opinion than to a sabre-rattling elite. Schulze 
therefore concludes:
The fever pitch of patriotism in both public and press placed such pressure on 
southern German governments that their cabinets could see no viable path other 
than joining the North German Confederation, on whatever terms might be 
offered. German unification by no means came about solely on orders from 
above, from the ruling princes and their governments, but also as a result of 
clamor from below, from the forces of the liberal, middle-class national 
movement, and the result was accordingly not a Great Prussia but a German 
Empire.72
Most significantly, however, the war further reinforced the central organising principle 
of German nationalism, namely the antagonism with France. The war of 1870/71 
popularised a perception of France as the ‘incarnation of an existential threat to the 
nation-state of Germany’.73 In contrast to the war of 1866 against Austria, which had 
been opposed by the Catholic population and (at least initially) a considerable segment 
of the National Liberals, the war against France was widely perceived as a national war. 
As Confino writes: ‘Whereas in 1866 opponents of Kleindeutschland blamed the war 
on Prussia, in 1871 all, including democrats and Grossdeutsche, were convinced that 
France bore the responsibility for the conflict.’74 An editorial that appeared in the 
Augsburger Zeitung on July 20,1870 reached the following conclusion: ‘The whole 
people has turned against France with an unanimity that exceeds all our expectations. 
This applies even to Wiirttemberg and Bavaria, which are renown to be Prussia’s 
fiercest opponents.’75
In various newspaper reports, a connection was made between the Wars of 
Liberation against Napoleon and the new war against France. The Deutsche Kriegs- 
Zeitung, for example, wrote upon the outbreak of the war: ‘There is no more 
unmistakable testimony to the clear conscience of the German people in this war than 
the unanimity and enthusiasm with which they took up the holy legacy of the Wars of 
Liberation.’76 And on September 6,1870 (by which time the strategic superiority of the
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Prussian-led troops had become evident), a statement in the Vossische Zeitung 
succinctly exemplified the process of nationalisation of the hostilities: ‘The Germann 
people is fighting a war against the French people, not against a different 
constitution.’77
In his assessment of the events, Carr goes so far as to argue that ‘the wave of 
anti-French feeling that swept through the cities and towns of South Germany’ left the
no
governments no choice other than mobilisation. On August 2, 1870, for example, The 
Frankfurter Zeitung enthused: ‘Swabians and Prussians hand in hand;/ North and South 
one army! / What is the Germans’ Fatherland, -  / No longer do we ask ourselves that 
question!’79 Even in Wurttemberg, a state that had fought against Prussia in previous 
wars, the push for national unification had considerable force. When a Landtag election 
was called in December 1870 (after the battle of Sedan in September 1870 and before 
the declaration of the Empire in January 1871), the Deutsche Partei, having 
campaigned in favour of national unity, made massive gains. By contrast, the 
Democrats, who had shown themselves to be lukewarm about the prospect of a
on
Prussian-dominated Germany, suffered large-scale losses.
Plate 7-2: Anton von Werner, Kaiserproklamation in Versailles 
(1885), Oil on Canvas, Friedrichsruh, Bismarck-Museum.
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The public controversy over the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine points in the same 
direction. Local newspapers, particularly in the southern states, started calling for the 
annexation of the two provinces after the German victory at Sedan. When, shortly after 
unification, a few German politicians began to champion the idea of a referendum as a 
way of resolving the issue, a public outcry ensued; and when the first representative of 
Alsace-Lorraine made the same proposal in the Reichstag in 1874, there was uproar 
among the other members of parliament. In the debate that followed, many justified the 
annexation of Alsace and Lorraine on the grounds that the population of both provinces 
was ethnically German. As Jeismann comments: ‘There was hardly a newspaper that 
did not run a series of editorials aimed at proving that, on historical, cultural and 
political grounds, the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine belonged to the German 
nation.’81
The Creation of New Rituals: Sedan Day and the Military Parades
In addition to reinforcing the anti-French antagonism, the events of 1870/71 brought 
into existence a number of new national symbols and rituals. Unlike in Switzerland, 
therefore, where an existing repertoire of myths and symbols retained its basic structure 
despite changes in interpretation, Germany witnessed the emergence of new symbols 
and rituals. In this regard, two developments deserve pride of place: first, the evolution 
of military rituals in the immediate aftermath of the war of 1870/71; and, second (and 
also inspired by war and unification), the emergence of the cult of Bismarck in the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century.
Having become a means of honouring important foreign visitors in the mid- 
eighteenth century, militaiy parades were further promoted in the latter half of the 
century. Two kinds of parades became significant foci of national self-assertion in the 
wake of unification: those in honour of the Prussian King (Kaiserparaden), and those in 
commemoration of the battle of Sedan of 1870, the so-called Sedantage. Between 1873 
and 1914, these latter celebrations were held annually throughout the Second Empire. 
They followed a standard pattern: tributes to the fallen soldiers at the foot of war
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monuments (which were often unveiled on these occasions) were followed by speeches 
by local veterans. As Allon Confino has shown in his recent study of Wiirttemberg, 
the Sedan Day commemorations were truly popular national festivals. The significance 
of this ritual, according to Confino, lay in the fact that ‘Sedan Day ... was tied with the 
unification and with the nation-state, and had no meaning outside of it. So, for better or 
for worse, contemporaries identified Sedan Day with the new era that began in 1871.*83 
Although Wilhelm I. refused to make Sedan Day an official national holiday, there was 
a strong commitment to the celebrations within the Protestant, liberal-minded sections 
of the German bourgeoisie.
Of even greater importance than Sedan Day (which was never free of 
controversy because of its close associations with the Liberal -  and hence
O A
overwhelmingly Protestant -  national movement) were the parades in honour of the 
German King, the Kaiserparaden, which were held annualy from 1876 onwards. As 
mass national rituals, they rapidly grew in importance after the levee en masse had been 
introduced in Germany in the second half of the nineteenth century, although in Berlin 
and Potsdam they retained their elitist character until the First World War.85 The 
parades on the Tempelhofer Feld in Berlin, for instance, were confined to members of 
the royal family and their guests -  usually high-ranking military personnel and 
members of the diplomatic service. In the provinces, however, the parades were highly 
popular affairs. Here private associations rather than a close circle of military and 
bureaucratic elites were responsible for organising the events, with the numerous 
veterans’ associations, the Kriegervereine, playing a particularly significant part.86
In terms of their capacity to nationalise the public sphere, the Kaiserparaden 
were probably more instrumental than any other public ritual. As they evolved over the 
years following their inception in the 1870s, a number of new practices were added to 
the basic ritual. First, the song Heil Dir im Siegerkranz was played at the outset, and 
soon emerged as Germany’s (unofficial) national anthem. Second, from 1897 onwards 
the non-Prussian regiments wore a Reichskokarde of white, red and gold in addition to 
their regional emblems. Third, from the early 1880s German schools were closed for 
the day of the parades, as were those in Prussia from 1903.87
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The fact that the Kaiserparaden fused small-German militarism with 
monarchical symbolism undoubtedly enhanced their popular appeal, reflecting the 
significance of the slogan Fur Kaiser und Reich (‘for King and Empire’) as an 
ingredient of post-unification nationalism.88 Militarism and monarchism had different 
meanings for different sections of the public, but the parades were able to reconcile 
both in a seemingly harmonious whole. The Liberal national movement had 
traditionally been sceptical of the monarchy, but tended to welcome militarism as a 
symbol of national unity and strength. Monarchical symbolism, on the other hand, 
helped to make a Prussian-dominated German nation-state acceptable to Catholics and 
to those who would have favoured a (Greater-German) solution including Austria.
What is more, monarchical symbolism supplied an emotive dimension to
nationhood that the constitution of the Second Empire could not. ‘I am absolutely
convinced’, declared a prominent member of the Catholic Centre Party in 1871, ‘that
the [German] population welcomes the linkage of Kaiser und Reich because of
memories of old times that have not vanished*. He continued in justification of this
assertion: ‘The modem state is a very recent construction ... With its dry emphasis on
the constitution of the German Empire it does not yet engender much popular
enthusiasm.’89 In 1907, the constitutional expert Paul Laband argued along similar lines
when he admitted that ‘the people cheer the Kaiser and devote more attention to him
00than a Bundesprdsident could ever expect’.
A New Myth of German Nationhood: The Heroic Bismarck
Of all the national symbols produced by the events surrounding German unification, the 
legend created around the German Chancellor Bismarck was perhaps the most resonant 
one. The process whereby (the politically controversial) Bismarck was made the subject 
of a national myth began in his own lifetime, in the late 1870s and 1880s. Gaining in 
influence after his removal from office in 1890, it reached the peak of its popularity 
after his death in 1898.91 The term ‘Bismarck era’ was not a creation of twentieth 
century historians, but was coined by contemporaries for the period 1871 to 1890.92
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Between 1898 and 1914, more than five hundred projects for honouring Bismarck’s 
memory were initiated, half of which were eventually realised. His memory was kept 
alive through public monuments and festivals, stamps and postcards, as well as painting 
and literature.93 The most extensive Bismarck hagiography (entitled Bismarck-Denkmal 
fur das deutsche Volk) rapidly sold 100,000 copies when it first appeared in 1896; a 
second edition of 120,000 copies was published in 1915.94 Various newspaper articles 
and public speeches provide evidence that Bismarck was widely seen as the very 
incarnation of German nationhood. Shortly after his death in 1898, the German student 
movement called for the erection of Bismarck towers. The students declared that the 
‘massive stones shall bear no name’ because ‘every child will be able to understand the 
message’.95
The German public’s veneration for Bismarck did not go unnoticed by astute 
commentators. Max Weber, for example, attributed Bismarck’s elevation to the status 
of a national hero to the upper bourgeoisie’s ‘longing for a new Caesar’ who would 
serve to inhibit socio-political reform and upward mobility.96 It may well be the case 
that Bismarck’s departure from the political stage put conservative-minded groups into 
something of a quandary, and that this provided ideal conditions for the emergence of a 
Bismarck cult. It was not the upper bourgeoisie, however, who bore the main 
responsibility for Bismarck’s increased symbolic significance. It was the petit- 
bourgeoisie and the students who spearheaded the Bismarck movement and demanded 
his immortalisation in monuments, on postcards and stamps, and in print.
The primary reason for their worship of Bismarck, it seems, was the fact that the 
ex-Chancellor was widely regarded as the chief architect of German unification. Given 
his pivotal role in the events that prepared the ground for unification, such conside­
rations must have made intuitive sense to the bulk of the German public at the time.
The wars against France, together with the unification of 1871, were ‘the only national 
experiences which the citizens of the new Empire had in common, given that all earlier 
conceptions of Germany and German unification were in one way or another “Great 
German’” .97 Bismarck had had a decisive impact on both -  which was enough to make 
him a national hero.98
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Conclusion
‘The cultural shreds and patches used by nationalism are often arbitrary historical 
inventions. Any old shred and patch would have served as well.’99 Ernest Gellner was 
undoubtedly right in rejecting the notion that nations were like biological organisms: 
nations don’t have navels. Yet the findings of this chapter suggest that his other dictum 
-  namely, that ‘any old shred and patch would have served as well’ when it comes to 
modem nation formation, and that all is dependent on the language-based high cultures 
of industrialised societies -  is unconvincing. The nature of ethno-symbolic antecedents 
(i.e. their structure and resonance) in part determines the process of nation formation 
and shapes the construction of modem national identities. If we consider modem nation 
formation in terms of a continuum between two ideal types -  from the situation where 
the past shapes the present to where the present determines the past -  then the Swiss 
model is closer to the first, and the German closer to the second.
In modem Switzerland, an ethno-symbolic memory that had taken shape over 
several centuries imposed cultural constraints on the construction of national identity 
throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth century. Although significant events 
and developments (the civil war of 1847, the threat of ethno-linguistic nationalism from 
the 1870s, and the challenge to the late medieval myths posed by the critical historians) 
helped to promote national identity and added some new elements to the basic 
repertoire (i.e., polyethnic exceptionalism and Alpine determinism), the core myths 
were of primary importance in providing a frame of reference that cross-cut social and 
cultural boundaries. Modem Swiss nationalism is thus the result of the interplay 
between ethno-symbolic memory and historical events.
The German case suggests that where a pre-modem ethno-symbolic memory is 
fragmented and thus of limited popular appeal, the scope for the invention nationhood 
(or, rather, its constitutive symbols and narratives) is considerably enhanced. Such a 
scenario therefore approximates Hobsbawm’s ideal-type of an invented national 
tradition. Nevertheless, such inventions will only resonate if they grow out of 
fundamental contemporary experiences that affect the larger part of a given population.
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The German example suggests that drastic historical events -  particularly wars 
followed by territorial occupation -  can either literally create myth-symbol complexes 
or structure and popularise a fragmented ethno-symbolic memory, thus presenting an 
alternative pattern to the more developmental path to modem nation formation 
represented, for example, by Switzerland and England.
In nineteenth-century Germany, the opposition to France became the motor of 
national identity. On the one hand, the collective experiences of French occupation, the 
Wars of Liberation, and the Franco-German war of 1870/71 forged the symbolic 
boundary that structured German nationhood along anti-French lines. On the other 
hand, these experiences created a new repertoire of national rituals, symbols and myths 
that became the hallmarks of German identity: Sedan Day, the Kaiserparaden, and the 
Bismarck myth. The constitutive elements of German ethno-symbolic memory prior to 
1800 -  the narrative of the Kulturnation and the Arminius myth -  entered the fabric of 
national identity as symbolic representations of Germanness, but did not play a decisive 
role. In short, nineteenth-Century German nationalism was the product of the wars 
against France.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
In Search of Authentic Nationhood: Nature and 
National Identity in Switzerland, the United States, 
and Canada
The pursuits labelled 'identity politics’ ... involve seeking 
recognition, legitimacy (and sometimes power), not only 
expression or autonomy ... This is even so for the identity o f  
nations, which normally involves a rhetoric o f cultural difference 
yet is in large part a claim to equivalent standing with other nations -  
i.e. to be the same sort o f thing that they are.
Craig Calhoun1
The myth of civic exceptionalism
In this final chapter, I will examine the supposition that some nationalisms can do 
without, or almost without, organic notions of community. That they can is the central 
claim advanced by the proponents of civic exceptionalism, a perspective still enjoying 
much currency both in scholarly and lay circles.
According to the thesis of civic exceptionalism, polyethnic nation-states like 
Switzerland or immigrant settler societies like the United States, Canada, and Australia 
are exceptions to the general ‘rules’ of nationalism and nation-formation. As mentioned 
in the Introduction to this thesis, a number of influential historians and social scientists, 
ranging from Friederich Meinecke and Hans Kohn to John Plamenatz and Rogers 
Brubaker, have described such nations as ‘civic’ or ‘political’, hence setting them apart 
from their ‘ethnic’ counterparts.
Whatever the terminological and substantive differences in the views of these 
scholars, they are agreed that a basic distinction between two types of nations can, and 
indeed, should, be drawn. Civic nations, they maintain, derive their legitimacy and 
internal cohesion from their members’ voluntary subscription to a set of political
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principles and institutions. In sharp contrast, ethnic nations are founded on a sense of 
self-identity determined by ‘natural’ factors such as language or ethnic descent. 
Consequently, civic nationhood is the outcome of deliberate human commitment, while 
its ethnic counterpart is determined by forces lying beyond the reach of the individual 
citizen. Political theorist Bernard Yack has juxtaposed the two conceptions in a critical 
analysis:
The myth of the ethnic nation suggests that you have no choice at all in the 
making of your national identity: you are your cultural inheritance and nothing 
else. The myth of the civic nation, in contrast, suggests that your national 
identity is nothing but your choice: you are the political principles you share 
with other like-minded individuals.2
European countries usually subsumed under the civic label include England, France, 
Holland, and Switzerland. Outside Europe, the New World societies of Canada, the 
United States, and Australia tend to be placed in the same category. However, in only a 
few of these societies has the belief in civic exceptionalism become an essential 
element of national identity. Its significance for the general population has been 
greatest in polyethnic nation-states with little ethnic conflict, such as Switzerland, and 
in immigrant settler societies, such as the United States and Canada.
In Switzerland, the belief in civic exceptionalism was expounded with an almost 
missionary zeal during certain periods of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in 
particular. The same is true for the United States of the post-revolutionary era and (to a 
lesser extent) for post-unification Canada. In all these societies, the narrative of civic 
exceptionalism has retained some of its appeal to the present day, even within scholarly 
discourse. Only recently, for instance, Swiss historian Urs Altermatt has argued that 
Switzerland belongs to a category of nations ‘which derive their identity solely from 
the shared experiences of a political community’. In an even more uncompromising 
fashion than his Swiss colleague, the eminent American political scientist Seymour 
Martin Lipset has embraced this view in his American Exceptionalism (published 
1995). In keeping with G. K. Chesterton’s statement of 1922 that ‘America is the only 
nation in the world that is founded on a creed’, Lipset has maintained that American
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identity was (and still is) based on five essential values: liberty, egalitarianism, 
individualism, populism, and laissez faire. This, he tells us, sets the US apart from 
Europe, where nationality is mostly associated not with a set of values but with a 
community of history and birth. To quote directly from Lipset’s work: ‘Being 
American ... is an ideological commitment. It is not a matter of birth. Those who reject 
American values are un-American.’4
Critiques o f civic exceptionalism
Claims of civic exceptionalism, however, have come under growing scrutiny in recent 
years, with the debate about the relationship between civic and ethnic nationhood now 
being hotly discussed issues among students of nationalism. For political theorist 
Bernard Yack, for example, the concept of civic nationhood is rooted in one of 
Liberalism’s central creeds:
The myth of the civic nation reflects one strategy that liberals have pursued in 
order to salvage their hopes for modem politics ... The idea of the civic nation 
defends the Enlightenment’s liberal legacy by employing the very concept -  that 
of the political community as a voluntary association -  whose plausibility has 
been undermined by the success of nationalism.5
In a particularly trenchant essay, Nicholas Xenos considers the myth of American 
exceptionalism championed by Lipset and others. By examining a number of well- 
known speeches by Abraham Lincoln, he is able to show that this President, closely 
associated as he was with the creed of civic exceptionalism, in fact frequently 
employed the language of classical nationalism. In some of his most famous speeches, 
Lincoln invoked common ancestry and blood ties as manifestations of a common 
American heritage, in endeavouring to foster an image of the ‘natural’ American 
family.6
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Nature and polyethnic nationhood
Whatever the merits of the recent scholarly debate about civic and ethnic nationalism, 
most of its participants, including those questioning the existence of civic nations, have 
largely confined themselves to theory. There is a conspicuous shortage of sustained 
empirical investigations into the construction of national identity in polyethnic nation­
states.
This chapter provides an analysis of the highly significant role played by 
landscape symbolism in the national discourse of Switzerland, the US and Canada. The 
purpose of this is not simply to reconstruct the iconography of landscape discourse in 
these three societies (although this will be an indispensable part of the discussion). 
Rather, my aim is to use the comparative analysis to critique the notion of civic 
exceptionalism. Applying the analytical framework developed in the Introduction, I 
attribute the significance of naturalism in the national discourse of polyethnic societies 
to a widely perceived need to forge an organic definition of nationhood. Only by 
demonstrating that their nations are rooted in the organic (i.e. natural) world can the 
members of these societies do justice to the twin criteria for national authenticity set by 
classical nationalism: being both distinctive and natural communities.
The first criterion -  distinctiveness -  the members of these societies can meet 
satisfactorily by claiming that ‘their* nations are civic exceptions to the general rule of 
nationalism. Thus the belief in civic exceptionalism is part and parcel of the self-image 
of polyethnic societies (as in Switzerland: see chapters 3 -  6); having been elaborated 
and constantly reiterated by intellectuals and politicians, the belief in civic 
exceptionalism has in these countries acquired the status of a popular (and scholarly) 
credo.
Yet the claim to distinctiveness in itself does not suffice, since, in a very 
fundamental sense, nation formation adheres to what Smith has designated a ‘pattern of 
similarity-cum-dissimilarity’.7 Hence, to meet the second criterion -  being a natural 
community -  the nation must be shown to be organically rooted. Given that the three 
societies under examination here ‘suffer’ (from the viewpoint of the adherents of
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classical nationalism) from a lack of ethno-cultural homogeneity (i.e. Switzerland and 
Canada) and/or a pre-modem past (i.e. the US and Canada), the natural environment 
becomes a vital symbolic resource for the construction of national identity. (By 
contrast, the other European nation-states usually subsumed under the label ‘civic 
nation’ -  England, Holland and France -  fulfil both of these criteria: they are ‘old’ in 
the sense of possessing a pre-modem past, and are also monolingual and thus relatively 
‘homogeneous’ in cultural terms. That they are able to do justice to nationalism’s twin 
criteria of authenticity, I suspect, largely explains why the claim to civic exceptionalism 
has not evolved into a popular credo in these societies.)
Of course, by arguing that their nations are determined by a specific natural 
environment -  the Alps in Switzerland, the North in Canada, and the West in the US -  
the referring to nature also served to buttress the claim of national distinctiveness. For 
what the Swiss, the Canadians, and the Americans asserted was that ‘their’ nature had 
produced an authentic and distinct ‘national character’. Yet the fundamental paradox 
that typifies the parallel use of civic exceptionalism and naturalistic nationalism 
remains: the claim of civic exceptionalism allowed these nations to meet the 
‘distinctive’ criterion of nationhood; but to meet the ‘natural* criterion they had, to 
some extent, to undermine the very notion of civic exceptionalism. Yet, in view of what 
was at stake at the time, such paradoxes and contradictions, while they may strike the 
scholarly observer who cares about logical consistency, did apparently not matter too 
much to those directly involved. Their principal task was to construct a national identity 
that was both salient domestically and secure international recognition for their polities.
This chapter comprises six sections. I first discuss the historical origins of 
intellectual thought about the relationship between nature and cultural communities. I 
then distinguish between two ideal-typical ways of linking nature and nationhood and 
show their relevance in different societies. The following three sections present case 
studies on how national identity was naturalised in Switzerland, the United States and 
Canada, respectively. I conclude with a brief discussion of the role of geographical 
national identity in these three societies in the post-war era.
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Thinking about geography and national character in history
Attempts to establish meaningful links between nature and culture communities are not 
confined to the modem era. Ever since antiquity, various groups or ‘peoples’ have 
turned to ‘their’ natural environment as a source of inspiration and collective 
identification. It was probably in the Hellenistic world that some of these themes were 
first developed in a more or less rigorous manner. These have remained at the heart of 
natural discourse ever since: the juxtaposition of rural and urban life, as well as the idea 
that certain physical environments might be more favourable to the emergence of high 
civilisations than others, provide examples of such themes. Some Greek dramatists in 
particular, such as Aeschylus and Aristophanes, or the historian Herodotus, referred in 
their writings to climatic factors to account for cultural differences. These Greek 
precedents, in their turn, exerted considerable influence on Roman writers. This became 
apparent, for example, when Tacitus, in the first century AD, described the Germanic 
tribes as mde and primitive and mentioned how closely tied they were to the Teutonic 
woods to support his claim.8
Yet it is only in the sixteenth century, that is, during a period marked not only 
by the discovery of non-European cultures but also by territorial consolidation and the 
rise of national consciousness in some European countries, that we witness a fairly 
widespread change in perception from ‘nature’ as a more general idea to the more 
specific notion of a ‘landscape’.9 A statement of Stefano Guazzo, dating from 1574, in 
which the author tries to explain alleged national differences by referring to a mixture 
of climatic and environmental factors marks this transitional stage: ‘There is no help for 
it, but you m ust... think that every nation, land and country, by the nature of the place, 
the climate of the heaven, and the influence of the stars has certain virtues and certain 
vices which are proper, natural, and perpetual.’10
Overall, however, neither geographical determinism nor cultural voluntarism 
prevailed in the works of early modem thinkers. Rather, the two conceptualisations of 
the relationship between nature and cultural activity made for a dualistic, and 
sometimes conflicting dialogue. Alongside the argument that nature in general, and
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geography in particular, delimited the scope open for voluntary human action,11 there
existed at the same time the belief that human beings should interfere in nature for the
sake of culture. In fact, this latter notion figured prominently in the theories of a great
many outstanding thinkers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (including
Machiavelli, Botero, Charron, and Milton). In its broad form, this belief asserted that a
people’s degree of civilisation found its clearest expression in its ability to cultivate
nature. Perhaps Giovanni Botero best encapsulated this classical ideal in his Reason o f
State (1589): ‘Nature gives a form to the raw materials and human industry imposes
upon this natural composition an infinite variety of artificial forms; thus nature is to the
craftsman what raw material is to the natural agent.’12
More systematic efforts to illuminate the link between particular natural
environments and alleged national characteristics were to follow in the eighteenth
century, especially in the works of Montesqiueu (1689-1755), Rousseau (1712-78), and
Herder (1744-1803). As was the case with their precursors in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, the works of many of these authors reveal, although to varying
degree, a tension between the notions of geographical determinism and human
voluntarism; between an emphasis on humankind being a product of geography on the
one hand, and on its role as a geographical agent capable of cultivating nature on the
other. For Herder, for instance, as he cogently expressed in his Ideen zur Philosophie
der Geschichte der Menschheit (1784-1791), geography was merely one among several
important factors affecting the course of cultural development and must take its place
alongside ‘the circumstances and occasions of the times, and the native or generated
1 %character of the people’. And even in the work of Montesquieu, rightly held to be the 
most influential proponent of geographical determinism of the eighteenth century, 
things are less clear-cut upon closer inspection. At one point in his L ’Esprit des Lois, 
for instance, he clearly adheres to the argument of a multiple causes without conceiving 
of climatic factors as determinative in the last instance: ‘Mankind are influenced by 
various causes: by the climate, by the religion, by the laws, by the maxims of 
government, by precedents, morals, and customs; whence is formed the general spirit of 
nations.’14
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As the foregoing indicates, the philosophical and moral interest in the natural 
environment was not constant over time. It commonly gained in intensity at times in 
which profound changes in the broad cognitive and moral frameworks of orientation 
provided fertile ground for the emergence of new conceptualisations of the relationship 
between nature and culture. This is true of the Hellenistic era, whose authors created 
the notion of an idyllic place while they were exposed to the phenomenon of 
urbanisation in the metropoles they lived.15 It also applies to the Renaissance period, 
when a more critical view of religious affairs and the emergence of new modes of 
scientific and moral thinking provoked a reconsideration of humanity’s position vis a 
vis its natural environment. And it surely holds true for the latter half of the eighteenth 
century. In a world in which traditional forms of religious attachment and social 
solidarity were declining at a disquieting speed, geography and the natural environment 
at least seemed to offer some degree of stability, calm, and purity.
It was in this context that landscape became critical as a source of social 
orientation. Commenting on the significant rise of landscape art at the end of the 
eighteenth century, the German painter, Philip Otto Runge exhorted: ‘We stand at the 
brink of all the religions which sprang up out of the Catholic one, the abstractions 
perish, everything is lighter and more insubstantial than before, everything presses 
toward landscape art, looks for something certain in this uncertainty and does not know 
how to begin.’16 Furthermore, as politicised nature, particular landscapes evolved into 
integral parts of historicism’s search for national pedigrees, that other powerful 
movement which by the turn of the eighteenth century had come to form the 
centrepiece of most European nationalisms and national identities.17
Landscape symbolism and the study o f national identity
Given that the rise of nationalism in the late eighteenth century conspicuously 
reinforced the interest in geographical symbolism, it is somewhat surprising that, so far, 
little attention has been paid in the field of nations and nationalism to the conditions 
under which specific natural environments acquire significance in definitions of
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nationhood.18 On the other hand, scholars working in fields such as human geography, 
art history, or environmental history have recently made use of existing theoretical 
approaches to nationalism and national identification.19 Yet these theories have served 
these researchers as signposts to be passed rather than as springboards for the 
construction of new theories that deal with the question of how landscapes are valued in 
different historical and political contexts. Lowenthal (1995: 283) expresses this marked 
and apparently widespread reluctance to draw even tentative theoretical conclusions, 
when he accuses ‘[t]hose predisposed toward particular explanations of landscape 
attachments’ of misreading ‘ambiguous material’.
Despite the absence of appropriate theoretical tools for landscape analysis, three 
broad positions are discernible. Adherents of a ‘primordialist’ perspective view people's 
attachments to their natural surroundings as a manifestation of basic socio-psycho- 
logical needs, and as a phenomenon that is both universal and historically persistent. 
Basing their analysis upon a psychological reductionism, however, those taking this 
position are at a loss to explain why people's interest in landscape can vary significantly 
over time. Applying an explicitly descriptive approach, a second group of researchers 
are concerned mainly with the way depictions of landscape are regarded as reflective of 
national virtues, such as freedom, liberty, or independence.21 In contrast to the first two 
approaches, a third group of scholars emphasises the situational aspect by identifying 
the way in which the public role of landscape-symbolism is contingent on particular 
cultural and political contexts.22
Even though each of the three positions outlined above has something to 
recommend them, I believe that neither is satisfactory when it comes to analysing the 
possible causes of the changing currency enjoyed by geographical symbolism in 
definitions of nationhood. From a formal point of view, the authentication of a national 
culture entails two processes: the construction of continuity with a nation’s alleged 
ethno-historical past (historicism) on the one hand and the creation of a sense of 
naturalness (naturalisation) on the other. The two processes, while analytically 
separate, are mutually intertwined and reinforce each other in the reality of nation 
formation: Whereas references to significant features of the natural environment serve
285
to buttress a cultural community’s claims of continuity, the historicist curiosity for the 
collective past inevitably directs attention to significant features of the ‘homeland’. 
Broadly speaking, the fundamental role of both historicism and naturalisation has to do, 
in large part, with their preventing the historical and cultural contingency of modem 
nations from entering into the picture.23
The dialectic of landscape and nationhood: two typical scenarios
Nationalising nature
From an ideal-typical point of view, symbolic analogies between ‘landscape’ and 
‘nation’ can take either of two forms. The first can be termed the nationalization o f 
nature. What is characteristic here is that popular historical myths, memories and 
supposed national virtues are projected onto a significant landscape in an attempt to 
lend more continuity and distinctiveness to it. In this way, an image of national 
authenticity is developed in which a nation’s distinctiveness is seen to be reflected in a 
particular landscape. As a way of incorporating a particular landscape into the fabric of 
national identity, this ideological pattern acquired intellectual prominence in the mid­
eighteenth century (with some early forerunners, as already noted, in European 
humanist thought). From there, it quickly spread to the educated public as a whole.
In each of the three cases considered, this pattern of linking nature and 
nationhood prevailed up until the middle of the nineteenth century. In Switzerland, the 
breakthrough towards the nationalisation of Alpine nature came in the course of the 
eighteenth century, when the mountains ‘had ceased to be monstrosities and had 
become an integral part of varied and diversified Nature’24 and when, towards the end 
of the century, a cult-like enthusiasm was focused on the Swiss Alps in particular. 
Thanks in no small part to the works of Johannes Scheuchzer, Albrecht von Haller,
Jean Jacques Rousseau and an ever increasing body of foreign travel literature, the Alps 
increasingly became an important aspect of Swiss patriotism in the last third of the 
eighteenth century. The intellectual focal point of this rapidly progressing movement,
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the Helvetic Society (founded in 1761), presented the Alps as the true seat of Swiss 
virtues. The mountains of central Switzerland were regarded as the genuine scene 
where the Swiss Confederation had been founded and has experienced its golden age of 
the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.25
After the founding of the Swiss nation-state in 1848, the association of Alpine 
landscape and Swiss nationhood further gained in salience. In the latter half of the 
nineteenth century, the Alps became the most common icon on tourist souvenirs. 
Furthermore, in 1863, the Swiss Alpine Club was founded. Its declared aim was ‘to 
gain a better knowledge of our Alpine landscape, especially with regard to its 
topography, natural history and social implications’. Finally, Alpine scenery became a 
prominent feature in the works of some of the most renowned Swiss artists in the 
second part of the nineteenth century. The Swiss novelist Gottfried Keller, for example, 
in his novel, Der Griine Heinrich (first published in 1854), declared that ‘[w]ith the 
thoughtlessness of youth and childish age, I believed that the natural beauty of 
Switzerland was a reflection of historical and political merit and of the patriotism of the 
Swiss people: an equivalent of freedom itself.27
In the United States of America, both before and after the Revolution the aim of 
cultivating large (and, from the viewpoint of the settling population, uninhabited) tracts 
of land inspired successive generations of European immigrants. This pattern continued 
even as wild nature began to be mythologised in Europe in the late eighteenth century. 
To a much greater degree than in Switzerland, where a sturdy Alpine landscape 
remained somewhat at odds with the classical ideal of nature (and where the classical 
and romantic conceptions occurred in tandem from the late eighteenth century 
onwards), the belief in man having the upper hand over nature was salient in the United 
States through much of the nineteenth century.28 An Ohio newspaper report of 1817 
provides an illustration of this future-oriented ideal of cultivation and progress: 
‘Looking only a few years through the vista of futurity what a sublime spectacle 
presents itself! Wilderness, once the chosen residence of solitude and savageness, 
converted into populous cities, smiling villages, beautiful farms and plantations!’29 
Confirming this picture, Alexis de Tocqueville observed in 1831 that the ideal of the
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American settlers was not wild landscape, but its cultivation and transformation. He 
wrote: ‘[The Americans] are insensible to the wonders of inanimate nature and they 
may be said not to perceive the mighty forests that surround them till they fall beneath 
the hatchet.’ He thus concluded that what supplied the ‘American people’ with a sense 
of identity was ‘its own march across these wilds, draining swamps, turning the course 
of rivers, peopling solitudes, and subduing nature.
In Canada, too, the prevalent ideal (at least initially) was that of cultivation.
This specific preference was inspired by both utilitarian (gaining land for agricultural 
production) and biblical motives. Hence Kaufmann concludes that ‘for the Loyalists 
who founded English Canada, their new Canadian home was interpreted partly as a 
foreboding Wilderness, and partly as a new Garden of Eden’. Emulating the classical 
ideal first elaborated by civic humanists in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries,
‘English Canadians also expressed the traditional agrarian/biblical fear of wilderness
*7 1
depravity’. Explorers such as David Thompson, Samuel Heame and Alexander 
Mackenzie, for instance, in their travel journals of the eighteenth century, firmly 
subscribed to the view that man ought to reign supreme over nature. Consequently, they 
associated the wilderness they found in the Canadian Northwest with barbarity and 
desolation. The same holds true for some of Canada’s prominent writers of the early 
nineteenth century.32
But, as already indicated, the nationalisation of nature, though it formed an 
important ingredient in the national narratives of Switzerland, Canada, and the United 
States, was by no means confined to these two cases. We encounter it in the English 
discourse on landscape which ever since the nineteenth century -  at least in its 
dominant version of rural paternalism -  showed a preference for the tamed as opposed 
to the savage lands. Here the former was equated with stability, permanence and 
harmony, while the latter was associated with an anarchic order, exemplified by French 
and American republicanism.33 Writing in 1791, moreover, the English aesthetics 
theorist William Gilpin claimed a widespread preference in favour of the classical 
view, noting that ‘the idea of a wild country, in a natural state, however picturesque, is 
to the generality of people but an unpleasing one’. And he concluded with some
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apparent relief: ‘There are few who do not prefer the busy scenes of cultivation to the 
grandest of nature’s rough productions.’34
Similarly, in France, where Vidal de la Blache invented human geography as a 
scientific discipline at the end of the nineteenth century, landscape, for a time at least, 
was crucial as a means of defining national identity. As in England, if out of different 
motives, French geographers and historians depicted humans as having the upper hand 
over Nature rather than being determined by it. This neo-classical ideal of homo 
sapiens' capacity for creating a rational social order by transforming Nature was most 
cogently expressed in 1833 by Jules Michelet in his Histoire de France:
Society, freedom have mastered nature, history has rubbed out geography. In 
this marvelous transformation, spirit has won over matter, the general over the 
particular, and idea over contingencies.35
Naturalising the nation: the search for organic nationhood
This leads me to the second formal possibility of establishing a symbolic link between 
nations and their natural environment, which can be designated the naturalisation o f the 
nation. Resting upon a notion of geographical determinism, this perspective views the 
natural environment as doing more than expressing certain national virtues and 
characteristics. Instead, nature in general, and specific landscapes in particular, are 
depicted as forces of moral and spiritual regeneration capable of determining the nation 
and giving it a compact, homogeneous, unified form. Whereas the logic behind the 
‘nationalisation of nature’ is in accordance with that of the civic conception of 
nationhood, the ‘naturalisation of the nation* draws its inspiration from an organic 
ideal. Here the nation's characteristics appear to be determined by physical rather than 
social factors - the result being no less than a sense of ideological ethnogenesis. If 
anything gives the discourse about national identity in Switzerland, the United States 
and Canada its specific outlook, it is the fundamental role this second pattern -  the 
‘naturalisation of the nation’ -  came to play from the mid-nineteenth century 
onwards.36
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To be sure, in neither of these cases did this second mechanism come to replace 
the other, historicist-expressionist pattern -  the ‘nationalisation of nature’. There is 
ample evidence, however, that in each case, for reasons that I shall discuss below, the 
‘naturalisation of the nation’ began to dominate the discourse on national identity as the 
nineteenth century progressed. Of course, the concrete manifestations of this basic 
pattern were slightly different in each of the cases under consideration. So were the 
conditions that made the pattern become prevalent. But what remains significant -  and 
what tells us much about the problems of nation-formation faced by these societies -  is 
that the different currents belong to a common argumentative framework, much like 
variations on a single theme. To be more specific, it was a particular section of the 
national environment, in these cases, the Swiss Alps, the American planes, and the 
Canadian North, that was believed to be the major determinant of authentic nationhood. 
How can this be explained?
I can see three principal reasons why the ‘naturalisation of the nation’ came to 
dominate in these three cases. The first is related to the affinity between an ideological 
factor -  the spread of a romantic style of thought in the latter half of the eighteenth 
century, and a material factor, geography. Romanticism, as a doctrine and movement, 
was fundamentally a reaction to the Enlightenment (particularly in its French version). 
Where romantics of various provenances found common ground was in their opposition 
to the belief that society should be organized and structured according to general 
rational laws. The result was an alternative ethic and blueprint for the future, which 
privileged creative individualism and the growth of 'national character', which was 
seen as organic and natural, above the neo-classical ideals of universalism and 
regularity.38 This romantic current of thought had a huge impact on nineteenth-century 
nationalism. The concept of national character was embraced by national intellectuals 
and movements all over Europe, as well as on the North American continent. What is 
of particular relevance to this analysis, however, is that two developments emerged 
from the romantic style of thought:
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1. a search for natural analogies and natural determination, and
2. a preference for ’primitive' nature.
Hardly any country in the Western World remained unaffected by the new romantic 
narrative. Almost everywhere the educated strata became familiar with its most basic 
premises; and even if some embraced it with more fervour than others, few rejected its 
tenets altogether. Hence many began to perceive the world around them through a 
romanticised lens. And yet, the degree to which the ideal of ‘primitive’ nature was 
accommodated differed from country to country. One (and only one!) factor that 
determined this ideal’s appeal was geography. So while it is surely true that ‘What men 
see in Nature is a result of what they have been taught to see’,40 the potential for the 
reception of particular mental constructs varies from case to case. Those societies 
which disposed over a rugged and relentless nature like the Swiss Alps, or which 
possessed large tracts of harsh, inaccessible wilderness like the Canadian North, 
embraced the naturalisation of nation with special fervour.
The second reason why the definition of national identity in Switzerland, the 
US, and Canada showed a strong propensity towards geographic determinism must 
again be attributed, I believe, to the coincidence of a material and an ideal factor. In this 
case, the divergence between the nationalist ideal of ethno-cultural homogeneity and 
the polyethnic composition of the three societies provided the impetus behind 
‘naturalisation’. Polyethnic societies too have aspired to the nationalist ideal of 
homogeneity in terms of culture or ethnic composition, even if these aspirations have 
had to be realised in a pluralistic environment41 Hence while such societies could not 
do justice to the ideal of ethnic homogeneity and often took pride in their polyethnic 
composition and civic values, their intellectual strata quite frequently embarked upon 
projects of ideological ethnogenesis in order to fortify the national identities of their 
respective populations.
The third factor for the significance of naturalism in the three cases concerns the 
lack of a distinct (pre-modem) ethno-historical past. Thus this third factor applies to the
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United States and Canada, the two immigrant settler societies, while it has no relevance 
for the Swiss example. In Switzerland, the lack of ethno-cultural unity was the main 
cause of concern, while references to a long historical pedigree helped to foster a sense 
of organic nationhood. In the US and English-Canada such assistance was not 
available, which in turn provided a major incentive to forge nationhood via references 
to natural symbolism.
Subsequent sections demonstrate how the ‘naturalisation of the nation* operated 
in each of the three cases.
‘It is in the Alpine human being that we find common ground’: 
nature and Swiss nationhood
The challenge o f ethno-linguistic nationalism
As set forth in chapters 5 and 6, what posed a serious challenge to its conception of 
nationality was the fact that ‘ethno-linguistic nationalism* became dominant in much of 
Europe in the late nineteenth century. Originating in Italy and Germany, this form of 
nationalism rapidly gained in strength around 1870, when it came to be seen as 
somewhat of a normative prerequisite of national legitimacy and served as a fertile 
ground for the emergence of irredentist movements in both countries.42 When Nazism 
rose to power in 1933, its volkisch nationalism, with its markedly racial overtones, 
proved tantamount to a denial of the legitimacy of Switzerland’s polyethnic conception 
of nationality. It is therefore chiefly from the 1870's onwards that the ‘naturalisation of 
the nation’ came to predominate in Switzerland.
The realisation of the discrepancy between the Swiss conception of nationality 
and that of its neighbours quickly set in, and it manifested itself in a widespread 
perception that Swiss nationhood was underdetermined. Let me repeat a statement by 
the eminent Swiss historian Karl Dandliker, which typifies this viewpoint. Alluding to 
the challenge posed by ethnic nationalism, he declared in 1884 that ‘the Swiss people
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did not enjoy the advantage of their neighbours: being a nation in the true and literal 
sense of the word, that is to say, being an entity uniform in terms of linguistic and 
ethnic composition’.43 Dandliker’s statement does not represent a marginal view but 
forms part of a concern that was apparently widespread at the time, at least among 
liberal intellectuals and the political establishment. When, in December 1914, German- 
and French-speaking Swiss had clashed over conflicting sympathies towards the parties 
involved in the First World War, the writer Carl Spitteler -  in an emphatic call for 
national unity -  argued that in the present European climate Switzerland’s dual lack of 
ethno-cultural homogeneity and a strong centralist state were ‘elements of political 
weakness’.44
Faced with the challenge of ethnic nationalism, liberal intellectuals and parts of 
the state intelligentsia thus endeavoured to create a distinct national identity for 
Switzerland. Yet, given that ethnic and volkish conceptions of nationhood emphasised 
ethnic or racial homogeneity, the ‘nationalisation of nature’ (the conception that puts 
the thrust on national originality and distinctiveness) would have been somewhat 
deficient as an ideological response. In view of the challenge at hand, therefore, the 
‘naturalisation of the nation’, which can best be understood as a kind of ideological 
ethnogenesis, seemed the more appropriate response. But to arrive at a better 
understanding of why this particular reaction came to predominate, let us reconstruct 
the different stages of the overall response to ethnic nationalism.
The civic response
At first glance at least, the forging of a civic nationalism (the brand of nationalism that, 
by and large, had been dominant in Switzerland ever since the late eighteenth century) 
seemed to provide an appropriate antidote against the threat of volkisch nationalism. 
The most outspoken supporter of this ideological response in the 1870's was the 
Bemese professor of law, Carl Hilty. In 1875, he maintained that Switzerland was the 
perfect nation, and that it was her destiny to uphold a truly republican, voluntarist 
conception of nationality, based upon citizenship rights and political values:
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Not race or ethnic community, nor common language and customs, nor nature 
and history have founded the state of the Swiss Confederation.... What holds 
Switzerland together vis a vis her [linguistically more homogeneous] 
neighbours is an ideal, namely the consciousness of being part of a state that in 
many ways represents a more civilised community; to constitute a nationality 
which stands head and shoulders above mere affiliations of blood or 
language.45
But Hilty’s presentist conception of nationality, though widespread among liberal- 
minded intellectuals, did not reflect the dominant line of thought.46 Instead, a more 
popular brand of nationalism traced Switzerland’s civic present back to its pre-modem 
past. This rested on two pillars: first, upon the myths of liberation and foundation (in 
particular the legends of Wilhelm Tell and the Oath of the Rutli), as well as on 
memories of allegedly glorious events (especially the victorious battles against the 
Habsburgs in 1315 and 1386); and second, upon the values and institutions of the 
modem Swiss nation-state, founded in 1848.47 These two ideological dimensions, one 
inspired by legalist rationality and liberal-democratic ethics, the other by the emotive 
power of an ideological myth of descent, were at the heart of Swiss national identity in 
its most widespread form.
The Alpine response
Nonetheless, to some contemporaries, neither the purely civic conception of national 
identity nor its more popular historicist counterpart seemed sufficient as the sole basis 
of Swiss nationality. For instance, Johann-Kaspar Bluntschli (1808-1881), a moderately 
conservative intellectual and professional colleague of Hilty’s, clearly recognised that, 
held against dominant nationalist standards, Swiss nationhood was perceived as 
underdetermined. Around 1870 he maintained that, in view of current debates on 
nationality in Europe, and given that ‘the belief in the existence of a particular [Swiss] 
nation vis a vis the German, French and Italian nationalities’ had recently been severely 
contested, it had become necessary to convince the outside world of the organic 
character of Swiss nationhood. To achieve this, Bluntschli argued, a notion of
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nationality that was grounded on voluntarism and the institutions of the modem state, 
as Hilty had proposed, would not suffice. But neither, he maintained, would the 
reference back to the mythical past per se, even if it fostered the reproduction of 
historical memories of wars fought for independence and liberty in the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries.48 Instead, to buttress the claim for a distinct national identity that 
could stand up to the force of ethnic nationalism, a further element was needed. It is 
here that Bluntschli brings the Alpine landscape into play:
I am surprised that Hilty did not, besides referring to the influence of the 
political idea, seek assistance from the country’s nature to make the notion of 
Swiss nationality acceptable. For Switzerland’s landscape is indeed of a 
peculiar character. If the Swiss possess a particular nationality, then this 
feeling derives above all from the existence of their beautiful homeland....
There may well be Alps, mountains, seas and rivers outside Switzerland; and 
yet, the Swiss homeland constitutes such a coherent and richly structured 
natural whole, one that enables to evolve on its soil a peculiar feeling of a 
common homeland which unites its inhabitants as sons of the same fatherland, 
even though they live in different valleys and speak different languages 49
The spread o f the Alpine myth
The previous analysis has mainly focused on intellectuals, naturally the most vocal 
segments within any nation’s public sphere. However, the idea that the Alps formed the 
ultimate source of national authenticity, that they were capable of fusing different 
linguistic groups into a single, homogeneous nation was not confined, in fact, solely to 
the realm of scholarly and intellectual discourse. To be sure, until the middle of the 
nineteenth century, the Alpine ideal had been the special preserve of a relatively small 
but articulate group of intellectuals and members of the intelligentsia. By the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century, however, this doctrine had spread to ever-wider 
sections of the population. Indeed, between 1870 and the end of World War II the Alps 
were turned into a popular national symbol of the Swiss.
Even though it is difficult to grasp precisely how the Alpine myth spread from
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its intellectual producers to ever-wider sections of the public, there are numerous 
examples that suggest that it had indeed become part of the national consciousness by 
the turn of the twentieth century at the latest. This was favoured, first and foremost, by 
national festivals and rituals of various sorts. A great many Swiss men and women 
directly participated in such public national events, many of which were deliberately 
staged in an Alpine environment. Crucial among these were historical plays, which 
experienced a remarkable boom after 1885.50 Furthermore, Alpine and pre-Alpine areas 
provided the traditional geographical setting for military training courses, which 
provided a fertile ground for the forging of popular patriotism; and ever since the early 
nineteenth century, the great majority of Switzerland’s male population has had to 
contribute to these most prominent rituals of the modem nation-state. Of no less 
importance was a folk-song movement that had witnessed a rapid expansion since the 
latter half of the nineteenth century, thus helping to embed the Alpine myth in the 
hearts and minds of many Swiss.51 Likewise, Alpine symbolism played a cmcial role in 
the ideology of Geistige Landesverteidigung (spiritual defence of the country), 
manifested in the National Exhibition of 1939.52 In official pamphlets on display at the 
exhibition, the Gotthard was depicted as the mountain which -  by fusing four different 
linguistic groups into a culturally and spiritually united nation -  had enabled 
Switzerland to exist (see chapter 6).
The ideologies of the major political movements of the time were also replete 
with images of the Alps. During the two World Wars, the Liberal and Conservative 
parties in particular made frequent use of Alpine symbolism in their definitions of the 
Swiss nation.53 So did people with direct influence on the course of national education. 
The school inspector Jacob Christinger, to name but one example, in a much-noticed 
final speech at the National Conference of Teachers in Basel in 1884, presented the 
argument with unmistakable clarity:
It seems that linguistic and religious differences in particular form a barrier to 
the national education of the Swiss people, and some go even so far as to deny 
that our people possess a unified national character. We do not want to accept 
this delusion. We all gaze upon the same mountains, look back to the same 
heroic figures in our history, enjoy the same folk songs and are proud of the 
same rights and liberties.54
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Moreover, recent analyses of history and textbooks used in secondary education in all 
parts of the country have revealed that the Alps served as one of the major motifs in 
fostering national identity within the education system.55 Hence, in 1905, on the 
occasion of the 100th anniversary of Schiller’s death, the Verein fur die Verbreitung 
guter Schriften (Association for the Promotion of Good Books) launched a special 
edition of Wilhelm Tell, the drama in which the Alpine landscape around the lake of 
Lucerne figures so prominently and which had become part of the Swiss literary canon 
soon after its first publication in 1804.56
In the field of artistic production, painting stood out in terms of the attention it 
devoted to the Alpine theme. Already during the nineteenth century, with Alexandre 
Calame and Francis Diday, mountain painting ‘had come to represent the very 
embodiment of national art’ in Switzerland. But the peak of Swiss landscape painting 
was not reached until the turn of the century, in the form of the work of Ferdinand 
Hodler. In paintings such as Dialogue with Nature and Communion with the Infinite, or 
Eiger, Monch and Jungfrau above a Sea o f Mist, Hodler revived ‘the Romantic belief 
in the spiritual replenishment and uplifting experience to be derived from oneness with 
the grandeur of nature’.57 Hodler’s naturalistic paintings, wrote the art critic Hermann 
Ganz, added ‘an overpowering force and magnitude to the Swiss landscape, enabling 
Switzerland to stand out as an independent entity against the countries which surround
Plate 8-1: Ferdinand Hodler, Eiger, Monch und Jungfrau tiber dem 
Nebelmeer (1908), Oil on Canvas, Musee Jenisch, Vevey.
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Finally, in an age of quickly expanding popular travel (railways) and mass 
communications, tourist propaganda and newspapers were important vehicles for the 
dissemination of the Alpine myth. In an advertisement launched by the Federal Swiss 
Railway Company during the inter-war period, the beauty of the country’s rivers, its 
countryside and forests were described at length, principally to underline the 
predominance of Alpine symbolism. As the text pointed out, the Alps ‘encircle the 
country and thus delimit its space, defend and erect it, and elevate it’.59 In newspapers 
and pamphlets, too, the Alps figured prominently as one of the most frequently evoked 
symbols of national identity and unity. As described in October 1935 by a Zurich-based 
newspaper aimed at a lower middle-class readership:
We understand by Swissness a certain inheritance of spiritual and physical 
features which we find among the people as a whole between the Alps and the 
Jura throughout the centuries of our history to the present day. ... We are the 
only typically Alpine state in Europe. ... The Alps are our actual strength, for it 
is in the Alpine human being that we find our common ground.60
Plate 8-2: Charles Giron, Wiege der Eidgenossenschaft (1901), 
O il on Canvas, Bern, Chamber o f  the National Council.
The painting portrays the mountains around Lake Lucerne, 
thereby fusing Alpine nature with the 'historic heartland’ of the 
Swiss Confederation.
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‘The children of Israel in the wilderness’: landscape and American nationhood
Ambivalent attitudes to tradition and an obsession with progress
The lack of a long and distinctive ethno-historical past posed a problem for the 
construction of American nationhood. Thus, as a genuinely American brand of 
nationalism gained momentum in the wake of the Revolution, the past remained a 
problematic source of inspiration. One way of dealing with this difficulty was to 
emphasise the value of progress. In The Rights o f Man (1791), for example, Tom Paine 
described the past as tyrannical, and advised his contemporaries to look to the future 
instead of wallowing in nostalgia: ‘We have no occasion to roam for information into 
the obscure world of antiquity. The real volume, not of history but of facts, is directly 
before us, unmitigated by the errors of tradition.’61
E. L. Godkin, a journalist of Irish origin, wrote about the ‘new communities’ 
that were ‘springing up at the West every month’. As he continued describing his 
impressions: ‘They have no history, and no traditions. The great memories of the 
Revolution are far less potent swells in Iowa and Illinois than in Massachusetts. The 
West, in short, has inherited nothing, and so far from regretting this, it glories it.’ One 
of the consequences of the successive waves of westward expansion, he observed, was 
that these communities showed a ‘strong tendency to live in the future, to neglect the 
past*.62 William Cullen Bryant’s poem, The Past (1828), corroborates the observation 
that nineteenth-century Americans tended to detest rather than glorify the past. It begins 
with these lines: ‘Though unrelenting Past! / Strong are the barriers round thy dark 
domain, / And fetters, sure and fast, / Hold all that enter thy unbreathing reign.’63 
With a more obviously nationalist bent, George P. Marsh proclaimed in 1843 that it 
was in ‘the character of youthful and vigorous nations to concern themselves with the 
present and the future rather than with the past’. It was ‘not until the sun of their 
greatness’ was ‘beginning to decline’, he concluded, that ‘a spirit of antiquarian 
research is excited’.64
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Instead of trying to forge distinctive traditions and collective memory, then, 
many Americans in the post-revolutionary era developed a marked obsession with 
progress. In contrast to the past-oriented narratives of European patriots, Americans 
began to create a future-oriented civic religion. Alexis de Tocqueville’s suspicion, 
expressed in his Democracy in America (1840), that ‘Among a democratic people 
poetry will not feed on legends or on traditions and memories of old days’ 
corresponded, at least partially, with American reality.65 More than a century after de 
Tocqueville had made this observation, one of the leading scholars of American 
culture, Michael Kammen, argued along the same lines: ‘In many societies the force of 
tradition has served as a source of authority. But for much of American history the 
inhabitants of this continent clearly indicated that they did not want power to reside in 
pastness.’ ‘For most of the nineteenth century’, Kammen maintained further, that 
‘formal education gave short shrift to the past. American history remained very much a 
minor subject in the schools -  rarely a required part of the curriculum.’ 66
The late-nineteenth century historical revival -  and its limitations
Nevertheless, from around the mid-nineteenth century onwards, a number of ‘socially 
and politically prominent figures’ began to criticise the widespread obsession with 
progress.67 In 1876 Charles W. Eliot, then Harvard’s President, wrote: ‘I think we 
Americans particularly need to cultivate our historical sense, lest we lose the lessons of 
the past in this incessant whirl of the present.’68 The rise of American nationalism may 
partly explain the reinforced public interest in the past that was particularly apparent in 
late Victorian America: ‘People who formed societies for historic preservation justified 
their activities in terms of an obligation to the nation and to posterity.* This was 
manifested in ‘a newly institutionalized respect for the past’ as epitomised in music, the 
visual arts, and in the founding of museums and historical associations.69 Hence 
Kammen argues with regard to the period of 1870 to 1915: ‘Anyone who probes 
historical sources for this period will be figuratively assaulted by the nation’s arsenal of
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memory devices and by the astonishing diversity of its stockpile. ... Between 1861 and
7ft1907, American memory began to take form as a self-conscious phenomenon.’
However, despite this collective re-orientation towards history, the past 
remained an ambiguous and controversial source of national identity. In Michael 
Kammen’s words: ‘The history that followed 1789 presented two problems; it was 
potentially divisive, both morally and politically; and it verged upon the present, mere 
current events.’71 In addition, there was ‘a sense of inferiority’, particularly widespread 
among middle-class Americans in the nineteenth century, in the face of European 
history and culture.72
‘National character often receives its peculiar cast from natural scenery. . . '
While history remained problematic as a basis of nationhood, the natural environment 
seemed to provide a solution to the American quandary. To begin with, where historical 
references threatened to reveal connections with a European historical and cultural 
heritage, nature supplied a symbolic resource ideally suited to stressing what was 
distinctive and organic about American nationhood. Lowenthal thus concludes that 
‘[t]o many Americans the grandeur of their natural landscapes more than compensated 
for the lack of historical associations’. Even early m the mneteenth century, 
statements attributing a character-shaping role to the natural environment were not 
uncommon. The authors of such statements often insisted that ‘natural wonders and 
antiquities in the United States were superior to their man-made counterparts in the Old 
World.’74
American landscape painting provided a particularly powerful means of 
elaborating the ideology of American national exceptionalism. Many American 
landscape painters, along with their sponsors and admirers, shared the belief (expressed 
in the book Remarks made on a Short Tour, between Hartford and Quebec in the 
Autumn o f 1819) that ‘national character often receives its peculiar cast from natural 
scenery’.75 It is indeed a notable feature of American landscape painting of the 
nineteenth century that its creators, rather than being interested in nature as a universal
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phenomenon, portray it as a force capable of inspiring American patriotism. As an 
article in the Bulletin o f the American Art Union put it in 1848: ‘[I]t is not only nature 
that we want in our works of art, but it is our nature, something that will awaken our 
sympathies and strengthen the bond that binds us to our homes.’76
As expressions of American patriotism, landscape paintings soon developed a 
considerable appeal for the American middle classes. Art critics and other 
commentators urged the public to visit the exhibitions of the great landscape painters 
such as Thomas Cole (1801-1848), Frederic Edwin Church (1826-1900), Asher B. 
Durand (1796-1886), and Albert Bierstadt (1830-1902). Commenting on Durand’s 
painting Progress, which was shown at the National Academy of Design in 1853, a 
reviewer for the Knickerbocker described it as ‘purely American. It tells an American 
story out of American facts, portrayed with true American feeling by a devoted and
77earnest student of Nature.’ Another reviewer of art exhibitions wrote of Bierstadt’s 
painting The domes o f the Yosemite (1867): ‘We recommend our readers to go at once 
and see the work. They will feel that the world is progressing and the Americans are a 
great people.’78
A preference for wild nature
The most distinctive aspect of American landscape discourse in the nineteenth century 
was the frequently stated preference for wild landscape. American landscape, so we 
learn from hundreds of statements, was novel, untamed and wild. Americans came to 
see in the wilderness of their natural environment, in Mankin Komhauser’s words, ‘a 
symbol of the nation’s potential as well as the country’s history’.79
Two recurring themes characterised the landscape discourse of the nineteenth 
century. The first was a marked geographical determinism, embodied in the ideological 
mechanism I have called the naturalisation of the nation. In his Leaves o f Grass (1855), 
novelist Walt Whitman provided an evocative example of this: ‘The Largeness of 
nature or the nation were monstrous without a corresponding largeness and generosity 
of the spirit of the citizen.... His spirit responds to his country’s spirit.... He incarnates
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its geography and natural life and rivers and lakes’.80 The hugely popular historian, 
George Bancroft, seconded Whitman’s view. Referring to the mythical figure of Daniel 
Boone, he wrote: ‘At sixteen he went into the wilderness as a surveyor, and for three 
years continued the pursuit, where the forest trained him, in meditative solitude, to 
freedom and largeness of mind’.81 The second recurring theme in the landscape 
discourse was the tendency to depict the natural environment as a silent witness to great 
republican deeds. This mixing of naturalising and historicising narratives was no less 
prominent than the purely naturalising one. Painter Thomas Cole, in his famous Essay 
on American Scenery (1835), provided a typical example of this perspective:
American scenes are not destitute of historical and legendary associations -  the 
great struggle for freedom has sanctified many a spot, and many a mountain 
stream, and rock has its legend, worthy of poet’s pen or the painter’s pencil.
The preference for wilderness also became apparent in the visual arts. In American 
landscape painting a pure (in the sense of virgin) nature came to be seen as containing 
the essence of American nationhood. As Thomas Cole reflected in a markedly patriotic 
tone in the 1830s (at least two decades before naturalistic nationalism became a 
prominent feature of American public discourse): ‘[A]ll nature here is new to Art. No 
Tivoli’s, Mont Blanc’s, Plinlimmons, hackneyed and worn by the daily pencils of 
hundreds, but virgin forests, lakes & waterfalls feast his eye with new delights.’ In 
America, Cole proclaimed, the artist had the privilege of encountering nature in its 
pristine state, ‘untouched from the time of creation for his heaven-favored pencil.’83 
In addition, wild nature allowed artists to give expression to what was widely 
believed to be another distinctive feature of the United States: its dynamic and 
progressive spirit. Consequently, paintings celebrating the vastness of the American 
continent and the seemingly inexhaustible energy of its inhabitants were commissioned 
in great numbers. Hardly accidentally, the Niagara Falls were the most frequently 
depicted North American natural wonder in the nineteenth century. Two years after 
Frederic Church had completed his Niagara Falls (1857), a critic wrote:
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[Niagara is] perhaps the finest picture yet done by an American; at least, that 
which is the fullest of feeling ... If it is inspired by Niagara, it is grand and 
sublime; it is natural to the nation, since nature herself, has given the type.. ,84
Plate 8-3: Frederic Edwin Church, Niagara Falls (1857), Oil on Canvas, The Corcoran Gallery of 
Art, Washington D.C.
‘The frontier is the line o f most rapid and effective Americanisation ’
Historians of both the popular and academic variety were the key players in the 
development and popularisation of the myth of the American frontier and its role in 
shaping the American character. In the 1870s, for example, popular historian George 
Bancroft expressed the opinion that the colonisation of the American West cleansed the 
settlers of their European past, thereby advancing a process of Americanisation. As he 
put it in one of his typically forceful statements:
European men, institutions, and ideas were lodged in the American wilderness, 
and this great American West took them to her bosom, taught them a new way 
of looking upon the destiny of the common man, trained them in adaptation to 
the conditions of the New World, to the creation of new institutions to meet new 
needs...85
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It was the historian Frederick Jackson Turner, however, who made the most eloquent 
and influential contribution to the discourse about westward expansion and its impact 
on American nationhood. At a conference of the American Historical Association in 
Chicago in 1893, Turner presented a paper on The Significance o f the Frontier in 
America. His ‘frontier thesis’ (developed after the frontier of settlement had been 
closed in the 1880s) was soon to exercise an influence that went far beyond 
professional historians. It ‘quickly emerged’, according to one historian of the 
American West, ‘as an incantation repeated in thousands of high school and college
o r
classrooms and textbooks’.
In his analysis of westward expansion in the period 1800 to 1880, Turner 
assumed that it was the frontier experience that had shaped the American nation and 
lent the American people their characteristic pragmatism, inventiveness, individualism 
and dynamism. He believed in ‘the essential plasticity of man and society and 
demanded that upon them the environment exerted an irresistible and unseen 
influence’.87 Turner had been educated by a generation of teachers who believed in 
organic growth and were sympathetic to the ‘germ theory’: that is, the idea that the
O Q
virtues of liberty and individualism were related to Germanic ancestry. Reversing this 
argument, Turner insisted that it was not Teutonic ancestry, but the influence of the 
environment that had been responsible for the emergence of a genuinely American
O Q
character. On the first page of his famous essay, he conveyed his big idea in typically
concise fashion: ‘The existence of an area of free land, its continuous recession, and the
00advance of American settlement westward, explain American development.’
Turner did not create this resonant notion out of nothing. After all, for a great 
many Americans the frontier was lived experience, which to a large degree explains the 
great importance his treatise acquired in such a short time. Turner mobilised familiar 
symbolic codes such as the log cabin in developing a systematic theory of how the 
frontier experience had shaped the American character. As White observes: ‘Americans 
had recognized for generations the cultural utility of the frontier in their politics, 
folklore, music, literature, art, and speech. All Turner had to do was to tell Americans 
about the SIGNIFICANCE of this familiar frontier’.91 In his vision of American
305
nationhood, moreover, Turner tried to reconcile nature and progress, but the progress 
he envisioned ‘was achieved’, in White’s words, ‘by retreating to the primitive along 
successive frontiers’.92 It was the American wilderness, Turner argued, that
strips off the garments of civilization and arrays him [the American] in the 
hunting shirt and moccasin. It puts him in the log cabin of the Cherokee and 
Iroquois ... In short, at the frontier the environment is at first too strong for the 
man ... the outcome is not the old Europe, not simply the development of 
Germanic germs ... The fact is, that here is a new product that is American.93
Plate 8-4: Across the Continent: ‘Westward the Course o f Empire Takes its Way ’ (1868)
Painters like Cole and intellectuals like Bancroft and Turner, along with the poets and 
literary critics who would follow their lead, embraced wild American landscape as a 
symbol of national identity. Taken together, they formed a vocal group keen to exert a 
significant and lasting influence. Acting as ‘popularizers who made their views widely 
accessible’, they were largely successful in their endeavours. Initially the preoccupation
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of a small avant-garde of intellectuals and artists, the linking of nationhood with 
landscape imagery soon captured the popular imagination. This was accomplished, to a 
large degree, through the public education system. Nineteenth-century American 
schoolbooks were ‘speckled* with assertions about the character-shaping role of the 
landscape of the New World. Popular culture -  in the form of musicals, advertising, 
theatre, and so forth -  played an equally significant part in the dissemination of the 
West and the American frontier as icons of American identity.94
The ‘Northmen of the New World’: landscape and Canadian nationhood
The predicament o f Canadian national identity
Several authors have regarded a more-or-less permanent identity crisis as a 
characteristic feature of modem Canadian society. Most have attributed this to the 
hybrid character of the emerging Canadian nation-state. Lipset, in an influential 
comparison of Canada and the US, puts it thus:
The reasons for this uncertainty are clear. Canada is a residual country. Before 
1776, Anglophone Canadians possessed the same traits that distinguished other 
American colonists from the British. Then ... the new nation to the south 
developed a political identity formulated around the values set out in the 
Declaration of Independence ... There is no ideology of Canadianism, 
although Canada has a Tory tradition derived from Britain and is, like the 
United States, descended from a North American settler and frontier society.95
Yet this dual political inheritance -  American ‘Whig* liberalism on the one hand, and 
British ‘Tory’ conservatism on the other -  was but one dimension of the predicament of 
Canadian nationhood. The other was an emerging public culture that, while continuing 
to maintain close associations with the British symbolic heritage, was extremely 
receptive to American cultural trends. Kaufinann describes an ‘historical British- 
American dilemma’ that has accompanied (Anglo) Canadian attempts to forge an 
authentic national identity out of the toolkit of available symbols and values: ‘[A]n
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American folk culture revolving around a pioneering New World lifestyle and a British 
set o f myths, symbols and collective representations.’96 Unlike the French-Canadian 
nationalism of the 1820s, which could look back to a 200-year history of French 
settlement, English Canadians had no distinctive ethno-historical foundation from 
which they could construct an ‘authentic’ national identity.97
This problem was at the heart of English-Canadian identity from the time of the 
first Loyalist migration northward in 1784. Anglo Canadians lacked the cultural 
differentiae that could have allowed them to forge a distinctive national identity vis-a- 
vis their neighbours in the south, the Americans: ‘Most Loyalists spoke with an 
American accent, believed in liberal democracy and individualism, shared an 
“American” landscape and pursued a pioneering North American lifestyle.’98 At the 
same time, there was a clearly expressed loyalty to Britain. The retention of symbolic 
ties with Britain, while it certainly helped to differentiate English Canadians from their 
American neighbours, at the same time hindered the formation of a distinctly Canadian 
identity. Kaufinann has compared the difficulties faced by would-be nation builders 
among the English Canadians with the more favourable situation of their counterparts 
in French Canada and the United States: ‘Thus while movements toward liberal- 
democratic reform (including rebellion) in the United States and French Canada 
contributed toward ethnic self-definition, similar movements in English Canada led 
toward ethnic dissolution because Toryism was at the heart of English Canada’s 
Loyalist founding myth.’ Consequently, the English-Canadian nationalism that 
developed between Confederation and the end of World War I was based on a ‘new 
synthesis between loyalty and liberty’, between ‘Loyalist mythology and Britannic 
sentiment’, between widespread pride in being part of the British Empire and a newly 
developed myth of (Loyalist) ethnic election.99
‘Canadians loyal to their soil’: fortifying the national boundary
Natural determinism offered a potent remedy for a national identity that would 
otherwise have been -  at least from the standpoint of Anglo-Canadian nation-builders -
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hopelessly underdetermined. Hence when naturalistic nationalism rose to prominence 
in English-Canadian discourse in the later nineteenth century, its foremost function was 
that of establishing a symbolic boundary vis-a-vis both the United States and Britain. 
The project of fostering a distinct sense of Canadian nationhood gathered momentum 
after 1867, when the colonies of Canada East, Canada West, Nova Scotia and New 
Brunswick united to form the Canadian Confederation; and the first nationalist 
movement, Canada First, was founded in 1868. One of its protagonists, W. A. Foster, 
urged the citizens of the new Confederation to make a deliberate choice about their 
collective identity. ‘It is the duty of all Canadians’, he insisted, ‘whether by birth or 
adoption to recognize the pressing necessity for the cultivation of a national sentiment 
which will unite the people of the various provinces more closely in the bonds of 
citizenship’. The ‘surest means of cementing a confederation and securing political 
action in the interest of the whole Dominion’, he continued, was to ‘draw the line 
between Canadians loyal to their soil and those who place their citizenship in a 
subordinate or secondary position’.100
A theme that was already implicit in Foster’s statement -  the association 
through the ‘soil’, of Canadianness with loyalty to the natural environment or 
‘homeland’ -  was soon to become a part of all discussions about Canadian identity. The 
view that the wilderness and cold climate of Canada’s North constituted a force capable 
of shaping a distinctively Canadian character was to become the cornerstone of an 
increasingly powerful Anglo-Canadian nationalism. A particularly outspoken supporter 
of Canada First, Robert Grant Haliburton, expressed it thus in an address to the 
Montreal Literary Club in 1869: ‘We are the Northmen of the New World’.101 William 
Foster, inspired by Romantic nationalism and Darwinian theories of development, 
argued along similar lines as he sought to distinguish Canadians from Americans. He 
wrote:
The old Norse mythology, with its Thor hammers ... appeals to us -  for we are 
a Northern people -  as the true out-crop of human nature, more manly, more 
real, than the weak marrow-bones superstition of an effeminate South.102
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In the literary world, too, the subject of Canadian landscape rose to prominence in the 
late nineteenth century, freeing it from the predominantly negative connotations it had 
had prior to the founding of the Confederation. The Confederation School of poet- 
critics, for example, ‘enjoined Canadian writers and painters to head to the “cleanly” 
North, rather than to disport themselves to the jaded fleshpots of Europe’.103 William 
Douw Lighthall introduced an anthology of poetry entitled Songs o f the Great 
Dominion with the following words: ‘The poets whose songs fill this book are voices 
cheerful with the consciousness of young might, public wealth and heroism, ... through 
them ... you may catch something of great Niagara falling, of brown rivers rushing 
with foam, of the crack of the rifle in the haunts of the moose and caribou’.104 At about 
the same time, there appeared an increasing number of northern adventure novels, 
romanticising and glorifying life in the wilderness of the Canadian North, with the 
pioneering but lonely lifestyle of the trapper being portrayed as the embodiment of 
essential Canadianness.105
Plate 8-5: Tom Thomson, Northern River (1915), Oil on 
Canvas.
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This tendency to naturalise the Canadian North, first evident in the closing decades of 
the nineteenth century, persisted well into the twentieth. In fact, the trend reached a 
new climax in the context of the cultural nationalism of the 1920s. In addition to 
forging a symbolic boundary vis-^-vis the big republican neighbour to the South, this 
new cultural nationalism ‘sought to make a clear break with the British connection’.106 
The experience of World War I, which cost the lives of more than 60,000 Canadian 
soldiers, furthered the cause of a nationalist movement that encouraged people to 
detach themselves from existing imperial attachments and loyalties. Through 
movements such as the Canadian League, the Association of Canadian Clubs and the 
League of Nations Society in Canada, this cultural nationalism gained wider influence. 
It particularly appealed to ‘the small groups of young university teachers and 
professional men ... who established the Canadian Forum and debated public issues 
through its pages and who founded the Canadian League and later the Canadian 
Institute of International Affairs*.107
In the visual arts, too, the naturalisation of the nation gathered momentum in the 
opening decades of the twentieth century. One group of Canadian landscape painters 
who made a particularly significant contribution to the movement of cultural 
nationalism was the Group of Seven. Comprised mainly of Ontarian artists, these 
painters acquired legendary status during their own lifetimes. They first met in 1910 
and 1911, and in the 1920s began to exhibit together. The wild landscape of the 
Canadian North emerged as a leitmotif in the paintings of the group’s members, as the 
titles of some of their works clearly indicate: Terre Sauvage (A. Y. Jackson, 1913); 
Sketch for Northern River (Tom Thomson, 1912); March Evening, Northland (J. E. H. 
MacDonald, 1914). According to one Group of Seven painter, Canada was ‘a long thin 
strip of civilisation on the southern fringe of a vast expanse of immensely varied, virgin 
land reaching into the remote north. Our whole country is cleansed by the pristine and 
replenishing air which sweeps out of that great hinterland.’108 While their landscape 
paintings earned the scorn of the Imperial Canadian art establishment, ‘the group used 
this conflict to symbolise the tension between Canadian and British identity and 
became active propagandists for the cause of an independent Canadian cultural
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nationalism’.109
Not only among fellow cultural nationalists but also among the wider public, 
the Group of Seven and their works soon became famous. One expert on the movement 
has argued that ‘by 1938 [their] influence had spread to all parts of the country. In its 
own generation only a few resisted its hegemony’.110 F. A. Housser’s popular A 
Canadian Art Movement: the Story o f the Group o f Seven, published in 1926, described 
the importance of the Group of Seven in fostering a distinctive and authentic Canadian 
identity:
Our British and European connection, so far as creative expression in Canada 
is concerned, has been a millstone around our neck ... For Canada to find a 
complete racial expression of herself through art, a complete break with 
European traditions was necessary ... What was required more than technique 
was a deep-rooted love of the country’s natural environment... The message 
that the Group of Seven art movement gives to this age is the message that here 
in the North has arisen a young nation with faith in its own creative genius.111
Geography ‘assists by creating a unity o f race transcending Canadian pluralism
In addition to fortifying the boundary of Canadian nationhood vis-a-vis both Britain 
and the United States, references to the natural environment served the purpose of 
transcending the cultural pluralism that had characterised the Canadian Confederation 
since its foundation in 1867. More specifically, Anglo-Canadian nation builders had to 
come terms with the fact that in the geographical area of Quebec a predominantly 
French-speaking population had begun to settle early in the seventeenth century. With 
the fall of New France in 1763, moreover, ethnic consciousness among the French- 
speaking population was accentuated; and ‘by the 1820s a new middle class, sprung 
from the upper levels of St. Lawrence habitant society, fomented the first French- 
Canadian nationalism.’112 Kaufinann writes on how Anglo-Canadian nation-builders 
perceived this new situation: ‘The principal problem for the English-Canadian 
intellectuals who narrated Canadian identity was the French-English divide,
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geographically located just east of the Great Lakes.... By the 1820s, English-speakers 
formed a majority and believed themselves capable of assimilating the French.’113
For the most part, however, these attempts at assimilating ‘the socially cohesive 
French-Canadians’ clearly failed, and Canada’s first Constitution in 1867 ‘only served 
to confirm the fact that Canadian pluralism was here to stay*.114 At the ideological 
level, however, the persistence of a French-Canadian population with a distinct identity 
only reinforced an Anglo-Canadian nationalism in which the idea of a ‘northern people’ 
played a pivotal role. An Ontario newspaper, for example, lamented in the 1880s:
Are we forever to be jabbering about our respective merits as Englishmen, 
Scotchmen, Welshmen, French and Germans; as Irish Catholic and Irish 
Orangemen? We have heard a great deal too much of this stuff talked. It is 
time that all classes of our population, whether bom here or elsewhere, 
whatever their creed or country, should consider themselves, above all, 
Canadians.115
This Anglo-Canadian nationalism was inclusive insofar as it aimed at transcending the 
French-English divide. Nevertheless, like its Swiss and American counterparts it was as 
much ‘organic’ as it was ‘civic’ in terms of its inspiration and rhetoric. Its most vocal 
proponents portrayed Canadians (irrespective of their ethno-cultural origins) as 
members of a single people, and Canada as ‘a melting pot of French and British 
peoples’. Although certain values and lifestyle patterns were regarded as vital 
manifestations of ‘Canadian character’, their adoption was depicted as the inevitable 
result of forces outside the control -  and indeed even the awareness -  of Canadians. 
Specifically, Canadian nationhood was portrayed as determined by either history or the 
natural environment.116 Some believed the roots of this alleged national homogeneity to 
lie in the mists of pre-historical times. ‘There is no real or vital difference in the origin 
of these two [French and English] races’, argued F. A. Wightman in 1909: ‘back 
beyond the foreground of history they were one’. Similarly, the historian William 
Wood claimed that ‘many of the French-Canadians are descended from the Norman- 
Franks, who conquered England ... However diverse they are now, the French and 
British peoples both have some Norman stock in common.’117
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However, as in the American case if for different reasons, the pre-modem past 
was an ambiguous source of national inspiration. This was not the case with regard to 
the natural environment. Thus the belief that northern wilderness could accomplish the 
miracle of Canadian ethnogenesis soon came to capture the popular imagination. What 
is more, the theme of a northern melting pot retained its salience throughout the 
nineteenth and into the twentieth century. Painter Lawren Harris, a member of the 
Group of Seven, voiced a widespread attitude when he declared in the 1920s that
it is only through the deep and vital experience of its total environment that a 
people identifies itself with its land ... To us there was also the strange
1 1 0
brooding sense of another nature fostering a new race and a new age.
Nature and nationhood in the post-war era
The question that still remains is that of what was the role played by landscape 
symbolism in the post-war national discourse of Switzerland, the United States, and 
Canada. Although a detailed response to this question would require a chapter in itself, 
a tentative answer may nonetheless be suggested here. In sum, my argument is this: the 
view that the natural environment produces a certain ‘national character’ -  a view that 
raised few eyebrows throughout the nineteenth and into the mid-twentieth century -  is 
no longer prominent as an ideological device used in official speeches and political 
rhetoric.
The main reason, it seems to me, is that reservations about organic notions of 
community have gained ground in the anti-nationalist climate of the immediate post­
war era, at least in the West. Fostered by liberal intellectuals and spread to wider 
society via the education system, the view that societies are what people make of them 
rather than what ‘history’, ‘culture’ and ‘nature’ dictate has become prevalent. The 
result seems to be that mainstream politicians are now increasingly reluctant to use an 
overtly organic language for fear of being stigmatised as ‘right-wing’ or 
‘reactionary’.119 The discourse of multiculturalism, which has been salient since the late
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1970s as a critical response to xenophobic anti-immigration movements, has only 
served to further debilitate the appeal of organic notions of community, as has the 
process of European integration which has been accompanied by a decidedly civic 
rhetoric. (This is not to deny, of course, that organic conceptions of community 
continue to thrive in the rhetoric of xenophobic movements throughout Europe. The 
same is true of the ethnonationalisms promoted, for instance, by the Lega Nord in Italy 
or the Basques in Spain.)
Nevertheless, landscape imagery remained in general has retained significance 
as a self-evident symbol of nationhood after the Second World War. Particularly on the 
vernacular (as opposed to the explicitly ideological) level, the association of nationhood 
with nature is frequently made, partly because the appeal of categories such as ‘nature’ 
and ‘landscape’ is no longer confined to a privileged European elite (which was largely 
the case until the end of the nineteenth century). In the twentieth century, and 
particularly over the past fifty years or so, the natural environment (or rather: particular 
portions of it) has begun to capture the imagination of the masses. In Switzerland, for 
example, travel and tourism started to be enjoyed by the masses from the turn of the 
nineteenth century, and hence the Alps became an integral part of popular leisure 
culture. For Swiss pupils of primary school age the annual outing (Schulreise) became 
part of the curriculum in the twentieth century, and more often than not these journeys 
would lead into an Alpine environment. Hill walking, hiking, and skiing became 
activities that appealed to all sections of Swiss society. Most Swiss took the opportunity 
to practise these; and all, indeed, could see the mountains on a clear day, whether they 
lived in Zurich, Bern, Geneva, Lucerne, or Lugano.
But even in scholarly accounts of Swiss national identity, the Alpine landscape 
was assigned some role. In a much-cited book published in 1951, for example, the 
prominent Swiss historian Hermann Weilenmann argued that geography had in large 
part determined Switzerland’s character as a nation. More specifically, he maintained 
that the forms of co-existence that had emerged in the small Alpine communities of 
Central Switzerland had in large part shaped ‘the Swiss nation state as a whole’.120 The 
writer Elias Canetti, in his Masse und Macht, first published in 1960, argued that the
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mountains were the undisputed symbol of the Swiss nation.121 Even on the recent 
occasion of August 1, 1989, as the Swiss were celebrating their national holiday, state 
representatives made use of Alpine symbolism in stirring public feeling. Hence the 
President of the Swiss Confederation, Jean Pascal Delamuraz, delivered his official 
address to the nation from the Gotthard, the mountain that in the 1930s had acquired 
such significance as a symbol of Switzerland’s stand for independence and liberty.122
In the United States, the indications are that the narrative and symbolism of the 
American wilderness, the Wild West and the frontier have retained much of their 
significance (despite oppositional voices in an increasingly diverse society). This is true 
even of the ideological level. In the early 1990s, for instance, a controversy erupted 
over the meaning and importance of Turner’s frontier thesis. The controversy unfolded 
when a number of journalists for whom this thesis was indispensable for explaining 
American identity discovered that the ‘New Western Historians* had ‘relegated 
[Turner] to the periphery’. As Grossman concludes from this incident:
The frontier thesis in the minds of reporters, and apparently their readers, 
remains vital; it persists as the standard explanation of western and American 
exceptionalism. It remains so deeply embedded in a wider constellation of 
images about the West and the United States that the reporters regarded any 
questioning of it as radical and daring.123
The controversy was felt even more profoundly at the time of ‘The West as America’ 
exhibition at the National Museum of American Art in 1991. The historians responsible 
for the exhibition adopted a deconstructivist approach: that is, their aim was to convey 
to the visitors that many of the most cherished works on the frontier theme (including 
famous paintings, works of literature, popular histories, and so on) could best be 
understood as ‘ideological narratives’ rather than reflections of ‘how it actually was’. 
The reactions were mixed, to put it mildly, with some visitors dismissing the exhibition 
as perverse and two United States senators voicing ‘their outrage over the 
Smithsonian’s complicity in debunking our frontier’.124 Against the backdrop of such 
public reactions, a critical historian of the American West concluded on the 
significance of frontier symbolism and mythology for American culture and identity:
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Packed full of nonsense and goofiness, jammed with nationalistic self- 
congratulation and toxic ethnocentrism, the image of the frontier is nonetheless 
universally recognized, and laden with positive associations. Whether or not it 
suits my preference, the concept works as a cultural glue -  a mental and 
emotional fastener that, in some very curious and unexpected ways, works to 
hold us together.... In the late twentieth century, the scholarly understanding 
formed in the late nineteenth century still governs most of the public rhetorical 
uses of the word ‘frontier’.125
Post-war Canada reveals a similar trend to that of the United States, at least as far as 
Anglo-Canadian discourse is concerned. (It is highly doubtful that French-Canadians 
share the enthusiasm for the Canadian wilderness, given the roots of this particular 
narrative in a nation-building discourse aimed at transcending Canadian ethnic 
pluralism.) Writing after the Second World War, Arthur Lower claimed that ‘if the 
Canadian people are to find their soul, they must seek for it, not in the English language 
or the French’, but in the ‘unconquerable vastness of the north. From the land, Canada, 
must come the soul of Canada’.126 One literary critic went so far as to claim that ‘the 
Northern imagination’ was ‘[pjerhaps the most exciting creative force in contemporary 
Canadian fiction -  French and English ... Increasingly, our most perceptive novelists 
have shown that the Canadian imagination in many of its most original flights is
1 '57inspired by the North’. An even more pronounced variation on the same theme 
appears in a work by William Morton, erstwhile President of the Canadian Historical 
Association. In his Canadian Identity (1961), in a passage reminiscent in both style and 
tone of Frederick Jackson Turner’s writing on the American frontier, he asserted that
Canadian history began when the Vikings crossed the frontier of fish, fur and 
farm across the North Atlantic ... From that obscure beginning Canada had a 
distinct, a unique, a northern destiny. Its modem beginnings are not 
Columbian, but Cabotan. And when the French followed Cartier up the St. 
Lawrence, they were at once committed by the development of the fur trade to 
the exploitation of the Canadian Shield ... The Canadian or Precambrian 
Shield is as central in Canadian history as it is to Canadian geography, and to 
all understanding of Canada ... And this alternate penetration of the wilderness
317
and return to civilization is the basic rhythm of Canadian life, and forms the 
basic element of Canadian character.128
As recently as 1991, moreover, the author of an academic paper on ‘The Forest and 
Canadian Culture’ came to the conclusion that it was ‘geography which sets the tone of 
Canadian culture just as it sets the rules of our working lives and governs our economic 
relations with other countries’.129 Meanwhile, John Ralston Saul, a widely read essayist 
and novelist, fortified the boundaries of Canadian nationhood by bringing the theme of 
northern landscape into play. The following passage, written in 1997, provides a 
particularly succinct account of the role that the wild landscape supposedly continues to 
play in determining Canadian identity:
Our destiny is tied to the territory of which we are custodians -  that is, the 
northern half of the continent.. ..Not religion, not language, not race, but place is 
the dominant feature of civilizations ... In more temperate, central countries, 
place is eventually dominated ... [but] our on the margins, place is never 
dominated.130
Exceptional nations in search o f natural identity
Nation-builders in the polyethnic societies of Switzerland, the United States, and 
Canada faced a particularly challenging task because of their divergence from the 
norms of classical nationalism. When it comes to the construction of collective identity, 
anything that distinguishes one group from others can be used as a boundary marker. 
This is why national ideologues in these three societies began to elaborate the concept 
of civic exceptionalism. Particularly in the two republican nation-states, Switzerland 
and the United States (from the late eighteenth century onwards), and to a lesser extent 
in Canada (from the late-nineteenth century onwards), the belief in forming an 
exception to the general rule of nationalism took on a missionary character. However, 
the fact that the notion of civic exceptionalism was at times embraced with such zeal 
also reflects an ill-disguised uneasiness about ‘not being like them’.
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Hence my second point: being different from the norm in this manner also 
posed its own problems. Nationalism demands that nations are more than merely 
groups held together by the institutional framework of a state. Specifically, it demands 
that nations be ‘natural* communities, rooted in the ‘organic’ rather than simply based 
on the voluntary commitment of a citizenry. Measured against these criteria, polyethnic 
societies appeared hopelessly underdetermined. This is why the cultural and political 
elites -  who had to operate within the ideological framework of classical nationalism -  
endeavoured to anchor ‘their’ nations in the organic world. The outcome was a dual 
strategy: while fervently subscribing to the rhetoric of civic exceptionalism, these elites 
at the same time fostered an ideology of organic (not ethnic) nationhood. This they 
accomplished by claiming that their communities, too, were naturally determined rather 
than merely abstractions. More specifically, they claimed that a particular part of the 
natural environment -  the Alps in Switzerland, the West in the US, and the North in 
Canada -  had created a unique ‘national character’.
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Conclusion
Summary
The theories we select for our empirical analyses, and the results they tend to produce, 
are to a large degree determined by the cases we examine. In this study, Switzerland 
has provided the major case of analysis, and I do therefore not pretend that my 
conclusions necessarily hold for other cases as well. What I have attempted, however, 
and what I believe distinguishes this thesis from a conventional case study, is to 
broaden the reach of my arguments by adding systematic comparisons with other 
societies. I hope that by choosing this strategy, I have been able to make a general 
contribution to two debates. The first is the role of ethno-symbolic memory in modem 
nation formation. The second concerns the impact of civic and organic conceptions of 
nationhood on the reconstruction of national identity, particularly in polyethnic 
societies.
Ethno-symbolic memory and nation formation
The impact of ethno-symbolic memory on the construction of Swiss nationhood in the 
modem era was considerable. Forged in the wars against Habsburg Austria (1315 and 
1386) and the Reich (1499-1500), such a collective memory began to take shape in the 
Old Swiss Confederation from the fifteenth century onwards. Resting on the antithesis 
of ‘communalism’ and ‘feudalism’, it comprised three central myths: a myth of 
foundation (embodied in the myth of the Rtitli); a myth of liberation (expressed in the 
legend about Wilhelm Tell); and a myth of ethnic election, which simultaneously 
explained and justified the Confederate victories over the armies of the nobility. 
Sustained and reinforced by the parallel rise of a set of Confederate institutions -  the 
Diet, the ritual of the communal oath, and the special concordats -  this ethno-symbolic 
memory rose to prominence in the Old Confederation from the fifteenth century
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onwards. By the close of the seventeenth century, the myths of foundation and 
liberation had come to provide the constitutive narrative of Confederate self-identity. 
The Swiss Peasant War of 1653 underscores the popular resonance of the foundation 
and liberation myths in early-modern Switzerland and their capacity to inspire 
collective action against ruling authorities deemed oppressive.
The Confederate memory was not tantamount to nationalism or ‘national 
consciousness*. To interpret it in such a way would mean to read a modem 
phenomenon into earlier centuries, thus adopting the teleological view that is at the 
heart of national historicism. It is the late-eighteenth century patriots who must be 
credited with turning this memory into an early Swiss nationalism by fusing the core 
myths with the future-oriented political narrative of the Enlightenment. Initially, their 
project revealed strong universalist tendencies, with some of the founding members of 
the Helvetic Society arguing that the noblest form of patriotism consisted in a 
cosmopolitan love of humanity. From around the 1780s onwards, however, more 
emphasis was placed on the ethno-historicist conception of community and on what 
some patriots described as the virtues of ‘national character’. These included, above all, 
the republican values of simplicity and democracy, values that were portrayed as rooted 
in an Alpine natural environment. To the extent that the champions of national 
authenticity gained the upper hand, the notion of ‘noble patriotism’, although it was 
never completely abolished, was relegated to a minority faith.
The fusion of civic and ethno-historicist narratives that the patriots had 
accomplished supplied the basic framework for future national discourse. It was at the 
heart of both the republican nationalism of the first half of the nineteenth century and 
the public debates over national identity after the founding of the Swiss nation-state in 
1848. The socio-political conflicts that punctuated the period from 1798 to 1848 
favoured the emergence of a public sphere that further reinforced ‘the nation’ as an 
emotive and cognitive category. Yet while this progress on the level of public 
communication prepared the ground for an intensification of nation-oriented activity, 
the existing repertoire of myths and narratives continued to define the scope within 
which the national discourse took place. Both the republican nationalists fighting for
327
the creation of a modem nation-state and their conservative opponents justified their 
rival claims by referring to the same historical myths. The national festival of 1891 in 
Schwyz and the National Exhibition of 1939 in Zurich provided impressive 
manifestations of the resilience of the core myths and narratives that constituted Swiss 
ethno-symbolic memory.
Although this disposition to interpret the present by referring to the past cut 
across linguistic and religious boundaries, the historicist pattern adopted varied 
depending on political and cultural affiliation. The tendency to view the ‘national past’ 
in genealogical terms, for instance, was most notable in Catholic-Conservative circles 
and their mostly rural constituencies. These groups conceived of the protagonist of 
Switzerland’s gallery of myths, Wilhelm Tell, as an ancestor in the first, and an 
ideological role model in the second instance. Or to put it differently: they viewed Tell 
as a role model to be emulated because he was considered an ancestor. The republican 
nationalists, on the other hand, tended to interpret the founding and liberation myths 
primarily in terms of a source of moral and ideological inspiration. The inclination to 
‘read’ the core myths in ideological rather than genealogical terms, it appears, was most 
marked among the educated elites of the French- and Italian-speaking cantons.
The resonance of the ethno-symbolic memory rested on the fact that it was both 
constitutive (i.e. by furnishing actors’ worldviews) and constraining (i.e. by delimiting 
the scope open for national invention). To be sure, by interpreting specific myths and 
narratives in the light of new worldviews (e.g., the Enlightenment in the case of the 
patriots of the eighteenth century) and conditions (e.g., the threat of ethno-linguistic 
nationalism 1870 -  1939), the meaning of the former was partially transformed. 
However, the fact that, from the 1760s to 1939, the existing ethno-symbolic memory 
largely retained its significance as a framework of reference testifies to its considerable 
resonance. The continued appeal of ethno-historicism lay in the fact that it served two 
major purposes for the construction of national identity. First, it provided a source of 
moral inspiration, and a means of lending authority and legitimacy to the project of 
creating a Swiss state in accordance with Enlightenment ideals of rationality and good
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government. Second, the core myths functioned as a ‘particularise counterweight to the 
civic discourse of the Enlightenment, which was essentially universalist in its nature.
The comparison with Germany in chapter 7 has revealed that, where ethno- 
symbolic memory held little popular resonance prior to the take off of modem 
nationalism, a different pattern of nation formation was the likely outcome. Thus in 
Germany modem nationhood was mainly forged by nineteenth-century events (the wars 
against France and national unification). To be sure, in Germany, too, a stock of myths 
and narratives existed that had their origins in the pre-modem period. However, its two 
most prominent elements -  the legend about Arminius the Cheruscan, and the narrative 
of the German Kulturnation -  provided inspiration only to a small cultural elite. It was 
not until the wars against France had created a nation-centred discourse that 
transcended religious and regional boundaries that this toolkit of myths and narratives 
began to capture the public’s imagination.
Civic and organic conceptions o f nationhood
The second conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis is that there are no purely 
‘political’ nations, as the myth of civic exceptionalism would have us believe. 
Nationhood, to be feasible and sustainable in the long term, needs stabilising principles 
of the kind that Mary Douglas considers vital for the reproduction of institutions more 
generally. Institutions -  including the collective loyalties and identifications that 
constitute ‘the nation’ -  gain their legitimacy and thus stability from the ‘naturalisation 
of social classifications’. To quote again Douglas’ cmcial passage: ‘There needs to be 
an analogy by which the formal structure of a cmcial set of social relations is found in 
the physical world, or in the supernatural world, or in eternity, anywhere, so long as it 
is not seen as a socially contrived arrangement.’1
To be sure, for historical and structural reasons, political values and state 
institutions tend to acquire a particular significance in the national discourse of 
polyethnic societies such as Switzerland, Canada and the United States. However, the 
strong civic thrust that characterises the construction of nationhood in these societies
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should also be interpreted in functional terms: as an indispensable symbolic marker that 
served to accentuate what was held to be distinctive about one’s own national identity. 
However, for nation-building elites operating in an international system defined by the 
doctrines of classical nationalism, the sole reliance on civic nationhood posed 
considerable problems. The predicament consisted precisely in the fact that the civic 
conception of nationhood puts the main weight of emphasis on the voluntary and 
constructed nature of national identities. Civic nationalism brings to the fore the 
constructed and contingent nature of nationhood. What is more, in propagating the 
belief in civic exceptionalism, it literally glorifies the voluntary dimension of 
nationhood, depicting it as superior to the putatively parochial affiliations of language 
and ethnicity. My analysis has revealed, however, that these societies could often 
hardly conceal their unease about ‘not being like the others*. The missionary zeal with 
which the belief in civic exceptionalism was frequently embraced is thus in part a 
reflection of this insecurity.
But the civic conception of nationhood in itself, while it could adequately serve 
to render these nations distinctive, was unable to do justice to the criteria of cultural 
authenticity as defined by classical nationalism. Nations, according to nationalism’s 
core doctrine, had to be ‘natural’ communities. To be able to do justice to classical 
nationalism’s criteria of national authenticity, the national ideologues of these societies 
had to supply proof that their nations were organically determined rather than merely 
products of human will. Among the generally recognised manifestations of organic 
nationhood, shared language and a distinctive pre-modem past take pride of place.
From this nationalist point of view, therefore, nation-states that were not based on 
shared language, such as Switzerland and Canada, or those that lacked a distinctive pre­
modem past, such as Canada and the United States, appeared as inadequate.
Yet the nation-building elites of polyethnic societies, who saw it as their task to 
secure international recognition for their states, developed a particular awareness that 
an emphasis on human will alone was insufficient as a basis for national identity. In 
Switzerland, this predicament became most obvious when ethno-linguistic nationalism 
was on the rise from the 1870s onwards. This led to the adoption of a combined
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ideological ‘strategy’ of historicism and geographical determinism. Thus on the one 
hand, cultural and political elites pointed to the long historical pedigree of the Swiss 
nation. This long pre-modem past, they argued, was a testimony to the organic nature 
of Swiss nationhood. The (implicit and sometimes explicit) logic behind the historicist 
narrative was this: a national community like Switzerland that had developed over the 
space of several centuries was both natural and authentic despite of its lack of cultural 
homogeneity.
A second narrative, the adherents of which pointed to the identity-shaping role 
of the natural environment, reinforced this claim to national authenticity. Specifically, 
they emphasised that Switzerland’s Alpine environment had produced a unique national 
character. In Canada and the United States, where for obvious reasons the past could be 
of less assistance, the natural environment played the key role in attempts at rendering 
nationhood natural and authentic. This is true in particular of the later nineteenth 
century, when romanticist conceptions of community experienced a revival both in 
Europe and on the North American Continent.
Postscript
Have the twin engines behind the construction of national identities in the modem era -  
historicism and organicism -  lost their grip on the public’s imagination? Let me end 
with some admittedly impressionistic observations and speculative conclusions on this 
issue, drawn from recent Swiss developments.
The challenge to the late-medieval framework
As for historicism, there is evidence that a re-conceptualisation in the public perception 
of the Swiss past has been in the making since the 1970s.2 A new historical memory, 
promoted by a heterogeneous but increasingly influential coalition of cultural and 
political elites, has acted as the driving force behind this transformation. The profound
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novelty of the new historical memory lies in the fact that its proponents openly reject 
the temporal and geographical framework upon which the reconstruction of Swiss 
nationhood had hitherto been based. According to the view they adhere to, the history 
of the Swiss nation begins either in 1798, when the Helvetic Republic was established, 
or in 1848, the founding date of the modem Swiss nation-state. Allied to this is a 
geographical shift concerning the nation’s symbolic capital: it is not Catholic central 
Switzerland with its pre-modem mythical repertoire that is seen as the true cradle of 
modem Switzerland. The revisionist coalition re-allocated this honour to the mainly 
Protestant towns -  above all Zurich, Bern, Basle and Geneva -  the traditional 
champions, that is, of the liberal state-construction as it came into being in 1848.
Given that even the most resolute supporters of the liberal state between, say, 
1870 and the end of World War II did not question the late-medieval framework, this 
presents quite a radical departure. However, over the last three decades or so such 
concerns seem to have weakened considerably. The organisation of the festivities in 
commemoration of Switzerland’s 700th anniversary in 1991 is an impressive testimony 
to this change of orientation. Not only was the public debate leading up to the festival 
protracted: ‘Few countries engage in soul-searching of this depth when planning 
celebrations’, was the comment of one foreign analyst. As the celebrations revealed, 
moreover, the traditional focus on the late-medieval past (embodied in the founding 
date of 1291) had become controversial beyond the immediate realm of critical 
historiography.4
A major motive for discrediting the late-medieval past was the conviction that it 
had too often acted as the handmaiden for conservative, isolationist and therefore 
essentially selfish policies which had prevented Switzerland from playing a more 
constructive role in European affairs.5 This view surfaced again in the intense public 
discourse concerning the national celebrations that were held in 1998 all over the 
country. The year 1998 provided a threefold reason for national commemoration: 1848 
(the year when Switzerland was founded as a modem nation-state); 1798 (when the 
Helvetic Republic was established with the aid of French troops); 1648 (when Swiss 
independence was officially recognised in the Treaty of Westphalia).
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Surprisingly enough, each of these three dates received public attention, 
although 1848 was favoured by the Swiss parliament and most probably by the 
majority of Swiss citizens. Yet 1798 was favoured by a coalition of left-of-centre 
politicians, some intellectuals and those cantons that had lost their former status as 
subject territories thanks to the Helvetic regime. 1648, on the other hand, was favoured 
by a relatively small group of Catholic Conservatives for whom both 1798 and 1848 
symbolised the political dominance of the Protestant and Liberal cantons. The late- 
medieval past, on the other hand, received either little attention or was depicted in 
openly negative terms.
However, what this outlook on the state of post-war discourse about 
Switzerland’s national past suggests is not that the Swiss are currently witnessing the 
dead of historicism as a mechanism for the construction of national identity. What it 
indicates is that the reconstruction of national identity in which they are presently 
engaged marks a cultural shift of no small significance: the transformation of the 
traditional temporal and geographical parameters of Swiss nationhood. The result is a 
new historicism, one more in accordance with the liberal and critical public.
Fears o f ‘Uberfremdung ’
What about the second pivotal mechanism, organicism? Has the belief in organic 
conceptions of community faded as a result of globalisation and the pressures on 
national sovereignty deriving from European integration? As I argued at the end of 
chapter 8, organic rhetoric has become rare in the speeches of mainstream politicians of 
the West. At least in Europe, explanations of human behaviour as rooted in the physical 
world -  biology or the natural environment -  is no longer en vogue in view of the mass 
killings that have been committed in the name of racist worldviews. Switzerland is of 
course no exception to this general rule, although the natural environment to this day 
takes a relatively prominent place in conservative discourse about an allegedly ‘unique 
Swiss character’. Yet can we conclude from the decline of organicist rhetoric among 
the centre and left-of-centre parties that organic notions of community are no longer
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germane to how people define their national identities? The relative success of the anti­
immigration movement of the 1960s and 1970s and the rejection at the ballot box in 
1994 of a proposal to facilitate the acquisition of Swiss citizenship for young foreign 
nationals indicate otherwise. (Of course, similar trends against foreign immigration 
could and can be observed in other countries as well; yet the populist character of Swiss 
democracy brings out more clearly than a purely representative system ever could the 
attitudes and worldviews of the so-called ordinary men and women on the street.)
Fears of Uberfremdung began to be raised more frequently from the mid-1960s 
onwards, when Swiss society was confronted with a sharp increase of labour 
immigration, mainly from southern European countries. (The term Uberfremdung is 
hard to translate. Essentially, it refers to a scenario in which the authenticity of Swiss 
culture becomes undermined as a result of too much foreign immigration. An accurate 
but inelegant translation would be ‘over-foreignisation’.) Swiss right-wing parties 
decided to use the traditional Swiss weapon, the ballot-box, to solve the problem of 
foreigners. In the course of the 1970s, the Nationale Aktion, the Republican Party and 
other right-wing organisations tried either to set quotas on foreigners or to tax 
employers who engaged foreign labour. In addition, the supporters of these proposals 
demanded that only a relatively small number of foreign nationals be granted Swiss 
citizenship each year. The voters rejected such proposals on every occasion. 
Nevertheless, the first referendum, which took place in June 1970, was rejected by a 
mere 54% of the total vote. By October 1974, when the second referendum against 
foreign immigration was conducted, the no-votes had increased to 66%, and in the third 
referendum in March 1977 they had reached 71%.6 To be sure, by the end of the 1970s 
the concept of Uberfremdung had lost much of its significance as a cultural code in 
public discourse. This does not mean, however, that the political mobilisation against 
foreign immigration had not left its imprint on future legislation. Instead, a new 
strategy was adopted designed to prevent Uberfremdung through the double policy of 
discouraging immigration and cultural assimilation and social integration.7
What needs underscoring, moreover, is that the discourse of Uberfremdung was 
salient both in conservative circles and among supporters of the Social Democrats and
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the trade unions, although it was less prominent among liberal groups. In 1964, a report 
in a trade union newspaper painted a critical picture of apparently widespread feelings 
of resentment among the unions’ rank and file against foreign guest workers:
We are quick to criticise the discrimination of the blacks in the United States 
and are always ready to draft resolutions against the policy of apartheid in South 
Africa. Yet, shockingly, the xenophobia to which many of our colleagues 
adhere contrasts sharply with the hollow internationalism that many of them are
o
eager to display on every possible occasion.
As recently as 1994, moreover, the voters rejected a referendum which would have 
made it easier for young foreigners between the age of 15 and 25 who had spent five 
years in Swiss schools to become citizens by an accelerated (and cheaper) procedure. 
Both the main parties and parliament had overwhelmingly welcomed the proposal. The 
popular vote went 52.9% to 47.1% in favour of liberalisation but the vote by canton 
revealed that thirteen had voted ‘No*. The strongest opposition to the initiative came 
from the Catholic and rural cantons, while urban areas voted in favour of the proposed 
legislation. A second line divided the French-speaking cantons, which tended to be 
overwhelmingly in favour, and the German-speaking areas, which were either less 
decisive in their approval (the urban areas) or were clearly against the proposal (the 
rural areas). Commenting on the outcome of the referendum, the Neue Zurcher Zeitung 
noted sadly that
once again the vote showed how little in these matters the views of parliament, 
the large parties and organisations can predict the behaviour of the voters. One 
ought to add that the political leaders and party members did all too little for an 
enterprise that they must have known would not be automatically accepted.9
My admittedly impressionistic observations suggest that millennial hopes about the 
coming of internationalism may be premature. This is despite the undeniable force 
emanating from global capitalism and the project of closer European integration 
currently under way. Tom Naim got it just about right in the early 1980s:
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No one in his senses is going to deny the increasing interdependence of the 
global economy, the economic rationale of larger productive units and markets, 
the growth of state intervention, the role of multinationals, or any other fetishes. 
But no automatic, ‘logical’ rendition of these factors into political or historical 
internationalisation has in fact occurred. ... internationalism and nationalism 
are, in a curious way, perfectly twin ideologies. They are part of a single, 
overall, modem thought-world.10
Notes
1 Douglas (1987: 48).
2 The trend is discussed in Kreis (1993: 1-16).
3 Bendix (1994: 39).
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mediavistischer Ruckblick auf das Jubilaumsjahr’, Neue Zurcher Zeitung, February 22/23, 1992; 
Franciois de Capitani, ‘Als es die republikanischen Tugenden zu beschworen gait. Im Jahr der 700 Jahre 
Eidgenossenschafi sind auch die nationalen Feste nicht mehr ganz das, was sie friiher waren’, 
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5 On 6 December, 1992, the Swiss people voted against joining the EEA (European Economic Area) by 
the narrow margin of 50.3%. However, at cantonal level the majority voting against the initiative was 
much more clear cut.
6 The figures are quoted from Romano (1998).
7 Romano (1999).
8 Quoted from Romano (1999).
9 Quoted from Steinberg (1996: 126).
10 Naim (1997: 27,41).
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